SACHIDA NAND LAL @ SACHIDA NAND SHAH Vs STATE OF BIHAR (NOW JHARKHAND)
Bench: C.K. THAKKER,D.K. JAIN, , ,
Case number: C.A. No.-006442-006442 / 2000
Diary number: 10296 / 2000
Advocates: GOPAL PRASAD Vs
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6442 OF 2000 SACHIDA NAND LAL @ SACHIDA NAND SHAH … APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF BIHAR, (NOW JHARKHAND) …RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T C.K. Thakker, J.
1. The present appeal is filed against
judgment and order dated June 22, 1999 passed
by a single Judge of the High Court of Patna
(Ranchi Bench) in Appeal from Original Decree
Nos. 228 and 229 of 1989 and confirmed by the
Division Bench on March 01, 2000 in Letters
Patent Appeal No. 362 of 1999.
2. Shortly stated the facts of the case
are that on February 16, 1978, a notification
under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) was
issued for acquisition of land bearing Khata
Nos. 277 and 107 situated in the town of
Lohardaga of Ranchi for construction of
agricultural market-yard. According to the
appellant, the Collector divided the land into
two categories; (i) category ‘ka’ and (ii)
category ‘kha’. The land situated up to 150
feet from the road was categorized as ‘ka’
whereas land situated beyond 150 feet from the
road was categorized as ‘kha’. The Collector
assessed the value of the land of category ‘ka’
at the rate of Rs.48,500/- per acre and
category ‘kha’ at the rate of Rs.32,335/- per
acre. It was, however, the allegation of the
appellant that the Deputy Secretary, Government
of Bihar illegally and without any reason or
ground and without authority of law reduced the
rate to Rs.25,000/- and Rs. 16,000/- per acre
for category ‘ka’ and ‘kha’ respectively.
Accordingly, an award was passed on May 05,
1980 on that basis.
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3. The appellant being aggrieved by the
award sought reference for enhancement of
compensation under Section 18 of the Act which
was registered as Land Acquisition Case No. 498
of 1981. Similar references were also sought by
other land owners. All the references came up
for hearing before the Court of learned
Subordinate Judge, Ranchi and the learned Judge
by judgment and order dated July 06, 1987
partly allowed the reference. For the land of
category ‘ka’, the Reference Court fixed
compensation at the rate of Rs.48,000/- per
acre and for category ‘kha’, it was fixed at
the rate of Rs.24,250/- per acre. The Court
also awarded solatium at the rate of 30% and
interest @ 6% with effect from June 01, 1979. 4. The appellant challenged the judgment
and order passed by Reference Court by filing
First Appeal No. 229 of 1989 in the High Court
of Patna, Ranchi Bench. The learned Single
Judge before whom the appeal came up for
hearing partly allowed it. So far as the land
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of category ‘ka’ is concerned, he enhanced
compensation from Rs.48,000/- per acre to
Rs.66,000/- per acre. He, however, declined to
interfere with the rate of ‘kha’ category of
land and no enhancement at all was granted to
the said land, though the Reference Court had
observed in the order that category ‘kha’ would
get 50% amount of compensation of the land of
category ‘ka’.
5. In the circumstances, the appellant-
claimant approached the Division Bench of the
High Court by filing Letters Patent Appeal
No.363 of 1999. The Division Bench of the High
Court disposed of the Letters Patent Appeal by
a cryptic order dated June 22, 1999 which read
as under;
“Heard counsel for the appellant.
We do not find any merit in this Letters Patent Appeal which is accordingly dismissed.”
6. The above order passed by the Division
Bench of the High Court in the Letters Patent
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Appeal is challenged by the appellant in the
present appeal. Initially when the matter was
placed for admission hearing, the following
order was passed by this Court on August 28,
2000;
“Issue notice limited to the question, whether the High Court is right while enhancing the rate of compensation of category ‘Ka’ land to Rs. 66,000.00 per acre but maintaining the category ‘Kha’ land at Rs. 24,250.00. The case of the petitioner is that the rate of the land of ‘Kha’ should have been at least half of the rate of the ‘Ka’ property as held by the referring Court.” (emphasis supplied)
7. On November 13, 2000, the petition was
called out for hearing. Service of notice was
complete, but none appeared for the respondent
and hence leave was granted. It was thereafter
placed for final hearing before the Court, but
it was brought to the notice of the Court that
in the light of bifurcation of two states of
(i) Bihar and (ii) Jharkhand, the subject
matter in the appeal related to the State of
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Jharkhand. Fresh notices were, therefore,
issued and opportunity was given to the State
of Jharkhand to make submissions.
8. We have heard the learned counsel for
the parties.
9. The learned counsel for the appellant
contended that the Division Bench committed an
error of law in dismissing the Letters Patent
Appeal without entering into the merits of the
matter. He also submitted that the Division
Bench ought to have allowed the appeal by
enhancing the amount of compensation.
10. In our opinion, however, the matter
deserves to be allowed on the first ground and
it would not be appropriate for this Court to
express any opinion on the second question on
merits of the matter.
