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PETITIONER: S.S. RATHORE

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

DATE OF JUDGMENT06/09/1989

BENCH: MISRA RANGNATH BENCH: MISRA RANGNATH VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (CJ) MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) OZA, G.L. (J) RAY, B.C. (J) SINGH, K.N. (J) NATRAJAN, S. (J)

CITATION:  1990 AIR   10            1989 SCR  Supl. (1)  43  1989 SCC  (4) 582        JT 1989 (3)   530  1989 SCALE  (2)510

ACT:     Limitation  Act,  1963--First Schedule--Articles 58  and 113--’When  the  right to sue or cause of action  first  ac- crues’--Interpretation  of--Held to be not from the date  of original  adverse order but from the date when the order  on the statutory appeal is made or six months from the date  of preferring  statutory appeal--Statutory appeals to  be  dis- posed of expeditiously--Ordinarily a period of three to  six months to be the outer limit.

HEADNOTE:     The  plaintiff-appellant was dismissed from  service  by the  Collector  on 13.1.1966. His  departmental  appeal  was dismissed  by  the  Divisional  Commissioner  on  31.8.1966. Thereupon  the  appellant  instituted a  suit  on  30.1.1969 asking  for  a declaration that the order of  dismissal  was inoperative and that he continued to be in service. The suit was  dismissed by the trial court and that order was  upheld by  the appellate courts. In dismissing the suit the  courts below  accepted  the  defence plea that it  had  been  filed beyond  the period of limitation prescribed therefore  under Article  58  of the first Schedule of  the  Limitation  Act. Hence this appeal. This appeal initially came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. At the hearing  reli- ance was placed before a decision of this Court in Sita  Ram Goel v. The Municipal Board, Kanpur & Ors., [1959] SCR  1148 in  support  of the contention that the suit was  barred  by limitation. The Division Bench took the view that the  deci- sion of this Court rendered by five Judge Bench in Sita  Ram Goel’s  aforesaid required reconsideration. This is how  the appeal has come up before a Seven Judge Bench. The  question that  fell for determination by the Court was ’When was  the right  to sue first accrued’ to the appellant  i.e.  whether from  the date when the original adverse order of  dismissal was  passed against him or when  the  departmental/statutory appeal  was finally disposed of. The appellant’s  contention

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is that the original order having merged in the final  order whereby  his departmental appeal was disposed of, the  right to  sue  accrued from that date and on this  reckoning,  the suit filed by him was within time. 44     Allowing  the appeal and remanding the matter  to  trial Court, this Court,     HELD: Powers of adjudication ordinarily vested in courts are  being  exercised under the law by tribunals  and  other constituted authorities. [51H]     In  respect  of many disputes the  jurisdiction  of  the court  is now barred and there is a vesting of  jurisdiction in tribunals and authorities. That being the position, there is  no justification for the distinction between courts  and tribunals in regard to the principle of merger. [51H; 52A]     It  must be held in the instant case, that the order  of dismissal made by the Collector did merge into the order  of the Divisional Commissioner when the appellant’s appeal  was dismissed on 31.8.1966. [52B]     The  cause  of  action first arises  when  the  remedies available  to the public servant under the relevant  service Rules as to redressal are disposed of. [53B]     The cause of action shall be taken to arise not from the date of the original adverse order but on the date when  the order  of the higher authority where a statutory  remedy  is provided entertaining the appeal or representation is  made. Where  no  such order is made, though the  remedy  has  been availed of, a six months’ period from the date of preferring of the appeal or making of the representation shall be taken to  be the date when cause of action shall be taken to  have first arisen. [53H; 54A]     In  every such case until the appeal  or  representation provided  by a law is disposed of, accrual of the  cause  of action  shall  first arise only when  the  higher  authority makes  its order on appeal or representation and where  such order is not made on the expiry of six months from the  date when the appeal was filed or representation was made. [54D]     Redressal of grievances in the hands of the departmental authorities taken an unduly long time. That is so on account of  the fact that no attention is ordinarily  bestowed  over these matters and they are not considered to be governmental business  of substance. This approach has to  be  deprecated and  authorities on whom power is vested to dispose  of  ap- peals and revisions under the service Rules must dispose  of such matters as expeditiously as possible. [52G-H] 45     Ordinarily,  a period of three to six months  should  be the  outer limit. That would discipline the system and  keep the public servant away from a protracted period of  litiga- tion. [53A]     Sita  Ram  Goel v. The Municipal Board, Kanpur  &  Ors., [1959] SCR 1148, overruled.     Madan  Gopal  Rungta v. Secretary to the  Government  of Orissa, [1962] Supp. 3 SCR 906, followed.     Pierce Leslie Co. Ltd. v. Violet Ouchterlony Wapshare  & Ors.,  and  vice  verse, [1969] 3 SCR 203;  State  of  Uttar Pradesh  v.  Muhammad  Nooh, [1958] SCR  595;  Collector  of Customs, Calcutta v. East India Commercial Co. Ltd.,  [1963] 2 SCR 563; Somnath Sahu v. State of Orissa & Ors., [1969]  3 SCC  384; C.I.T.v. Amrit Lal Bhagilal & Co., [1959] SCR  713 and Raghuvir Jha v. State of Bihar & Ors., [1986] Suppl. SCC 372, referred to.

