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PETITIONER: S.   Rm. Ar. S.  Sp.  SATHAPPA CHETTIAR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: S.   Rm. Ar.  Rm.  RAMANATHAN CHETTIAR

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 28/11/1957

BENCH: BOSE, VIVIAN BENCH: BOSE, VIVIAN DAS, SUDHI RANJAN (CJ) AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA DAS, S.K. SARKAR, A.K.

CITATION:  1958 AIR  228            1958 SCR 1015

ACT:    Court  fee, Computation of-Suit for enforcement of  share in joint family Property-Plaintiff’s valuation of the  claim -Value  for purposes of jurisdiction, if must be  the  same- Court-Fees  Act,  1870 (VII of 1870), s.  7  (IV)  (b)-Suits Valuation Act, 1887 (VII of 1887), s. 8.

HEADNOTE: The  computation  of Court fees in suits  falling  under  s. 7(IV) of the Court-Fees Act depends upon the valuation which the  plaintiff in his option puts on his claim and  once  he exercises  his option and values his claim, such value  must also be the value for purposes of jurisdiction under s. 8 of the  Suits Valuation Act.  The value for purposes  of  Court fee,  therefore,  determines  the  value  for  purposes   of jurisdiction in such a suit and not vice versa. 1022 Where, therefore, the Court finds that the case falls  under s.  7(IV)(b)  of the Court-Fees Act, and the  plaintiff  has omitted  to  specifically value his  claim,  liberty  should ordinarily  be given to him to amend his plaint and set  out the amount at which he wants to value his claim.  The  value put for purposes of jurisdiction which cannot be binding for purposes of Court fee, and must be altered accordingly Karam  Ilahi  v. Muhammad Bashir, A.I.R.  (1949)  Lah.  116, referred to. Consequently,  in the present case where the Division  Bench of the Madras High Court was of the opinion that s. 7(IV)(b) of the Court-Fees Act applied but nevertheless held that the valuation  given in the plaint for purposes of  jurisdiction should  be taken to be the valuation for purposes  of  court fee and directed the appellant to pay court fees both on the plaint and the memorandum of appeal on that basis, its order was set aside and the appellant allowed to pay court fees on the amount at which he valued his relief. Held further, that 0. 11, r. 1 of the High Court Fees Rules, 1933,  framed  by the Madras High Court  clearly  indicates, that  S.  12 of the Court Fees Act applies to  the  Original Side of the Madras High Court and it was, therefore, open to

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the Division Bench in a reference to assume jurisdiction and pass appropriate orders thereunder. In the absence of any evidence on the record to show that he had  either  generally or specially been  empowered  by  the Chief  justice in this behalf, the Chamber judge sitting  on the   Original  Side  of  the  Madras  High  Court  has   no jurisdiction  under  s. 5 Of the Court Fees Act  to  pass  a final order thereunder.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 203 of 1956. Appeal  by special leave from the orders dated  January  25, 1955,  of the Madras High Court in C.M.P. No. 9335  of  1954 and S. R. No. 55247 of 1953. K.   S.  Krishnaswamy  Iyengar,  R. Ganapathy  Iyer  and  G. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant. C.   K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India and M.   S. K. Sastri, for the respondent. Venkatakrishnan  and  T. M. Sen, for the  intervener.  1957. November  28.   The  following Judgment  of  the  Court  was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR  J.-This is a plaintiff’s appeal  by  special leave  against the order passed by a Division Bench  of  the Madras High Court on January 25, 1955, 1023 calling  upon him to pay court fees on the valuation of  Rs. 15,00,000 both on his plaint and on his memorandum of appeal and  it raises some interesting questions of law  under  the provisions  of the Court Fees Act (which will  be  described hereafter as the Act). The  appellant bad filed Civil Suit No. 311 of 1951  on  the Original Side of the Madras High Court.  In this suit be had claimed  partition  of the joint family, properties  and  an account in respect of the joint family assets managed by the respondent.   The appellant is the son of Subbiah  Chettiar. His  case was that Subbiah had been adopted by Lakshmi  Achi in  1922.   Lakshmi  Achi was the  widow  of  the  undivided paternal  uncle  of  the respondent.  As  a  result  of  his adoption Subbiah became a coparcener in his adoptive  family and, as Subbiah’s son, the appellant claimed to have a share in  the  joint family properties and in the  assets  of  the joint  family  and that was the basis on which a  claim  for partition  and  accounts was made by the  appellant  in  his suit.   In the plaint it had been alleged that  Subbiah  had filed  a suit for partition of his share and had obtained  a decree  in  the trial court.  The respondent  had  taken  an appeal  against the said decree in the High Court.   Pending the  appeal  the dispute was settled  amicably  between  the parties  and in consideration of payment of a specified  sum and  delivery of possession of certain sites Subbiah  agreed to release all his claims and those of his son, the  present appellant,  in  respect  of the  properties  then  in  suit. According to the appellant, this compromise transaction  did not  bind  the appellant and so he claimed  to  recover  his share  ignoring the said transaction between his father  and the  respondent.  The plaint filed by the  appellant  valued the claim for accounts at Rs. 1,000 under s. 7(iv)(f) of the Act  and  a court fee of Rs. 112-7-0 was paid  on  the  said amount on an ad valorem basis.  In regard to the relief  for partition  the  fixed court fee of Rs. 100 was paid  by  the appellant  under  Art. 17-B (Madras) of Schedule II  of  the Act.  For the purposes of jurisdiction, however, the  appel- lant gave Rs. 15,00,000 as the value of his share.

