25 August 1983
Supreme Court
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SADHU RAM Vs DELHI TRANSPORT CORPORATION

Bench: REDDY,O. CHINNAPPA (J)
Case number: Appeal Civil 6346 of 1983


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PETITIONER: SADHU RAM

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DELHI TRANSPORT CORPORATION

DATE OF JUDGMENT25/08/1983

BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) SEN, A.P. (J) VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)

CITATION:  1984 AIR 1467            1983 SCR  (3) 725  1983 SCC  (4) 156        1983 SCALE  (2)136

ACT:      Constitution of India-Art. 226-Exercise of Jurisdiction by High Court-Scope of.

HEADNOTE:      The services  of the  appellant-workman were terminated by the  Management of  the respondent.  On a report from the Conciliation Officer  the Government referred the dispute to the Labour  Court. The Management contended that the workman had not raised any demand with the Management and that there was, therefore,  no industrial  dispute.  The  Labour  Court found as  a fact  that the  Union had  raised a valid demand with the  Management and that the termination of services of the workman  was  illegal  and  mala  fide.  The  Management invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226. A Single Judge  of the  High Court  quashed the  Award of  the Labour Court  on the  finding that no demand had been raised and there  was no industrial dispute which could be properly referred by the Government for adjudication. The judgment of the Single Judge was affirmed by the Division Bench.      Allowing the appeal, ^      HELD: The  High Court was not right in interfering with the Award  of the  Labour Court  under Art.  226 on  a  mere technicality, [728 E]      The jurisdiction  under Art. 226 of the Constitution is truly wide but, for that very reason, it has to be exercised with great  circumspection. It  is not for the High Court to constitute itself  into an  appellate court  over  Tribunals constituted under  special legislations  to resolve disputes of  a  kind  qualitatively  different  from  ordinary  civil disputes and  to readjudicate upon questions of fact decided by those  Tribunals. That  the questions  decided pertain to jurisdictional facts  does not  entitle the  High  Court  to interfere with  the findings  on jurisdictional  facts which the Tribunal is well competent to decide. [727 D-F]      In  the   instant  case   there  was   a   conciliation proceeding, the conciliation had failed and the Conciliation Officer had  so reported  to the  Government. The Government was justified  in thinking  that  there  was  an  industrial dispute and  referring it  to the  Labour  Court.  The  High

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Court’s discussion  on what  was an  industrial dispute  and what was  a jurisdictional  fact was an entirely unnecessary exercise. [727 G-F; 728 A-B]      Sindhu Resettlement  Corporation Ltd. v. The Industrial Tribunal of  Gujarat,  [1968]1  S.C.R.  515,  explained  and distinguished. 726

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6346 of 1983.      Appeal by  Special leave  from the  Judgment and  order dated the  18th January,  1980 of  the Delhi  High Court  in L.P.A. No. 62 of 1973.      D.N. Vohra, Anil Kumar Gupta and Miss Kailash Mehta for the Appellant.      S.N. Bhandari and Arunesewar Gupta for the Respondent.      The Order of the Court was delivered by      CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. Special leave granted.      Sadhu  Ram   was  a  probationer  Bus  Conductor  whose services were  terminated on  7th  September,  1967  by  the respondent, the  Delhi Transport Corporation. On the failure of conciliation proceedings, the Conciliation Officer, Delhi submitted his report to the Delhi Administration under s. 12 (5) of  the Industrial  Disputes Act,  whereupon  the  Delhi Administration  referred   the  following   dispute  to  the Presiding Officer,  Labour Court,  Delhi  for  adjudication: "Whether the  termination of  service, of  Shri  Sadhu  Ram, conductor  is  illegal  and  unjustified,  and  if  so  what directions are  necessary in  this respect".  The  Union  on behalf of the workman and the management appeared before the Presiding  Officer,   Labour  Court.   On  behalf   of   the management, a contention was raised that the workman had not raised any  demand with  the management  and that  there was therefore,  no   industrial  dispute.   The  reference   was accordingly claimed  to be  incompetent.  The  Labour  Court overruled the  contention, holding  as a fact that the Union had raised  a valid  demand with  the management. On merits, the Labour  Court gave the following finding: "I, therefore, hold that  the termination  order in respect of this workman is illegal  and mala  fide and  that amounts  to  colourable exercise  of   power."  Consequently,   the  management  was directed to  reinstate the  workman  with  effect  from  8th September, 1967  with the  full back wages and benefits. The management invoked  the jurisdiction  of the  High Court  of Delhi under  Art. 226  of the  Constitution questioning  the award of  the Labour  Court. The  High  Court  went  into  a learned discussion  on what  was an  Industrial Dispute  and what was a jurisdictional fact, a discussion 727 which in  our opinion  was an entirely unnecessary exercise. In  launching   into  a   discussion  on   these   questions needlessly, the High Court appeared to forget the basic fact that the  Labour Court had given two categoric findings: (i) that the  Union had  raised a demand with the management and (ii) that the termination of the services of the workman was a mala  fide and  colourable exercise of power. Delving into the  evidence   as  if   it  was  an  appellate  Court,  and reappreciating the evidence, the High Court thought that one of the  documents upon which the Labour Court had relied was a suspicious  document; and  the High  Court went on to find that no  demand had  been raised and there was no Industrial Dispute which  could be  properly referred by the Government

