http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 11  

PETITIONER: SAHEBZADA MOHAMMAD KAMGAR SHAH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: JAGDISH CHANDRA DEO DHABAL DEOAND OTHERS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 21/04/1960

BENCH: GUPTA, K.C. DAS BENCH: GUPTA, K.C. DAS GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. WANCHOO, K.N.

CITATION:  1960 AIR  953            1960 SCR  (3) 604  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1963 SC 890  (12)  F          1967 SC 135  (13)  R          1973 SC2609  (22,26)

ACT:        Document-Construction  of-Discrepancy  between  earlier  and        later   parts-"   Duly  authorised  ",   meaning   of-Indian        Limitation Act, 1908 (IX of 1908), Explanation 11, s. 19.

HEADNOTE: In  1900 the then proprietor of the Dhalbhum estate who  was the predecessor-in-interest of the first respondent  granted a  permanent lease of the mining rights for  certain  metals and  minerals in the estate to one Prince Mohammad  Bakhtyar Shah.   During  the  lifetime of  the  said  proprietor  the management  of  the  estate was taken  over  by  the  Deputy Commission  of  Singhbhum under the  Chotanagpur  Encumbered Estates Act and after the former’s death the manager of  the Estate  granted  to the Official Receiver to the  estate  of Prince  Mohammad Bakhtyar Shah another lease in  respect  of mining  rights  in  the  same  area  in  1919.   The   first respondent commenced the present litigation for the  purpose of recovering rents and royalties on the basis of the second lease  from the heirs and representatives of the  estate  of Prince Mohammad Bakhtyar Shah and also from the appellant as the  Receiver  to  that Estate.  The decision  of  the  case depended upon the construction of the two leases of 1900 and 1919 and the Trial Court and the High Court decided the case in  favour of the plaintiff respondents.  On appeal  by  the contesting  defendant appellant on a certificate granted  by the High Court : Held,  that  the intention of the parties to  a  dispositive document must be gathered from the words used by the parties themselves and they must be presumed to have used the  words in  their strict grammatical sense.  If the statements  made in the earlier part of the document were irreconcilable with those made in the later part, the earlier part must prevail. In cases of ambiguity the court should look at all the parts of  the document to ascertain the intention of the  parties. If  ambiguity still remains, the Court should interpret  the document  strictly against the grantor and in favour of  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 11  

grantee. Under Exp. 11 of s. 19 of the Limitation Act the words  duly authorised  "  would include duly authorised either  by  the action of the party indebted or by force of law or order  of the court. Annapagonda  v. Sangadiappa, (1901) Bom.  L.R.  221  (F.B.), Rashbehari v. Anand Ram, 43 Cal. 211, Ramcharan Das v.  Gaya Prasad,  30 All. 422, Lakshumanan v. Sadayappa, A.I.R.  1919 Mad.  816 and Thankamma v. Kunhamma, A.I.R. 1919  Mad.  370, approved. 605 Currimbhai v. Ahmedali, 58 Bom. 505 and Lakshmanan Chetty v. Sadayappa Chetty, 35 M.L.J. 571, considered.

