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PETITIONER: S. S. SHETTY

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: BHARAT NIDHI, LTD.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/09/1957

BENCH: BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H. BENCH: BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H. DAS, S.K. GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.

CITATION:  1958 AIR   12            1958 SCR  442

ACT:        Industrial  dispute-Wrongful  dismissal--Tribunal  directing        reinstatement-Failure  to implement award-Benefit  of  rein-        statement-Monetary value-Computation-Code of Civil Procedure        (Act V of 1908), s. 95-Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribu-        nal) Act, 1950 (XLVIII Of 1950), S. 20(1), (2).

HEADNOTE:        The appellant was in the service of the respondent but  sub        sequently  he was discharged on the plea that he had  become        surplus        4443        to the requirement of the respondent.  The Industrial Tribu-        nal  found  that the respondent had been  guilty  of  unfair        labour practice and victimisation and held that the order of        discharge was illegal and that he should be reinstated, with        arrears of salary and allowances from the date of discharge.        The  respondent  having failed to implement the  award,  the        appellant  filed an application under section 2o(2)  of  the        Industrial  Disputes  (Appellate Tribunal)  Act,  1950,  for        computation of the money value of the benefit of  reinstate-        ment.   The Industrial Tribunal assessed the value of  rein-        statement at the sum of Rs. 1,000 by adopting the measure of        damages  as laid down under section 95 of the Code of  Civil        Procedure.  Under the bye-laws framed by the respondent  the        services  of an employee could be terminated on  giving  one        month’s notice.        Held,  that the monetary value of the benefit of  reinstate-        ment  is to be computed not on the basis of a breach of  the        contract of employment nor on the basis of a tort alleged to        have  been committed by the employer by reason of  the  non-        implementation of the direction for reinstatement  contained        in the award.  The computation has to be made by the  Indus-        trial Tribunal having regard to all the.circumstances of the        case,  such a?, the terms and conditions of employment,  the        tenure  of  service, the possibility of termination  of  the        employment at the instance of either party, the  possibility        of retrenchment by the employer or resignation or retirement        by the employee and even of the employer himself ceasing  to        exist,  or  of the employee being awarded  various  benefits        including reinstatement under the terms of future awards  by

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      Industrial  Tribunals  in the event of  industrial  disputes        arising between the parties in the future.        The observations of Greer L. J. in Salt v. Power Plant  Co.,        Ltd. (1936) 3 All E.R. 322, 325, relied on.        In  the  instant case, having regard to  the  bye-laws,  the        appellant  would  have  been entitled to  only  one  month’s        salary in lieu of notice, as and by way of compensation  for        non-implementation  of the direction for reinstatement,  but        this right could not be availed of by the respondent in view        of the finding of the Tribunal that he was guilty of  unfair        labour practice and victimisation, and a correct estimate of        the  value  of the benefit of reinstatement had to  be  made        bearing in mind all the relevant factors.

JUDGMENT:        CIVIL APPELLATTE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 329 of 1956.        Appeal  by special leave from the decision dated  April  29,        1954,  of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lucknow, in  Appeal        No.  III-97 of 1953 arising out of the Award  dated  January        24, 1953, made by the        57        444        Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Calcutta, in  Appli-        cation No. 106 of 1952.        B.R. L. Iyengar and B. C. Misra, for the appellant.        Veda Vyasa, K. L. Mehta and I. S. Sawhney, for the  respond-        ent.        1957.   September 17.  The following Judgment of  the  Court        was delivered by        BHAGWATIJ.-This  appeal  with  special  leave  is   directed        against  the  decision of the Labour Appellate  Tribunal  of        India, Lucknow, confirming, on appeal, the award made by the        Central  Government  Industrial  Tribunal,  Calcutta,  in  a        dispute between the appellant and the respondent.        The  appellant  took  up service with  the  respondent  then        knownm the Bharat Bank Ltd., with effect from July 1,  1944,        as an Inspector at Bombay in the grade of Rs. 170-10-200-20-        400 and was given three increments when the first  increment        fell due as from October 1, 1945.  He was also given  promo-        tions  on October 1, 1946, and on October 1, 1947,  and  was        drawing  Rs.  240 per month plus a special allowance  for  a        servant  -of Rs. 30 per month at the time when he  was  dis-        charged  by  the respondent on August 5, 1949, on  the  plea        that  he  had become surplus to the requirement of  the  re-        spondent.   The Government of India, Ministry of Labour  had        by  Notification No. LR. 2 (273), dated February  21,  1950,        referred  for adjudication to the Central Government  Indus-        trial Tribunal at Calcutta the disputes pending between  the        various banks and their employees, and the appellant’s  case        came  up  for  hearing in the course  of  those  proceedings        before the Tribunal which held on December 5, 1950, that the        order of discharge of the appellant was illegal and that the        respondent  should take him back in service as well  as  pay        the appellant his arrears of salary and allowances from  the        date  of  discharge.  This direction was to be  carried  out        within  a month of the date of the publication of the  award        which  was actually published in the Gazette of India  (Part        II, Section 3, page 1143) of December 30, 1950.                                    445        On  January  30, 1951, the respondent  preferred  an  appeal        against  the  said order to the Labour  Appellate  Tribunal,        Calcutta, sitting at Allahabad, which by its decision  dated        September  25,  1951,  upheld the directions  given  by  the

