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PETITIONER: S. SURJIT SINGH KALRA ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA AND ANR. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT13/02/1991

BENCH: SHETTY, K.J. (J) BENCH: SHETTY, K.J. (J) SHARMA, L.M. (J) SAWANT, P.B.

CITATION:  1991 SCR  (1) 364        1991 SCC  (2)  87  JT 1991 (1)   417        1991 SCALE  (1)179

ACT:      Delhi  Rent  Control Act, 1958- Sections  14B  to  14D; 14(1)(e),   14(6)  &  7  and  25C(2)-Classified   Landlords- Landlord’s  right to evict tenant-Tenant’s right  to  resist eviction-Scope  of-Whether  landlord has to prove  his  bona fide requirement.      Section  25B:  Introduction of Sections 14B to  14D  in sub-section  (1)  of Section  25B-Absence  of  corresponding amendments to subsections (4) and (5) as also to the form of summons  specified  in the Third Schedule-Whether  allows  a tenant  to  take  up defence under Section  14  (1)  (e)  as against an application under Sections 14B to 14D.      Sections 25B(5) is self contained and Order 37 Rule  3, CPC has no role there-CPC, 1908, Order 37 Rule 3.      Interpretation  of  statutes-Reading    words   in    a statute-When permissible-Harmonious  construction--Purposive approach   to   be adopted by Courts.

HEADNOTE:      The Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 was amended by Act  57 of  1988  which introduced Sections 14B to 14D  to  the  Act carving  out thereby classified landlords from  the  general class   of  landlords  with  specified  rights  to   recover immediate  possession  of the premises let out  by  them  if these are required for their own residence. The released  or retired  persons from armed forces or the dependents of  the member  of  armed  forces killed in action  are  covered  by Section 14B, the retired employees of the Central Government and of the Delhi Administration are covered by Section  14C, and  the landlords who are widows are  covered   by  Section 14D.  These classified landlords are also given the  benefit of summary trial under Chapter IIIA by introducing  Sections 14B to 14D in Sub-section (1) of Section 25B, but there  are no  corresponding amendments to sub-sections (2) to  (5)  of Section 25B.      The   two  petitioners,  who  are  tenants,   were   in occupation  of the premises belonging to two  Army  Officers (respondent-landlords). In the                                                        365 action  for eviction brought by the landlords on the  ground that  they  needed the premises for  their  occupation,  the

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tenants  sought leave to contest the application  which  the Rent Controller being not satisfied with the facts disclosed by  the  tenants  in  their  affidavits  denied.  The   Rent Controller  accepted the case of the landlords  and  ordered eviction  of  the tenants. The two  tenants  challenged  the eviction orders by filing separate revision petitions in the High Court. They also challenged the validity of Section 14B of  the Act before the High Court by means of  two  separate writ  petitions under Article 226 of the  Constitution.  The High  Court  dismissed the writ petition  and  the  revision petition  filed  by one of the tenants who  being  aggrieved moved this Court by way of special Leave Petition Nos.  7146 JUDGMENT: Court following its decision in the first case dismissed the writ  petition  filed by him, though the  revision  petition filed  by him was still pending. The tenant  challenged  the decision  of  the  High Court by  preferring  Special  Leave Petition No. 7364 of 1990 to this Court.      It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that  the tenant’s  right to contest the application for  eviction  on the  grounds specified in Section 14(l)(e) cannot be  denied even  as  against  the classified  landlords  falling  under Sections  14B  to 14D. The tenant is entitled  to  leave  to contest  the  application by disclosing such  facts  in  the affidavit as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction under Section 14(l)(e). This is because of retention  of  sub-section (5) of Section  25B  without  any amendment  and  absence  of  amendment  to  Section  25C(2). It  was  also  contended that sub-sections (4)  and  (5)  of Section  25B  are a composite scheme and since  that  scheme has   been   left untouched the  tenant’s  right  thereunder cannot  be   denied.  It  was further  contended  that  sub- section (6) of Section 14 is attracted to applications under Sections 14B to 14D.      Dismissing the Petitions, the Court,      HELD: 1. Section 14B is a special provision made by the legislature  conferring certain rights to persons  belonging to  Armed  Forces to recover from  their  tenants  immediate possession of the premises for their occupation. [369E]      2.1  The  Tenant  cannot  claim  right  to  contest  an application for eviction on the grounds specified in Section 14(l)(e)  against  the classified  landlords  falling  under Sections  14B  to  14D. Acceptance of  such  a  claim  would practically   obliterate   the   purpose   and   object   of classification  of landlords under Sections 14B to  14D  who are carved out from                                                        366 the  general  landlords; indeed it would  render  the  whole exercise  of  creating  special classes  of  landlords  with specified  rights to recover immediate of the  premises  let out by them nugatory. [371H-372C]      2.2 The remedy under Section 14(l)(e) is available only to  landlords  in  general  or the  landlords  who  are  not classified   landlords  under  Sections  14B  to  14D.   The classified landlords have been conferred with certain rights which are different from and independent of the rights under Section 14(l)(e). [372E-F]      2.3  Sections  14B to 14D are markedly  different  from Section 14(1)(e).[375E-F]      3.1 The argument that the absence of amendments to sub- sections  (4) and (5) of Section 25B preserves the  tenant’s right  to  contest  the application  of  even  a  classified landlord on the grounds specified under Section 14(l)(e)  is not  sustainable.  Sub-section (4) of Section  25B  provides that the tenant has to obtain leave from the Controller  "as

