REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 527 of 2002

Sahdeo @ Sahdeo Singh …Appellant

Versus

State of U.P. & Ors. …Respondents WITH  

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 531 of 2002

Liladhar  …Appellant

Versus

State of U.P. & Ors. …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

1. The present appeals have been filed against the judgment and order of  

the Allahabad High Court dated 20.12.2001 passed in Criminal Contempt  

No.  69  of  1997,  convicting  the  appellants  for  not  complying  with  the  

directions  issued by this  Court  in  D.K. Basu Vs.  State  of  West  Bengal  

AIR 1997 SC 610, and sentencing them for six months’ imprisonment and  

also imposing a fine to the tune of Rs.2000/- each.  Further, direction has

been  issued  to  the  State  Government  to  terminate  the  services  of  the  

appellants after holding disciplinary proceedings.  

2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to the present appeals are that  

one Ramwati lodged an FIR dated 01.06.1997 in the Police Station Kotwali  

Ghaziabad with an allegation that her son Tej Veer Singh @ Pappu, a man  

of absolutely clear antecedents,  never involved in any criminal case, who  

was  running  a  sweet  mart  shop,  was  going  to  Allahabad  by  Prayagraj  

Express on 29.05.1997.  He was apprehended by Deep Chand, Sub-Inspector  

of Police, posted at Police Station, Sector 24, Noida and Constable Ramesh  

Chandra, posted in the office of Superintendent of Police (R.A.) Ghaziabad  

along  with  some  other  policemen,  from  Shyamal  Chauk,  Sibbanpura,  

Ghaziabad.  Tej Veer Singh was carrying a briefcase containing clothes and  

Rs.  40000/-  in cash apart  from the ticket.   At the time of apprehending,  

neither  the  reason for his  arrest  nor the destination,  where  he was being  

taken to, was disclosed to him.  His family members ran from pillar to post  

to  know  his  whereabouts  but  in  vain.   On  30.05.1997,  telegraphic  

information regarding abduction of Tej Veer Singh @ Pappu by police was  

sent  to  the  Senior  Superintendent  of  Police,  Ghaziabad  and  Inspector  

General of Police, Meerut Zone.   

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3. No action was taken on the aforesaid FIR, thus Smt. Ramwati, mother  

of  Tej  Veer  Singh  made  complaint  to  the  Senior  Suptd.  of  Police,  

Ghaziabad, Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India and the Chairman, National  

Human Rights Commission, New Delhi.  The case was registered only on  

04.06.1997 under Section 364 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter called  

IPC).   However,  no  progress  was  made  in  the  investigation.   Being  

aggrieved, a Habeas Corpus petition, being numbered as Crl. Misc. (Habeas  

Corpus) Writ Petition No. 20040 of 1997, was filed in June, 1997 by one M.  

C.  Verma,  being  next  friend  of  the  detenu  Tej  Veer  Singh  before  the  

Allahabad High Court.  In the said petition, allegations had been made that  

the respondent therein, Deep Chand, Sub-Inspector of Police and Constable  

Ramesh Chandra had detained Tej Veer Singh illegally since 29.5.1997 and  

his whereabouts were not known.   

4. As  the  High  Court  could  not  get  any  information  from  the  State  

regarding the whereabouts of Tej Veer Singh, the Court, vide order dated  

30.07.1997,  directed  the  District  Judge,  Ghaziabad  to  hold  an  inquiry  

regarding the allegations made in the Habeas Corpus petition.  The purpose  

of  holding  an  inquiry  was  to  find  out  as  to  whether  the  police  was  

responsible for his arrest and thereafter, his disappearance.

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5. The District Judge submitted his report dated 03.12.1997 wherein it  

was mentioned that  Yashpal,  the elder  brother  of  Tej  Veer Singh,  was a  

hardened criminal, and was wanted in large number of criminal cases.  The  

police  had taken away Tej  Veer  Singh alongwith  one Jagdish  Kumar  to  

know the whereabouts  of Yashpal to Murad Nagar Police Station,  where  

they were beaten up. However, no information could be gathered from either  

of them about Yashpal.  It was found that Jagdish Kumar was released by  

the police from its custody at 4.00 AM on 30.05.1997 but Tej Veer Singh  

remained  under  detention  and  still  remained  untraceable.   Sub-Inspector  

Deep Chand was the mastermind in abducting Tej Veer Singh and Constable  

Ramesh Chandra had participated in illegal detention.  Sub-Inspectors  R. P.  