JUDGMENT:        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 81 of 1956.        Appeal from the judgment and decree dated September 24,1952,        of the Patna High Court in First Appeal from Original Decree        No. 2 of 1947, arising out of the judgment and decree  dated        August,31,   1946,   of  the  Special   Subordinate   Judge,        Chaibassa, in Money Suit No. 3 of 1941.        L.K. Jha, B. K. Saran, S. T. Hussain, S. K. Jha and K. L.        Mehta, for the appellant.        H.   N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India,        J.   C. Das Gupta and R. C. Prasad, for respondent No. 1.        1960.  April 21.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by        DAS GUPTA, J.--Dhalbhum estate which covers an area of  more        than  1,000  sq. miles and lies partly in  the  District  of        Midnapur and partly in the District of Singhbhum is rich  in        minerals.   In 1900 the then Proprietor of this estate  Raja        Satrughan Deo Dhabal Deo the predecessor-in-interest of  the        first  respondent Jagdish Deo Dhabal Deo  granted  permanent        lease  of the mining rights for certain metals and  minerals        in   this  estate  to  Prince  Mohammad  Bakhtyar  Shah   of        Tollygunge  in the District of 24-Parganas.  Raja  Satrughan        Deo Dhabal Deo died in 1916.  Before his death, however, the        management of the estate had been taken over by ’the  Deputy        Commissioner  of Singhbhum under the Chotanagpur  Encumbered        Estates  Act.  In the course of such management the  Manager        of the Estate granted on September 1, 1919, to the  Official        Receiver  to  the estate of Prince  Mohammad  Bakhtyar  Shah        another lease in respect of mining rights in the same  area.        The present litigation was commenced by the first respondent        with  a view to recover rents and royalties on the basis  of        the  second lease from the heirs and representatives of  the        estate  of Prince Mohammad Bakhtyar Shah and also  from  the        present appellant as Receiver to that estate.  As under  the        terms of the lease the lessor is entitled to the half  share        of the receipts on account of        79        606        rents  and  royalties and other incomes in  respect  of  the        minerals  demised  and the exact income could not  be  known        until  accounts were furnished by the lessee, the  defendant        prayed  for a decree for accounts from January 1, 1926,  and        for a decree for the sum found due on such accounts.  As the        suit  was  brought on August 12, 1941, the period  prior  to        August  12,1935, would prima facie be barred by  limitation.        According  to  the plaintiff, limitation was  saved  by  the        acknowledgments that had been made from time to time by  the        then  Receiver of the estate.  Two defences were  raised  by        the  Receiver  who was the only contesting  defendant.   The        first was that the lessor had dispossessed him from part  of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 11  

      the  leasehold  property  and so there  ought  to  be  total        suspension  of rents and royalties.  The second defence  was        as  regards  the claim for the period prior  to  August  12,        1935.  It was pleaded that the letters which are claimed  to        have  acknowledged  the liability did not in law  amount  to        acknowledgment of liability and that in any case the alleged        ackowledgments being by the Receiver who was an agent of the        court  and not an agent of the parties  the  acknowledgments        would be of no avail in saving limitation.        Though the written statement itself did not in terms mention        the nature of the lessee’s dispossession from the  leasehold        property  the  definite  case at the  trial  was  that  this        dispossession  was  in respect of minerals  which  had  been        specifically  excluded  from the earlier lease of  1900  but        according to the defendant included in the later lease.  One        of the main questions in the appeal is whether the  minerals        specifically  excluded in cl. 16 of the earlier  lease  were        demised  to the lessee by the later lease of 1919.   of  the        several  issues that have been framed we are therefore  con-        cerned now only with the two issues in respect of these  two        defences.   The  first  of  these is:  "  Is  the  defendant        entitled to suspension of rents and royalties as claimed " ;        the  second  is: " Is any portion of the  plaintiff’s  claim        barred  by  limitation?  " The Subordinate Judge held  on  a        construction  of the lease of 1919 that it did  not  include        minerals  specifically  excluded by cl. 16  of  the  earlier        lease and as the only        607        case  of dispossession from leasehold property was  made  in        respect  of  these minerals the plea of suspension  of  rent        must fail.  He also negatived the plea of limitation,  being        of opinion that the Official Receiver was competent to  make        such   acknowledgments   and  that  in   fact   there   were        acknowledgments  of  the plaintiff’s  liability  within  the        meaning of s. 19 of the Limitation Act.  With regard to  the        period  from 1935 to 1941., regarding which no  question  of        limitation  arose,  the Subordinate Judge gave a  decree  of        rendition  of  accounts and for payment of such  amounts  as        would  be found on accounting by the Commissioner.   On  the        basis  of  his finding that there was an  acknowledgment  of        liability  to the extent of Rs. 67,459-3-3 as due under  the        terms  of the two leases up to the year 1935 but that  there        was no material on the record to find out as to what was the        amount  due  up  to that year on the basis  of  that  second        lease,, he made an order -in the following terms:        "  The defendant is hereby directed to assess and state  the        amount  due under the lease in suit out of the said  sum  of        Rs.  67,459-3-3  on  the  basis,  of  the  accounts  of  his        office....  in  respect of the plaintiff’s dues  within  two        months from this date, failing which a commissioner will  be        appointed  to take accounts and ascertain the amount due  to        the  plaintiff,  and the defendant shall be liable  for  the        costs of the same."        Against  this decree the contesting defendant, the  Receiver        appealed  to the High Court of Judicature at Patna.   Before        the appeal court two points were raised.  The first was that        on  a  proper construction of the 1919 lease  it  should  be        found  that the minerals specifically excluded in clause  16        of  the  earlier lease were included in the 1919  lease  and        consequently,  the lessor having granted certain  leases  to        other  parties in respect of these minerals in the area  the        lessee was entitled to suspension of rents.  The other point        raised.  was that in law there was no acknowledgment  which,        could  save  limitation in respect of the  claim  prior  to,        August 12, 1935.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 11  