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      Industrial Tribunal and dismissed the appeal.  The  respond-        ent  failed and neglected to implement the decision  of  the        Labour  Appellate Tribunal within the prescribed  period  in        spite of the appellant’s intimating to the respondent by his        letter  dated October 10, 1951, at its address at  37,  Faiz        Bazar,  Delhi, that he was at Bombay and that he would  like        to  know where he should report himself for duty.   By  this        letter  he  also claimed arrears of  salary  and  allowances        which  had  not till then been paid to him, apart  from  the        payments made under the interim orders of the Labour  Appel-        late Tribunal.  The respondent did not send any reply to the        said letter with the result that the appellant served on the        respondent a notice on November 5, 1951, through his solici-        tors intimating that the respondent had failed and neglected        to  reinstate  the  appellant inspite of  his  letter  dated        October  10,  1951, requesting it to do so.   The  appellant        further  intimated to the respondent that by reason  of  its        failure  to reinstate him within the prescribed  period  the        respondent  had committed a breach of the directions of  the        Labour  Appellate Tribunal and the appellant  had  therefore        become entitled to compensation for the same.  The appellant        therefore called upon the respondent to pay to him a sum  of        Rs.  32,388  as the amount of compensation to which  he  was        entitled on account of the pay he would have earned till his        55th year, i.e., upto May 4, 1960, Provident Fund  contribu-        tion  on pay at 6 1/4 % as allowed by the Rules of the  Bank        and gratuity for about 16 years from July 1, 1944, to May 4,        1960,  at month’s pay per year of service, adjustment  being        made at 6% per annum for payment, if made as demanded.  This        amount was exclusive of other claims against the  respondent        such  as amounts due to him under the order  dated  February        17, 1951, of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Allaha-        bad,  arrears  of salary etc., withheld by  the  respondent.        A,-, the respondent failed        446        and  neglected  to send any reply to the said notice  or  to        comply  with the requisitions therein contained, the  appel-        lant  made  an  application to the Government  of  India  on        February  22, 1952, for recovery of money under s. 20(1)  of        the  Industrial  Disputes  (Appellate  Tribunal)  Act,  1950        (hereinafter  referred  to as " the Act ") to which  he  re-        ceived a reply on May 13, 1952, stating that an  application        for  recovery  of money under that section could  be  enter-        tained only if it was confined to the arrears of salary  and        allowances  from the date of his discharge upto the date  of        the application, and advising him to submit a revised appli-        cation  accordingly.   A suggestion was also  made  in  that        letter  that  the appellant might  approach  the  Industrial        Tribunal, Calcutta, under s.20(2) of the Act for a  computa-        tion  in terms of money of the benefit of reinstatement,  as        it was only when a definite sum had been so determined  that        action for recovery under s. 20(1) of the Act could be taken        by the Government.        It  appears that in the meantime the respondent  had  trans-        ferred  its  banking business under an  agreement  with  the        Punjab National Bank Ltd., and had also changed its name  to        Bharat  Nidhi Ltd.  By its letter dated April 3,  1952,  the        respondent  in  its new name of the Bharat Nidhi  Ltd.,  ad-        dressed  a letter to the appellant stating that due  to  the        transfer  of  its liabilities and equivalent assets  to  the        Punjab  National  Bank  Ltd., and the  closure  of  all  its        branches in India, the appellant was surplus to its require-        ments.  It therefore purported to give to the appellant  two        months’ notice of its intention to terminate the said  award        and  his  services in terms of s. 19(6)  of  the  Industrial