Singh and Satya Veer Singh, who were allegedly participated in abduction,  

were exonerated.  However, Sahdeo Singh, Lila Dhar (appellants) and one  

Sujan Singh, Constable, were found to have participated in abduction.  Sub-

Inspector  Deep Chand,  had died in a  car  accident  on 20.08.1997.  After  

receiving the report from the District Judge, the High Court on 4.12.1997  

issued  notices  to  the  four  indicted   persons  initiating  proceedings  for  

criminal contempt suo motu.  Sujan Singh submitted an application before  

the  High  Court  that  during  the  inquiry  by  the  District  Judge,  no  

notice/opportunity of hearing was given to him.  The High Court asked the  

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District Judge, Ghaziabad to provide an opportunity of hearing to the said  

applicant-Sujan Singh and submit a supplementary report.  The said report  

was submitted on 10.07.1998 exonerating Sujan Singh from any criminal  

liability.  Sahdeo Singh and Ramesh Chandra submitted their replies to the  

said Show Cause Notices dated 4.12.1997.  Lila Dhar did not submit any  

reply.

As the whereabouts of Tej Veer Singh could not be known, the High  

Court disposed of the Habeas Corpus petition vide judgment and order dated  

20.12.2001  transferring  the  investigation  to  the  Central  Bureau  of  

Investigation (hereinafter called, “CBI”).  In contempt case, the Court came  

to the conclusion that taking the said Tej Veer Singh into custody, was in  

violation of the directions issued by this Court in  D. K. Basu (supra) and  

held all the three alleged contemnors guilty. Constable Ramesh Chandra was  

sentenced for six months’ imprisonment and a fine of rupees one lakh was  

imposed.  In addition,  Rs. 5000/- was imposed as costs.  The appellants  

were imposed the punishment of six months’ imprisonment and a fine of Rs.  

2000/- each.   Further direction was issued to the State  to terminate  their  

services after holding disciplinary proceedings. Hence, these appeals.   

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6. Sh.  Jitendra  Mohan  Sharma  and  Sh.  P.K.  Jain,  learned  counsel  

appearing  for  the  appellants,  have  submitted  that  the  High  Court  had  

committed  an  error  as  while  disposing  of  the  Habeas  Corpus  petition  it  

observed that Tej Veer Singh had died and, therefore, no purpose would be  

served in continuing with the Habeas Corpus petition.  There was not even  

prima facie evidence against the appellants in contempt proceedings. The  

court did not adopt the fair procedure. Even charges had not been framed.  

The enquiry conducted by the District Judge,  at the most, could be treated to  

be a preliminary enquiry.  The High Court  erred in placing reliance on a  

preliminary enquiry report and convicting the appellants without furnishing  

the copy thereof to them.  More so, the  contempt proceedings are quasi-

criminal  in nature.  The Court while deciding the criminal case  does not  

have  competence  to  issue  any  direction  affecting  the  civil  rights  of  the  

parties.   Therefore,  the  judgment and order  impugned is  liable  to  be set  

aside.   

On the contrary, Sh. R.K. Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the  

State  of  U.P.  and  Sh.  K.C.  Lamba,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  Smt.  

Ramwati, the mother of Tej Veer Singh, defended the impugned judgment  

and order contending that a fair trial had been conducted.  The appellant Lila  

Dhar did not even submit the reply to the Show Cause Notice issued by the  

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High Court.  Therefore, no fault could be found with the impugned judgment  

and order.  The appeals are liable to be dismissed.  

We  have  considered  the  rival  submissions  made  by  the  learned  

counsel for the parties and perused the record.   

7. The impugned judgment and the record of the case reveal that as no  

progress was likely to be made in the Habeas Corpus petition, the District  

Judge,  Ghaziabad,  was  directed  to  conduct  an  inquiry  in  the  allegations  

made in the petition and also taking note of the contents of the FIR dated  

4.6.1997 lodged by Smt.  Ramwati,  the  mother  of  Tej  Veer  Singh.   The  

District Judge submitted his report after recording evidence of the witnesses,  

particularly, the family members and friends of Tej Veer Singh,  and also  

hearing the appellants and other police officials. On the basis of the report  

submitted by the District Judge, the Habeas Corpus petition was disposed of  

vide Order dated 20.12.2001 presuming that Tej Veer Singh was dead.   