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hereinafter  provided",  which  in  the  contest  means   as provided under sub-section-(5). This is the only sub-section under which the Controller could give leave to the tenant to contest the application if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses  such facts as would disentitle the landlord  from obtaining  an  order for the recovery of possession  of  the premises. [376G, F]      3.2  The  form specified in the Third  Schedule  refers only to application filed under Section 14(l)(e) or  Section 14A.  Therefore, when an application is filed under  Section 14B, a copy of the application should be sent to the  tenant by  making  necessary amendment to the prescribed  form  and omitting the other references which are not relevant and the summons  should  state that the application is  filed  under Section 14B and not under Section 14(l)(e) or 14A.  Likewise if  the  applications  are under Sections 14C  to  14D,  the summons  should state accordingly. That would  indicate  the scope of defence of the tenant for obtaining leave  referred to in sub-section (5) of Section 25B. [377G-378A]      3.3 Under sub-section (5), the tenant could contest the application  by  obtaining  leave  with  reference  to   the particular   claim  in  the  application  of  the   landlord depending upon whether it is under Sections 14A, 14B, 14C or 14D or under Section 14(l)(e). [378B]      The  tenant cannot be allowed to take up defence  under Section  14(l)(e)  as against an application  under  Section 14B. There cannot be                                                        367 any  defence unconnected with or unrelated to the  claim  or right  of the plaintiff or applicant. That would be  against our  jurisprudence  and would be a mechanical interpretation of  the enactment  defeating  its purpose. The  courts  have always  adopted a purposive approach to  the  interpretation of statutes. [378C-D]      3.4  Section 14B and other allied provisions  ought  to receive  a  purposeful construction and sub-section  (5)  of Section  25B  should  be so construed as  to  implement  the object and purpose of Sections 14B to 14D. It is the duty of the Court to give effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed in Sections 148 to 14D. [378E]      4.  The  tenant  is  entitled  to  raise  all  relevant contentions   as  against  the  claim  of   the   classified landlords.  The fact that there is no reference to the  word bona fide requirement in Sections 14B to 14D do not  absolve the landlord from proving that the requirement is bona  fide or the tenant from showing that it is not bona fide. In fact every  claim  for eviction against a tenant must be  a  bona fide one. There is also enough indication in support of this construction  from  the title  of section 25B  which  states "special  procedure  for the disposal  of  applications  for eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement". [378H-379B]      5. Section 14B and other allied provisions refer to the premises  let  out  and not acquired by  transfer.  One  may become an owner  of  the premises by transfer but the tenant in occupation of the transferred property cannot be  evicted by resorting to Sections 14B to 14D. If the transferee wants to  evict the tenant he must take action only under  Section 14(l)(e).  Equally  Sub-section  (7) of Section  14  has  no application  to eviction under Sections 14B to 14D, nor  the amended  provisions under Section 25C(2). But that does  not mean that the tenants covered under Sections 14B to 14D  are not entitled to any time for surrendering possession of  the premises.  It  is  always left to the Controller  who  is  a quasi-judicial  authority to exercise his discretion  having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case and grant

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a reasonable time to the tenant. [379E-G]      6. The Controller’s power to give leave to contest  the application  filed under Section 14(l)(e) or Section 14A  is cribbed  by the condition that the ’affidavit filed  by  the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from  obtaining an order for the recovery  of possession  of the  premises  on the ground specified’  in  the  respective sections.  Therefore,  if  an  application  is  filed  under Section  14B or  14C or 14D, the tenant’s right  to  contest the application is narrowed down                                                        368 and  is  restricted  to the  parameters  of  the  respective Sections.  He  cannot  widen the scope  of  his  defence  by relying upon Section 14(l)(e). Subsection (5) of Section 25B is  self-contained  and Order 37 Rule 3 CPC has no  part  to play there. [38OB-C]      Busching  Schmitz  Private  Ltd.  v.  P.T.  Menghani  & Anr.,[1977] 2 SCC 835, affirmed and reiterated.      Precision  Steel & Engineering Works and Anr. v.   Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal, [1982] 3 SCC 270, harmonised.      7.  The  landlord in SLP No. 11425/90 is  living  in  a rented  house  and  is paying a rent of  Rs.2,000  p.m.  and requires  the  premises for himself and the members  of  his family. The landlord cannot be denied possession of his  own premises  under section 14B when he is residing in a  rented premises. [38OD-E]      8. The contention that the concerned landlord has taken voluntary  retirement long earlier and has become a part  of the Society just like any other landlord and Section 14B was not  intended to confer such landlord the special  right  to recover   immediate  possession  of  the  premises  is   not maintainable because Section 14B(l) states that the  persons who  have already retired may within one year from the  date of  their release or retirement from such Armed  Forces  or, within a period of one year from the date of introduction of Section 14B, whichever is later, apply to the controller for recovering the immediate possession of their premises.  That is the legislative wisdom. [38OF-G]      9.  True  it  is not permissible to  read  words  in  a statute which are not there, but "where the alternative lies between  either supplying by implication words which  appear to   have   been  accidentally  omitted,   or   adopting   a construction  which deprives certain existing words  of  all meanings,  it  is permissible to supply the  words".  Having regard to the context in which a provision appears and,  the object  of  the  statute  in which  the  said  provision  is enacted, the court should construe it in a harmonious way to make  it meaningful. An attempt must always  be made  so  to reconcile  the relevant provisions as to advance the  remedy intended by the statute. [378E-G] Craies  Statute Law, 7th Edition, P. 109; Hameedia  Hardware Stores  V. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar, [1988] 2 SCC 513 at  524-25, and  Sirajul Haq Khan & Ors. v. The Sunni Central  Board  of Waqf, [1959].1 SCR 1287 at 1299, relied upon.                                                    369

