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PETITIONER: S. VASUNDARA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: CANARA BANK & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       28/10/1996

BENCH: K. RAMASWAMY, G.B. PATTANAIK

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                             WITH         SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 20632 OF 1996                          O R D E R      These special  leave petitions  have been filed against the Order  of the  Division Bench  of the  Madras High Court made on  September 9,1996 in Writ Petition Nos. 17011/94 and 9851/87.      The admitted  facts  are  that  the  petitioner,  while working as  a Manager of the respondent-Bank, was charged on November 3,  1986 for  an offence  punishable under Sections 420, 467,  477  IPC  read  with  Section  5(1)  (d)  of  the Prevention of  Corruption Act,  1947 (for short, the ‘Act’). The trial  Court convicted  the petitioner  for  an  offence under Sections  420 and  477A IPC and 5(2) read with 5(1)(d) of the  Act and  sentenced to  undergo one year imprisonment and also imposed a fine of Rs.3,000/- on each of the counts. On  appeal,   the  High  Court  suspended  the  sentence  on September 15,  1987 and enlarged the petitioner on bail. The respondents had  issued a show cause notice pending trial to the  petitioner   on  September  24,  l987.  The  petitioner challenged the  same which was subsequently withdrawn. After the conviction, they issued another notice to the petitioner on September  12, 1994.  The petitioner  challenged the show cause notice  in the  above writ petition. The High Court in the impugned order dismissed the same. Shri Sampath. learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the conviction on the basis  of a  criminal charge is not one of the specified enumerated misconducts. Removal does not lead the conviction due to  the  misconduct  under  the  Regulation.  Therefore, Regulations 6,  7 and 8 would not apply to the facts in this case. Consequently, Regulation 11 of the Canara Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline  and Appeal) Regulations does not get attracted.  The   action  taken,   therefore,   is   without jurisdiction. We find no force in the contention. It is true that the  High Court  had suspended  the  operation  of  the judgment but  nonetheless the  conviction  recorded  by  the trial Court  cannot be  obliterated. It  is still conviction but only  redemption is that by operation of the suspension, the petitioner  is not  required  to  undergo  the  sentence pending appeal  in the  High Court.  Regulation 11  reads as

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under;      Regulation 11:-      Notwithstanding anything  contained      in Regulation  6 or Regulation 7 or      Regulation   8   the   Disciplinary      Authority may  impose  any  of  the      penalties SPECIFIED  IN  Regulation      4, if the Officer employee has been      convicted on  a Criminal  Charge or      on  the   strength  of   facts   or      conclusions   arrived   at   by   a      judicial trial."      The  respondents   have  specifically  stated  that  on account of  the  conviction  by  the  criminal  court  on  a criminal charge,  the action  is sought  to be taking action under the  Regulations. The non obstante clause engrafted in Regulation  11   takes  out  the  necessity  to  follow  the procedure prescribed  in Regulation  6, 7  or 8, as the case may be,  by excluding  the operation of Regulations 6, 7 and 8. The  authority is  empowered to  take action  against the delinquent employee  for imposition  of any of the penalties specified in  Regulation 4. Only in two cases, Regulation 11 could be invoked, namely, conviction of a criminal charge or on the  strength of  facts of  conclusions arrived  at by  a judicial trial.  In view of the fact that criminal court had recorded the  conviction of the appellant for offences under Sections 420. 477A and 5(2) read with Section 5(l)(d) of the Act. The invocation of Regulation 11 stands applicable.      It is  then contended  that the conviction must be such that leads  to the  criminal misconduct under the Regulation and when only the action could be taken. We find no force in the contention.  If the  action is  taken  for  any  of  the misconducts  specified   in  Regulation  4,  the  procedural requirements contemplated  under Regulations  6, 7 and 8, as the case  may be,  are required  to be  followed  and  order passed. In  other words,  if any  delinquent employee of the Bank was convicted of a criminal charge, action is taken not on the  basis of  the misconducts  on the  basis of  a crime committed by  the employee  by abuse of the office or on the basis of an offence that led to the conviction on a criminal charge or on the strength of facts or conclusions arrived at by a  judicial trial  irrespective of  the abuse  of office. Since the  petitioner is  not an  employee governed  by  the proviso to  Article 311(2)  of the Constitution, we need not go into  the conviction  leading to  the  conviction  as  to whether the  authority can take disciplinary, action pending criminal proceedings  leading to  conviction. In  this case, since there  is already  a finding of conviction recorded by the criminal court, though the sentence was suspended by the High Court on appeal, the authorities are still competent to take action  under Regulation  11. Therefore, the High Court was clearly  right in not interfering with the notice issued to the petitioner.      The petitions are accordingly dismissed.