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      Disputes  Act, 1947.  The letter further proceeded to  state        that the appellant had not so far reported himself for  duty        at  -its office at Delhi which was the only office  that  it        had  in India since March 10, 1951, and which was  its  Head        Office  and registered office before that date.  The  appel-        lant replied by his Advocate’s letter dated April 16,  1952,        pointing  out that in spite of his letter dated October  10,        1951,  addressed  to the respondent the latter had  not  in-        formed him as        447        to when and where he should report for duty nor had it cared        to  respond to the same.  He intimated that he  had  already        made  an  application to the Government of  India  under  s.        20(1)  of the Act and was awaiting the result thereof.   The        letter  dated April 3, 1952, addressed by the respondent  to        the  appellant was under the circumstances characterized  by        the appellant as evidently addressed to him with some  ulte-        rior  motive.   The respondent by its letter dated  May  10,        1952, addressed to the appellant reiterated that in spite of        its asking the appellant to do so, he had failed to join its        office.   It stated that by its letter dated April 3,  1952,        it had clearly asked the appellant to join at Delhi but that        the  appellant  had failed to do so and the conduct  of  the        appellant  clearly amounted to evasion of  its  instructions        and absence from duty.  It also stated that the notice dated        April  3, 1952, had effect from the date of receipt  thereof        by the appellant, viz., April 9, 1952.  No further reply was        made by the appellant to the aforesaid letter but it appears        that on June 28, 1952) the respondent addressed a letter  to        the  Under  Secretary, Government of India,  New  Delhi,  in        answer to a communication dated June 12, 1952, addressed  by        the  latter to it that the appellant had already  been  paid        arrears  of his pay and allowances awarded by the  Tribunal,        that he was further asked by it to resume duty which he  had        failed to do, and, in the circumstances be was being consid-        ered  absent from duty.  A copy of the letter dated May  10,        1952, addressed by it to the appellant as also a copy of the        letter  of the same date addressed to the Chief Labour  Com-        missioner (Central), New Delhi, were enclosed therewith  for        information.   Nothing further transpired and on October  8,        1952, the appellant filed the petition under s. 20(2) of the        Act  for  computation of the money value of the  benefit  of        reinstatement  because of non-implementation of  the  direc-        tions contained in the award by the respondent.  He  claimed        a  sum  of Rs. 47,738 computed in the mariner  indicated  in        annexure ’D’ to that petition.        The  respondent filed its written statement on  December  4,        1952, wherein the only plea taken was        448        that there was a flagrant violation by the appellant of  its        instructions to join duty and that thereby the appellant had        forfeited his right to claim reinstatement and all  benefits        flowing therefrom.  It further stated that without prejudice        and with a view to close his case it had offered him  salary        upto  June 19, 1952, by its letter dated November 15,  1952,        under  intimation to the Conciliation Officer, Central  Gov-        ernment, New Delhi, but the appellant had not replied to the        same.   The respondent further contended that the  award  in        question  was in force for -only one year under s. 19(3)  of        the  Industrial  Disputes Act, 1947, and that the  same  was        therefore no longer in force and the respondent had  already        terminated the same.  The claim of the appellant was  there-        fore illegal and preposterous and the respondent prayed that        the petition be dismissed with costs.        The petition came up for hearing before the Central  Govern-