&      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 837. 838 and 839 of 1991.      From  the  Judgment and Order dated  10.5-1990  of  the Delhi  High Court in Civil Writ Petition Nos. 1381, 2994  of 1989 and C.R. No. 954 of 1989.      Soli  J.  Sorabjee, Attorney  General,   Kapil   Sibal,

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Additional Solicitor General, G.L. Sanghi, Dr. Y.S. Chitale, Harish  N. Salve, H.K. Puri, Rajeev Sharma,  Ravinder  Nath, V.B.   Saharya,  P.K-  Jain,  Krishna  Moorthy  Iyer,   Prem Malhotra,  A.C. Sehgal, Mrs. Urmila Sirur, R.L.  Jain,  S.K. Tredal,  Ms.  kitty Kumarmanglam, R.P.  Dave,   Mrs.  Sushma Suri,  Ms.  M.  Biswas and Ashok Mathur  for  the  appearing parties.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. Leave granted. These  appeals  from the decision of the  Delhi  High  Court raise the question with regard to landlord’s right to  evict the tenant under Section 14-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958  (’The Act’) and the corresponding right of the  tenant to  resist  the  eviction proceedings.  Section  14-B  is  a special provision made by the Legislature conferring certain rights to persons belonging to Armed Forces to recover  from their tenants immediate possession of the premises for their occupation.      Mahendra Raj, the common petitioner in S.L.P. Nos. 7146 and  11425/90,  is a tenant occupying the  premises  of  the respondent  Col. Ashok Puri. The petitioner in SLP No.  7364 is  also a tenant, but occupying the premises belonging   to the   respondent   Brig.   V.N. Channa. In  the  action  for eviction brought by the respondents on the ground that  they need  the premises for their occupation, the tenants  sought leave  to contest the application. But the  Rent  Controller was not satisfied with the facts disclosed by the tenants in their affidavits and therefore, denied leave to contest  the application  for eviction. He considered the  affidavits  of the  parties  and  accepted the case  of  the  landlord  and directed  that the tenants shall be evicted. In the case  of Mahendra  Raj,  the Rent Controller made an  order  dated  2 September,  1989 inter alia, observing that the landlord  is living in a rented house, that he is paying rent of Rs.2,000 p.m., and that he requires the premises for himself and  the members of his family. The eviction order was challenged  by the  tenant by means of revision petition before  the  Delhi High  Court. Almost simultaneously, the tenant also filed  a writ                                                        370 petition under Article 226 of the Constitution,  challenging the validity of Section 14-B. On 10 May 1990, the High Court dismissed the revision as well as the writ petition. Against the judgment of the High Court dismissing the writ petition, the  tenant has preferred SLP No. 7146 of 1990. Against  the order  dismissing  the  revision petition,  the  tenant  has preferred SLP No. 11425 of 1990.      The tenant in SLP No. 7364 of 1990 has also  challenged the order of eviction in a revision petition before the High Court  and we are told that the revision is  still  pending. Like  the other tenant, he has also questioned the  validity of Section 14-B before the High Court under Article 226. The High Court dismissed that petition following the decision in Mahendra Raj’s case.      It  would  be  convenient  to  refer  to  the  relevant provisions of the Act ’before dealing with the points raised in  these  cases.  The Act applies  to  premises  which  are defined by Section 2(i) as meaning, inter alia, any building or  part of a building which is, or is intended to  be,  let separately  for use as a residence or for commercial use  or for   any  or  other  purpose.  Section  14  provides   that notwithstanding  anything  to the contrary contained in  any other  law or contract, no decree or order for the  recovery of  possession of any premises shall be passed by any  Court or  Controller in favour of the landlord against  a  tenant.

