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PETITIONER: S.T. MUTHUSAMI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: K. NATARAJAN & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT20/01/1988

BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) SEN, A.P. (J)

CITATION:  1988 AIR  616            1988 SCR  (2) 759  1988 SCC  (1) 572        JT 1988 (1)   159  1988 SCALE  (1)149

ACT:      Tamil Nadu  Panchayats  Act,  1958-Whether  High  Court could interfere  with an election process at an intermediate stage after  commencement of  election  process  and  before declaration of  result of  election held for filling vacancy in the  office  of  Chairman  of  a  Panchayat  Union  under provisions-Thereof.

HEADNOTE: %      The question for consideration in this case was whether it was  appropriate for  the High Court to interfere with an election  process   at  an   intermediate  stage  after  its commencement and before the declaration of the result of the election held  for filling up a vacancy in the office of the Chairman  of   a  Panchayat   Union  under  the  Tamil  Nadu Panchayats, Act,  1958 (The  Act), on  the ground that there was an  error in  the matter  of allotment of symbols to the contesting candidates.      The appellant.  the respondent  No. 1,  the  respondent No.6 and  two others  were nominated  as candidates  at  the election held  to the  office  of  the  Chairman.  Panchayat Union, Madathukkulam.  On scrutiny of the nomination papers, the nomination  papers of  the appellant, respondents Nos. 1 and 6,  and the  two others  were found  to be  laid by  the Returning officer.  Under rule  17(1 )  of  the  Tamil  Nadu Panchayats (Conduct  of Election  of Chairman  of  Panchayat Union Councils & Presidents and members of Panchayats) Rules 1978.(The Rules),  the Returning officer was directed by the State Government to assign to the candidates of the National and State parties the symbols reserved by the Chief Election Commissioner. The  symbol reserved  for the  Indian National Congress (I)  was ’hand’.  Under the procedure prescribed by the Government,  intimation was  received by  the  Returning officer showing the appellant as the candidate of the Indian National Congress  (I) under the signatures of the President of  the  Tamil  Nadu  Congress  (I)  Committee  on  the  3rd February,  1986.   A  similar  letter  was  handed  over  by respondent No.  6 on  that date showing that he was also the official candidate  of  the  Indian  National  Congress  (I) Committee. That  letter also appeared to have been signed by

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the President  of the  Tamil Nadu  Congress  (I)  Committee. Faced  with   two  persons   claiming  to  be  the  official candidates of the same party, the Returning officer declined to 760 assign the  symbol ’hand’  to either  of the  two. These two candidates, i.e.,  the appellant  and respondent No. 6, then gave in  writing their  choice of  symbols belonging  to the unreserved category.  The  Returning  officer  allotted  the symbol of  ’glass tumbler’  to the  appellant and the symbol ’fish’ to  respondent No.  6.  The  Returning  officer  then published the  list of  the candidates  nominated  with  the symbols allotted  to each  of  the  three  candidates  whose nomination papers  had been  found to be valid. Immediately, on publication  of the said list, the President of the Tamil Nadu Congress  (I) Committee, who was alleged to have signed the letters  in favour  of both the appellant and respondent No. 6  as the  official candidates,  wrote to the respondent No. 3,  the Election  Authority as  well as the Secretary to the Government,  Rural Development Department, Government of Tamil Nadu,  on 4.2.86  stating that  he had  not given  his approval to respondent No. 6 being the official Congress (I) candidate, and  the authorised candidate of the Congress (I) Party was  the appellant.  On receipt  of  the  letter,  the respondent  No.  3  sent  a  message  to  the  Collector  of Coimbatore to  treat the appellant as the official candidate of the  Indian National Congress (I) Party and to assign the symbol  ’hand’  to  him.  The  Collector  communicated  this message to  the Returning  officer on  6.2.86. The Returning officer issued, in accordance with that direction, an Errata Notification in Form IV assigning the symbol ’hand’ reserved for the  Indian National  Congress (I)  to the  appellant on that date itself and sent copies of the said Notification to all the  contesting candidates. This action of the Returning officer  was  challenged  by  respondent  No.  I  a  validly nominated candidate with ’bow and arrow’ as his symbol, by a writ petition in the High Court, contending that the issuing of  the  Errata  Notification  was  an  abuse  of  power  on extraneous and irrelevant considerations and there was undue interference with  the actual  conduct of  the election, and praying that  the Errata Notification dated 6.2.86 should be quashed and  the election,  directed to be proceeded with in accordance with  the Notification  issued  on  3.2.86  under which the  ’glass tumbler’  symbol had  been allotted to the appellant. The  High Court (Single Judge) dismissed the writ petition holding  that the petitioner respondent No. I could not be considered as an aggrieved party and that the dispute could be,  if at  all, between  the appellant and respondent No. 6.  The respondent No. I filed an appeal before the High Court. A  Division Bench  allowed the  appeal,  quashed  the Errata Notification  issued by  the  Returning  officer  and directed him  to hold  the election  on  the  basis  of  the symbols originally allotted, treating ’glass tumbler’ as the symbol of  the appellant, etc. Aggrieved by the order of the Division Bench,  the appellant  filed this appeal by special leave. 761      Allowing the appeal, the Court, ^      HELD: The  appellant contended  that the Division Bench was in error in setting aside the Errata Notification issued by the  Returning officer  in exercise  of its  jurisdiction under Article  226 of  the Constitution  of India before the declaration of  the result  of the  election in  view of  an alternative remedy  under the  Rules  framed  under  section

