03 April 1997
Supreme Court
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S. VANATHAN MUTHURAJA Vs RAMALINGAM ALIASKRISHNAMURTHY GURUKKAL & ORS.

Bench: K. RAMASWAMY,D.P. WADHWA
Case number: Appeal (civil) 3039 of 1986


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PETITIONER: S. VANATHAN MUTHURAJA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAMALINGAM ALIASKRISHNAMURTHY GURUKKAL & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       03/04/1997

BENCH: K. RAMASWAMY, D.P. WADHWA

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      This appeal  by special  leave arises from the judgment of the learned single Judge of the Madras High Court ,  made on July  16, 1983  in Second  Appeal  No.222/97.    For  the purpose of  disposal of this appeal,  it is not necessary to state all  the facts., Suffice it to state that one Ayyasamy Gurukkal  was   common  ancestor  in  respect  of  the  suit property.    He  had four  sons,  namely, Annasamy, Subbiah, Sundara and  Neelkanda. Ramani  is the grand-son of Ayyasamy Gurukkal who  was  impleaded  as  first  defendant.      The appellant had  purchased his  1/3rd share  in  the  property under the  sale deed,   Ex.A-6,   dated  6.5.1967.   Subbiah Gurukkal having  been died  unmarried; Sundara  Gurukkal and Neelkanda  Gurukkal  had  1/3rd  share  each;  Sundara  died leaving behind  him four  grand-sons, D-3 to D-6 through his son  Rajarathina,   widow  Dorai  ,  D-7;  and  another  son Ramalingam, D-2,  Neelkanda  died  leaving  behind  him  his widow,   D-8 and  daughter, D-9.  his widow D-8 had sold her 1/3rd share  to the  plaintiff No.1 under sale deed,  Ex.A-7 dated June  26, 1970,  Initially, The plaintiff had filed OS No. 1848/67 for a declaration of title and injunction of the property purchased  under Ex.A-6.  Therein, it was held that though sale of undivided 1/3rd share is valid, no injunction could be  granted against the co-owners and , therefore, the suit came  to against the co-owners and, therefore, the suit came to  be dismissed.  After the  purchase of  the property under Ex.A-7,  the OS  No. 946/1972  came to  be  filed  for partition  of   the  2/3rd  shard  and  separate  possession thereof. The  defendants pleaded  in the  written  statement that the  lands and are burdened with services of performing pooja to  the temple. Since Annasamy, eldest son of Ayyasamy Gurukkal had  failed to  perform the duty, he lost his right to the  property. Ultimately  Sundara, having  been  in  his possession, perfected  his title  of adverse possession and, therefore, appellant  did  not  acquire  any  title  to  the property.     The  trial  court  has  accepted  defence  and dismissed the suit. However, on appeal, it was reversed with the holding  that they  did not  acquire  title  of  adverse possession against  co-owner. The finding in that respect is correct in  low.