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This  provision is, however,  subject  to   the   exceptions provided   under  several clauses of  the  proviso.  Section 14(l)(e)  allows a decree for ejectment to be passed if  the Court  or Controller is satisfied that the premises let  for residential purposes are required bona fide by the  landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any  member of  his family dependent on him, provided that the  landlord is  the owner of the premises and he has no other reasonably suitable   residential   accommodation.   The    explanation thereunder  states  that   for  the purpose  of  the  clause 14(1)(e) "premises let for residential purposes" include any premises  which having been let for use as a residence  are, without  the consent of the landlord, used incidentally  for commercial  or other purposes. Section 14(l)(e)  is  further restricted  by sub-sections (6) and (7) of Section 14.  Sub- section  (6) imposes a restriction on the landlord, who  has acquired  any premises by transfer, not to evict the  tenant under Section 14(l)(e) within the period of five years  from the   date  of  acquisition.  Sub-section  (7)  imposes   an obligation on the Court where an order for eviction is  made on  the  ground specified in Section 14(l)(e)  to  give  the tenant  the minimum period  of  six months for  delivery  of possession to the landlord.                                                        371 By  Act 18 of 1976 the Legislature has  introduced   certain changes  in  the  Act with effect  from  1  December,  1975. Section 14-A was introduced in Chapter Ill providing certain rights  to a person occupying residential premises  allotted to  him  by  the  Central  Government  or  any  other  local authority.  If  he is required to  vacate  such  residential accommodation  on  the  ground that he  owns  in  the  Union Territory  of  Delhi, a house in his name or in the name  of his spouse or dependent children, he could recover immediate possession  of his premises let out by  him  notwithstanding anything  contained elsewhere  in  the  Act  or   any  other law  for  the time being in force.  Simultaneously,  Chapter III-A  was  introduced  containing  Section  25-A  to   25-C providing summary trial of the applications filed  landlords classified under Section 14-A and also applications filed by any  other  landlord  for bona  fide  requirement  of  their premises under Section 14(l)(e).      By  the  Amending Act 57 of 1988 some more  classes  of landlords  were  carved  out  from  the  class  of   general landlords. Section 14-B to Section 14-D are the  provisions. The  released or retired persons from armed  forces  or  the dependents  of the  member  of   armed forces who  had  been killed  in  action are covered by Section 14-B.  They  could recover immediate possession of the premises let out by them if  they are required for their own residence.  The  retired employees  of  the  Central  Government  and  of  the  Delhi Administration  are  covered  by Section  14-C.  They  could recover immediate possession of the premises let out by them if  they are needed for their own residence.  The  landlords who  are  widows are covered by Section  14-D  with  similar right  to recover immediate possession of the  premises  let out by them or by their husband. These classified  landlords are  also  given  the benefit of  the  summary  trial  under Chapter III-A, by introducing Sections 14-B to 14-D in  sub- section (1) of Section 25-B. The sub-section (1) of  Section 25-B  as  it  stands provides that every  application  by  a landlord for recovery of possession of any premises on   the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1)  of Section 14, or under Section 14-A or  under  Section 14-B  or under Section 14-C or under Section 14-D  shall  be dealt  with  in accordance with the procedure  specified  in

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this Section. There are however, no corresponding amendments to sub-sections 2 to 5 of Section 25-B.      Omission    to    make    corresponding      amendments particularly,    to sub-sections 4 & 5 of Section 25  B  has given  rise  to the arguments for the petitioners  that  the tenant’s  right to contest the application for  eviction  on the  grounds specified in Section 14(1)(e) cannot be  denied even  as  against  the classified  landlords  falling  under Sections 14-B to 14-D. It                                                        372 was also argued that the classified landlords may prove  the facts stated in their respective provisions, but the  tenant is  entitled to contest the application by  disclosing  such facts  as would disentitle the landlords from  obtaining  an order  of  eviction on the grounds specified  under  Section 14(l)(e).      The acceptance of the submissions urged for petitioners would  practically  obliterate  the purpose  and  object  of classification of landlords under Sections 14-B to 14-D  who are carved out from the general landlords. Indeed, it  would render  the  whole exercise of creating special  classes  of landlords  with  specified  rights  to   recover   immediate possession of the premises let out by them nugatory.      Before  the  introduction  of  Sections  14-B  to   14- D,   Section 14(l)(e) was the only remedy available  to  all landlords  except   those  covered  under  Section  14-A  to recover  possession   of  their   premises.  The  Controller shall give the tenant leave to contest the applications,  if the  tenant in his affidavit discloses such facts  as  would disentitle  the  landlords  from  obtaining  an  order   for recovery  of  possession  of  the premises  on  the  grounds specified  under Section 14(l)(e). It  is  but natural  when the landlord brings an action for recovery of possession  of the  premises  covered under Section 14(l)(e),  the   tenant has  the legitimate right to show that the landlord does not qualify  under  or  satisfy  the  requirements  of   Section 14(l)(e).  But  today  the  remedy under Section 14(l)(e) is available only to landlords in general or the landlords  who are not classified  landlords  under  Sections  14-B  to 14- D. The classified landlords have been conferred with certain rights  which  are  different from and  independent  of  the rights under  Section 14( 1)(e). For a proper understanding, we  may set out Section 14(l)(e), side by side with  Section 14-B. Section 14 (1) (e)              Section 14-B 14.  Protection  of   tenant    14.   B  Right  to   recover against eviction.               immediate    possession    of                                 premises to accrue to members                                 of the armed forces etc. (1) Notwithstanding anything   (1)  Where the  landlord:- to the contrary contained in any  other law or  contract,   (a) is a released or  retired no  order   or decree  for     person   from      any   armed the  recovery  of possession   forces  and the premises  let of  any premises shall be      out  by him are required  for made by any Court on           his  own  residence;  or                                                        373 Controller in favour of  the   (b)  is  a  dependent  of  a landlord against a tenant:     member  of any armed  forces                                who   had  been  killed   in                                action and the premises  let Provided that the Controller   out   by  such  member   are may, on an application  made   required  for the  residence to  him  in  the  prescribed   of   the  family   of   such manner make an order for the   member,

