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PETITIONER: SACHIDA NAND SINGH AND ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF BIHAR AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       03/02/1998

BENCH: K.T. THOMAS, M. SRINIVASAN

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T Thomas, J.      Can prosecution  be maintained  in respect  of a forged document produced  in court  unless complaint has been filed by the  court concerned  in that behalf? In other words, the question involved in this appeal is, whether the prohibition contained in  Section 1951(1)(b)(ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973  (for short  ‘the Code)  would apply to such prosecution. The  aforesaid question, ticklish it may appear to some  extent, seemed to have received a quietus from this Court with the pronouncement in Patel Laliibhai Somabha  vs. The State  of Gujarat  (AIR 1971  SC 1935) while considering the scope  of its corresponding provision in the old Code of Criminal Procedure  1989. But  a subsequent decision of this Court in Gopalakrishna Menon & anr. vs. D.Raja Reddy & anr., [1983(4)SCC 240]  which  struck  a  different  note  thereon seemed to  have revived  the issue and kept it buoying up in the legal  stream. That question, in this appeal, has arisen from the following facts:      A complaint  was filed by second respondent (Lal Narain Singh) in the court of a Chief Judicial Magistrate, alleging offences, inter alia, under Sections 468, 469 and 471 of the Indian Penal  Code on the facts that appellants had forged a document (certified  copy of  Jamabandi  -  Rent  Roll)  and produced it  in a  court of  Executive Magistrate  which was then dealing with proceedings under Section 145 of the Code. Chief Judicial  Magistrate forwarded  the complaint  to  the police as  provided in  Section 156(3)  of the  Code. Police registered an  FIR on  the basis  of the  said complaint and after investigation  laid a  charge-sheet against appellants for those  offences.  The  Chief  Judicial  Magistrate  took cognizance of  those offences  and  issued  process  to  the accused.  Appellants  then  moved  Patna  High  Court  under Section 482  of the Code for quashing the prosecution on the main  ground  that  the  Magistrate  could  not  have  taken cognizance of the said offences in view of the bar contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code.      Before the High Court, appellants sited the decision of the Court  in Gopala  Krishna Menon  (supra) b  ut a  single judge of  the High  Court dismissed  the said petition filed

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under Section  482 b  y relying  on a later decision of this Court in  Mahadev Bapuji  Mahajan  and  anr.  vs.  State  of Maharashtra (AIR  1994 SC 1549). Appellants therefore, filed this appeal by special leave.      Shri K.B.  Sinha, learned senior counsel contended that though the  decision in  Patel Laljibhai  Somabhai  vs.  The State of Gujarat (supra) was rendered by a three judge Bench of this  Court it is no longer relevant as the said decision was rendered  under the  corresponding provision  of the old Code which has a subtle difference from the new provision in Section 195(1)(b)(ii)  of the Code and that difference makes all the change. According to the learned senior counsel, the ratio laid  down by  this Court in Gopalakrishna Menon would hold the  field since  that decision  was rendered under the new Code.      Shri  B.B.Singh,   learned  counsel   for   the   first respondent (State  of Bihar), on the other hand, argued that the slight  change made in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code vis-a-vis the  corresponding provision  in the  old Code was not for  deviating from  the legal position settled b y this Court in  Patel Laljibhai  Somabhai (supra). Learned counsel has  highlighted   the  consequences  of  adopting  a  wider construction as to the scope of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code. For  deciding the  issue it  is appropriate to extract here the material portion of the said clause here:      We Court shall take cognizance-      Even if  the clause is capable of two interpretation we are inclined  to  choose  the  narrower  interpretation  for obvious reasons.  Section 190  of  the  Code  empowers  "any magistrate of  the first  class" to  take cognizance of "any offence" upon  receiving a  complaint, or  police report  or information or upon his own knowledge. Section 195 restricts such general powers of the magistrate, and the general right of a  person to  move the  Court with a complaint is to that extent  curtailed.   It  is   a  well-recognised   canon  of interpretation   that    provision   curbing   the   general jurisdiction of  the  court  must  normally  receive  strict interpretation unless  the statute  or the  context requires otherwise [Abdul Waheed Khan vs. Bhawani (1996 (3) SCR 617].      That  apart   it  is  difficult  to  interpret  Section 195(1)(b)(ii) as  containing a  b ar  against initiation  of prosecution  proceedings   merely     because  the  document concerned was  produced in a court albeit the act of forgery was perpetrated  prior to  its production  in the court. Any such construction is likely to ensue unsavoury consequences. For instance,  if rank  forgery of  a valuable  document  is detected an  the forgery is sure that he would imminently be embroiled in  prosecution proceedings he can simply get that document produced  in any  long drawn  litigation which  was either instituted  by himself  or some  body else who can be influenced by  him and  thereby pre-empt the prosecution for the entire long period of pendency of that litigation. It is a settled  proposition that if the language of a legislation is capable of more than one interpretation, the one which is capable  of   causing  mischievous  consequences  should  be averted. Quoting from Gill vs. Donald Humberstone & Co. Ltd. (1963-1-W.L.R.929)  Maxwell   has  stated  in  his  treaties (Interpretation of  Statutes, 12th  Edn. Page  105) that "if the language  is capable  of more than one interpretation we ought to  discard the  more natural  meaning if  it leads to unreasonable result  and   adopt that  interpretation  which leads to  a reasonable practicable result". The clause which we are  now considering  contains enough  indication to show that the  more natural meaning is that which leans in favour of  a   strict  construction,   and  hence   the   aforesaid