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    When the  appeal was pending under the Tamil Nadu Minor Inams (Abolition  and Conversion  into Ryotwari)  Act,  1963 (30 of  1963),  The Tehsildar had initiated suo motu enquiry for grant  of ryotwari  patta after  enquiry, the  Tehsildar found that  Ryotwari patta  was granted  in   favour of  the institution.   Thus the  patta granted  to  the  institution become final. When the second appeal was filed,  the learned Judge held  that by virtue of the provisions contained under the Act,  the suit  is not  maintainable.  Accordingly,  the suit came  to be  dismissed.   Thus, this  appeal by special leave.      The patta under Ex.B-1 dated February 28,  1974 granted under section  8(2) (ii)  of the  Act by  the Tehsildar  was confirmed.   On appeal,   it  was confirmed  which order has become final.  Thus, the title to the property was vested in the institution  and thereby,   none  of the parties has any right,   title and interest in the property.  Therefore, the suit of  the   appellant with out impleading the institution is not  maintainable. Under  Section 9,  CPC,    the  courts shall,   subject to  the provisions  contained therein, have jurisdiction to  try all  suits of  civil  nature  excepting suits cognizance  of which  is either expressly or impliedly barred.   When a  legal right is infringed, a suit would lie unless there  is a  bar against  entertainment of such civil suit and  the civil  courts would  tame  cognizance  of  it. Therefore, the  normal rule of law is that civil courts gave jurisdiction to  try all  suits of civil nature expect those of which  cognizance is  either expressly  or  by  necessary implication excluded.   The  Rule of construction being that every presumption  would be  made in favour of the existence of a  right and  remedy in  a democratic  set up governed by rule of law and jurisdiction of the civil courts is assumed. The exclusion  would,  therefore,  normally be an exception. Courts  generally  construe  the  provisions  strictly  when jurisdiction of  the civil courts is claimed to be excluded. However,   in the  development  of  civil  adjudication  and abnormal delay  at hierarchical  stages,  statutes intervene and provide alternative mode of resolution of civil disputes with less expensive but expeditious disposal.  It is settled legal position  That if a Tribunal with limited jurisdiction cannot assume  exclusive jurisdiction  and decide for itself the dispute  conclusively, in  such a  situation,  it is the court that  is required  to decide whether the Tribunal with limited jurisdiction  has correctly assumed jurisdiction and decided    the dispute within its limits.  it is settled law that when jurisdiction has is conferred on a Tribunal ,  the court  examine   whether   the   essential   principles   of jurisdiction have been followed and decided by the Tribunals leaving the  decision on  merits to the Tribunal. It is also equally settled  legal position  that where  a statute gives finality to  the orders  of the  special Tribunal, the civil court’s jurisdiction  must be  held to be excluded, if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil court would normally do in  a suit.   Such a provision,  however does not exclude those cases  where the provision, of the particular Act have not been  complied with  or the  statutory Tribunal  has not acted in  conformity  with  the  fundamental  principles  of judicial  procedure.  Where  there  is  an  express  bar  of jurisdiction of  the Court,  an examination of the scheme of the particular  Act to  find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain  the jurisdiction of the civil Court. Where there is no  express exclusion,   the  examination of the remedies and the  scheme of  the  particular  Act  to  find  out  the intendment becomes  necessary and  the result of the inquiry

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may be  decisive. In  the latter  case, it is necessary that the  statute  creates  a  special  right  or  liability  and provides remedy  for  the  determination  of  the  right  or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right  or liability shall be determined by the Tribunal so  constituted   and  the  question  whether  remedies  are normally associated  with the  action  in  civil  courts  or prescribed by  the  statutes  or  not  require  examination. Therefore,  each   case  requires  examination  whether  the statute provides  right and remedy and whether the scheme of the Act  is that  the procedure  provided will be conclusive and thereby  excludes the jurisdiction of the civil court in respect thereof.  After the advent of independence, the land reforms was  one of  the policies  of the  Government of the Ryotwari patta on the tiller of the soil. Thereby,  the land reform laws  extinguish pre-existing  rights and  create new rights under  the Act. The act provides for the jurisdiction on the  Tribunals in  matters relating thereto and hierarchy of appeals/revisions are provided thereunder giving finality to the  orders passed  thereunder.   Thereby,  by  necessary implication, The  jurisdiction of  the civil  court to  tame cognizance of  the suits  of civil  nature covered under the land  reforms  laws  stand  excluded  giving  not  only  the finality to  the decisions  of the  Tribunal and  making the Ryotwari patta granted to the tiller of the soil conclusive. Under the normal course of civil procedure, the jurisdiction of the  trial of  the civil suits in relation to the matters covered under  the Acts  being time  consuming and tardy the lack  of   financial  resources   or  otherwise   incapacity defending or  want of knowledge of the  rights energy sapped civil suits  and by  hierarchy of appeals are intended to be avoided. Obviously,   therefore,   the  civil suits  and  by hierarchy of appeals are intended to be avoided.  Obviously, therefore,   the civil suits by necessary implication stands excluded unless  the fundamental principles of procedure are followed by the Tribunals constituted under the land reforms lows. In  this case, the Act concerned extinguishes the pre- existing right,  creates new  rights,   creates  new  rights under the  Act and  requires Tribunals  to enquire  into the rival claims and a forms of appeal has been provided against the order  of the  primary authority.  Thereby the right and remedy made  conclusive under  the Act are given finality by the orders  passed under  the Act.   Thereby,  by  necessary implication,   the jurisdiction  of the  civil court  stands excluded.      That apart,  in view of the law laid down by this court in Vatticherukuru  Village Panchayat  vs.    Norivenkatarama Deekshithulu &  Ors [1991  Supp. 2  SCC 228]  wherein entire case law  including the law laid down in state of Tamil Nadu vs. Ramalinga Samigal Madam [(1985) 4 SCC 10] was discussed, We held  that the  suit is not maintainable,  as held by the learned single judge.      This appeal is,  accordingly, dismissed.  No costs.