      608        Patna  High  Court  who heard the  appeal  agreed  with  the        conclusions  of  the Trial Judge.  On the first  point  they        held  that  the minerals excluded by clause 16 of  the  1900        lease were not included in the Second lease and so there was        no question of any suspension of rents.  They also held that        quite  apart  from  the  question  of  construction  of  the        document, the lessee was not entitled to suspension of rents        as  in order to justify witholding of the rents, the act  of        the landlord must be forcible or, at any rate, tortious  and        that  these  conditions  had not  been  established  in  the        present  case.  On the second question, the  learned  judges        held that the letters on which the plaintiff relied to  show        acknowledgments  by  the  Receiver  did  in  law  amount  to        acknowledgments   and  the  acknowledgments  being  by   the        Receiver  who was himself bound to pay the rent due  to  the        superior  landlord  were  good  acknowledgments  within  the        meaning  of s. 19 of the Limitation Act.   Accordingly  they        dismissed the appeal.        The  present  appeal has been brought by  the  con.  testing        defendant  the Receiver on a certificate given by  the  High        Court under Art. 133 of the Constitution.        Both  the defences raised in the court of appeal  have  been        pressed  before us.  The alleged dispossession on the  basis        of which the first defence of a right to suspension of  rent        is   urged  is  only  in  respect  of   minerals   mentioned        specifically in clause 16 of the earlier lease of 1900.   It        is necessary therefore to decide in the first place  whether        these  minerals mentioned in clause 16 of the earlier  lease        have been included in the second lease.  If as found by  the        courts  below they have not been so included no question  of        suspension  will  arise.  If they have been  included,  some        other questions of law and fact may have to be considered in        deciding whether the defendant’s plea of suspension of  rent        can  succeed.  While primarily we have to construe the  1919        lease to find an answer to the question indicated above,  it        will be necessary for that very purpose to refer to  several        portions  of  the  earlier lease of 1900.   The  very  first        clause  in  the operative portion of the 1900  lease  is  in        these words:-        609        "  That  you shall prospect, raise, purify,  melt  and  sell        gold,  silver,  copper, lead, zinc,  iron,  mercury,,  mica,        sulphur, copper sulphate, coal, chalk, redearth, etc.,  mati        slate  stone  and  all  kinds of  precious  stones  such  as        diamond, ruby, emerald, topaz, crystals, etc., lying on  the        surface  and  subsoil of Ghatsila otherwise  called  pargana        Dhalbhum,  mentioned  in  Schedule excluding  the  2  mouzas        Narsinghgarh  and  Ghatsila and the  Dibkulis  mentioned  in        Schedule below."        It will be noticed that this clause does not mention stones,        lime-stones,  ghuting  or ballasts.  Clause 6 of  the  lease        however  provided  that the lessee shall be "  competent  to        take  stones, lime-stones, ghuting and ballast which may  be        required for constructing buildings, bungalows and pathways,        etc.,  necessary for the aforesaid mining work free of  cost        and  rent."  Clause 16 of the lease  contains  some  further        provisions as regards these and is in these words :-        "  That by virtue of the aforesaid patta, you shall  not  be        competent to offer any obstruction either to me or to my any        authorised  person  to raise stones (used) for  utensils  or        stones,  lime-stone and ghuting, etc., for  buildings  which        are not covered by this patta and sell the same to me or  to        tenants, etc., under me to dig bandh, tank, canal and wells,        etc.,  but  the terms of the said patta shall hold  good  in