8. Section  108  of  Indian  Evidence  Act,  1872  (hereinafter  called  

‘Evidence Act’) provides for presumption of a person being dead in case he  

has not been heard of for seven years.  In the instant case, only a period of  

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4½ years had elapsed.  Therefore, we are not able to understand as under  

what circumstances, such a presumption could be drawn by the High Court.  

9. The proceedings of contempt are quasi-criminal in nature. In a case  

where  the  order  passed  by  the  court  is  not  complied  with  by  mistake,  

inadvertence  or  by mis-understanding of  the  meaning  and purport  of  the  

order, unless it is intentional, no charge of contempt can be brought home.  

There may possibly be a case where  disobedience is accidental. If that is  

so, there would be no contempt. (Vide  B.K. Kar Vs.  Hon’ble the Chief  

Justice and his companion Justices of the Orissa High Court & Anr.,  

AIR 1961 SC 1367).

10. Similarly,  in  Debabrata Bandopadhyay & Ors. Vs.  The State of  

West Bengal & Anr., AIR 1969 SC 189, this Court has observed as under:-

“A question whether there is contempt of court or not is   a  serious one. The court is both the accuser as well as   the judge of the accusation. It behoves  the court to act   with  as  great  circumspection as  possible  making  all   allowances for errors of judgment and difficulties arising  from inveterate  practices  in  courts  and tribunals.  It  is   only  when  a  clear  case  of  contumacious  conduct  not   explainable otherwise, arises that the contemnor must be   punished……… Punishment under the law of Contempt   is  called  for  when  the  lapse  is  deliberate and  in   disregard of one’s duty and in defiance of authority.  To  take action in an unclear case is  to make the law of   contempt  do duty  for  other measures and is  not  to be   encouraged.”

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The  same  view  has  been  re-iterated  by  this  Court  in  Aligarh  

Municipal Board & Ors. Vs. Ekka Tonga Mazdoor Union & Ors., AIR  

1970 SC 1767; Dushyant Somal (Capt.) Vs. Smt Sushma Somal &  Ors.,  

AIR 1981 SC 1026; M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar &  

Ors., AIR 1988 SC 127; Niaz Mohammed & Ors.  Vs. State of Haryana  

& Ors, (1994) 6 SCC 332;  and Manish Gupta & Ors. Vs. Gurudas Roy,  

(1995) 3 SCC 559.  

11. The  Constitution Bench of this  Court,  in  The State of Bihar Vs.  

Rani Sonabati  Kumari,  AIR 1961 SC 221,  held  that  the  provisions  of  

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for short ‘the Act, 1971’) deal with the wilful  

defiance  of  the  order  passed  by  the  Court.  Order  of  punishment  be  not  

passed  if  the  Court  is  satisfied  that  the  party  was,  in  fact,  under  a  

misapprehension as to the scope of the order or there was an unintentional  

wrong for the reason that the order was ambiguous and reasonably capable  

of more than one interpretation or the party never intended to disobey the  

order  but  conducted  himself  in  accordance  with  the  interpretation  of  the  

order.

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12. In  Sukhdev Singh Vs. Hon'ble C.J.S. Teja Singh & the Hon'ble  

Judges of the Pepsu High Court at Patiala, AIR 1954 SC 186, this Court  

placing reliance  upon the judgment  of  the  Privy Council  in  Andre Paul  

Terence Ambard Vs. The Attorney - General of Trinidad and Tabago,  

AIR 1936 PC 141, held that the proceedings under the Contempt of Courts  

Act are quasi-criminal  in nature and orders passed in those proceedings are  

to be treated as orders passed in criminal cases.

13. In  S. Abdul Karim Vs. M.K. Prakash & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 859,  

Chhotu Ram Vs. Urvashi Gulati & Anr., (2001) 7 SCC 530; Anil  Ratan  

Sarkar & Ors. Vs.  Hirak Ghosh & Ors. AIR 2002 SC 1405;   Daroga  

Singh & Ors. Vs. B.K. Pandey,  (2004) 5 SCC 26; and  All India Anna  

Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam  Vs.  L.K. Tripathi & Ors. AIR 2009 SC  

1314,  this  Court  held  that  burden  and  standard  of  proof  in  contempt  

proceedings, being quasi-criminal in nature, is the standard of proof required  

in criminal proceedings, for the reason that contempt proceedings are quasi-

criminal in nature.

