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PETITIONER: SAHIB SINGH MEHRA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 22/01/1965

BENCH: DAYAL, RAGHUBAR BENCH: DAYAL, RAGHUBAR MUDHOLKAR, J.R.

CITATION:  1965 AIR 1451            1965 SCR  (2) 823  CITATOR INFO :  D          1972 SC2609  (16,20)

ACT: Indian  Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860), ss. 499 and  500- Publication  of statement defamatory of  Public  prosecuting staff  at  Aligarh  State Government  giving,  sanction  for prosecution  under  s. 198B(c) Code of  Criminal  Procedure- Whether  Aligarh Prosecuting staff a collection of  persons’ within  the  meaning  of Explanation  2,  s.  499-Considered whether remarks published for public good.

HEADNOTE: The   appellant  published  in  his  paper,  which   had   a circulation  mainly  in Aligarh, a statement to  the  effect that Public Prosecutors and Assistant Public Prosecutors had been receiving bribes. The   Public   Prosecutor  and  the  11   Assistant   Public Prosecutors  at Aligarh obtained the sanction of  the  State Government as required under s.    198B(c)   of   Code    of Criminal Procedure to file a complaint under s.   500 Indian Penal Code in a court of Sessions against the appellant  for publishing  defamatory remarks against the Assistant  Public Prosecutor   S,  of  District  Aligarh  and   other   police prosecuting  staff  of the Government in  respect  of  their conduct in the discharge of public functions. The  Sessions  Judge convicted the appellant  and  the  High Court dismissed his appeal against the conviction. It  was  contended on behalf of the appellant,  inter  alia, that  the  sanction  granted under s. 198B(c)  was  not  the sanction  contemplated  by  law because  it  was  a  general sanction  and  not  with respect to the  defamation  of  any particular Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor; for the purpose of an offence under s. 500 Indian Penal Code the  person  defamed must be an individual or  a  particular group  and  there  was no evidence  that  the  remarks  were defamatory of any particular group; that the prosecution did not  lead any evidence to establish that the  defamed  group had  any reputation which could be harmed; and that  in  any event the remarks were for public good. HELD  :  (i)  the  sanction  given  by  the  Government  was specifically  with  respect  to the  defamation  of  S,  the Assistant   Public  Prosecutor,  Aligarh,  and   the   other

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prosecuting staff of the Government and as such it could not be  considered a general sanction not contemplated  by  law. [826 H] The sanction given, could be taken to be sanction in respect of  the  defamation of the entire Prosecution staff  in  the State;  there was therefore no force in the contention  that the  Public  Prosecutor Was not competent  to  restrict  his complaint   to  the  defamation  of  S,  and  other   Public Prosecuting  staff  of  the  State  Government  at  Aligarh. Furthermore,  although the impugned article did not  contain any  express reference to the prosecuting staff at  Aligarh, the  offending remarks could properly be taken to  refer  to the prosecuting staff at Aligarh in the context of the paper being  a  local weekly and the other  circumstances  of  the case. [827 C-E] (ii) Explanation II to s. 499 makes it clear that there  can be  a  defamation  of an individual person  and  also  of  a ’collection of persons’.  Such a collection of persons  must be identifiable in the sense, that one could with  cartainty say  that  the  particular group had been  defamed  as  dis- tinguished from the rest of the community.  The  prosecuting staff  of  Aligarh, and even the prosecuting  staff  in  the State  of  U.P.  would  be such  an  identifiable  group  or ’collection of persons’. [827 G-H; 828 A-C] Supp/. 65-6 824 (iii)     The impugned remarks were per se defamatory of the group of persons referred to.  The tenor of the article  did not indicate that the purpose of the appellant in publishing these remarks was "public good". No enquiry could have  been started  by that Government on such a  publication  implying the  acceptance  of bribes by the  prosecuting  staff.   The impugned  remarks could lead readers to believe  or  suspect that  the Public Prosecutors were corrupt and thus  affected the  reputation of the prosecuting staff adversely.   Unless proved otherwise, the presumption is that every person has a good reputation. [828 E-H] The  lower  courts  were therefore right  in  rejecting  the contention  that the impugned remarks were  protected  under Exceptions  3 and 9 to s. 499 I.P.C. and in  convicting  the appellant. [829 B-D]