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 11  

      respect  of the underground minerals, etc., lying under  the        said wells, etc."        Two  things  that are abundantly clear  from  this  document        are:-(1) that the mining rights were specifically granted in        respect  of gold, silver, copper lead, zinc, iron,  mercury,        mica  sulphur, copper sulphate, coal, chalk,  red-earth  and        certain  precious  stones such as  diamond,  ruby,  emerald,        topaz,  crystals, etc., and (2) that stones for utensils  or        stones, limestones, ghuting, etc., and ballast for buildings        were  specifically  excluded from the lease.  By  the  later        lease of 1919 the lessor gave and the lessee obtained mining        rights  in  respect of certain minerals not granted  by  the        earlier lease.  The question is whether what was granted  by        the later lease included in addition to things which had not        been specifically named in the        610        earlier  grant  also  things  which  had  been  specifically        excluded  there.   The important portion  of  the  operative        clause of the later lease is in these words:-        "  In consideration of the rent hereby reserved and  of  the        covenants  and conditions hereinafter contained the  Manager        hereby grants demised unto the Receiver all and singular all        metals and minerals of whatsoever kind or description  other        than  those  specifically comprised in and  granted  by  the        principal lease.....................................        rights,  privileges and powers comprised in and  granted  to        the said Prince Mohammad Bakhtyar Shah by the said principal        lease  in  all  respects as though the  same  were  repeated        herein  so  far  as  they  do  not  contradict  any  of  the        provisions  herein  contained  and are  still  existing  and        capable of taking effect."        The covenant runs thus:-        Receiver covenants with the Manager that he will at the time        and  in the manner provided for in the said principal  lease        pay  the rent or royalty reserved hereby and will carry  out        and comply with all the provisions and conditions  comprised        in the said principal lease so far as they are applicable to        these  presents in the same manner as though they  had  been        inserted herein."        The  document contains next an agreement that  the  Receiver        shall be at liberty to grant under-leases subject to certain        conditions and provisions.  One of the conditions  mentioned        is--"  That  all such underleases shall be subject  to  such        special  terms  in  regard to specific minerals  as  may  be        prescribed  from  time  to  time  by  the  Government  Rules        relating  to  Mining  Leases and shall  be  subject  to  the        provision of clause 16 of the said principal lease."        The lease concluded with the words:----        "Provided always and it is hereby agreed that nothing herein        contained  shall  be deemed to show that the Pottah  of  the        tenth  day  of January one thousand and  nine  hundred  made        between  Raja Satrughan Deo Dhabal Deo, son of Gopinath  Deo        Dhabal Deo, deceased and the Hon’ble Prince        611        Mohammad  Bakhtyar Shah, son of Prince Mohammad Anwar  Shah,        deceased is not still valid and subsisting."        In  his  attempt to establish that by this later  lease  the        lessor granted a lease even of those minerals which had been        excluded specifically by clause 16 of the earlier lease, Mr.        Jha  has  arrayed  in  his  aid  several  well   established        principles of construction.  The first of these is that  the        intention  of  the parties to a document of  grant  must  be        ascertained  first and foremost from the words used  in  the        disposition  clause, understanding the words used  in  their        strict,   natural  grammatical  sense  and  that  once   the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 11  

      intention  can be clearly understood from the words  in  the        disposition clause thus interpreted it is no business of the        courts  to examine what the parties may have said  in  other        portions of the document.  Next it is urged that if it  does        appear  that  the later clauses of the document  purport  to        restrict  or cut down in any way the effect of  the  earlier        clause  disposing  of  property  the  earlier  clause   must        prevail.  Thirdly it is said that if there be any  ambiguity        in  the disposition clause taken by itself, the  benefit  of        that ambiguity must be given to the grantee, the rule  being        that all documents of grants must be interpreted strictly as        against  the  grantor.  Lastly it was urged that  where  the        operative portion of the document can be interpreted without        the aid of the preamble, the preamble ought not and must not        be looked into.        The correctness of these principles is too well  established        by authorities to justify any detailed discussion.  The task        being  to ascertain the intention of the parties, the  cases        have laid down that that intention has to be gathered by the        words  used  by  the parties themselves.  In  doing  so  the        parties  must  be presumed to have used the words  in  their        strict  grammatical  sense.  If and when  the  parties  have        first expressed themselves in one way and then go on  saying        something,  which  is  irreconcilable  with  what  has  gone        before, the courts have evolved the principle on the  theory        that  what once had been granted cannot next be taken  away,        that the clear disposition by an earlier clause will not  be        allowed to be out down by later        612        clause.   Where  there is ambiguity it is the  duty  of  the        Court to look at all the parts of the document to  ascertain        what was really intended by the parties.  But even here  the        rule  has  to be borne in mind that the document  being  the        grantor’s document it has to be interpreted strictly against        him and in favour of the grantee.        Bearing  these principles in mind we shall now  examine  the        1919  lease  to  perform  this  task  of  ascertaining   the        intention  of  the parties as to what was being  granted  by        this lease.  The disposition clause as has already been  set        out  is in these words:-" The Manager hereby grants  demised        unto  the Receiver all and singular all metals and  minerals        of   whatsoever  kind  or  description  other   than   those        specifically  comprised  in  and granted  by  the  principal        lease." On behalf of the appellant it is argued that if  the        totality  of metals and minerals in the area is  denoted  by        the symbol "X" and what was granted by the earlier lease  is        denoted  by the symbol "Y" the intention of the  parties  in        using the words set out above was that this lease should  be        in  respect  of "X" minus "Y".  We are afraid  however  that        this is an over-simplification of the problem which we  must        resist.   While it is true that strict grammatical sense  of        the words must be given effect to, words and phrases are not        used by people always and invariably in the same sense.   As        has often been emphasised by eminent judges the intention of        persons   using  certain  words  cannot  be  discovered   by        considering  the words in the abstract.  When in this  lease        the  grantor  used certain words, what we cannot  ignore  is        that when words set out above were used in the present lease        both the parties had present in their minds the fact of  the        principal lease.  They were not only well aware of the  fact        of  the  earlier lease but actually referred to  it  as  the        principal lease and repeatedly emphasised the fact that  the        terms and conditions of the principal lease in so far as not        contradicted  by  the present lease would remain  valid  and        effective.  One of the principal facts of that earlier lease