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178(2)(iii) of  the  Act,  entitled  "Decision  of  Election Disputes Relating to Panchayat Union Councils". [766A-B]      Rule 5  of the  Rules  provided  that  subject  to  the superintendence,  direction  and  control  of  the  Election Authority the  Returning officer  should be  responsible for the proper  conduct of  the election  under the  Rules.  The instructions  issued   by  the  Election  Authority  to  the Returning officer  regarding the  allotment of  the  symbols could not,  therefore, be construed as interference with the election  process  by  an  authority  unconnected  with  the process of election. Even if there was any mistake committed by either the Election Authority or the Returning officer in the allotment  of symbol  to the  appellant the said mistake could not  amount to a non-compliance with the provisions of the Act  or the  Rules made  thereunder. It  was clear  from clause (c)  of rule  II of the Rules made for the purpose of providing a  machinery for  the  decision  of  the  election disputes relating  to panchayat  union councils  that  every action amounting  to such non-compliance with the provisions of  the   Act  and  the  Rules  made  thereunder  would  not automatically vitiate  an election.  It was  only  when  the election court  on a  consideration of  the entire  material placed before  it at  the trial of an election petition came to the  conclusion that  the result of the election had been materially affected  by such  non-compliance with any of the provisions of  the Act  or the  Rules  made  thereunder  the election of  the returned  candidate could be declared void. Rule I  of the  said Rules  provided that  an election  held under the  Act whether  of a  member or  Chairman  or  Vice- Chairman of  a Panchayat  Union Council  could be  called in question only by an election petition and not otherwise, but the rule  could not have the effect of overriding the powers of the  High Court  under Article 226 of the Constitution of India [767H:768A-F]      In  N.P.  Ponnuswami  v.  Returning  Officer,  Namakkal Constituency and  Ors., 11952]  S.C.R. 213  (decided by  the Full Court)  this court  first laid  down  as  a  matter  of general principle that interference with an election process between the  commencement of  such process  and the stage of declaration of the result by a court would not ordinarily be proper, and  next laid  down that  Article 329  (b)  of  the Constitution 762 had the effect of taking away the jurisdiction under Article 226 of  the Constitution  also in  respect  of  the  dispute arising out  of election during the said period. The view of this Court in the above case laid down a salutary principle. [770A-B]      Taking  into  consideration  all  the  aspects  of  the present case.  including the  fact that the person who filed the writ  petition before  the High Court was not one of the candidates nominated by the Indian National Congress (I) and the fact  the President  of  the  Tamil  Nadu  Congress  (I) Committee had  written that  he had authorised the appellant to contest  as the  candidate on behalf of his party and had not given  his approval  to respondent No. 6 contesting as a candidate on  behalf of  his  party,  the  exercise  of  the jurisdiction by  the High  Court under  Article 226  of  the Constitution in  this  case  could  not  be  supported.  The parties who  were aggrieved  by the  result of  the election could question  the validity  of the election by an election petition which was an effective alternative remedy. [775D-F]      The Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  committed  a serious error  in issuing  a writ  under Article  226 of the Constitution quashing  the Errata Notification allotting the