11. As already observed earlier, after the
Reference Court decided the Reference, Appeal
from Original Decree was preferred by the
claimant before the High Court. It was heard
by the learned Single Judge of the High Court.
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Section 54 of the Act provides for filing
Appeals in proceedings before the Court. It
reads as under;
Appeals in proceedings before Court.—Subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), applicable to appeals from original decrees, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment for the time being in force, an appeal shall only lie in any proceedings under this Act to the High Court from the award, or from any part of the award, of the Court and from any decree of the High Court passed on such appeal as aforesaid an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court subject to the provisions contained in Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and in Order XLIV thereof.
12. In view of express provision as to
filing of appeal under the Act as also the
provision relating to filing of Letters Patent
as applicable to the High Court of Patna, an
order passed by a single Judge of the High
Court can be challenged by filing an intra-
Court appeal before a Division Bench of the
same Court. The claimant was, therefore,
justified in exercising the right of filing
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Letters Patent Appeal and accordingly, appeal
was preferred before a Division Bench.
13. Since the appeal before the learned
Single Judge was Appeal from Original Decree,
i.e. First Appeal, the Division Bench ought to have considered the correctness or otherwise of
the order passed by the learned Single Judge by
exercising same powers as exercised by the
learned single Judge in the appeal from
original decree. The Letters Patent before the
Division Bench was not in the nature of appeal
from an appellate decree, i.e. Second Appeal, but it was continuation of appeal from original
decree, i.e. First Appeal. In the circumstances, in our opinion, the Division
Bench committed an error of law in dismissing
the appeal in limine by a brief order quoted
hereinabove without considering the merits.
14. The law on the point is well-settled
as regards the power of the Division Bench
while dealing with and deciding Letters Patent
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Appeal from an order passed by a single Judge
in exercise of power as a Court of Appeal.
15. In Asha Devi v. Dukhi Sao, AIR 1974 SC
2048, a similar question came up for
consideration before this Court. There, a
First Appeal came up for hearing before a
Single Judge of the High Court and was disposed
of. Against the said order, a Letters Patent
Appeals was filed. A preliminary objection was
raised on behalf of the respondents that since
it was an appeal from a decree passed by a
Single Judge of the High Court in First Appeal,
the appeal before the Division Bench was in
substance and in reality in the nature of
Second Appeal and questions of law only could
be agitated in such Letters Patent Appeal.
16. Negativing the contention and holding
that the scope of appeal before the Division
Bench was similar to one before a Single Judge,
this Court stated;
“There is no dispute that an appeal lies to a Division Bench of the High Court from the judgment of a Single
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Judge of that Court in appeal from a judgment and decree of a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court. The only question is whether the power of a Division Bench hearing a Letters Patent appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of Patna High Court or under the analogous provisions in the Letters Patent of other High Courts is limited only to a question of law under Section 100 of the CPC or has it the same power which the Single Judge has as a first Appellate Court in respect of both questions of fact and of law. The limitations on the power of the Court imposed by Sections 100 and 101 of the CPC cannot be made applicable to an Appellate Court hearing a Letters Patent appeal from the judgment of a Single Judge of that High Court in a first appeal from the judgment and decree of the court subordinate to the High Court, for the simple reason that a Single Judge to the High Court is not a Court subordinate, to the High Court”.
17. The above observations in Asha Devi
make it explicitly clear that an intra-Court
appeal is required to be considered and decided
by the Division Bench of the High Court on the
same footing as an appeal considered and
decided by a single Judge of the Court.
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18. A similar question again arose before
this Court recently in Gaudiya Mission v.
Shobha Bose & Anr., JT 2008 (1) SC 384. There
also, a single Judge of the High Court of
Allahabad decided the First Appeal against
which Letters Patent Appeal was filed before a
Division Bench. There also, the Division Bench
without entering into questions of fact and
law, dismissed the appeal as if it was in the
nature of Second Appeal. Setting aside the
order passed by the Single Judge, following the
law laid down by this Court in Asha Devi and
remitting the matter to the Division Bench of
the High Court for fresh disposal in accordance
with law, this Court held that the order passed
by the Division Bench was liable to be set
aside and the matter was required to be decided
on all questions, i.e. on questions of fact as
also on questions of law.
19. The same principle applies in the
present case also. The order passed by the
Division Bench of the High Court dismissing the
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Letters Patent Appeal cannot be said to be in
accordance with law and the said order deserves
to be set aside. Accordingly, the appeal is
allowed and the order passed by the Division
Bench is set aside. The appeal stands allowed
and the matter is remanded to Division Bench
which will now hear the parties on merits and
decide the case in accordance with law by a
reasoned judgment. On the facts and in the
circumstances of the case, however, there shall
be no order as to costs.
20. Before parting with the matter, we may
clarify that we have not expressed any opinion
on merits of the matter one way or the other.
All the observations made by us hereinabove
have been made only for the purpose of deciding
the present appeal. As and when the matter will
be placed for hearing before the Division
Bench, the same will be decided strictly on its
own merits without being influenced by the
above observations.
21. The appeal is accordingly allowed.
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…………………………………………………J. (C.K. THAKKER)
New Delhi; …………………………………………………J. November 07, 2008 (D. K. JAIN)
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