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recovery  of  possession  of the premises on one or  more of  the  following   grounds   Such person or, as the  case only, namely-                  may  be, the dependent  may,                                within  one  year  from  the      xxx   xxx   xxx           date   of  his  release   or                                retirement  from such  armed (e)  that the  premises  let   forces  or, as the case  may for residential purposes are   be,  the  date of  death  of required  bona fide  by  the   such  member,  or  within  a landlord for occupation as a   period of one year from  the residence for himself or for   date of commencement of  the any  member  of  his  family   Delhi      Rent      Control dependent  on him, if he  is   (Amendment)    Act,    1988, the  owner thereof,  or  for   whichever is later, apply to any person for whose benefit   the      Controller      for the  premises are  held  and   recovering   the   immediate that  the landlord  or  such   possession of such premises. person    has    no    other   (2)  Where the landlord is a reasonably suitable residen-   member  of any of the  armed tial accommodation :           forces  and has a period  of                                less than one year preceding                                the  date of his  retirement                                and the premises let out  by                                him are required for his own                                residence     after      his                                retirement,  he may, at  any Explanation:     For     the   time, within a period of one purposes  of  this   clause,   year before the date of  his ’premises      let       for   retirement,  apply  to   the residential        purposes’   Controller  for   recovering include  any premises  which   the immediate possession  of having been let for use as a   such premises. residence  are, without  the consent  of  the   landlord,   (2) Where the landlord is  a used    incidentally     for   member of any of the   armed commercial     or      other   forces  and  has a period of purposes."                     less than one year preceding                                the date  of  his retirement                                and the premises let out  by                                him are required for his own                                residence     after      his                                retirement, he may,  at  any                                time, within a period of one                                year before the date  of his                                retirement,   apply  to  the                                Controller   for  recovering                                the immediate possession  of                                such premises.                                (3)  Where   the    landlord                                referred  to  in sub-section                                (1) or  sub-section  (2) has                                let  out   more   than   one                                premises, it shall be open to                                him to make  an  application                                under  that  sub-section  in                                respect of only one  of  the                                premises chosen by him.                                Explanation: For the purposes                                of this Section ‘armed forces’                                means an armed force  of  the                                Union  constituted  under  an                                Act    of   Parliament    and                                includes  a  member  of   the                                police   force    constituted

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                              under Section 3 of the  Delhi                                Police   Act,  1978  (34   of                                1978)."                                                         374      To  make  the picture complete we may  also  read  sub- sections 6 & 7 of Section 14.           "14(6) Where a landlord has acquired any  premises           transfer,  no  application  for  the  recovery  of           possession  of such premises shall lie under  sub-           section (1) on the ground specified in clause  (e)           of  the proviso thereto, unless a period  of  five           years   has   elapsed  from  the   date   of   the           acquisition.           14(7) Where an order for recovery of possession of           any  premises is made on the ground  specified  in           clause  (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1)  the           landlord   shall   not  be  entitled   to   obtain           possession  thereof  before the  expiration  of  a           period of six months from the date of the order."      Under  Section  14(l)(e),  the  premises  let  out  for residence  could  be  recovered  from  the  tenant,  if  the landlord  requires  the  premises  bona  fide  for  his  own occupation or for any member of his family dependent on him. The  eviction could also be sought for any person for  whose benefit  the  premises are held. The condition  being  apart from  the requirement must be bona fide, there shall  be  no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation for  the landlord  or  for whose benefit the premises are  held.  The explanation  to Section 14(1)(e) provides "premises let  for residential purposes" include any premises which having been let  for use as a residence are without the consent  of  the landlord,   used  incidentally  for  commercial   or   other purposes. That means if with the consent of the landlord the premises   let  for  residential  purposes  are   used   for commercial  or  other  purposes,  the  landlord  will   have difficult  task  to evict such tenant.  Sub-section  (6)  of Section  14  provides protection to the  tenant  from  being evicted  from  the premises which are transferred  to  third parties.The  transferee  landlord must wait for  five  years from the date of the transfer or acquisition before he moves the  Court for eviction of the tenant already in  occupation of  the premises. Sub-section (7) is again a  protection  to the  tenant requiring the Court or the Controller to give  a minimum  period  of six months to vacate from  the  date  of order  of  eviction. This is a complete code  governing  the disposal of application filed under Section 14(1)(e).      Under  Section  14-B the right to evict the  tenant  is available  to two categories of persons, (i) The person  who has let out the premises and, (ii) the dependent of a member of any armed forces who had let                                                        375 out  the premises but killed in action. In the former  case, the  premises must be required for his own residence and  in the latter, for the residence of the family of such  member. It  may  be noted that  Section 14(l)(e) requires  that  the premises  should have been let for residential purposes  but the  landlord who seeks eviction need not be the person  who has let out. But Section 14-B narrows down such right. It is he who has let out alone could evict or the dependent of the person who has let out but since killed in action. Secondly, Section  14-B uses the expression "the premises let  out  by him"  unlike  the expression used in Section  14(l)(e)  "the premises  let out for residential purposes". The  definition of  "premises" under sub-section (2)(i) means "any  building or  part  of  a building which is or  intended  to  be  let,