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 47  of 1963. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and order,  dated January  29,  1963 of the Allahabad High Court  in  Criminal Appeal No. 998 of 1962. M.   K.  Ramamurthi,  S. C. Agarwal, R. K. Garg  and  D.  P. Singh, for the appellant. Girish Chandra and 0. P. Rana, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Raghubar  Dayal,  J. Sahib Singh Mehra,  appellant  in  this appeal  by special leave, published an article in his  paper ’Kaliyug’  of Aligarh, dated September 12, 1960,  under  the heading  "Ultra  Chor Kotwal Ko Dante’ which  means  that  a thief  reprimanded the kotwal, a police officer, though  the right  thing would be the other way.  The article  contained the following expressions, as translated               "How  the  justice stands at a distance  as  a               helpless  spectator  of  the show  as  to  the               manner  in which the illicit bribe money  from               plaintiffs  and  defendants  enters  into  the

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             pockets  of public prosecutors  and  assistant               public prosecutors and the extent to which  it               reaches and to which use it is put."               The Public Prosecutor and the eleven Assistant               Public  Prosecutors at Aligarh  requested  the               Superintendent  of  Police for  obtaining  the               sanction  of  the  Government  for  filing   a               complaint  by the District Government  Counsel               in  the Court of the Sessions Judge  under  s.               500 I.P.C. The Government was duly  approached               through  proper channel and,  ultimately,  the               Home Secretary, U.P. Government, wrote to  the               Inspector General, U.P. on March 1, 1961 :               I  am directed to convey the sanction  of  the               State Government under section 198B(c) of  the               Code of                                    825               Criminal   Procedure  to  the  filing   of   a               complaint under section 500 Indian Penal  Code               in a Court of Sessions, against the Editor and               Publisher   of  the  Newspaper  ’Kaliyug’   of               District  Aligarh which published a news  item               under the caption ’Ulta Chor Kotwal Ko  Dante’               in   its  issue,  dated  September  12,   1960               containing  defamatory  remarks  against   the               Assistant  Public Prosecutor Sri R. K.  Sharma               of   District   Aligarh   and   other   police               prosecuting staff of the Government in respect               of  their conduct in the discharge  of  public               functions." Thereafter,  the  Public  Prosecutor of  Aligarh  filed  the complaint in the Court of Session, Aligarh, praying for  the summoning of the accused and for his trial according to  law for the offence under s. 500 I.P.C. The appellant admitted before the Sessions Judge the  publi- cation of the impugned article and stated that he never  had any evil intention.  He further stated that he had published the  news  item for the good of the public and that  he  had published  it in most general terms to bring bad  things  to the  notice  of the Government and the authorities  for  the public good. The Sessions Judge convicted him of the offence under s. 500 I.P.C. holding that the aforesaid statements in the  article were defamatory and that the appellant was not protected  by exceptions  3  and  9  to s. 499  I.P.C.  He  sentenced  the appellant  to simple imprisonment for six months and a  fine of Rs. 200.  His appeal against the conviction was dismissed by the High Court. Of  the points sought to be urged for the appellant, we  did not  allow one to be urged.  It was that there was no  proof that  the  Government  bad sanctioned  the  lodging  of  the complaint.   This  point had not been taken  in  the  Courts below  and  was not even taken in the petition  for  special leave.  What was urged in the petition for special leave was that one of the questions of law which arose in the case for consideration was whether the charge framed was the one  for which  sanction was granted or the requisite  complaint  was filed.   This  question  is very  much  different  from  the question  whether the Government did grant the  sanction  or whether  the granting of the sanction by the Government  had been duly proved in the case. The  other points urged are : (1) that the sanction  granted was  a  general  sanction  and  not  with  respect  to   the defamation of any particular Public Prosecutor or  Assistant Public   Prosecutor   and  that  such   sanction   was   not