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      ment  Industrial  Tribunal at Calcutta and it  was  observed        that there were three aspects of the case, viz., (i) whether        the respondent refused to implement the award or the  subse-        quent  decision  of  the Labour Appellate  Tribunal  by  not        taking the appellant in service as directed by the Tribunals        (as  urged on behalf of the appellant); (ii) whether it  was        the  petitioner  who failed to resume his duty in  spite  of        having  been asked to do so and thereby forfeited the  right        conferred  upon him in terms of the award (as urged  by  the        respondent); (iii) To what relief or compensation in lieu of        reinstatement  the petitioner was entitled in  the  peculiar        circumstances  in which Bharat Bank ceased functioning  soon        after  the  award  of December, 1950, and in  the  light  of        various other applications of other employees in which  only        retrenchment relief was awarded.  On the first two questions        the Industrial Tribunal held in favour of the appellant  and        then  proceeded to consider the third question, viz., as  to        what  relief  or compensation in lieu of  reinstatement  the        appellant  was  entitled  to.  After  discussing  the  legal        position  it  came  to the conclusion that  the  measure  of        damages was that laid down under s. 95 of. the Code of Civil        Procedure which put it at a figure        449        of  Rs.  1,000.  It therefore assessed the  value  of  rein.        statement asked for at the sum of Rs. 1,000 and awarded that        sum  under  s. 20(2) of the Act.  The other prayers  of  the        appellant  regarding  arrears were not dealt  with  by  the’        Industrial  Tribunal  in so far as they  were  the  subject-        matter  of the application under s. 20(1) of the  Act  which        the  appellant had already made to the  Central  Government.        The appellant being, aggrieved by the award of the Industri-        al Tribunal carried an appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribu-        nal of India at Lucknow.  A preliminary objection was  taken        by the respondent before the Labour Appellate Tribunal  that        the appeal was not competent under the provisions of s. 7 of        the Act.  This objection found favour with the Labour Appel-        late  Tribunal and holding that no substantial  question  of        law  was  raised  by the award it dismissed  the  appeal  as        incompetent.  The appellant applied for and obtained special        leave  to appeal against this decision of the Labour  Appel-        late  Tribunal and that is bow the present appeal is  before        us.        The two questions of fact, viz., (i) whether the  respondent        refused to implement the award by not taking .the  appellant        back  in service and (ii) whether it was the  appellant  who        had failed to resume his duty in spite of having been  asked        to do so and thereby forfeited the right conferred upon  him        in terms of the award are concluded by the findings  arrived        at by the Industrial Tribunal after due consideration of the        correspondence  which passed between the parties.   We  also        have perused the said correspondence and we see no reason to        disturb  those  findings.  If therefore  the  appellant  was        ready  and  willing to be reinstated in the service  of  the        respondent  and was not guilty of any default in the  matter        of  reporting himself for duty, the only question  that  re-        mains  to be considered by us here is what is the amount  at        which this benefit of reinstatement which was awarded to the        appellant should be computed within the meaning of s.  20(2)        of  the Act.  That was the only scope of the enquiry  before        the Industrial Tribunal and we have to determine what is the        correct method of such computation.        450        Section  20(2)  of the Act reads as  follows:--        Section 20.- Recovery of money due from an employer under an        award or decision.