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symbol ’hand’  to the  appellant. Judgment  of the  Division Bench was  set aside  writ petition  filed in the High Court was dismissed  and the  Returning officer  was  directed  to proceed with  the election  in accordance  with law from the stage at  which it  was interrupted by the order of the High Court. [775G-H]      N.  P.   Ponnuswami  v.   Returning  officer,  Namakkal Constituency and  Ors., [1952] S.C.R. 213; Nanhoo Mal & Ors. v. Hira  Mal &  Ors., [1976]1 S.C.R. 809; Malam Singh v. The Collector, Sehore,  M.P. &  Ors., A.I.R,  1971  M  .P.  195, referred to.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal No 1722 of 1986.      From the  Judgment and  order dated  8 4  ]986  of  the Madras High Court in W A. No. 173 of 1986.      T.S  Krishnamurthy   Iyer,  M.N.   Krishnamani  and  V. Balachandran for the Appellant.      Kailash Vasudev for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 763      VENKATARAMIAH, J.  The question  for  consideration  in this case is whether it is appropriate for the High Court to interfere with  an election process at an intermediate stage after the  commencement of  the election  process and before the declaration  of the  result of the election held for the purpose of  filling a  vacancy in the office of the Chairman of a  Panchayat Union under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Panchayats  Act,   1958  (Act  XXXV  of  1958)  (hereinafter referred to  as ’the  Act’) on  the ground that there was an error  in   the  matter  of  allotment  of  symbols  to  the candidates contesting at such election.      The appellant  - S.T.  Muthusami, respondent  No.  1-K. Natarajan, respondent  No. 6-M.  Thangavelu and  two  others were nominated  as candidates  at the  election held  to the office of  the  Chairman,  Panchayat  Union,  Madathukkulam, Udamalpet Taluk,  Coimbatore District  in the State of Tamil Nadu. The date of scrutiny of the nomination papers was 31st January,  1986   and  the   last  date   for  withdrawal  of nominations was 3rd February, 1986. The election was to take place on  the 23rd  February,  1986.  On  the  date  of  the scrutiny of  the nomination papers, the nomination papers of the appellant, respondent No. 1. respondent No. 6 and of two others were  found to  be valid  by the  Returning  officer, respondent No. 5. As regards the allotment of symbols to the candidates  the  order  made  by  the  State  Government  on 8.1.1986 in  exercise of  the powers under rule 17(1) of the Tamil Nadu  Panchayats (Conduct  of Election  of Chairmen of Panchayat Union  Councils  and  Presidents  and  members  of Panchayats) Rules,  1978 (hereinafter  referred to  as  ’the Rules’) directed  that the Returning officer shall assign to the candidates  set up by the National and the State parties the symbols  reserved for  the purpose by the Chief Election Commissioner. The  symbol reserved  for the  Indian National Congress (I)  was ’hand’.  Similarly the  symbols were  also reserved for  the All  India Anna  Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam and Dravida  Munnetra Kazhagam.  15 other  symbols were also notified by the Returning officer which could be assigned to the independent  candidates contesting  the elections. Under the procedure prescribed by the Government where a candidate was set  up by  a national  party who could claim the symbol which  was  reserved  for  such  national  party,  the  said

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national party  had to  send  an  intimation  to  the  State Election  Authority,  namely,  the  Director  of  the  Rural Development, Madras  (respondent No.  3) intimating  in Form ’A’ annexed to the order of the Government the names and the specimen signatures  of not more than two representatives of the party who had been authorised to send intimations of the names of  the candidates  set up  by the party in respect of the election  to the office of the Chairmen of the Panchayat Union 764 Councils  and  the  Presidents  of  Town  Panchayats.  These representatives of  the parties,  whose names were intimated to the  Director of  the Rural  Development were then either singly or  generally required  to intimate  the names of the persons, whom  the party concerned had authorised to contest as its  official candidates in order of priority in Form ’B’ annexed to  the  Government  order.  If  the  support  to  a candidate was  withdrawn an  intimation was  required to  be sent to  the Returning  officer not  later than 3.00 P.M. On the last date fixed for withdrawal of the nomination papers. If no  intimation was  received before  3.00 PM. On the last date fixed for withdrawal the Returning officer was directed not to  consider any  candidate as a candidate set up by the political party  and not  to assign the symbol for which the priority was  given to  the concerned party. This order also stated that  symbols should be assigned only by drawing lots when there  were conflicting  claims  between  two  or  more candidates and  that no  priority  could  be  given  to  any candidate. In  the case before us intimation was received by the Returning  officer showing the appellant as the official candidate  of   Indian  National   Congress  (I)  under  the signature of  the President  of the  Tamil Nadu Congress (I) Committee by  12.00 noon  on the  3rd of  February, 1986.  A similar letter  was handed over by respondent No. 6 at 12.45 P.M. On  that date  showing that  he was  also the  official candidate of  the Indian  National Congress (I). That letter also appeared  to have  been signed  by the President of the Tamil Nadu  Congress (I)  Committee. Having  found that  two persons were  claiming to  be the official candidates of the same party,  the Returning  officer declined  to  grant  the symbol ’hand’  to any  one of  them. These  two  candidates, i.e., the  appellant and  respondent  No.  6  then  gave  in writing their  choice of symbols belonging to the unreserved category giving  three alternative  choices.  Accepting  the first choice of each of them, the Returning officer allotted at 4.30  P.M. On  3.2.1986 the symbol ’glass tumbler’ to the appellant and  the symbol  ’fish’ to  respondent No.  6. The Returning officer  then proceeded to publish the list of the candidates nominated as per rule 17(2) of the Rules with the symbols allotted  to each  of the  three  candidates,  whose nomination papers  had been  found to  be valid. Immediately after the  publication of  the said  list of  the  nominated candidates, the  President of  the Tamil  Nadu Congress  (I) Committee who  was alleged  to have  signed both the letters given  to   the  Returning  officer  representing  that  the appellant and respondent No. 6 were both official candidates wrote to  the Director  of The Rural Development Department, respondent No.3,  who was  the Election Authority as well as the  Secretary   to  the   Government,   Rural   Development Department, Government  of Tamil  Nadu on  4.2.1986  stating that he had not given his approval to respondent 765 No. 6  being an official Congress (I) candidate and that the authorised candidate  of the  Congress  (I)  Party  was  the appellant, S.T.  Muthusami. On  receipt of  the said  letter