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separately  for use as a residence or for commercial use  or for any other purpose . . .". It is clear that Section  14-B does not require that the premises should have been let  out for  residential  purposes and the purpose  of  letting  out seems  to be irrelevant. But he who has let out alone  could seek eviction of his tenant or the dependent of , member  of any armed forces who had let out but since killed in action. Section  14-B  also provides the period  of  limitation  for claiming possession of such premises, but no such limitation is  provided  under  Section 14(l)(e).  Sub-section  (3)  of Section 14-B imposes further restriction on the landlord who is having more than one premises. Such a landlord cannot ask for  possession of more than one of the premises but he  can choose any one  of  the premises which he has let out.  Here again  we  find  that  there is no  such  restriction  to  a landlord   covered  under  Section  14(l)(e)  provided   the requirement of the landlord is bona fide and he has no other reasonably  suitable  residential  accommodation.    Section 14(l)(e)   does   not  preclude the  landlord  from  seeking eviction  of more than one premises provided he  establishes the need.      Similar are the provisions in allied Sections 14-C  and 14-D.      It  will  be thus seen that Sections 14-B to  14-D  are markedly different from Section 14(1)(e).      Notwithstanding  these two independent provisions  with specified rights to landlords in general and the  classified landlords,  Counsel  for  the tenants  argued  that  Section 14(l)(e)  is  the  weapon of defence  for  the  tenant  even against the applications under Sections 14-B or 14-C or  14- D.   The  tenant  is  entitled  to  leave  to  contest   the application by disclosing such facts in his affidavit  which would  disentitle  the landlord from obtaining an  order  of eviction  under Section 14(l)(e). This contention is  sought to be supported first, by the retention of sub-section                                                        376 (5)  of Section 25-B without any amendment, second,  absence of   amendment  to   SeCtion   25(C)(2).   It    was    also contended   that  sub-sections 4 & 5 of Section 25-B  are  a composite  scheme  and  since  that  scheme  has  been  left untouched   the   tenant’s   right   thereunder   cannot  be denied.      The  submission if taken to logical  conclusion   leads to   obvious anomaly which will be indicated presently.  But before  we  do that it will be necessary to  deal  with  one other  contention. Sub-section (1) of Section 25-B  provides that every application for the recovery of possession of any premises belonging to persons referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 25-B shall be dealt with in accordance with   the procedure  prescribed  "in  this  Section"  meaning  thereby entire   Section  25-B.  It was also the submission  of  Dr. Chitale  counsel for one of the tenants in these cases.  Mr. Krishna  Moorthy  Iyer  counsel for  the  Union  of   India, however,  argued  that  the  procedure  contemplated   under sub-section (5) of Section 25-B need not be followed by  the Controller  with  regard  to   applications   filed    under Sections   14-B  to  14-D.  According  to counsel  when  the tenant  is  duly  served of  the  application  filed   under Sections  14-B, 14-C or 14-D he has no right to contest  the application unless he files an affidavit stating the grounds on  which he seeks to contest the application  for  eviction and  obtains leave  from  the  Controller. It is  said  that sub-section  (4) itself authorises the Controller to  refuse leave  if  he is satisfied that the grounds set out  in  the affidavit of the tenant would not disentitle the landlord to