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130 1024 It  appears that the Registry, on examining the plaint,  was inclined to take the view that the plaint should have  borne court  fee  under  s.  7(v) in  respect  of  the  claim  for partition.  Since the appellant did not accept this view the matter  was referred to the Master of the Court who was  the taxing officer under the Madras High Court Fees Rules, 1933. The Master felt that the issue raised by the Registry was of some importance and so, in his turn, he referred the dispute to the Judge sitting on the Original Side under s. 5 of  the Act.   This  reference  was decided  by  the  Chamber  Judge Krishnaswamy  Naidu  J. on October 18,  1951.   The  learned judge held that the appellant was not bound to set aside the prior   compromise  decree  between  his  father   and   the respondent and that the plaint was governed by Art. 17-B  of Schedule  11.   Accordingly  the  court  fee  paid  by   the appellant in respect of his claim for partition was held  to be in order. In  due  course  the respondent was served and  he  filed  a written  statement raising several contentions  against  the appellant’s  claim for partition and accounts.  One  of  the points raised by the respondent was -that the compromise and the release deed executed by the appellant’s father and  the decree that was subsequently passed between the parties were fair and bona fide transactions and, since they amounted  to a  settlement  of  the disputed  claim  by  the  appellant’s father, the plaintiff was bound by them. Ramaswamy   Gounder  J.  who  heard  the  suit   tried   the respondent’s  contention about the binding character of  the compromise decree as a preliminary issue.  The learned judge held  that there was a fair and bona fide settlement of  the dispute  by the appellant’s father acting as the manager  of his branch and so the appellant was bound by the  compromise decree.   In the result, the appellant’s suit was  dismissed on September 22, 1953. Against  this decree the appellant presented his  memorandum of  appeal  on December 1, 1953.  This memorandum  bore  the same court fees as the plaint.  On examining the  memorandum of  appeal the Registry again raised the question about  the sufficiency of 1025 fees paid by the appellant.  The Registry took the view that the  appellant should have paid court fees under s. 7(v)  of the  Act  in  respect  of his claim  for  partition  as  the appellant’s  claim in substance was a claim for recovery  of possession  based  on title within the meaning of  s.  7(v). The  matter  was then referred to the Master;  but,  in  his turn,  the  Master again made a reference  to  the  Taxation Judge  under  s. 12(2) of the Act.   Thereupon  the  learned Chief Justice constituted a Bench of two judges to deal with this reference. The learned judges who heard the reference did not think  it necessary  to  consider  whether  s.  12  of  the  Act   was applicable  to  the  present appeal.  They  dealt  with  the reference  as  made under s. 5 of the  Act.   The  appellant urged  before  the Division Bench that the order  passed  by Krishnaswami Naidu J. was final since it was an order passed under  s. 5 of the Act.  The learned judges did  not  accept this  contention.   They held that the record did  not  show that  Krishnaswamy Naidu J. had been nominated by the  Chief Justice  to.  hear  the reference under s.  5  either  by  a general  or  a  special order and so no  finality  could  be claimed  for the said order under s. 5 of the Act.   On  the merits  the  learned judges agreed with the  view  taken  by