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contemplated  by  law; (2) that it is not  proved  that  the appellant had any intention to harm the 826 reputation of any particular Public Prosecutor or  Assistant Public  Prosecutor; (3) that there was no evidence that  the remarks  were defamatory of any particular group;  (4)  that the prosecution did not lead any evidence to establish  that the  defamed group had any reputation which could be  banned and (5) that the remarks were for public good. Before   dealing  with  the  contentions  raised   for   the appellant,  we  may  refer to the provisions  of  law  which enable a Public Prosecutor to Me a complaint for an  offence under  S.  500 I.P.C. committed against  a  public  servant. Section  198  Cr.  P.C. provides inter alia  that  no  Court shall  take cognizance of an offence falling  under  Chapter XXI  (which  contains ss. 499 and 500  I.P.C.)  except  upon complaint  made  by some person aggrieved by  such  offence. Section 198B, however, is an exception to the provisions  of S. 198 and provides that notwithstanding anything  contained in  the Code, when any offence falling under Chapter XXI  of the  Indian Penal Code other than the offence of  defamation by  spoken words is alleged to have been  committed  against any public servant, employed in connection with the  affairs of  a State, in respect of his conduct in the  discharge  of his public functions, a Court of Session may take cognizance of  such offence without the accused being committed  to  it for  trial, upon a complaint in writing made by  the  Public Prosecutor.  It is thus that a Public Prosecutor can file  a complaint  in writing in the Court of Session directly  with respect to an offence under S. 500 I.P.C. committed  against a public servant in respect of his conduct in the  discharge of  his  public functions.  Sub-s. (3) of S.  198B  provides that  no  complaint under sub-s. (1) shall be  made  by  the Public  Prosecutor except with the previous sanction of  the Government concerned for the filing of a complaint under  S. 500 I.P.C. The sanction referred to above, in this case, and conveyed  by the Home Secretary to the Inspector-General  of Police,  was a sanction for making a complaint under S.  500 I.P.C.  against  the appellant with respect to  the  article under the heading ’Ulta Chor Kotwal Ko Dante’, in the  issue of ’Kaliyug’ dated September 12, 1960, containing defamatory remarks  against  the  Assistant Public  Prosecutor,  R.  K. Sharma,  of  Aligarh,  and other prosecuting  staff  of  the Government  in respect of their conduct in the discharge  of public  functions.  The sanction was therefore with  respect to  defamation  of two persons (i) R. K.  Sharma,  Assistant Public  prosecutor,  Aligarh;  and  (ii)  the  other  police prosecuting  staff  of Government of  Uttar  Pradesh,  which would  be the entire prosecuting staff in the State.   There was thus nothing wrong in the form of the sanction. 827 The  case did not proceed with respect to the defamation  of R. K. Sharma, Assistant Public Prosecutor, as such.  We may, however,  here  indicate  in brief  this  reference  to  the defamation  of  R.  K.  Sharma.   The  appellant   published sometime in May 1960 something which was defamatory of R. K. Sharma.   R.  K.  Sharma  filed  a  complaint  about  it  in September  1960.  The impugned article had stated, prior  to the   remarks  to  which  objection  has  been  taken,   the publication of the earlier article and the news reaching the Editor that R. K. Sharma was contemplating taking action  in a  Court of law and then expressed that the Editor  welcomed the  news  and would show how the bribe  money  reaches  the Public Prosecutors, how it is utilised and_how justice  sees all  this  show  from a distance.   The  Public  Prosecutor,