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seek eviction.  We  do not think that this contention  could be  accepted.  Indeed,  sub-section (4) itself provides that the  tenant  has to obtain leave from  the  Controller,  "as hereinafter  provided",  which  in  the  context  means   as provided  under  sub-section (5) the meaning  and  scope  of which  will be presently considered. This is the only   sub- section   under  which  the  Controller could give leave  to the tenant to contest the application if the affidavit filed by  the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle  the landlord  from  obtaining  an  order  for  the  recovery  of possession of the premises.      The  argument  that the absence of amendments  to  sub- sections  4  and 5 of Section 25-B  preserves  the  tenant’s right  to  contest  the application  of  even  a  classified landlord  on  the grounds specified under  section  14(l)(e) would be basically faulty. If such argument is available  in respect of sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 25-B, it must be  equally  available to sub-section (2) of  Section  25-B. There  is also no corresponding amendment to the summons  to be issued under subsection (2) and the form specified in the Third Schedule after the introduction of Section 14-B to 14- D. Third Schedule is in these terms:                                                        377                     "The Third Schedule           Form  of  Summons  in a  case  where  recovery  of           possession  of  Premises  is  Prayed  for  on  the           ground of bona fide requirement or under  Section           14-A.           To           (Name,  description and place of residence of  the           tenant)           Whereas Shri  _________________________________has           filed an application (a copy of which is  annexed)           for    your   eviction  from  (here   insert   the           particulars   of  the  premises)  on  the   ground           specified  in  clause (e) of the proviso  to  sub-           section (1) of Section 14, or under Section  14-A;           You are hereby  summoned  to  appear  before   the           Controller  within  fifteen days  of  the  service           hereof  and  to obtain the leave of the Controller           to  contest  the application for eviction  on  the           ground   aforesaid;  in   default   whereof,   the           applicant  will be entitled at any time after  the           expiry  of  the  said period of  fifteen  days  to           obtain  an order for your eviction from  the  said           premises.           Leave  to  appear and  contest   the   application           may    be  obtained  or  an  application  to   the           Controller   supported   by  an  affidavit  as  if           referred  to in sub-section (5) of  Section  25-B.           Given under my hand and seal.           This_________________ day of_____________________           19_______                                                 Controller"      This  form specified in the Third Schedule refers  only to  applications  filed  under  Section  14(l)(e)  or  under Section.14A. Does it mean that the unamended form should  be used  to  issue  notice to the tenant  even  in  case  where application for eviction is not made under Section  14(l)(e) or  14-A?  Is  the tenant entitled to  claim  that  he  must receive  the notice in the unamended form only, since  there is no corresponding amendment to the form after introduction of  Sections 14-B to 14-D? A wooden reading may furnish  him positive  answers,  but  it would  be  ridiculous.  When  an application  is  filed  under Section 14-B, a  copy  of  the

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application should be sent to the tenant by making necessary amendment to the prescribed form and omitting the other                                                        378 references  which  are not relevant. If the  application  is filed under Section 14-B, the summons should state that  the application  is  filed  under Section  14-B  and  not  under Section  14(l)(e) or 14-A. Likewise if the applications  are under  Sections  14-C  to 14-D,  the  summons  should  state accordingly. That would indicate the scope of the defence of the  tenant for obtaining leave referred to  in  sub-section (5) of Section 25-B. Under sub-section (5), the tenant could contest the application by obtaining leave with reference to the  particular  claim in the application  of  the  landlord depending upon whether it is under Section 14-A, 14-B,  14-C or  14-D  or under Section 14(l)(e). The tenant can  not  be allowed to take up defence under Section 14(l)(e) as against an  application  under  Section 14-B. There  cannot  be  any defence unconnected with or unrelated to the claim or  right of  the  plaintiff or applicant. That would be  against  our jurisprudence. It is unlikely that the Legislature  intended the  result for which the counsel for the tenant  contended. It  will  be a mechanical interpretation  of  the  enactment defeating  its  purpose. Such an  interpretation  has  never found  favour  with the Courts which have always  adopted  a purposive  approach  to  the  interpretation  of   statutes. Section 14-B and other allied provisions ought to receive  a purposeful  construction and subsection (5) of Section  25-B should  be  so  construed as to  implement  the  object  and purpose of Section 14-B to 14-D. It is the duty of the Court to  give  effect  to the intention  of  the  Legislature  as expressed in Section 14-B to 14-D.      True  it is not permissible to read words in a  statute which are not there, but "where the alternative lies between either  supplying by implication words which appear to  have been accidentally omitted, or adopting a construction  which deprives  certain  existing  words of all  meanings,  it  is permissible  to supply the words" (Craies Statute  Law,  7th Edition,  p. 109). Similar are the observations in  Hameedia Hardware Stores v. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar, [ 1988] 2 SCC 513 at 524-25  where  it was observed that the court  construing  a provision  should not easily read into it words  which  have not been expressly enacted but having regard to the  context in  which a provision appears and the object of the  statute in  which  the said provision is enacted  the  court  should construe  it in a harmonious way to make it  meaningful.  An attempt  must  always be made so to reconcile  the  relevant provisions as to advance the remedy intended by the statute. (See: Sirajul Haq Khan & Ors. v. The Sunni Central Board  of Waqf, [ 1959] SCR 1287 at 1299).      The tenant of course is entitled to raise all  relevant contentions   as  against  the  claim  of   the   classified landlords. The fact that there is no                                                        379 reference to the word bona fide requirement in sections  14- B  to  14-D does not absolve the landlord from proving  that his requirement is bona fide or the tenant from showing that it  is not bona fide. In fact every claim for eviction of  a tenant  must  be  a  bona fide one.  There  is  also  enough indication in support of this construction from the title of Section  25(B)  which  states  "special  procedure  for  the disposal of applications for eviction on the ground of  bona fide requirement.      It was next urged that sub-section (6) of Section 14 is also  attracted to applications under Section 14-B to  14-D. This  contention   overlooks the express  wordings  of  sub-