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respondent No.  3-the  Director  of  the  Rural  Development Department, the  Election Authority  sent a telex message to the Collector  of Coimbatore  to treat  the appellant as the official candidate of the Indian National Congress (I) Party and to  assign the  symbol  ’hand’  to  him.  The  Collector communicated  this  message  to  the  Returning  officer  by sending telex  message on  6.2.1986. In accordance with that direction   the   Returning   officer   issued   an   Errata Notification in Form VI assigning of the symbol ’hand’ which had been  reserved for  the Indian  National Congress (I) to the appellant on that date itself and the copies of the said Errata Notification  were sent  by him to all the contesting candidates through  special messengers.  This action  of the Returning officer  was challenged  by  respondent  No.  1-K. Natarajan, who  was a  validly nominated candidate with ’bow and arrow’  as his  symbol by  filing  a  petition  in  Writ Petition No.  1178 of  1986 on the file of the High Court of Madras under  Article  226  of  the  Constitution  of  India contending that  the issuing  of the Errata Notification was an abuse  of power  committed on  extraneous and  irrelevant considerations and  there was  undue interference  with  the actual conduct  of the  election. He  prayed before the High Court that  the Errata Notification dated 6.2.1986 should be quashed and  the election should be directed to be proceeded with in  accordance with the notification issued on 3.2.1986 under which  the ’glass tumbler’ symbol had been allotted to the  appellant.   The  above   Writ  Petition  came  up  for consideration before  the learned  Single Judge  of the High Court on  17.2.1986. The  learned Single Judge dismissed the Writ Petition  holding that  respondent No.  1-K. Natarajan, who had  filed the Writ Petition, could not be considered as an aggrieved  party  since  he  did  not  claim  to  be  the candidate sponsored  by the Indian National Congress (I) and that the  dispute could be, if at all, between the appellant and respondent  No. 6. Aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge,  respondent No.  1 filed  an  appeal  in  Writ Appeal No.  173 of 1986 before the High Court of Madras. The said appeal was heard by a Division Bench and it was allowed on  8.4.1986.   The  Division   Bench  quashed   the  Errata Notification issued  by the  Returning officer  and directed him to  hold the  election  on  the  basis  of  the  symbols originally allotted,  treating ’glass tumbler’ as the symbol of the  appellant and ’fish’ as the symbol of respondent No. 6. The  Returning officer  was further  directed to  proceed immediately with  the election  process from  that stage  as provided by  the  Rules.  Aggrieved  by  the  order  of  the Division Bench,  the appellant  has  filed  this  appeal  by special leave. 766      In this  appeal there  is no  dispute about  the  tacts which have  been set  out above.  The  point  urged  by  the appellant before  us is that the Division Bench was in error in setting  aside the  Errata  Notification  issued  by  the Returning officer  in exercise  of  its  jurisdiction  under Article  226   of  the  Constitution  of  India  before  the declaration of  the result  of the  election in  view of the existence of  an alternative  remedy under  the Rules framed under section  178(2)(ii) of  the Act  entitled Decision  of Election Disputes Relating to Panchayat Union Councils’ have provided a  machinery for  the settlement  of  the  election disputes relating  to Panchayat Union Councils. The relevant parts of rule ] and rule 11 of the said Rules read thus:                "I(1) Save as otherwise provided, no election           held under the T.N Panchayats Act, 1958 whether of           a member, chairman or vice-chairman of a panchayat