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JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.  207  of 1984.     From  the  Judgment and Order dated 12.3.  1982  of  the Madhya  Pradesh  High Court in Misc Civil Case  No.  539  of 1981. Ranjit Kumar and Subhash Sharma for the Appellant. Prithvi Raj and S.K. Agnihotri for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     RANGANATH MISRA, J. This appeal is by special leave  and is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh by which the High Court has in second appeal  upheld the dismissal of the plaintiff’s suit on the plea of limita- tion.     The  plaintiff, a Government servant of Madhya  Pradesh, was  dismissed  from  service by the Collector  on  13th  of January,  1966.  He preferred an appeal  to  the  Divisional Commissioner and that appeal was dismissed on 31.8.1966. The order  of  dismissal of the appeal was communicated  to  the plaintiff on 19.9.1960. The plaintiff gave notice under s.80 of  the Code of Civil Procedure on 17.6.1969 and  filed  his suit  on 30th of September, 1969, asking for  a  declaration that the order of dismissal was inoperative and he continued to be in service. This 46 suit has been dismissed in the Courts below on acceptance of the  defence  plea that it had not been filed  within  three years from the date when the cause of action first arose, as required  under  Article  58 of the First  Schedule  of  the Limitation Act, 1963.     When  this appeal came up for hearing before a  Division Bench, reliance was placed on the decision of this Court  in Sita Ram Goel v. The Municipal Board, Kanpur & Ors.,  [1959] SCR  1148  in support of the contention that  the  suit  was barred by limitation. The Division Bench extracted a passage from Goel’s judgment where it said:                         ’The result is no doubt  unfortunate               for  the  appellant, because the  trial  court               found  in his favour in regard to his plea  of               wrongful dismissal. If he had only brought the               suit  within the period prescribed by  section               326  of  the Act, he might possibly  have  got               some relief from the Court. He, however, chose               to wait till the decision of the State Govern-               ment  on his appeal and overstepped the  limit               of time to his own detriment. We are unable to               come  to  any other conclusion  than  the  one               reached above and the appeal must,  therefore,               stand  dismissed; but in the peculiar  circum-               stances  of  the case we make no order  as  to               costs’,               and observed:               "Such  unfortunate results should be  avoided,               if it is possible to do so. We are of the view               that  the  decision in Sita  Ram  Goel’s  case               which  has  been decided by a  Bench  of  five               Judges requires to be reconsidered  .....  "               (See 1988 Suppl. SCC 522) That  is  how this appeal has come before  the  Seven  Judge Bench.     The  plaintiff’s  suit was one to obtain  a  declaration that  the order of dismissal was bad and he continued to  be in  service.  To such a suit the Courts below  have  rightly applied  Article 58 of the First Schedule of the  Limitation Act. That Article runs thus:

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                  "58.       To obtain any     Three   When               the right to                              other  declaration. years   sue               first accrues."     Appellant’s  counsel  placed  before  us  the  residuary Article 113 and has referred to a few decisions of some High Courts where in a 47 situation as here reliance was placed on that Article. It is unnecessary to refer to those decisions as on the  authority of the judgment of this Court in the case of Pierce Leslie & Co.  Ltd. v. Violet Ouchterlony Wapshare & Ors. vice  versa, [1969]  3 SCR 203, it must be held that Article 113  of  the Act of 1963, corresponding to Article 120 of the old Act, is a  general  one and would apply to suits to which  no  other Article in the schedule applies.     The  fate  of  this appeal, therefore,  rests  upon  the finding  as to when the right to sue first accrued. All  the three  Courts  have accepted the position that  on  1.3.1966 when  the order of dismissal was made by the Collector,  the right  to  sue first accrued. Admittedly, the suit  was  not filed  within  a period of three years from that  date.  The appeal  was  dismissed on 31.8.1966. The  sixty  days’  time spent for complying with the requirement of notice under  s. 80  of  the  Code of Civil Procedure was  available  to  the plaintiff  in addition to the period of three years. If  the date,  therefore,  counts, from the date  of  the  appellate order, the suit would be within time.     In  Goel’s case the question of merger of the  order  of the lower authority in the order of the higher authority was considered. Adverting to this aspect, Bhagwati, J. who spoke for the Court, said:                         "The  initial difficulty in the  way               of the appellant, however, is that  departmen-               tal  enquiries even though They  culminate  in               decisions  on  appeals or revision  cannot  be               equated  with proceedings before  the  regular               courts of law."     Reliance was placed on the observations of this Court in State Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh, [1958] SCR 595,  where it has been said:                         ....   an order of dismissal  passed               on a departmental enquiry by an officer in the               department  and  an order  passed  by  another               officer  next  higher in  rank  dismissing  an               appeal  therefrom  and an order  rejecting  an               application  for revision by the head  of  the               department  can  hardly be  equated  with  any               propriety  with decrees made in a  civil  suit               under the Code of Civil Procedure by the Court               of  first instance and the  decree  dismissing               the  appeal therefrom by an appeal  court  and               the order dismissing the revision petition  by               a  yet higher court,  .....  because  the  de-               partmental               48               tribunals  of the first instance or on  appeal               or  revision are not regular courts manned  by               persons trained in law although they may  have               the trapping of the courts of law ,’               and the Court proceeded to say:               "The analogy of the decisions of the courts of               law  would, therefore, be hardly available  to               the appellant."     Alternately, the Court also examined the question as  to

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whether when the appeal of the appellate court affirming the decree of the trial court was made, the original decree  had ceased  to be operative. Bhagwati, J. quoted  with  approval another part of the judgment in Moharnmad Nooh’s case, where it was said:               "In  the next place, while it is true  that  a               decree  of  a court of first instance  may  be               said  to merge in the decree passed on  appeal               therefrom  or  even  in the  order  passed  in               revision,  it  does so only for  certain  pur-               poses,  namely, for the purposes of  computing               the period of limitation for execution of  the               decree  as  in  Batuk Nath v.  Munni  Dei,  41               Indian  Appeals  104,  or  for  computing  the               period  of limitation for an  application  for               final  decree in a mortgage suit as  in  Jowad               Hussain  v.  Gendan Singh, 53  Indian  Appeals               197.  But as pointed out by Sir Lawrence  Jen-               kins  in delivering the judgment of the  Privy               Council in Juscurn Soid v. Pirthichand Lal, 40               indian  Appeals  52, whatever  be  the  theory               under  other systems of law, under the  Indian               law  and procedure an original decree  is  not               suspended by the presentation of an appeal nor               is its operation interrupted where the  decree               on appeal is merely one of dismissal. There is               nothing  in  the  Indian law  to  warrant  the               suggestion  that  the decree or order  of  the               court  or tribunal of the first  instance  be-               comes   final  only  on  the  termination   of               all .proceedings by way of appeal or revision.               The  filing of the appeal or revision may  put               the  decree or order in jeopardy but until  it               is reversed or modified it remains effective.’               Bhagwati, J. then said:               "The original decree being thus operative what               we are really concerned with is the  commence-               ment of the period of limitation as prescribed               in the relevant statute and if the               49               statute prescribes that it commences from  the               date  of  the accrual of the cause  of  action               there  is  no getting behind  these  words  in               spite of the apparent inequity of applying the               same."     In  Mohammad Nooh’s case the question for  consideration was  whether  the impugned order in  the  proceedings  under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court was an order  prior  to the Constitution and, therefore,  the  High Court  could  not exercise its jurisdiction or  was  it  one pending  at  the commencement of the  Constitution  and  the revisional  order  being after the  Constitution  came  into force, the writ petition would be maintainable. The  majori- ty,  as  also Bose, J. who otherwise differed,  agreed  that jurisdiction  under Article 226 of the Constitution was  not retrospective.  The majority opinion, however, was  that  it would not be correct to say that the order of dismissal made on  April 20, 1948, merged in the appellate order dated  May 7,  1949,  and both the orders in due course merged  in  the revisional order of April 22, 1950. The original of dismiss- al  was  operative on its own strength.  Bose,  J.  however, observed:                         "I  see no reason why any narrow  or               ultra technical restrictions should be  placed               on  them.  Justice should, in my  opinion,  be