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section (6). It refers to premises acquired by transfer  and thereby  the  transferee  becoming  the  landlord.  Such   a landlord  cannot bring an action for eviction of  tenant  in possession of the acquired premises within a period of  five years from the date of acquisition. After five years such  a landlord  can ask for eviction of the tenant  under  section 14(i)(e).  This is indeed, as we said earlier, a  protection to  the tenant. The original landlord who cannot  evict  the tenant  since  he has got many houses under  his  occupation cannot use the device by transferring one of the houses to a third party who could easily evict such a tenant. The tenant in occupation of the transferred premises gets a  protection from  eviction for a minimum period of five  years.  Section 14-B  and other allied provisions refer to the premises  let out  and not acquired  by transfer. One may become an  owner of the premises by transfer but the tenant in occupation  of the  transferred property cannot be evicted by resorting  to sections 14-B to 14-D. If the transferee wants to evict  the tenant  of  such  premises he must take  action  only  under Section 14(l)(e). Equally, sub-section (7) of Section 14 has no application to eviction under Sections 14-B to 14-D.  Nor the   amended  provisions under Section 25(c)(2)  would   be attracted  since  it applies exclusively to tenants  of  the landlords covered under Section 14-A. But that does not mean that the tenants covered under Sections 14-B to 14-D are not entitled  to  any time for surrendering  possession  of  the premises.  it  is  always left to the Controller  who  is  a quasi-judicial  authority to exercise his discretion  having regard  to  the facts and circumstances of  each  case.  The Controller  must exercise his judicial discretion  in  every case of eviction and grant a reasonable time to the tenant.      There is one other  aspect which requires  elucidation. In  Busching Schmitz Private Limited v. P. T.  Meighani  and Anr.,  [1977]  2 SCC 835 this Court while dealing  with  the scope  of  Section 14-A and the corresponding right  of  the tenant to resist the application thereunder, has inter-alia, observed  that  sub-section (5) of Section  25-B  cannot  be equated  with  Order  37  Rule  3  of  the  Code  of   Civil Procedure.  The                                                        380 social  setting demanding summary proceeding, the nature  of the  subject-matter and, above all, the legislative  diction which  has  been deliberately designed, differ  in  the  two provisions. The Controller’s power to give leave to  contest the application filed under Section 14(l)(e) or Section 14-A is cribbed by the condition that the affidavit filed by  the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from  obtaining an order for the recovery of  possession  of the  premises  on  the ground specified  in  the  respective sections. Needless to state, therefore if an application  is filed under Section 14-B or 14-C or 14-D, the tenant’s right to   contest  the  application  is  narrowed  down  and   is restricted to the parameters of the respective sections.  He cannot  widen  the  scope of his  defence  by  relying  upon Section  14(l)(e). We find nothing contrary to our  view  in Precision  Steel & Engineering Works and Anr. v.  Prem  Deva Niranjan  Deva Tayal, [ 1982] 3 SCC 270. Subsection  (5)  of Section 25 is self contained and Order 37 Rule 3 CPC has  no part  to  play  there. We, therefore,  reiterate  the  views expressed in Basching Schmitz Private Limited case.      The  tenant, who is petitioner in SLP No. 11425/90  has suffered  an order of eviction which has been  confirmed  by the High Court in revision. It is found that his landlord is living  in a rented house and is paying a rent  of  Rs.2,000 p.m.  and  he  requires the premises  for  himself  and  the

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members of his family. We concur with the view taken by  the Controller  as  affirmed  by the High  Court.  The  landlord cannot  be  denied  possession of  his  own  premises  under Section 14-B when he is residing in a rented premises.      Before parting with the case, we have to deal with  one other  contention which has been specifically raised by  Mr. Sanghi.  The counsel argued that the concerned landlord  has taken voluntary retirement long earlier and he has become  a part of the society just like any other landlord and Section 14-B  was not intended to confer such landlord, the  special right  to  recover  immediate possession  of  the  premises. Obvious  answer to this contention is found in  Section  14- B(1) which states that the persons who have already  retired may  within  one  year from the date  of  their  release  or retirement from such Armed Forces or, within a period of one year  from  the  date  of  introduction  of  Section   14-B, whichever  is later apply to the Controller  for  recovering the  immediate  possession of their premises.  That  is  the legislative wisdom.      In this view of the matter, the appeals stand  disposed without an order as to costs. D.R.L.                                 Appeals disposed  of.                                                        381