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 11  

      is  that  while some metals and minerals  were  specifically        granted   thereby  some  were  specifically   excluded,   In        interpreting the words of        613        the  disposition clause we have to take notice of  the  fact        that  no  reference is being made to that fact  of  specific        exclusion.   The question that arises for  determination  is        whether by this omission to make a specific reference to the        exclusion clause of the previous lease the parties  intended        that  the  exclusion  clause  will  have  no  effect.    The        appellant’s  argument  is that the necessary result  of  the        words  " grants demised unto the Receiver all  and  singular        all  metals and minerals of whatsoever kind  or  description        other  than  specifically comprised in and  granted  by  the        principal lease" is that the exclusion clause of the earlier        lease was itself being excluded.  While there is some  scope        for  that interpretation, if we do not look further, we  are        unable  to agree with the learned Advocate that it is  clear        and  unambiguous  that  by this reference  to  the  granting        clause  of the earlier lease and the words used  in  respect        thereof, the exclusion clause of the earlier lease was being        necessarily excluded.  There is in our opinion as much scope        for  arguing  that the exclusion clause not being  in  terms        referred  to would remain valid and active as there  is  for        the  appellant’s  argument  that  the  words  used  show  an        intention to exclude the exclusion clause itself.  In  cases        of ambiguity it is necessary and proper that the court whose        task is to construe the document should examine the  several        parts of the document in order to ascertain what was  really        intended  by  the parties.  In this much assistance  can  be        derived  from the fourth condition of the  conditions  which        were  imposed  by  the lease as regards the  grant  of  sub-        leases.   This condition provided inter alia that  all  such        under-leases to be granted by the lessee shall be subject to        the  provisions  of clause 16 of the  principal  lease.   In        other words, the sub-lessees shall not be competent to offer        any  obstruction to the head lessor or to any  other  person        authorised  by him to raise stone for utensils or stones  or        lime-stone  and ghuting, etc., for buildings and in  selling        the same.  Nor will he be competent to offer any obstruction        to  any  person authorised by the lessor in  digging  bandh,        tank, canal and wells, etc.  In terms this is a provision as        regards  under-leases only.  But the question which  springs        to the mind is: What could be the sense of 80        614        such a term being imposed in respect of under-lessees if  so        long  as  under-leases were not given,  the  lessee  himself        would  not  be bound by the provisions of clause 16  of  the        principal lease and would be competent to obstruct the  head        lessor in the several matier is mentioned in clause 16 ?  It        is  in  our opinion unthinkable that such a clause  as  this        fourth  clause would be included in respect  of  sub-lessees        unless  it  was also the intention of the parties  that  the        lessee himself would be bound by the provisions of cl. 16 of        the principal lease.  The view that this must have been  the        intention  is strengthened by the concluding words  of  this        lease  which  provide  in  substance  that   notwithstanding        anything  in  the later lease the principal lease  would  be        valid and subsisting.  Here also there would be no point  in        saying   that  the  principal  lease  would  be  valid   and        subsisting  as  regards merely the minerals which  had  been        specifically  ’granted by the principal lease.   As  regards        the  principal  lease  being binding  in  respect  of  those        minerals,  there  could  be  no  doubt  whatsoever  and  the        concluding clause of the 1919 lease would be unnecessary and