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             administered  in our Courts in a  common-sense               liberal way and be broad-based on human values               rather than on narrow and restricted consider-               ations hedged round with hairsplitting techni-               calities   .....  The final order  was  passed               after  the Constitution on April 22, 1950.  It               is true that if it had been passed before  the               Constitution  came into force on  January  26,               1950, the petitioner would have had no  remedy               in  the Courts. But the Constitution  breathed               fresh  life into this land and conferred  pre-               cious  rights  and privileges  that  were  not               there  before. Why should they be viewed  nar-               rowly?  Why should not that which  would  have               been  regarded  as still pending  for  present               purposes,  if  all  had been  done  after  the               Constitution,  be construed in  any  different               way when the final act, which is the  decisive               one for these purposes, was done after it?" The problem in Mohammad Nooh’s case, therefore, was  differ- ent from what was for consideration in Goel’s case.     In Madan Gopal Rungta v. Secretary to the Government  of Orissa,  [1962]  Suppl. 3 SCR 906, a Constitution  bench  of this Court was 50 examining  the correctness of the finding of the High  Court that  it had no jurisdiction to entertain a  petition  under Article 226 of the Constitution as the revisional order  was that of Government of India located outside its  territorial jurisdiction.  Rungta’s  case took  into  consideration  the judgment in Mohammad Nooh’s case and stated:               "We  are  of  opinion that  the  principle  of               Mohammad  Nooh’s  case  cannot  apply  in  the               circumstances  of the present case. The  ques-               tion  there was whether the High  Court  could               issue  a writ under Art. 226 in respect  of  a               dismissal  which  was  effective  from   1948,               simply because the revision against the  order               of  dismissal was dismissed by the State  Gov-               ernment in April, 1950 after the  Constitution               came into force. It was in these circumstances               that this Court held that the dismissal having               taken place in 1948 could not be the  subject-               matter of an application under Art. 226 of the               Constitution  for that would be giving  retro-               spective effect to that Article. The  argument               that  the  order of dismissal  merged  in  the               order  passed in appeal therefrom and  in  the               final  order of revision was repelled by  this               Court  on two grounds. It was  held,  firstly,               that  the  principle of merger  applicable  to               decrees of courts would not apply to orders of               departmental  tribunals, and,  secondly,  that               the  original  order  of  dismissal  would  be               operative on its own strength and did not gain               greater  efficacy by the subsequent  order  of               dismissal  of  the  appeal  or  revision,  and               therefore, the order of dismissal having  been               passed  before the Constitution would  not  be               open to attack under Art. 226 of the Constitu-               tion.  We  are of opinion that  the  facts  in               Mohd.  Nooh’s case were of a special kind  and               the reasoning in that case would not apply  to               the facts of the present case." The  view  expressed by Wanchoo, J. in Rungta’s  case  meets