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         union council  shall be  called in question except           by an  election petition  presented in  accordance           with these  rules to  an election court as defined           in  sub-rule  (2)  by  any  candidate  or  elector           against the  candidate who  has been  declared  to           have been  duly elected  (hereinafter  called  the           returned candidate) .                (2) The election court shall be-                (i) except in cases falling under clause (ii)           in the  case of districts other than the Nilgiris,           the    District    Munsif    having    territorial           jurisdiction over the place in which the office of           the panchayat  union council  is situated,  or  if           there is  more  than  one  such  District  Munsif,           elections  governed  would  and  in  the  case  of           Nilgiris   district    the   Subordinate    Judge,           Ootacamund: and                (ii) where  the Government so direct, whether           in respect  of panchayat  union councils generally           or in  respect of  any class  of  panchayat  union           councils or in respect of panchayat union councils           in the  same district or taluk, such (’ officer or           officers of Government as may be designated by the           Government in  this behalf by name or by virtue of           office:                Provided that  an election  petition may,  on           application, be transferred- 767                (a) if  presented to  a District Munsif under           clause (i),  by the  District Judge  concerned  to           another District  Munsif within  his jurisdiction;           and                (b) if  presented to an officer of Government           under clause  (ii), by  the Government  to another           officer of Government:                Provided  further   that  where  an  election           petition is transferred to any authority under the           foregoing proviso,  such authority shall be deemed           to be the election court.           ..................................................                11.-If in the opinion of the election court-           ..................................................                (c) the  result  of  the  election  has  been           materially affected by any irregularity in respect           of a nomination paper or by the improper reception           or refusal of a nomination paper or vote or by any           non-compliance with  the provisions  of the Act or           the rules  made thereunder,  the election  of such           returned candidate shall be void.           ................................................      The Government  order No  1677 L.A.  dated 8.  10. 1960 provides that  for all the purposes of the Act, the District Collector and the Division Development officer in respect of panchayat constituted  under the  said Act  under  the  area within their respective jurisdiction, the District Collector in respect  of every  panchayat  union  council  constituted under the  Act in  the District  under his  charge  and  the Additional Development  Commissioner, Madras  in respect  of every said  panchayat union council under the said Act shall be  the   election  authorities.  The  expression  ’election authority’ is  defined by  section 2(9)  of the  Act as such authority? not  being the  president or  vice president or a member of  the panchayat or the chairman or vice chairman or a  member   of  the   panchayat  union  council  as  may  be prescribed. Rule 5 of the Rules provides that subject to the

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superintendence,  direction  and  control  of  the  election authority the Returning officer shall be responsible for the proper conduct of the election 768 under  the   rules.  Instructions  issued  by  the  Election Authority to  the Returning  officer regarding the allotment of  the   symbols  cannot,   therefore,  be   construed   as interference with  the  election  process  by  an  authority unconnected with  the process  of election. Even if there is any mistake  committed by  either the  election authority or the Returning  officer in  the allotment  of symbol  to  the appellant the  said mistake   can  only  amount  to  a  non- compliance with  the provisions of the Act or the Rules made thereunder. It  is clear  from clause  (c) of rule 11 of the Rules made  for the purpose of providing a machinery for the decision of  election disputes  relating to  panchayat union councils that  every action amounting to such non-compliance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder would not automatically vitiate an election. It is only when the election court on a consideration of the entire material placed before  it at the trial of an election petition comes to the  conclusion that  the result of the election has been materially affected  by such  non-compliance with any of the provisions of  the Act  or the  Rules  made  thereunder  the election of  the returned  candidate can  be declared  void. Rule 1  of the  said Rules  provides that  an election  held under the  Act whether  of a  member or  chairman  or  vice- chairman of  a panchayat  union council  can  be  called  in question only  by an election petition and not otherwise. In these circumstances  it has  to be seen whether the Division Bench of  the High  Court was justified in setting aside the Errata Notification  issued by  the Returning  officer  with regard to the allotment of symbols.      It is no doubt true that rule (1) of the Rules made for the settlement  of election  disputes which provides that an election can  be questioned  only by  an  election  petition cannot have  the effect of overriding the powers of the High Court under  Article 226  of the  Constitution of  India. It may, however,  be taken  into consideration  in  determining whether it  would be  appropriate  for  the  High  Court  to exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in a case of this nature.      In  N.P.  Ponnuswami  v.  Returning  officer,  Namakkal Constituency and  others, [1952] S.C.R. 218 dealing with the question whether  a writ  petition was a proper remedy which can  be   availed  of  by  (,  a  person  aggrieved  by  any irregularity in the conduct of an election before the result of  the   election  is   declared,  Fazal   Ali,  J.   On  a consideration of  the nature  of litigation  in  respect  of elections observed thus at page 234:                "The conclusions  which I have arrived at may           be summed up briefly as follows: 769                (1) Having  regard to the important functions           which  the   legislatures  have   to  perform   in           democratic   countries,   it   has   always   been           recognized to be a matter of first importance that           elections should be concluded as early as possible           according to  time schedule  and all controversial           matters and  all disputes arising out of elections           should be  postponed till  after the elections are           over, so  that the election proceedings may not be           unduly retarded or protracted.                (2) In  conformity with  this principle,  the           scheme of the election law in this country as well