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observation is eminently applicable here.      As Section  340(1) of  the Code  has an inter-link with Section 195(1)(b)  it is  necessary to  refer to  that  sub- section in  the present  context. The said sub-section reads as follows:      "When upon  an application  made to      it in this behalf or otherwise, any      Court   is of  opinion that  it  is      expedient  in   the   interest   of      justice that  an inquiry  should be      made into  any offence  referred to      in clause  (b) of sub-section(1) of      section 195,  which appears to have      been committed in or in relation to      a proceeding  in that  Court or, as      the case  may be,  in respect  of a      document  produced   or  given   in      evidence in  a proceeding  in  that      Court, such  Court may,  after such      preliminary inquiry,  if any, as it      thinks necessary,-      (a)  record   a  finding   to  that      effect;      (b) make  a  complaint  thereof  in      writing;      (c) send  it to a Magistrate of the      first class having jurisdiction;      (d) take  sufficient  security  for      the  appearance   of  the   accused      before such  Magistrate, or  if the      alleged offence is non-bailable and      the Court thinks it necessary so to      do, send  the accused in custody to      such Magistrate; and      (e) bind  over any person to appear      and  give   evidence  before   such      Magistrate."      The sub-section  puts the  condition  that  before  the Court makes  a complaint  of "any  offence  referred  to  in clause (b)  of Section  195(1)" the  Court has to follow the procedure laid  down in  Section 340.  In  other  words,  no complaint can  be made  by a  court  regarding  any  offence falling within  the ambit  of Section  195(1)(b) of the Code without first  adopting those  procedural requirements. It h as to be noted that Section 340 falls within Chapter XXVI of the Code  which contains  a fasciculus  of "Provisions as to offences affecting  the administration  of justice"  as  the title of  the Chapter  appellates. So the offences envisaged in Section  195(1)(b) of  the Code  must involve  acts which would have affected the administration of justice.      The scope  of  the  preliminary  enquiry  envisaged  in Section 340(1)  of the  Code is  to  ascertain  whether  any offence  affecting   administration  of   justice  ha   been committed in  respect of  a document  produced in  Court  or given in  evidence in  a proceeding  in that Court. In other words, the  offence should  have been  committed during  the time when the document was in custodia legis.      It would  be  a  strained  thinking  that  any  offence involving forgery of a document if committed far outside the precincts of the Court and long before its production in the Court, could  also be treated as on affecting administration of justice  merely because  that document  later reached the Court records.      The three Judges Bench of this Court in Patel Laljibhai Somabhai’s case  (supra) has  interpreted the  corresponding

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section in  the old  Code, [Section 195(1)(c)] in almost the same manner  as indicated  above. It is advantageous in this context to  extract clause  (c) of Section 195(1) of the old Code.      "No Court shall take cognizance-      of any offence described in section      463  or  punishable  under  section      471, section  475 or section 476 of      the same Coda, when each offence is      alleged to have been committed by a      party  to  any  proceeding  in  any      Court  in  respect  of  a  document      produced or  given in  evidence  in      such  proceeding   except  on   the      complain in  writing of such Court,      or of  some other  Court  to  which      such   Court    is    subordinate."      (underline supplied)      The issue  involved in  Patel Laljibhai Somabhai’s case related to  the applicability  of that sub-section to a case where forged  document was  produced in  a suit  by a  party thereto, and subsequently a prosecution was launched against him for  offences under Section 467 and 471 of IPC through a private complain.  The ratio  of the decision therein is the following:      "The offences about which the court      alone,  to  the  exclusion  of  the      aggrieve   private    parties,   is      clothed with  the right to complain      may,  therefore,  be  appropriately      considered   to   be   only   those      offences committed  by a party to a      proceeding  in   that  court,   the      commission   of    which   has    a      reasonable  close  nexus  with  the      proceedings in the court so that it      can,  without  embarking  upon    a      completely  independent  and  fresh      inquiry, satisfactorily consider by      reference   principally    to   its      records    the     expediency    of      prosecuting the  delinquent  party.      It, therefore,  appears to us to be      more  appropriate   to  adopt   the      strict  construction  of  confining      the  prohibition  contained  in  s.      195(c) only  to hose cases in which      the  offences   specified   therein      committed  by   a   party   t   the      proceeding in the character as such      party."      After stating  so their  Lordships proceeded to observe that the  legislature could  not have intended to extend the prohibition in  the sub-section  to offences  committed by a party to the proceedings prior to his becoming such a party. According to  their Lordships,  any  construction    to  the contrary would  unreasonably restrict  the right of a person which was recognized in Section 190 of the  Code.      The aforesaid legal position was followed by this Court in   Raghunath &  ors. vs.  State of   U.P & ors, 1973(1)SCC 564. Mohan  Lal &  ors. vs.  The State  of Rajasthan & ors., 1974(3) SCC  628, and  Legal Remembrance  of Govt,  of  West Bengal vs. Haridas Mundra, 1976(2) SCR 933.      But in  Gopalakrishna Menon  & ors. vs. D. Raja Reddy & ors. (supra)  Desai. J.and  R.N.Misra, J.(as  he than was) h