Similarly, in Mrityunjoy Das & Anr. Vs. Sayed Hasibur Rahaman  

& Ors., AIR 2001 SC 1293, this Court placing reliance upon a large number  

of its earlier judgments, including,  V.G. Nigam & Ors. Vs. Kedar Nath  

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Gupta & Anr., AIR 1992 SC 215; and Murray & Co. Vs. Ashok Kumar  

Newatia & Ors., AIR 2000 SC 833, held that jurisdiction of the contempt  

has been conferred on the Court to punish an offender for his contemptuous  

conduct  or  obstruction  to  the  majesty  of  law,  but  in  the  case  of  quasi-

criminal in nature, charges have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and  

alleged contemnor becomes entitled to the benefit of doubt. It would be very  

hazardous  to  impose  sentence  in  contempt  proceedings  on  some  

probabilities.

14. In  Dr. L.P. Misra  Vs. State of U.P. AIR 1998 SC 3337, this Court  

dealt with an untoward incident  i.e. ex-facie contempt in Allahabad High  

Court wherein, the High Court passed certain orders without following the  

procedure  prescribed  in  the  Rules  applicable  in  such  proceedings.   This  

Court  held  that  power  of  the  High Court  even under  Article  215 of  the  

Constitution has to be exercised in accordance with the procedure prescribed  

by law.  The Court observed as under :

“12. ……… we are of the opinion that the Court while   passing  the  impugned  order  had  not  followed  the  procedure prescribed by law.  It  is  true that  the High  Court  can  invoke  powers  and  jurisdiction  vested  in  it   under Article 215 of the Constitution of India but such a  jurisdiction has to be exercised in accordance with the  

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procedure prescribed by law. It is in these circumstances   the  impugned  order  cannot  be  sustained.”  (Emphasis   supplied)     

15. In  Three Cheers Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. Vs. C.E.S.C. Ltd. AIR  

2009 SC 735, this Court held that in contempt proceedings the court must  

conclude  the  trial  and complete  the  proceedings  “in  accordance  with  the  

procedure prescribed by law”.  However, for enforcing the order passed by  

the Court “a roving enquiry is not permissible”.  The  proceedings had to be  

completed  most  expeditiously  and  the  court  has  to  permit  the  parties  to  

cross-examine the witnesses to enable the court to reach a particular finding.  

16. The  Court  should  not  punish  an  alleged  contemnor  without  any  

foundation merely on conjectures and surmises in criminal contempt. (Vide  

T.R. Dhananjaya Vs. J. Vasudevan, AIR 1996 SC 302; Afzal & Anr. Vs.  

State  of  Haryana  &  Ors, AIR  1996  SC  2326;  Contemnor:  In  re,  

Arundhati Roy, AIR 2002 SC 1375; Prem Surana Vs. Additional Munsif  

&  Judicial  Magistrate, AIR  2002  SC  2956;  Radha  Mohan  Lal  Vs.  

Rajasthan High Court AIR 2003 SC 1467; and S.R. Ramaraj Vs. Special  

Court, Bombay, AIR 2003 SC 3039).

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17. In R.K. Anand Vs.  Registrar, Delhi High Court (2009) 8 SCC 106,  

this Court while dealing with the same issue held as under:

“140. ………Now, it is one thing to say that the standard  of  proof  in a contempt proceeding is  no less rigorous  than  a  criminal  trial  but  it  is  something  entirely   different to insist that the manner of proof for the two  proceedings must also be the same. 141.  It is now well settled and so also the High Court   has held that the proceeding of contempt of court is sui   generis. In other words, it is not strictly controlled by the   provisions  of  CrPC  and  the  Evidence  Act.  What,   however,  applies to a proceeding of contempt of court   are the principles of natural justice and those principles   apply  to  the contempt  proceeding with greater  rigour  than any other proceeding.  This means that  the court   must follow a procedure that is fair and objective; that   should  cause  no  prejudice  to  the  person  facing  the  charge  of  contempt  of  court  and  that  should  allow  him/her  the  fullest  opportunity  to  defend  himself/herself.” (Emphasis added)