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 11  

      meaningless.   As regards the metals and minerals which  are        excluded  by  cl. 16 there might however be some  scope  for        argument  as  to what would prevail.  But  for  some  appre-        hension  in  the mind of the grantor perhaps on  account  of        clause  6  that there might be some scope of  difference  as        regards  the metals and minerals mentioned in el. 16 of  the        earlier  clause,  the  inclusion  of  this  clause  in   the        principal lease itself would perhaps be unnecessary.  It was        as a safeguard against that uncertainty that the  concluding        sentence of the later lease uses the words that we find.        It  appears to us reasonable therefore to hold that  of  the        two  meanings of which the words in the  disposition  clause        are capable, the meaning that the parties intended that  the        minerals  excluded by clause 16 of the principal lease  were        not covered by the present grant but would remain  excluded,        should be accepted.        We  have  so  long  not referred  to  the  preamble  of  the        document.  The relevant portion of the same which is of some        assistance  in  construing the document  before  us,  occurs        where the Manager mentions the        615        consent of the High Court as regards this later lease.        The passage runs thus:-        " Whereas recently certain disputes have arisen between  the        Manager  as  representing  the Estate of the  said  Sri  Sri        Satrughna  Deo Dhabal Deb, and the Receiver as  representing        the  estate  of the said Prince Mohammad Bakhtyar  Shah  now        deceased  with regard to the construction of  the  principal        lease  and  the minerals comprised therein, and  whereas  in        order to put an end to all such disputes and differences  of        opinion  and  for the purpose of preventing  litigation  and        consequent loss of both the said Estates it has been  agreed        by and between the parties hereto subject to the consent and        approval of the said High Court that the Manager shall grant        to  the  Receiver a lease of all minerals other  than  those        specifically mentioned in the said principal lease.  "        In the judgment of the Trial Court there is a statement that        the dispute which bad arisen as regards the construction  of        the  principal lease was whether a mineral known as  wolfram        was  included in the lease of 1900 or not.  The  correctness        of  this  observation in the Trial  Court’s  judgment  based        apparently  on  statements  made at the  bar  has  not  been        disputed before us. If that was the dispute then the  object        of  the  second lease was obviously to include  therein,  in        respect of the purposes of the granting clause of the  first        lease even those minerals which had not been included.  That        the dispute must have been of the nature, as the Trial Court        believes’ appears probable also from the use of the words  "        other  than those specifically mentioned " in the  preamble.        The dispute being on the question of what was mentioned  and        what was not mentioned in the granting clause, the object of        granting the second lease was that what had not so long been        mentioned  in the granting clause would also be included  in        such  grant by a supplementary lease.  The question of  what        had  been  excluded  was not in  the  contemplation  of  the        parties at all.  It is significant to note that there was no        evidence  that  before  the date of the  second  lease,  any        dispute had arisen as regards the operation of the exclusion        clause, viz., Clause 16.  A consideration of        616        the  preamble therefore further strengthens  the  conclusion        that  this later lease did not grant any mineral  rights  in        respect of what had been excluded by the principal lease  in        its 16th clause.        If  we interpret the disposition clause in the second  lease