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ave found  that a  persecution initiated  on the  basis of a private complaint,  in the absence of any complaint from the appropriate civil  court (before  which the  alleged  forged receipt was produced) was whether offences under section 461 and 471 of IPC are also offences described in Section 463 of IPC falling within the ambit of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code.      Of course  in the end of that decision it was mentioned that prosecution on the basis of a private complaint, in the absence of  a complaint from appropriate civil court, is not sustainable. Learned  Judge made  reference to the decisions in Patel  Laljibhai Somabhai  (cited supra)  and Goswami vs. High Court  of M.P.,  1979(1) SCC 373, and observed that the ratio in  those decisions  support the  view taken b y them. The forgery  alleged in Goswami’s case took place during the period when  the document  in question was in the custody of the court   and  in such  a case  t  he  bar  under  Section 195(1)(b)(ii)  would   certainly  apply.   But,  with  great respect, we  are unable to agree that the ratio in Laljibhai Somabhai   would   support   the   conclusion   reached   in Gopalakrishna Menon’s case (supra).      Shri K.B.  Sinha learned  senor counsel  contended that the  position   which  held  the  field  pursuant  to  Patel Laljibhai Somabhai’s  case decision  has since  been changed with the enactment of the new Code because of absence of the words ("by  a party  to any  proceeding in  an y  court") in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code. On the other hand learned counsel for  the respondents  contended that the only object for deletion of those words was to advance the protection of the section to other persons as well who might not have been parties to the litigation.      A scrutiny  of the sub clause in juxtaposition with the corresponding  provision  in  old  Code  dissuades  us  from attaching any significance to the deletion of the words ("by a party  to any  proceeding in  any court")  except  to  the extent  that  the  deletion  was  intended  to  stretch  the advantage to non-parties to the proceedings as well.      The Law  Commission in  its 41st Report has observed in paragraph 15.93 as follows:      "15.39   The purpose of the section      is to  b  ar  private  prosecutions      where  the  course  of  justice  is      sought to  be perverted  leaving to      the  court  itself  to  uphold  its      dignity and  prestige. On principle      there  is   no   reason   why   the      safeguard in  clause (c) should not      apply  to   offences  committed  by      witnesses also.  Witnesses need  as      much protection  against  vexatious      prosecutions  as  parties  and  the      court should  have as  much control      over the  acts  of  witnesses  that      enter as  a component of a judicial      proceeding, as  over  the  acts  of      parties.   If,    therefore,    the      provisions  of   clause   (c)   are      extended    to    witnesses,    the      extension would  be  in  conformity      with  the   broad  principle  which      forms the basis of S. 195."      The  above   reasons  of   the  Law   Commission  which eventually led to the parliamentary exercise in deleting the words referred  to earlier  would unmistakably  point to the legislative object in doing so.

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    The same  issue came  up before  a Full  Bench  of  the Punjab and  Haryana High Court, particularly in the light of change made  in Section  195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code vis-a-vis the corresponding  provision in  the old  Code.  In  Harbans Singh and  others   vs. State of Punjab - [AIR 1987 Punjab & Haryana 19],  the Full Bench observed that deletion of those words would not help to take a wider view as the restrictive view is  more in  consonance with the scheme of the Code. We have notice  that Karnataka  High Court  in Govindaraju  vs. State of  Karnataka [1995  Crl.L.J.1491] and the Bombay High Court in  Alka Bhagwant Jadhav vs. State of Maharashtra [ILR 1986 (Bombay) 64] have also adopted the same view.      The sequitur  of the  above discussion  is that the bar contained in  Section  195(1)(b)(ii)  of  the  Code  is  not applicable  to  case  where  forgery  of  the  document  was committed before  the document  was  produced  in  a  Court. Accordingly we dismiss this appeal.