18. This Court In Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra (the alleged contemnor)  

(1995) 2 SCC 584, has observed that a contempt amounts to an offence but  

it  is an offence sui generis and hence for such an offence, the procedure  

adopted both under the common law and the statute law has always been  

summary.   The Court  held  that  in spite  of  the fact  that  it  is  a  summary  

procedure, there must be an opportunity to the alleged contemnor of meeting  

the charge.  The degree of precision with which the charge may be stated  

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depends  upon  the  circumstances.  So  long  as  the  gist  of  the  specific  

allegation is made clear or otherwise the contemnor is aware of the specific  

allegation, it is not always necessary to formulate the charge. So long as the  

contemnor's interest is adequately safeguarded by giving him an opportunity  

of  being  heard  in  his  defence,  even  summary  procedure  in  the  case  of  

contempt cannot be found fault with.        

19. In Daroga Singh (supra), this Court observed that in case, the alleged  

contemnor feels that there is a necessity to cross-examine the witnesses i.e.  

deponents of affidavits filed against him,  the alleged contemnor must be  

given an opportunity to cross-examine the said witnesses  provided it is so  

asked  by  him.  This  Court  observed  that  in  Contempt  proceedings,  a  

summary  procedure  is  to  be  adopted  for  the  reason  that  matter  is  to  be  

disposed of most expeditiously and it is for this reason that in spite of the  

fact  that  proceedings  are  quasi-criminal  in  nature,  the  procedure  under  

Cr.P.C. or Evidence Act is not made applicable.  

20. In view of the above, the law can be summarised that the High Court  

has a power to initiate the contempt proceedings suo motu for ensuring the  

compliance  of  the  orders  passed  by  the  Court.  However,  contempt  

proceedings being quasi-criminal in nature,  the same standard of proof is  

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required  in  the  same  manner  as  in  other  criminal  cases.  The  alleged  

contemnor is  entitled  to  the  protection  of  all  safeguards/rights  which are  

provided  in  the  Criminal  Jurisprudence,  including  the  benefit  of  doubt.  

There must be a clear-cut case of obstruction of administration of justice by  

a  party  intentionally  to  bring  the  matter  within  the  ambit  of  the  said  

provision.  The alleged contemnor is to be informed as what is the charge, he  

has to meet. Thus, specific charge has to be framed in precision. The alleged  

contemnor may ask the Court to permit him to cross-examine the witnesses  

i.e. deponents of affidavits, who have deposed against him. In spite of the  

fact  that contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature,  provisions of  

Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973  (hereinafter  called,  “Cr.P.C.”)  and  

Evidence Act are not attracted for the reason that proceedings have to be  

concluded  expeditiously.  Thus,  the  trial  has  to  be  concluded as  early  as  

possible. The case should not rest only on surmises and conjectures. There  

must be clear and reliable evidence to substantiate the allegations against the  

alleged  contemnor.  The  proceedings  must  be  concluded  giving  strict  

adherence to the statutory Rules framed for the purpose.  

21. The instant cases are required to be examined in view of the aforesaid  

settled legal proposition. The contempt proceedings had been initiated under  

the Act, 1971.  Section 23 of the Act  1971 enables the High Court to frame  

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rules  providing for  a  procedure  in  contempt  cases.   In  view thereof,  the  

Allahabad High Court framed the rules by adding chapter XXXV-E in the  

Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 (hereinafter called the ‘Rules 1952’) vide  

amendment published in Uttar Pradesh Gazette, Part II dated 12.2.1977.  As  

per the said rules, a  criminal contempt is to be dealt with by the Division  

Bench and a detailed procedure to file the application  etc. has been laid  

down therein.  Once the Court is prima facie satisfied that there is a case to  

proceed with the contempt against a person concerned, the Division Bench  

in  such  case  has  to  proceed  giving  strict  adherence  to  the  procedure  

prescribed under the Rules 1952. Rule 5 of the Chapter XXXV-E  reads as  

under:-

“5. Issuance of notice. – Such allegations contained in  the petition as appears to the Court to make out a prima  facie  case  of  contempt  of  Court  against  the  person  concerned,  shall be reduced into charge or charges by  the  Court  against  such  person,  and  notice  shall  be   issued  only  with  respect  to  those  charges.    (Emphasis    added).  