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with  our approval. In Rungta’s case this  Court  ultimately held that the order of the State Government had merged  into the order of the Central Government and the High Court  was, therefore, right in its view that it had no jurisdiction.      The  next Constitution Bench decision of this Court  is that of Collector of Customs, Calcutta v. East India Commer- cial Co. Ltd., [1963] 2 SCR 563 where this Court observed:               "The question, therefore, turns on whether the               order of               51               the  original authority becomes merged in  the               order  of the appellate authority  even  where               the  appellate authority merely dismisses  the               appeal  without any modification of the  order               of the original authority. It is obvious  that               when an appeal is made, the appellate authori-               ty can do one of three things, namely, (i)  it               may  reverse the order under appeal,  (ii)  it               may modify that order, and (iii) it may merely               dismiss the appeal and thus confirm the  order               without  any modification. It is not  disputed               that in the first two cases where the order of               the  original authority is either reversed  or               modified  it  is the order  of  the  appellate               authority which is the operative order and  if               the High Court has no jurisdiction to issue  a               writ  to  the appellate  authority  it  cannot               issue  a writ to the original  authority.  The               question  therefore  is whether there  is  any               difference  between  these two cases  and  the               third  case  where  the  appellate   authority               dismisses  the  appeal and thus  confirms  the               order  of the original authority. It seems  to               us that on principle it is difficult to draw a               distinction  between  the first two  kinds  of               orders  passed by the appellate authority  and               the  third kind of order passed by it. In  all               these three cases after the appellate authori-               ty  has disposed of the appeal, the  operative               order is the order of the appellate  authority               whether it has reversed the original order  or               modified  it  or  confirmed it.  In  law,  the               appellate  order of confirmation is  quite  as               efficacious as an operative order as an appel-               late order of reversal or modification."     A 3-Judge Bench decision in the case of Somnath Sahu  v. The State of Orissa & Ors., [1969] 3 SCC 384 is an authority in support of the position as accepted by the two  Constitu- tion  Bench judgments referred to above. There, it was  held in  the  case of a service dispute that the  original  order merged in the appellate order of the State Government and it is the appellate decision which subsisted and became  opera- tive  in law and was capable of enforcement.  That  judgment relied upon another decision of this Court in support of its view  being C.I.T .v. Amrit Lal Bhagilal & Co.,  [1959]  SCR 713.     The distinction adopted in Mohammad Nooh’s case  between a court and a tribunal being the appellate or the revisional authority is one without any legal justification. Powers  of adjudication ordinarily vested in courts are being exercised under  the law by tribunals and other  constituted  authori- ties. In fact, in respect of many disputes the 52 jurisdiction  of  the  court is now barred and  there  is  a vesting  of jurisdiction in tribunals and authorities.  That

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being the position, we see no justification for the distinc- tion between courts and tribunals in regard to the principle of merger. On the authority of the precedents indicated,  it must be held that the order of dismissal made by the Collec- tor did merge into the order of the Divisional  Commissioner when the appellant’s appeal was dismissed on 31.8. 1966.     In  several  States  the Conduct  Rules  for  Government servants require the administrative remedies to be exhausted before  the disciplinary orders can be challenged in  court. Section  20(1)  of the Administrative  Tribunals  Act,  1985 provides:               "20(1). A Tribunal shall not ordinarily  admit               an application unless it is satisfied that the               applicant  had  availed of  all  the  remedies               available  to him under the  relevant  service               rules as to redressal of grievances."     The  Rules relating to disciplinary proceedings do  pro- vide for an appeal against the orders of punishment  imposed on public servants. Some Rules provide even a second  appeal or  a revision. The purport of s. 20 of  the  Administrative Tribunals  Act is to give effect to the  Disciplinary  Rules and the exhaustion of the remedies available thereunder is a condition  precedent  to  maintaining of  claims  under  the Administrative Tribunals Act. Administrative Tribunals  have been set up for Government servants of the Centre and sever- al  States have already set up such Tribunals under the  Act for the employees of the respective States. The law is  soon going to get crystallised on the line laid down under s.  20 of the Administrative Tribunals Act.     In  this background if the original order of  punishment is taken as the date when cause of action first accrues  for purposes of Article 58 of the Limitation Act, great hardship is  bound  to result. On one side, the claim  would  not  be maintainable  if laid before exhaustion of the remedies;  on the other, if the departmental remedy though availed is  not finalised  within  the period of limitation,  the  cause  of action would no more be justiciable having become barred  by limitation.  Redressal  of grievances in the  hands  of  the departmental  authorities take an unduly long time. That  is so  on account of the fact that no attention  is  ordinarily bestowed  over these matters and they are not considered  to be governmental business of substance. This approach has  to be  deprecated  and authorities on whom power is  vested  to dispose  of  appeals and revisions under the  Service  Rules must dispose of such matters as 53 expeditiously as possible. Ordinarily, a period of three  to six months should be the outer limit. That would  discipline the system and keep the public servant away from a protract- ed period of litigation.     We  are  satisfied  that to meet the  situation  as  has arisen here, it would be appropriate to hold that the  cause of  action first arises when the remedies available  to  the public  servant under the relevant service Rules as  to  re- dressal are disposed of.     The  question for consideration is whether it should  be disposal  of one appeal or ’the entire hierarchy of  reliefs as  may have been provided. Statutory guidance is  available from  the provisions of sub-ss. (2) and (3) of s. 20 of  the Administrative Tribunals Act. There, it has been laid down:               "20(2). For the purposes of sub-section (1), a               person shall be deemed to have availed of  all               the remedies available to him under the  rele-               vant  service rules as to redressal of  griev-               ances,