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 11  

      in  this  way, as we think we must, there is  no  repugnancy        between  this clause and the later clauses and there  is  no        scope therefore for the applicability of the doctrine relied        on  by  Mr. Jha that if there be two clauses or parts  of  a        deed  one  repugnant to the other the first  part  shall  be        accepted and the latter rejected.  Nor is there any question        in  the present case of the words being  construed  strictly        against  the  grantor.   It is only if the  meaning  is  not        otherwise  clear that the courts would by recourse  to  that        rule  give the grantee something which he might not  clearly        have  received.  As however on a proper construction of  the        document  as  a  whole  we reach  the  conclusion  that  the        intention of the parties has been clearly established to  be        that  the  minerals excluded by clause 16 of  the  principal        lease will remain excluded from the later lease also,  there        is no scope of any benefit accruing to the lessee by  reason        of  the  rule that all deeds are to  be  construed  strictly        against the grantor and in favour of the grantee.        We  have  therefore come to the conclusion that  the  courts        below  were  right  in their conclusion  that  the  minerals        mentioned  in cl.16 of the principal lease were not  granted        by the later lease also.        The  appellant’s plea of suspension of rents based as it  is        on the allegation that the metals and minerals mentioned  in        el.  16  of the principal lease were covered  by  the  later        lease  must  therefore  fail.  We think  it  unnecessary  to        consider  in  this  appeal  the  question  whether  if   the        construction  which  the appellant wanted to  place  on  the        document  was correct the plea of suspension of rents  would        have been available to him and we express no opinion on  the        correctness or otherwise of the views expressed by the  High        Court  as  regards  the circumstances in  which  a  plea  of        suspension of rent can succeed.        There remains for consideration the question of   limitation        as regards the period of the claim prior to        617        August 12, 1935.  On this point the learned counsel for  the        appellant has advanced a two-fold contention before us.        In  the  first  place  he has  contended  that  the  alleged        acknowledgments  were conditional, the condition  as  stated        being  that  the  statements of account  enclosed  with  the        letters  which  are said to constitute  the  acknowledgments        must be accepted as correct.  In support of his argument Mr.        Jha  drew  our attention to the words used in  Exhibit  2(1)        dated   March  7,  1931,  which  typifies  the   nature   of        acknowledgments  in  the  other letters  relied  on  by  the        plaintiff.   This letter addressed by the Official  Receiver        to Raja Jagdish Deo Dhabal Deo is in these words:-        "Sir,        I have the honour to send herewith two statements of account        showing an aggregate sum of Rs. 4,993-6-1 as royalty due  to        the  Dhalbhum  Raj by the above estate from 1st  January  to        31st  December, 1930.  On your accepting the  statements  as        correct  a cheque for the said sum of Rs. 4,993-6-1 will  be        sent to you.        Besides  the  above,  there is lying to the  credit  of  the        Dhalbhum  Raj  the sum of Rs. 31,944-8-3 being  the  royalty        upto  the end of December, 1929.  I shall be obliged if  you        will  kindly let me know whether you are prepared to  accept        the same and on hearing from you I shall be glad to  forward        to you a cheque in payment thereof."        According to Mr. Jha the first statement as regards the  sum        of Rs. 4,993-6-1 due to the Dhalbhum Raj by the above estate        from 1st January to 31st December, 1930, was not a clear and        independent  statement of the dues but was made  subject  to

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 11  

      the condition that this was accepted as correct.   Similarly        he  argued that the statement in the next paragraph  of  the        letter  as  regards  the sum of  Rs.  31,944-8-3  being  the        royalty  up  to the end of December, 1929, was  also  not  a        clear  and independent statement of what is due but is  made        subject to the acceptance of the same.  That in our  opinion        is not a proper reading of what is stated in the letter.  In        the very first sentence of the letter the Receiver is saying        that a sum of Rs. 4,993-6-1 as shown        618        in the enclosure to the document was according to him due to        the Dhalbhum Raj for the year 1930 on account of royalty; to        this  he was adding a statement in the second sentence  that        as soon as this statement of dues was accepted as correct  a        cheque  in  payment  thereof would be  sent.   To  say  that        however was not to say that the earlier statement of what is        due is subject to the acceptance of the accounts.  The  idea        in  the  second  sentence  clearly  was  that  in  case  the        statement  of what was due was not accepted as  correct  the        matter will have to be decided by further discussion  before        payment  will be made.  This second sentence cannot  by  any        stretch  of  imagination  be  read as  a  condition  to  the        statement  made in the first sentence.  Similarly the  first        sentence  in the second paragraph of the letter  as  regards        the  sum  of Rs. 31,944-8-3 being royalty up to the  end  of        December, 1929, is, as we read the letter, made  independent        of  what  was stated in the following sentence and  was  not        subject  thereto.  The argument that  these  acknowledgments        were conditional acknowledgments has therefore been  rightly        rejected by the High Court.        The  second contention urged by the learned counsel is  that        in  any case an acknowledgment by the Receiver of an  estate        is  not an acknowledgment by an agent of the owners  of  the        estate " duly authorised in this behalf " within the meaning        of Explanation II of s. 19 of the Limitation Act, and so  is        not an acknowledgment within the meaning of s. 19(1) of  the        Limitation Act.        According  to the learned counsel " duly authorised in  this        behalf " in Explanation II of s. 19 means " duly  authorised        by the debtor " and does not include duly authorised by  law        or  by an order of the Court.  For this proposition  we  can        find   no   support  either  in  authority   or   principle.        Explanation  II to s. 19 of the Limitation Act in  saying  "        for  the  purposes  of this section  ’signed’  means  signed        either  personally  or by an agent duly authorised  in  this        behalf " has not limited in any way the manner in which  the        authority can be given.  The view taken in this matter by  a        Full  Bench  of  the Bombay High  Court  in  Annapagonda  v.        Sangadiappa (1) that " duly authorised " would include        (1)  (1901) Bom.  L.R. 221. (F.B.).        619        duly  authorised either by the action of the party  indebted        or  by force of law or order of the Court has been  followed        in  other  High Courts also (Vide: Rashbehary v.  Anand  Ram        (1);  Ramcharan  Das V.  Gaya Prasad (2)  ;  Lakshumanan  v.        Sadayappa  (3  ) and Thankamma v. Kunhamma (4)  and  in  our        opinion represents the correct state of law.        Mr.  Jha  has next argued that, in any case,  law  does  not        authorise the Receiver of an Estate to make  acknowledgments        of  debt due from the estate.  For this proposition  he  has        relied on a decision of the Bombay High Court in  Currimbhai        v.  Ahmedali  (5).   In  that  case  it  was  held  that  an        acknowledgment by an official assignee will not amount to an        acknowledgment by an agent of the debtor.  Though this  case        does not deal strictly with the case of a Receiver, Mr.  Jha