Rule 6 thereof provides mandatorily that the show cause notice issued  

under  Rule 5 must  be accompanied  with material  documents.   The Rule  

reads as under:-

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“6. Documents accompanied notice. – Where an order  has  been  made  directing  that  notice  be  issued  to  any   person to show cause why he should not be punished for   contempt of Court, a date shall be fixed for the hearing  and a notice thereof in the prescribed form given to the   person concerned.   The notice  of  a  criminal  contempt   shall also be served on the Government Advocate.  The  notice  shall  be  accompanied  by  copies  of  the  application,  motion and the affidavit  or  a  copy of  the  reference by a subordinate court as the case may be, and  a copy of the charge or charges as framed by the Court,  and shall require the person concerned to appear, unless   otherwise ordered, in person before the Court at the time  and on the date specified therein to show cause why he   should not be punished for Contempt of Court.  Notice of   every proceeding under Section 15 of the Act  shall  be  served  personally  on  the  person  charged,  unless  the  Court  for  reasons  to  be  recorded  directs  otherwise.”   (Emphasis added) Thus,  it  is  evident  that  while  initiating  contempt  proceedings  the  

Court  has  to  frame  the  charge  (s)  and  serve  the  same  alongwith  other  

relevant  material  upon  the  alleged  contemnor.  This  is  a  mandatory  

requirement under the Rules 1952.  

22.The question does arise as to whether the contempt proceedings had been  

concluded in conformity with the aforesaid Rules? The enquiry entrusted  

to  the  District  Judge  was  to  find  out  as  what  was  the  truth  in  the  

allegations made in the Habeas Corpus Petition about kidnapping of Tej  

Veer Singh. After submission of both the reports by the District Judge,  

Ghaziabad, the Court suo motu initiated the contempt proceedings. The  

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appellants ought to have been told clearing as for what offence they were  

being tried.   We have examined the original record of the case and to our  

utter surprise, we find that show cause notices for suo motu contempt  

dated 20.2.1998 had been issued in a case, titled as “State of UP Vs.  

Ramesh Chandra & Ors.”. The notice reads as under:  

“IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD QUASI CRIMINAL SIDE NO.48- NOTICE

In the matter of Crl. Miscellaneous Contempt Case No.69/97

Between

State of U.P. ..Applicant And

Ramesh Chandra & Ors. ..Opposite Party Sri Lilidhar Constable Police Station Muradnagar,  District Ghaziabad.

To, WHEREAS the abovenamed applicant has represented to  

this Court that you have committed contempt of court.

AND WHEREAS the 31st day of March, 1998 has been  fixed for the hearing of the said case:

NOTICE  is  hereby  given  to  you  calling  upon  you  to  appear in person in this Court on the above mentioned date at  10 O’ clock in the forenoon to show cause why you should not  be punished for contempt of court.

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, This  20th day of February, 1998.

Deputy Registrar Allahabad”

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23. The notices had been served upon the appellants  and other  alleged  

contemnor.  There was no case filed by the State of U.P.  before the High  

Court  in respect  of  abduction of  Tej  Veer  Singh nor  any application for  

initiating contempt proceedings was ever filed by any person. Admittedly,  

the proceedings were initiated by the High Court suo motu. The notice itself  

remains incomplete, inaccurate and mis-leading. The Registry of the High  

Court issued the “dotted lines notice” without any sense of responsibility.  

The notice did not mention as what was the allegation/accusation against  

either of them.  It did not contain any charge(s) against either of them.  In  

D.K. Basu (supra) this Court has issued as many as eleven directions to the  

police authorities inter-alia, furnishing the information of the person arrested  

to his relatives;   the person should be arrested only by the police officials  

with clear identification marks; a memo of arrest is to be prepared at the  

time of arrest, which should be attested at least by some person from the  

locality; the time, place of arrest and venue of custody must be disclosed etc.  

etc.   This  Court  further  observed  that  non-observance  of  any  of  the  

directions  issued  therein  would  make  the  Police  personnel  liable  for  

departmental action and render them liable to be punished for Contempt of  

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Court and proceedings for Contempt of Court would be initiated in the High  

Court having territorial jurisdiction over the matter.    