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         as in  England is  that no  significance should be           attached to  anything which  does not  affect  the           ’election’;  and   if   any   irregularities   are           committed while  it is in progress and they belong           to the  category or  class which, under the law by           which elections are governed would have the effect           of vitiating  the ’election’ and enable the person           affected to  call it  in question,  they should be           brought up  before a  special tribunal by means of           an election  petition and  not be made the subject           of a  dispute before  any court while the election           is in progress."      Having  laid  down  the  above  principles,  the  Court further held  that Article  329(b) of  the  Constitution  of India had  the effect  of ousting  the jurisdiction  of  the courts with  regard  to  the  matters  arising  between  the commencement  of   the  polling  and  the  final  selection. Repelling  the   argument  that   Article  329(b)   of   the Constitution ousted the jurisdiction of the courts only with regard to  matters arising  between the  commencement of the polling and  the final selection and that questions relating to nominations  could be  agitated under  Article 226 of the Constitution this Court observed thus:                "The question  which has  to be asked is what           conceivable reason  the legislature could have had           to leave  only matters  connected with nominations           subject to  the jurisdiction  of  the  High  Court           under Article  226 of the Constitution. If Part XV           of the  Constitution is  a code by itself i.e., it           creates rights  and provides for their enforcement           by a  special tribunal  to the  exclusion  of  all           courts including  the High  Court, there can be no           reason for assuming that the Constitution left one           small part  of the election process to be made the           subject-matter of  contest before  the High Courts           and  thereby   upset  the  time  schedule  of  the           elections The  more reasonable  view seems  to  be           that Article 770           329 covers all ’electoral matters."’      lt is  thus seen  that in the above decision (which was rendered by  the Full Court) this Court first laid down as a matter  of  general  principle  that  interference  with  an election process  between the  commencement of  such process and the  stage of declaration of result by a court would not ordinarily be  proper and next laid down that Article 329(b) of the  Constitution had  the  effect  of  taking  away  the jurisdiction under  Article 226  of the Constitution also in respect of  the disputes  arising out of election during the said period.      Following the above decision in N. P. Ponnuswami’s case (supra) in  Nanhoo Mal  & Ors.  v. Hira Mal & Ors., [1976] 1 S.C R.  809 this  Court held that the right to vote or stand for election  to the  office of the President of a Municipal Board is  a creature  of  the  statute,  that  is  the  U.P. Municipalities Act and it must be subject to the limitations imposed  by  it.  Accordingly,  this  Court  held  that  the election to  the office  of the  President of  the Municipal Board could  be challenged  only according  to the procedure prescribed by  that Act  and that is by means of an election petition presented in accordance with the provisions of that Act and  in no  other way.  The Court  further held that the said Act  provided only for one remedy, that remedy being an election petition  to be  presented after  the election  was over and  there was  no remedy  provided at any intermediate

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stage. Referring  to the decision  in N.P. Ponnuswami’s case (supra) this  Court observed  in the  above decision at page 814 thus:                "These conclusions  follow from  the decision           of this  Court in Ponnuswami’s case (supra) in its           application to  the facts  of this  case. But  the           conclusions above  stated were  arrived at without           taking the provisions of Article 329 into account.           The provisions of Article 329 are relevant only to           the extent  that even the remedy under Article 226           of the  Constitution is  barred as a result of the           provisions. But  once the  legal effect  above set           forth  of  the  provision  of  law  which  we  are           concerned with  is taken  into account there is no           room for  the High Courts to interfere in exercise           of  their   powers  under   Article  226   of  the           Constitution.   Whether    there   can    be   any           extraordinary  circumstances  in  which  the  High           Courts could  exercise their  power under  Article           226 of  the Constitution  in relation to elections           it is  not now  necessary  to  consider.  All  the           considerations applied in coming to the conclusion           that elections to the legislatures 771           should  not   be  delayed  or  protracted  by  the           interference of A Courts at any intermediate stage           before  the  results  of  the  election  are  over           applied with  equal force  to elections  to  local           bodies."      In the  above passage  this Court  clarified  that  the conclusions in  N.P.  Ponnuswami’s  case  (supra)  had  been arrived without  taking the provisions of Article 329 of the Constitution into account and that the provisions of Article 329 of  the Constitution  were relevant  only to  the extent that even  the remedy  under Article 226 of the Constitution was barred  as a  result of  the provisions.  Earlier in the course of  the decision  in Nanhoo  Mal ’s case (supra) this Court observed at page 811:                "After the  decision of  this Court  in N  P.           Ponnuswami   v.    Returning   officer,   Namakkal           Constituency &  Ors. there  is hardly any room for           Courts to entertain applications under Article 226           of  the   Constitution  in   matters  relating  to           elections.      A Full  Bench of  the  High  Court  of  Madhya  Pradesh expressed the  same view  in the  year 1971 earlier in Malam Singh v. The Collector, Sehore, M.P. and others, AIR 1971 MP 195. In  the above decision the High Court of Madhya Pradesh was called  upon  to  consider  the  controversial  question whether it  was proper  that the  High Court should exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in election matters arising  under the  Madhya Pradesh  Panchayats  Act, 1962 at  intermediate stages,  that is,  to  interfere  with individual orders  passed during the process of election and thus impede  that process  or should  it decline to exercise that power  and leave  the parties  to their  remedy  of  an election petition  to be  presented after  the election  was over. The  provision that  fell for consideration before the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in that case was section 375(1)  of the  Madhya Pradesh Panchayats Act, 1962, the language  of which  was identically  the same as that of section 80 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. It was pointed  out that  the Court  in N.P.  Ponnuswami’s case (supra),  having   regard  to   the  words  ’Notwithstanding anything in  this Constitution’  used in Article 329(b) held