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      (1)...........................        (2)Where any workman is entitled to receive from the empoly-        er  any benefit under an award or decision of an  industrial        tribunal  which  is capable of being computed  in  terms  of        money,  the amount at which such benefit should be  computed        may, subject to the rules made under this Act, be determined        by  that industrial tribunal, and the amount  so  determined        may be recovered as provided for in subsection (1).        It  may  be  noted that sub-section (1)  above  referred  to        provides that:-        any  money due from an employer under any award or  decision        of  an  industrial tribunal may be recovered as  arrears  of        land  revenue or as a public demand by the appropriate  Gov-        ernment on an application made to it by the person  entitled        to the money under that award or decision.        The  petition of the appellant proceeded on the  basis  that        the  benefit of reinstatement which he was entitled  to  re-        ceive  under  the terms of the award was  capable  of  being        computed in terms of money and that position was not disput-        ed by the respondent.  Even though there was no plea by  the        respondent  in  its written statement that  there  were  any        circumstances which made it impossible for the respondent to        reinstate the appellant in its service except the failure of        the appellant to resume his duty in spite of his having been        asked to do so, the respondent. was allowed to lead evidence        in regard to the transfer of its liabilities and  equivalent        assets to the Punjab National Bank Ltd., and the closure  of        its  banking  business in all of its branches  in  India  in        order to show that the respondent was not in default and the        value of the benefit of reinstatement in terms of money  had        thus  dwindled into insignificance.  Reliance was placed  on        the further circumstance that the Punjab National Bank Ltd.,        was  not  under any obligation to take into its  employ  the        employees  of the respondent, that as a matter of fact  only        10% of the employees of the        451        respondent  bad  been absorbed by the Punjab  National  Bank        Ltd., and in regard to the rest who were not so absorbed the        only  sums awarded to them by the Industrial Tribunals  were        salary for the notice month. and retrenchment  compensation.        We are of opinion that these circumstances cannot be availed        of by the respondent.  It is no doubt true that the respond-        ent transferred its liabilities and equivalent assets to the        Punjab  National  Bank Ltd., some time in March  1951.   The        correspondence  which was carried on between  the  appellant        and  the  respondent  however shows that in  spite  of  such        transfer to the Punjab National Bank Ltd., and the change of        the  name  of the respondent from the Bharat Bank  Ltd.,  to        Bharat  Nidhi  Ltd.,  the respondent  never  contended  that        Bharat  Nidhi  Ltd. was not in a position to  reinstate  the        appellant in its service.  The correspondence proceeded  all        along on the footing that Bharat Nidhi Ltd., was in a  posi-        tion  to  reinstate the appellant in its service  and  as  a        matter  of  fact took up the plea that it  had  invited  the        appellant  to  join it at Delhi but that the  appellant  bad        failed and neglected to do so.  Not only in its letter dated        May  10,  1952, did the Bharat Nidhi Ltd.,  state  that  the        appellant’s failure to join it at Delhi amounted to  absence        from  duty but as late as June 28, 1952, in its  letter  ad-        dressed  to the Under Secretary to the Government of  India,        New  Delhi,  it reiterated that the appellant was  asked  to        resume  duty which he had failed to do and that in the  cir-        cumstances he was being considered as absent from duty.   It        is  clear therefore that the Bharat Nidhi Ltd., was all  the        time insisting that the appellant should join its service at

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      Delhi  and never took up the plea that the transfer  of  its        liabilities  and  equivalent assets to the  Punjab  National        Bank  Ltd., and also the possibility of the Punjab  National        Bank  Ltd., not absorbing the appellant in its  employ  were        circumstances available to it by way of defence.  The appel-        lant having become surplus to its requirement was of  course        a  plea taken by it in the course of the correspondence  and        by  its letter dated April 3, 1952, the Bharat  Nidhi  Ltd.,        gave the appellant two months’ notice of its intention to        58        452        terminate  the award and service of the appellant.  In  this        behalf it also relied on the provisions of s. 19 (6) of  the        Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, but when it came  to file its        written  statement  it did not put forward that plea  as  an        answer  to the claim of the appellant under s. 20(2) of  the        Act.   We  fail to understand therefore  how  these  circum-        stances could ever have been taken into consideration by the        Industrial  Tribunal  while arriving at the  computation  in        terms  of money of the benefit of reinstatement  awarded  to        the  appellant under the terms of the award.  Such  computa-        tion  has therefore got to be made regardless of those  cir-        cumstances  which  were put forward by the respondent  as  a        last resort.        The  Industrial  Tribunal computed the money value  of  this        benefit on the analogy of s. 95 of the Code of Civil  Proce-        dure.  It treated the non-implementation of the direction in        the -award made by an Industrial Tribunal on a par with  the        obtaining  of arrest, attachment or injunction  on  insuffi-        cient  grounds and awarded to the appellant the sum  of  Rs.        1,000  which it deemed to be a reasonable  compensation  for        the  injury caused to him.  Even if the direction  given  by        the Industrial Tribunal in its award be treated as a  statu-        tory  obligation imposed on the respondent,  this  certainly        could not be a measure of compensation or damaoes and it was        fairly  conceded by the learned counsel for  the  respondent        that  he was not in a position to support that part  of  the        judgment.        Mr.  lyengar who appeared for the appellant before us  urged        that  the computation of the money value of the  benefit  of        reinstatement awarded to the appellant should be made on one        or  the other of the three bases which he suggested for  the        purpose,  viz.,  (i) the order of  reinstatement  should  be        construed  as entitling the appellant to the full tenure  of        service  in accordance with the terms of the  original  con-        tract  and  the  appellant should  be  awarded  compensation        commensurate with the salary and the benefits which he would        have  earned during his service with the respondent for  the        full term of 55 years which was the age of  superanntiation;        (ii) the non-implementation of the direction as                                    453        to  reinstatement should be treated as a breach of  contract        on  the part of the respondent and the appellant  should  be        awarded  damages for breach of the contract which  would  be        calculated again on the same, basis; (iii) the non-implemen-        tation should be treated as a breach of a statutory duty and        the appellant should be awarded damages for  non-implementa-        tion  as on a tort committed by the respondent.  The  appel-        lant  would  in that event be entitled not only  to  general        damages  but  also special damages by reason  of  oppressive        conduct on the part of the respondent.        The  position- as it obtains in the ordinary law  of  master        and  servant  is  quite clear.  The  master  who  wrongfully        dismisses  his servant is bound to pay him such  damages  as        will compensate him for the wrong that he has sustained.   "