24. The notice did not make any reference to the judgment of this Court in  

D.K.Basu (supra).  Neither the report of the District Judge nor any evidence  

collected by him during that inquiry, nor any other document relevant to the  

case  was annexed with the said notice.  Rather, considering the reply of  

Constable Ramesh Chandra and Sahdeo Singh, the impugned judgment and  

order  has been passed.   The aforesaid Rules 1952 provide  for  a specific  

procedure to hold the trial in contempt cases.  The Rules 1952 mandatorily  

require the framing of charge(s) and furnishing the copy of the documents to  

the alleged contemnor on the basis of which, the charges have been framed.  

In  the  instant  cases,  there  has  been  no  compliance  of  these  mandatory  

provisions  contained  in   the   Rules.   In  absence  of  the  charge(s),  a  

delinquent/accused/alleged  contemnor  may  not  be  able  to  furnish  any  

defence as he is not aware as to what charge(s) he is required to meet.  Every  

statutory provision requires strict adherence, for the reason that the Statute  

creates  rights  in  favour  of  persons  concerned.   The  impugned  judgment  

suffered from non-observance of  the principles  of  natural  justice  and not  

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ensuring  the  compliance  of  Statutory  Rules,  1952.   Thus,  the  trial  itself  

suffered from material procedural defect and stood vitiated.   

The impugned judgment  and order,  so far as  the conviction of  the  

appellants in Contempt proceedings are concerned, is liable to be set aside.   

25. By the  impugned judgment  and order,  Constable  Ramesh  Chandra  

was convicted and punished with imprisonment for six months.  Further,  a  

fine of Rs. 1 lakh and costs of Rs. 5000/- were also imposed on him.  We are  

told that during the pendency of his appeals, i.e. Criminal Appeal Nos. 530  

& 532 of 2002, Constable Ramesh Chandra has died and those appeals have  

been disposed of  accordingly.   Appellants  were,  however,  convicted  and  

imposed punishment as referred to hereinabove.

26. In the instant cases, the record reveals that the Habeas Corpus petition  

was taken by the High Court on 30.07.1997 and directed the District Judge,  

Ghaziabad to hold the inquiry on the allegations made in the Habeas Corpus  

petition.  The District Judge submitted the report on 03.12.1997.   The Court  

considered the case on 4.12.1997 and initiated contempt proceedings against  

appellants and others suo motu. Matter was remanded to the District Judge  

for further inquiry in view of the fact that Sujan Singh was not heard in the  

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earlier inquiry. The District Judge, Ghaziabad, submitted the supplementary  

inquiry report on 12.07.1998.  After hearing the parties the judgment was  

reserved on 12.03.1999.  Thereafter, it was listed on 14.12.2001 i.e. after 2  

years  and  9  months  for  fresh  arguments.   However,  the  counsel  for  the  

parties stated that nothing more was required to be submitted except what  

had been argued earlier.  The judgment was pronounced on 20.12.2001.  It is  

apparent from the order sheets itself that the matter remained pending before  

the Court, so far as the contempt proceedings are concerned, for more than  

three years which itself is in contravention of the true spirit of the purpose of  

initiation of the contempt proceedings.      

27. In  view  of  the  above,  we  reach  the  inescapable  conclusion  that  

contempt proceedings had been concluded without ensuring the compliance  

of the mandatory provisions of the Rules 1952. The appellants had never  

been  informed  as  what  were  the  charges  against  them.  The  relevant  

documents on the basis of which the High Court had taken a prima facie  

view while initiating the contempt proceedings suo motu, had not been made  

available to them. The notice itself was not only defective, but inaccurate  

and totally  mis-leading.  The facts  and circumstances  of  the  case  warrant  

reversal of the aforesaid judgment and order.   

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This Court, while entertaining these appeals, granted interim relief to  

the  appellants.   Thus,  State  could  not  initiate  disciplinary  proceedings  

against either of them.    

The appeals stand allowed. The judgment and order dated 20.12.2001  

passed by the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Contempt No.69 of 1997 is  

hereby set aside.  

         …………………………………J. (J.M. PANCHAL)

New Delhi, …………………………………J. February 23, 2010  (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

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