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however,  in his complaint, restricted it to the  defamation of  R. K. Sharma and other police prosecuting staff  of  the U.P. Government at Aligarh.  It is not possible to say  that he  was  not competent to do so, when the  sanction  by  the Government could be taken to be sanction for the  defamation of  the  entire  prosecuting staff in  the  State  of  Uttar Pradesh,  there  being  no such  express  statement  in  the article  as  to  restrict the imputation  to  the  staff  at Aligarh  alone and when the remarks could be properly  taken to be with reference to the prosecuting staff at Aligarh  in the context of ’Kaliyug’ being a local weekly and the desire of the Editor to make public all these matters in a Court in proceedings to be started by R. K. Sharma in view of certain matter published about him in an earlier issue of the paper. We therefore do not consider that the sanction suffered from any defect. The  next question to determine is whether it  is  essential for  the purpose of an offence under S. 500 I.P.C. that  the person   defamed  must  be  an  individual  and   that   the prosecuting  staff  at  Aligarh or of  the  State  of  Uttar Pradesh  could not be said to be a ’person’ which  could  be defamed.   Section  499  I.P.C.  defines  ’defamation’   and provides  inter  alia that whoever makes  or  publishes  any imputation  concerning  any  person intending  to  harm,  or knowing  or  having reason to believe that  such  imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in cases  covered by the exceptions to the Section, to,  defame that  person.  Explanation 2 provides that it may amount  to defamation to make an imputation concerning a company or  an association  or collection of persons as such.  It is  clear therefore  that there could be defamation of  an  individual person  and  also of a collection of persons as  such.   The contention  for  the appellant then reduces  itself  to  the question  whether  the prosecuting staff at Aligarh  can  be considered to be such a collection of persons as is contem- 828 plated  by Explanation 2. The language of Explanation  2  is general  and any collection of persons would be  covered  by it.    of  course,  that  collection  of  persons  must   be identifiable  in the sense that one could,  with  certainty, say  that this group of particular people has been  defamed, as  distinguished  from  the rest  of  the  community.   The prosecuting  staff of Aligarh or, as a matter of  fact,  the prosecuting  staff  in  the  State  of  Uttar  Pradesh,   is certainly  such  an  identifiable  group  or  collection  of persons.  There is nothing indefinite about it.  This  group consists  of  all members of the prosecuting  staff  in  the service  of  the Government of Uttar Pradesh.   Within  this general  group of Public Prosecutors of U.P. there is  again an  identifiable group of prosecuting staff,  consisting  of Public  Prosecutors  and Assistant  Public  Prosecutors,  at Aligarh.   This  group  of  persons  would  be  covered   by Explanation  2  and  could  therefore  be  the  subject   of defamation. We  have  not been referred to any case relating to  S.  499 I.P.C.  in support of the contention for the appellant  that the  Public Prosecutor and Assistant Public  Prosecutors  at Aligarh  could not form such a body of persons as  would  be covered by Explanation 2 to S. 499 I.P.C. The  impugned remarks are per se defamatory of the group  of persons  referred to.  It is no defence and it has not  been urged as defence-that the remarks were true.  The defence in the Courts below was that they were for public good and  the appellant was protected under Exceptions 3 and 9, of s.  499 I.P.C.  The tenor of the article does not indicate that  the

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purpose  of  the appellant in publishing these  remarks  was ’public  good’.   According to the  article.  the  appellant would have welcomed the opportunity that would be offered by the  case contemplated against him by R. K. Sharma, to  make public  the impugned matters.  His remarks  therefore  could have the tendency to dissuade R. K. Sharma from  instituting the  proceedings  for  fear of giving  greater  currency  to untrue allegations which be not favourable to him or to  the prosecuting  staff  at  Aligarh  or in  the  State,  and  by themselves  could  not render any public good.   No  enquiry could  have  been  started  by  the  Government  on  such  a publication  implying the passing of money from the  pockets of  certain set of people to the pockets of the  prosecuting staff.   The  impugned  remarks  could  certainly  lead  the readers  of the article to believe or suspect that the  pro- secuting staff is corrupt in the discharge of its duties  as public  prosecutors,  and  are  thus  bound  to  affect  the reputation  of  the  prosecuting  staff  adversely.   Unless proved otherwise, the presumption is that every person has a good reputation.  In this case, the                             829 Public  Prosecutor  and  Assistant  Public  Prosecutor   had deposed  that they are not corrupt, and according  to  their knowledge,  none at Aligarh, is corrupt in the discharge  of his duty.  There is no evidence to the contrary. Exception 3 to s. 499 I.P.C. comes into play when some defa- matory  remark  is  made in good faith.   Nothing  has  been brought  on  the record to establish that  those  defamatory remarks  were  made  by the appellant  after  due  care  and attention and so, in good faith. Exception  9  gives protection to imputations made  in  good faith  for  the  protection of the interest  of  the  person making  it  or of any other person or for the  public  good. The appellant has not established his good faith and, as  we have said above, the imputations could not have been said to have been made for the public good. We  are  therefore of opinion that the  appellant  has  been rightly  held  to have committed the offence  under  s.  500 I.P.C.  by  defaming  the Public  Prosecutor  and  Assistant Public Prosecutors at Aligarh. It  is urged for the appellant that the sentence  is  severe and  be  reduced  to  the  period  of  imprisonment  already undergone.  We do not see any justification for reducing the sentence.  The Press has great power in impressing the minds of  the people and it is essential that persons  responsible for publishing anything in newspapers should take good  care before   publishing  anything  which  tends  to   harm   the reputation  of  a  person.   Reckless  comments  are  to  be avoided.   When  one  is  proved  to  have  made  defamatory comments  with  an  ulterior motive and  without  the  least justification  motivated  by self-interest,  he  deserves  a deterrent sentence. We dismiss the appeal.  The appellant will surrender to  his bail. Appeal dismissed. 830