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      They are to be assessed by reference to the amount earned in        the  service  wrongfully terminated and the time  likely  to        elapse before the servant obtains another post for which  he        is  fitted.  If the contract expressly provides that  it  is        terminable  upon, e.g., a month’s notice, the  damages  will        ordinarily be a month’s wages.................. No compensa-        tion  can  be claimed in respect of the injury done  to  the        servant’s  feelings by the circumstances of  his  dismissal,        nor in respect of extra difficulty of finding work resulting        from those circumstances.  A servant who has been wrongfully        dismissed must use diligence to seek another employment, and        the  fact  that he has been offered a suitable post  may  be        taken  into  account in assessing the damages."  (Chitty  on        Contracts, 21st Ed., Vol. (2), p. 559 para. 1040).        If  the contract of employment is for a specific  term,  the        servant  would  in  that event be entitled  to  damages  the        amount of which would be measured prima facie and subject to        the  rule of maitigation in the salary of which  the  master        had deprived him. (Vide Collier v. Sunday Referee Publishing        Co.,  Ltd. (1)).  The servant would then be entitled to  the        whole  of  the salary, benefits, etc., which he  would  have        earned had be continued in the employ of the master for  the        full        (1) [1940] 4 All E.R.                                    237.        454        term  of  the contract, subject of course to  mitigation  of        damages by way of seeking alternative employment.        Such  damages would be recoverable by the servant  .for  his        wrongful  dismissal by the master only on the basis  of  the        master having committed a breach of the contract of  employ-        ment.   If, however, the contract is treated  as  subsisting        and a claim is made by the servant for a declaration that he        continues in the employ of the master and should be  awarded        his salary, benefits, etc., on the basis of the continuation        of the contract, the servant would be entitled to a declara-        tion that he continues in the employ of the master and would        only  be entitled to the payment of salary, benefits,  etc.,        which  accrued due to him up to the date of the  institution        of the suit.        The  benefit of reinstatement which is awarded to a  workman        under  the  terms  of the award does not become  a  term  or        condition  of  the contract between him  and  the  employer.        There  are no doubt other reliefs by way of changes  in  the        terms and conditions of employment which when awarded by the        appropriate  tribunal might be treated as implied  terms  of        the  contract between the employer and the workers  to  whom        the  award  applies and would enure for the benefit  of  the        worker until varied by appropriate legal proceedings.  There        is  no statutory provision in that behalf contained  in  the        Industrial  "Disputes Act, 1947.  But it is  interesting  to        note that in the Industrial Disputes Order, 1951,  obtaining        in England there is enacted s. 10 which runs as follows:        Section  10: Award to be implied term of contract: Where  an        award  on a dispute or issue has been made by  the  Tribunal        then as from the date of the award or from such other  date,        not  being  earlier than the date on which  the  dispute  or        issue to which the award relates first arose, as the  Tribu-        nal may direct, it shall be an implied term of the  contract        between  the employer and workers to whom the award  applies        that  the terms and conditions of employment to be  observed        under  the  contract shall be in accordance with  the  award        until varied by agreement between the parties or by a subse-        quent award of the Tribunal        455