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 11  

      has  relied on the reasoning therein as supporting his  con-        tention.   Our  attention has been drawn by Mr.  Sanyal,  on        behalf  of the respondent to the fact that a  contrary  view        has been taken in Lakshmanan Chetty v. Sadayappa Chetty (6).        Mr. Sanyal has argued that in respect of a debt due from the        estate  the  Receiver  of the estate  fully  represents  the        owners  of the estate and that once it is held, as  it  must        be,  that  the Receiver had authority to pay the  debt,  Mr.        Sanyal   argues,   it   must  necessarily   be   held   that        acknowledgment  of  a debt as incidental to  the  Receiver’s        duties  in  respect  of the payment of the  debts,  is  also        within  his authority.  So, he argues that in every case  an        acknowledgment by a Receiver is an acknowledgment by a  duly        authorised agent of the debtor.        The  above is a brief indication of the arguments on  either        side  on  Mr.  Jha’s contention that  the  Receiver  has  no        authority to acknowledge debts on behalf of the Estate.   It        is  unnecessary for us however to decide for the purpose  of        the  present  appeal the question whether a Receiver  is  an        agent  of  the  owners  of the estate of  which  he  is  the        Receiver  for  the purposes of an acknowledgment of  a  debt        under s. 19 of the        Limitation Act.        (1)  43 Cal. 211.        (2)  30 All. 422        (3)  A.I.R. 1919 Mad. 816.        (4)  A.I.R. 1919 Mad. 370.        (5)  58 Born. 505.        (6)  35 M.L.J. 571.        620        In the present case the suit is based on the second lease of        1919 which was executed in favour of the then Receiver.  The        acknowledgments by which limitation is claimed to have  been        saved  is by a previous Receiver of the Estate through  whom        the  appellant who is the present Receiver has  derived  his        liability to pay the debt.  Section 19 is therefore in terms        applicable   as  the  acknowledgements  have   been   signed        personally  by those previous Receivers and no  recourse  is        needed  by the plaintiff to the second part  of  Explanation        11.  This position was indeed fairly conceded by Mr. Jha who        agreed  that in view of this it was not necessary for us  to        decide  whether  the Receiver of an Estate is by  that  fact        itself an agent of the owners of the estate duly  authorised        to make acknowledgments under s. 19 of the Limitation Act.        There can be no doubt that the acknowledgments on which  the        plaintiff  relies are acknowledgments within the meaning  of        s.  19 of the Limitation Act and save limitation in  respect        of  the period prior to August 12, 1935.  The  Courts  below        were  therefore right in rejecting the defendant’s  plea  of        limitation.        As both the contentions raised before us fail, the appeal is        dismissed with costs.        Appeal dismissed.