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for adjudication.  On those  findings a learned single judge of the High Court quashed the Award of the Presiding Officer of the  Labour Court.  The decision  of the  learned  single judge was affirmed by a Division Bench. The workman has come before us under Art. 136 of the Constitution.      We are  afraid the  High Court  misdirected itself. The jurisdiction under  Art. 226  of the  Constitution is  truly wide but  for that  very reason, it has to be exercised with great circumspection.  It is  not  for  the  High  Court  to constitute itself  into an  appellate court  over  Tribunals constituted under  special legislations  to resolve disputes of  a  kind  qualitatively  different  from  ordinary  civil disputes and  to readjudicate upon questions of fact decided by those  Tribunals. That  the questions  decided pertain to jurisdictional facts  does not  entitle the  High  Court  to interfere with  the findings  on jurisdictional  facts which the  Tribunal   is  well  competent  to  decide.  Where  the circumstances indicate  that the  Tribunal has  snatched  at jurisdiction,  the   High  Court   may   be   justified   in interfering. But  where the  Tribunal gets jurisdiction only if a  reference is  made and it is therefore impossible ever to say that the Tribunal has clutched at jurisdiction, we do not  think  that  it  was  proper  for  the  High  Court  to substitute its  judgment for  that of  the Labour  Court and hold  that  the  workman  had  raised  no  demand  with  the management.  There   was  a   conciliation  proceeding,  the conciliation had  failed and the Conciliation Officer had so reported to  the Government. The Government was justified in thinking that  there was an industrial dispute and referring it to the Labour Court.      The High  Court appeared  to think that the decision of this Court  in the  Sindhu Resettlement  Corporation Ltd. v. The Industrial 728 Tribunal of  Gujarat(1) justified  its conclusion  that  the failure of  the conciliation  proceedings and  the report of the  Conciliation   Officer  to   the  Government  were  not sufficient to sustain a finding that there was an industrial dispute. This was also what was urged by the learned counsel for the  respondents. The  High Court  was in  error  in  so thinking. In  Sindhu Resettlement  Corporation Ltd.  v.  The Industrial Tribunal  of Gujarat(1),  the question really was about the  precise  scope  of  the  reference  made  by  the Government for adjudication. Throughout it appeared that the only reference  that the  Government could have made related to the  payment of retrenchment compensation which alone was the subject  matter of  dispute  between  the  parties.  The conciliation which failed had also concerned itself with the question of  payment of  retrenchment  compensation  and  in their  claims   before  the   management,  the  workmen  had requested  for  payment  of  retrenchment  compensation  and raised no  dispute regarding  reinstatement. It was in those circumstances  that   the  court  held  that  there  was  no industrial dispute  regarding reinstatement.  We do  not see how Sindhu  Resettlement Corporation  Ltd. v. The Industrial Tribunal  of  Gujarat  can  be  of  any  assistance  to  the respondents.      Nor do we think that it was right for the High Court to interfere with the award of a Labour Court under Art. 226 on a mere  technicality. Article  226 is a device to secure and advance justice  and not  otherwise. In the result, we allow the appeal,  set aside  the judgment  of the  High Court and restore the award of the Presiding Officer, Labour Court. H.S.K.                                       Appeal allowed. 729

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