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      or  until  different terms and conditions of  employment  in        respect  of  the workers concerned are settled  through  the        machinery  of negotiation or arbitration for the  settlement        of  terms  and  conditions of employment in,  the  trade  or        industry  or section of trade or industry or undertaking  in        which those workers are employed.        Whatever  be the position in regard to the terms and  condi-        tions of employment thus varied in accordance with the terms        of  the  award, the benefit of reinstatement  awarded  to  a        workman certainly cannot be treated as part of the  contract        between  him  and the employer.  The effect of an  order  of        reinstatement is merely to set at nought the order of wrong-        ful  dismissal of the workman by the employer and  to  rein-        state him in the service of the employer as if the  Contract        of  employment originally entered into had been  contiuning.        The terms and conditions of the contract which obtained when        the  workman was in the employ of the employer prior to  his        wrongful  dismissal  which has been set  aside  continue  to        govern  the  relations between the parties and  the  workman        continues  in the employ of the employer under  those  terms        and  conditions.  There is no variation of those  terms  and        conditions of the contract.  The only thing which happens is        that the workman is reinstated in his old service as before.        The monetary value of the benefits of such reinstatement  is        therefore to be computed not on the basis of a breach of the        contract  of employment nor on them basis of a tort  alleged        to have been committed by the employer by reason of the non-        implementation of the direction for reinstatement  contained        in the award.  The analogy of a suit for a declaration  that        the workman is continuing in the employ of the employer  and        that he should be paid the safary and benefits, etc.,  which        would have been earned by him up to the date of the institu-        tion of the suit also does not strictly apply for the simple        reason that the workman here is not asking for a declaration        that-he  is still continuing in service on the  ground  that        there  was  a termination of his service  after  the  award,        which  termination  is  void.  What he is asking  for  is  a        computation in terms        456        of  money of the benefit of reinstatement which was  granted        to him by the Industrial Tribunal and which the employer did        not implement.        The  purpose of the enactment of s. 20(2) of the Act is  not        to award to the workman compensation or damages for a breach        of  contract  or a breach of a statutory obligation  on  the        part  of the employer.  Any money which is due from  an  em-        ployer under the award can by virtue of the provisions of s.        20(1) of the Act be recovered by the appropriate  Government        on an application made to it by the workman.  Where  however        any  benefit  which is not expressed in terms  of  money  is        awarded to the workman under the terms of the award it  will        be necessary to compute in terms of money the value of  that        benefit  before the workman can ask the appropriate  Govern-        ment  to help him in such recovery.  Section 20  sub-s.  (2)        provides for the computation in terms of money of the  value        of such benefit and the amount at which such benefit  should        be  computed is to be determined by the Industrial  Tribunal        to which reference would be made by the appropriate  Govern-        ment for the purpose.  Such computation has relation only to        the  date  from which the reinstatement of the  workman  has        been ordered under the terms of the award and would have  to        be made by the Industrial Tribunal having regard to all  the        circumstances  of the case.  The Industrial  Tribunal  would        have  to take into account the terms and conditions  of  em-        ployment, the tenure of service, the possibility of termina-