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that they  G were  sufficient to exclude jurisdiction of the High Court to deal with any matter which may arise while the elections are  in progress Nevertheless, the decision of the Court in  N.P. Ponnuswami’s  case (supra)  did not  entirely turn on  the language  of Article 329(b) of the Constitution but  the   Court  also   enunciated   certain   well-settled principles applicable  to  election  cases  in  general.  In particular, the Court H 772 interpreted section  80 of  the Representation of the People Act, 1951.  The Full  Bench observed  that though it was not concerned with  Article 329(b)  of the  Constitution, it was bound by  the principles laid down in N.P. Ponnuswami’s case (supra). In  delivering the  judgment of the Full Bench, one of us (Sen, J.) observed:                "9. First  of all,  their Lordships  rejected           the contention that the post-election remedy of an           election petition  was inadequate  to  afford  the           relief  which   the  petitioner   sought.  On  the           strength of  the observations  of Wallace,  J., in           Sarvothama Rao  v.  Chairman,  Municipal  Council,           Saidapet, ILR  47 Mad 585 AIR 1923 Mad 475, it was           urged before them that to drive him to that remedy           would be  an anomaly,  which their  Lordships more           appropriately described  as hardship or prejudice.           It was  further urged  that the  Court  could  not           stultify itself by allowing the wrong which it was           asked to prevent to be actually consummated. While           rejecting the  contention, their Lordships noticed           with  approval   the  following   observations  of           Wallace,  J.   in  Desi   Chettiar  v.  Chinnasami           Chettair, AIR 1928Mad 1271:                     The  petitioner   is  not   without  his                remedy.  His   remedy  lies  in  an  election                petition which  we under stand he has already                put in.  It is  argued for  him  that  remedy                which merely  allows him to have set aside an                election once  held is  not an efficacious as                the one  which would  enable him  to stop the                election altogether  and certain observations                at page  600 of  ILR 47 Mad 585 (AIR 1923 Mad                475) (supra), are quoted. In the first place,                we do  not see  how the  mere fact  that  the                petitioner cannot  get the  election stopped,                and has  his remedy  only after it is over by                an election  petition, will  in itself confer                on him  any right  to obtain  a writ.  In the                second   place,   these   observations   were                directed  to   the   consideration   of   the                propriety of an injunction in a civil suit, a                matter with  which we are not here concerned.                And finally,  it may  be observed  that these                remarks were  made some  years ago  when  the                practice of  individuals  coming  forward  to                stop  elections   in  order  that  their  own                individual interest  may be  safeguarded  was                not so  common. It  is clear  that  there  is                another  side   of   the   question   to   be                considered, namely,  the inconvenience to the                public 773                administration of  having elections  and  the                business of  A Local  Boards  held  up  while                individuals   prosecute    their   individual                grievances.