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                       (a)  if a final order has been  made               by the Government or other authority or  offi-               cer  or  other person competent to  pass  such               order  under such rules, rejecting any  appeal               preferred  or  representation  made  by   such               person in connection with the grievances; or                         (b)  where no final order  has  been               made  by tee Government or other authority  or               officer or other person competent to pass such               order  with regard to the appeal preferred  or               representation  made  by  such  person,  if  a               period  of six months from the date  on  which               such  appeal was preferred  or  representation               was made has expired.                         (3) For the purposes of sub-sections               (1) and (2), any remedy available to an appli-               cant by way of submission of a memorial to the               President or the Governor of a State or to any               other  functionary shall not be deemed  to  be               one of the remedies which are available unless               the  applicant  had  elected  to  submit  such               memorial."     We  are  of the view that the cause of action  shall  be taken  to  arise not from the date of the  original  adverse order but on the date when the order of the higher authority where a statutory remedy is provided 54 entertaining the appeal or representation is made and  where no  such order is made, though the remedy has  been  availed of, a six months’ period from the date of preferring of  the appeal or making of the representation shall be taken to  be the  date when cause of action shall be taken to have  first arisen.  We, however, make it clear that this principle  may not  be applicable when the remedy availed of has  not  been provided  by law. Repeated unsuccessful representations  not provided by law are not governed by this principle.     It  is  appropriate to notice  the  provision  regarding limitation under s. 21 of the Administrative Tribunals  Act. Sub-section  (1)  has prescribed a period of  one  year  for making of the application and power of condonation of  delay of  a total period of six months has been vested under  sub- section  (3). The Civil Court’s jurisdiction has been  taken away  by the Act and, therefore, as far as Government  serv- ants are concerned, Article’ 58 may not be invocable in view of the special limitation. Yet, suits outside the purview of the  Administrative Tribunals Act shall continue to be  gov- erned by Article 58.     It  is proper that the position in such cases should  be uniform. Therefore, in every such case only when the  appeal or  representation provided by law is disposed of, cause  of action shall first accrue and where such order is not  made, on  the expiry of six months from the date when  the  appeal was-filed or representation was made, the right to sue shall first accrue.     Submission  of just a memorial or representation to  the Head of the establishment shall not be taken into considera- tion in the matter of fixing limitation.     In view of what we have said above, Goel’s case must  be taken to have not been correctly decided.     Reliance was placed by appellant’s learned counsel on  a recent decision of a Two Judge Bench in the case of Raghubir Jha  v.  State of Bihar & Ors., [1986] Suppl. SCC  372.  The conclusion  reached is in accord with what we have held  but the  legal position was not at all referred to or  examined. It  is  unnecessary to make any further  reference  to  that

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judgment.      Now  coming to the facts of the present  appeal.  Since the  claim has been dismissed on the plea of limitation  and our  conclusion is that the suit was within time, the  judg- ments of the trial Court, the First 55 Appellate  Court  and the High Court are set aside  and  the matter  is remitted to the trial Court for disposal  in  ac- cordance  with  law. Too long a period  has  now  intervened between  the dismissal of the suit and our order of  remand. We,  therefore, direct the learned trial Judge to  take  all effective  steps open to him in law to ensure that the  suit is  disposed of finally before the 15th of  December,  1989. Costs shall abide the event. Y.Lal.                                     Appeal allowed. 56