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      tion of the employment at the instance of either party,  the        possibility  of retrenchment by the employer or  resignation        or  retirement by the workman and even of the employer  him-        self  ceasing to exist or of the workman being awarded  var-        ious  benefits  including reinstatement under the  terms  of        future awards by Industrial Tribunals in the event of indus-        trial disputes arising between the parties in the future.        Even  in the case of ordinary contracts ’between master  and        servant  such  considerations  have  been  imported  by  the        courts.  The observations of Greer,        457        L.J.,  in Salt v. Power Plant Co., Ltd. (1) are apposite  in        this context:        "  This is the case of a man who had, according to my  view,        got an engagement which was to last for life, or at any rate        for the joint lives of himself and the company, but I  think        for his life, because, I think there are authorities to  the        effect  that if a company winds up, that is a  dismissal  of        the  servants, and they can then prove for damages  and  get        their dividend, whatever it may happen to be.   Fortunately,        the  company  has not been wound up, but in  estimating  the        damages,  of course, the tribunal estimating them will  have        to  take into consideration the fact that at any time  after        June 26, 1935, it might have appeared to the directors  that        they had good reasons for terminating the plaintiff’s  serv-        ices, reasons connected with his conduct.  The present value        of  what his salary would be for the rest of his  life  must        also  be considered, and there must also be taken  into  ac-        count the fact that he is a man who might at any time termi-        nate  his  service by his life coming to an end,  and  other        matters with which I need not deal."        These and similar considerations would equally be germane in        the matter of the computation in terms of money of the value        of  the  benefit of reinstatement which was awarded  to  the        appellant in the case before us.        Turning therefore to the terms and conditions of  employment        we  find  that the respondent had enacted bye-laws  for  the        employees of Bharat Bank Ltd., which were applicable to  the        appellant.   Bye-law 9 provides that an employee may  resign        from  the  service of the respondent by giving  one  month’s        notice.  Bye-law 11 provides that the respondent shall  have        the option to terminate an employee’s service on giving  him        the same notice as he is required to give to the  respondent        under rule No. 9 (which can be served even when the employee        may  be  on leave), or by paying him salary for  the  notice        period in lieu of notice, in the absence of an agreement  to        the  contrary,  provided that no notice shall  be  necessary        when he is        (1)  [1936] 3 All E.R. 322, 325.        458        dismissed on account of misconduct, dishonesty, gross negli-        gence,  insubordination or disregard of any of the  standing        instructions.   Bye-law 13 lays down that every employee  is        required to retire on attaining the age of 55 years.  He may        be retained in service after that age only with the  express        sanction  of the authorities but such extension  of  service        will not exceed more than 2 years at a time.        If  regard  be  had to these terms and  conditions,  it  was        possible for the respondent to terminate the service of  the        appellant  by paying him one month’s salary in lieu  of  no-        tice.   If there was nothing more the appellant  would  have        been entitled only to that amount as and by way of compensa-        tion  for nonimplementation of the direction for  reinstate-        ment.  There was however a finding recorded by the Industri-        al  Tribunal  which made the award dated December  5,  1950,

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      that  the respondent had been guilty of unfair labour  prac-        tice  and  victimization and the ordinary right,  which  the        respondent  would  have been in a position to  exercise,  of        terminating  the service of the appellant on giving him  one        month’s salary in lieu of notice could not be availed of  by        the  respondent.   On an industrial dispute  raised  by  the        appellant on the respondent’s terminating his service at any        time  in  the  future, it would be open  to  the  Industrial        Tribunal to go into the question whether the termination  of        the appellant’s service by the respondent was justified  and        if the Industrial Tribunal came to an adverse conclusion, it        would be open to it to reinstate the appellant in the  serv-        ice of the respondent with all back salary, allowances, etc.        Even if the respondent wanted to retrench the appellant, the        same  considerations  would  arise with  a  possible  result        against the respondent.  On the other hand, there was also a        possibility  of the respondent being in the right and  being        entitled to lawfully terminate the service of the  appellant        in which event of course the appellant would be without  any        redress  whatever.   In  computing the money  value  of  the        benefit of reinstatement the Industrial Tribunal would  also        have  to  take into account the present value  of  what  his        salary, benefits,        459        etc’ would be till he attained the age of superannuation and        the value of such benefits would have to be computed as from        the date when such reinstatement was ordered under the terms        of the award.        Having  regard  to the considerations detailed above  it  is        impossible  to  compute the money value of this  benefit  of        reinstatement  awarded  to the appellant  with  mathematical        exactitude and the best that any Tribunal or Court would  do        under  the  circumstances  would be to make  as  correct  an        estimate  as is possible bearing of course in mind  all  the        relevant  factors  pro and con.  We have  ourselves  devoted        very  anxious  thought to this aspect of the matter  and  we        have  come to the conclusion that having regard to  all  the        circumstances of the case it would be reasonable to  compute        the benefit of reinstatement which was awarded to the appel-        lant at an amount of Rs. 12,500 (Rupees twelve thousand  and        five hundred only).        We  accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the  decision        of  the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Lucknow as  well        as  the  award  made by the  Central  Government  Industrial        Tribunal, Calcutta and award that the appellant shall recov-        er  from the respondent the said sum of Rs.  12,500  (Rupees        twelve thousand and five hundred only) being the computation        of  the money value of the benefit of reinstatement  awarded        to  him under the terms of the award of the Central  Govern-        ment Industrial Tribunal at Calcutta dated December 5, 1950.        The respondent will pay the appellant’s costs of this appeal        as  well as the proceedings before the  Industrial  Tribunal        and the Labour Appellate Tribunal.        Appeal allowed.        59        460