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              These observations  of Wallace,  J. were made           in regard  to elections  to Local  Boards. It thus           follows that the alternative remedy of an election           petition is  not less  convenient  beneficial  and           effectual." It was then observed:                "Next,   their    Lordships   re-stated   the           principle that  the right  to vote  or stand  as a           candidate for election is not a civil right but is           a creature  of statute  or special law and must be           subject to  the limitations  imposed by  it. Their           Lordships relied  on the  dictum  of  Willes,  J.,           which has become classical:                     It is  now well-recognised  that where a                right or  liability is  created by  a statute                which gives  a special  remedy for  enforcing                it, the  remedy provided by that statute only                must be availed of. This rule was stated with                great clarity by Willes, J., in Wolverhampton                New Water  Works Co.  v. Hawkesford, [1859] 6                CB (NS)  336, at  p. 356,  in  the  following                passage: E                     There are  three  classes  of  cases  in                which a  liability may be established founded                upon statute.  One  is,  where  there  was  a                liability existing  at common  law, and  that                liability is  affirmed  by  a  statute  which                gives a special and a peculiar form of remedy                different from  F the remedy which existed at                common  law;   there,  unless   the   statute                contains  words   which   expressly   or   by                necessary implication  exclude the common law                remedy, the  party suing  has his election to                pursue either  that or  the statutory remedy.                The second  class  of  cases  is,  where  the                statute gives  the right  to sue  merely, but                provides no particular form of remedy; there,                the party  can  only  proceed  by  action  at                common law. But there is a third class, viz.,                where a  liability not existing at common law                is created  by a  statute which  at the  same                time gives  a special  and particular  remedy                for enforcing it ...... The 774                remedy  provided   by  the  statute  must  be                followed, and  A it  is not  competent to the                party to  pursue  the  course  applicable  to                cases of  the second class. The form given by                the statute must be adopted and adhered to                The  rule  laid  down  by  this  passage  was           approved by  the House  of  Lords  in  Neville  v.           London Express  News paper  Ltd., i  1919] AC 368,           and has  been reaffirmed  by the  Privy Council in           Attorney General  of Trinidad and Tobago v. Gordon           Grant &  Co., 119351  AC 532 and Secy. Of State v.           Mask & Co., 44 Cal. WN 709 AIR 1940 PC 105, and it           has also  been held  to be  equally applicable  to           enforcement  of  rights  (see  Hurdutrai  v.  Off.           Assignee of  Calcutta, [1948]  52 Cal WN 343 at p.           349. Further it was observed:                "Lastly, their  Lordships stated that the law           of election  in this  country does not contemplate           that  there  should  be  two  attacks  on  matters           connected  with   election  proceedings,   in  the

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         following passage:                     In my opinion, to affirm such a position                would be  contrary to  the scheme  of ..  the                Representation of  the People Act, which as I                shall point  out later,  seems to be that any                matter which  has the  effect of vitiating an                election should  be brought  up only  at  the                appropriate stage in an appropriate manner be                fore a  special tribunal  and should  not  be                brought up  at an  intermediate stage  before                any Court.  It seems  to me  that  under  the                election law,  the only  significance,  which                the rejection  of  a  nomination  paper  has,                consists in the fact that it can be used as a                ground to call the election in question."      In the ultimate analysis, the Full Bench laid down:                " 12.  There is  no constitutional bar to the           excise  of   writ  jurisdiction   in  respect   of           elections to Local Bodies such as, Municipalities,           Panchayats  and   the  like.  However,  as  it  is           desirable to  resolve election  disputes  speedily           through the  machinery of  election petitions, the           Court in the exer- 775           cise of  its discretion  should always  decline to           invoke  its   writ  jurisdiction  in  an  election           dispute, if  the alternative remedy of an election           petition is  available. So, their Lordships of the           Supreme  Court   in  Sangram   Singh  v.  Election           Tribunal, Kotah, AIR 1955 SC 425 stated:                ....  though   no  legislature   can   impose           limitations on these constitutional powers it is a           sound exercise  of discretion  to bear in mind the           policy of  the legislature  to have disputes about           these special  rights decided  as speedily  as may           be.  Therefore,   writ  petitions  should  not  be           lightly entertained in this class of cases."      We are  inclined to  accept this view which lays down a salutary principle.      The Division  Bench of  the High  Court  against  whose decision the present appeal by special leave is filed was of the view  that the issuing of the Errata Notification by the Returning  officer   amounted  a  very  serious  breach  and interference under  Article 226 of the Constitution of India was called for. Taking into consideration all the aspects of the present  case including  the fact  that the  person  who filed the writ petition before the High Court was not one of the candidates nominated by the Indian National Congress (I) and the  fact that  the President of the Tamil Nadu Congress (I)  Committee  had  written  that  he  had  authorised  the appellant to contest as the candidate on behalf of his party and he  had not  given  his  approval  to  respondent  No  6 contesting as  a candidate  on behalf  of his party, we feel that the  exercise of  the jurisdiction by the High Court in this case  under Article  226 of  the Constitution cannot be supported. The  parties who  are aggrieved  by the result of the election  can question  the validity  of election  by an election petition which is an effective alternative remedy.      We are  of the view that the Division Bench of the High Court committed  a serious  error in  issuing a  writ  under Article  226   of  the   Constitution  quashing  the  Errata Notification allotting the symbol ’hand’ to the appellant by its judgment  under appeal.  We, therefore,  set  aside  the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court and dismiss the writ  petition filed  in the  High Court.  The Returning

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officer shall  proceed with  the election in accordance with law from  the stage at which it was interrupted by the order of the  High Court.  The appeal  is accordingly  allowed. No costs. S.L.                                         Appeal allowed. 776