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Krishnaswamy Naidu J., and held that s. 7(v) of the Act  was not  applicable  to  the appellant’s  claim  for  partition. According  to the learned judges, neither was Art.  17-B  of Schedule II applicable.  They held that the provisions of s. 7(iv)(b)  of the Act applied. That is why the appellant  was directed  to mention his value for the relief  of  partition under  the said section.  It may be mentioned at this  stage that  this order became necessary because in the plaint  the plaintiff  had not specifically mentioned the value for  the relief  of partition claimed by him.  He had  merely  stated that  for  the  relief of partition claimed by  him  he  was paying  a court fee of Rs. 100 in accordance  with  Schedule II,  Art. 17-B.  All that he had done in the plaint  was  to value his total claim for jurisdiction at Rs. 15,00,000. In compliance with this order the appellant valued 1026 his relief to enforce his right to share in the joint family properties in suit at Rs. 50,000, paid the deficit court fee Rs.  1,662-7-0 and re-presented his memorandum of appeal  in court on May 7, 1954. That,  however,  was not the end of the present  dispute  in respect   of  court  fees.   The  Registry  raised   another objection  this time.  According to the Registry, since  the appellant had valued his relief in the suit for purposes  of jurisdiction  at  Rs. 15,00,000, it was not open to  him  to value  his  relief  on the memorandum  of  appeal  under  s. 7(iv)(b)  without an amendment of the valuation made in  the plaint.  Since the appellant did not accept this view of the Registry,  the matter was again placed before the court  for orders.   The appellant then offered to file an  application for  formal  amendment  of his plaint  by  substituting  Rs. 50,000,  in place of Rs. 15,00,000, for  the  jurisdictional value  of  his  relief Accordingly  the  appellant  made  an application  on  October  18,1954.   This  application   was opposed both by the respondent and the Assistant  Government Pleader  on  behalf of the State.  The  learned  judges  who heard  this application took the view that if the  appellant had  given the value in the first instance for  purposes  of jurisdiction he was precluded from giving a different  value at  a  later  stage.   Accordingly  it  was  held  that  Rs. 15,00,000,  which  had been mentioned in the plaint  as  the value  of the appellant’s claim for jurisdictional  purposes should  be treated as the value given by the appellant  also for the purposes of court fees under s. 7(iv)(b) of the Act. The  result was that the application made by  the  appellant for  a formal amendment of the valuation made in the  plaint was rejected.  The learned judges also purported to exercise their  jurisdiction under s. 12(2) of the Act  and  directed that  the  appellant should pay deficit court  fees  on  the basis of Rs. 15,00,000 not only on his memorandum of  appeal but  also on his plaint.  It is this order which  has  given rise to the present appeal. The first point which Shri Krishnaswamy Ayyangar has  raised before  us  on  behalf of the appellant is  that  the  order passed by the learned Chamber Judge on 1027 October  18, 1951, is final under s. 5 of the Act.  By  this order  the  learned Chamber Judge had held that  the  plaint filed in the present suit did not attract the provisions  of s. 7(v) of the Act and that the proper court fee to be  paid was  determined  by  Art. 17-B of Schedule II  of  the  Act. Since the appellant had paid the fixed court fee of Rs. 100, under this latter provision, no objection could be taken  on the ground that sufficient court fee had not been paid.   If this  order bad really been passed under s. 5 of the Act  it

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would  undoubtedly be final.  Section 5 of the Act  provides for procedure in case of difference as to necessity of court fee.  In cases where a difference arises between an  officer whose  duty it is to see that any fee is paid under  Chapter III  and a suitor as to the necessity of paying the  fee  or the  amount  thereof, it has to be referred  to  the  taxing officer whose decision thereon shall be final.  This section further  provides that if the taxing officer, to  whom  such difference is referred by the office, is of opinion that the point raised is one of general importance, he can refer  the said point to the final decision of the Chief Justice of the High  Court  or such judge of the High Court  as  the  Chief Justice shall appoint either generally or specially in  this behalf;  and  it is clear that if the Chief Justice  or  any other  judge appointed in that behalf by the  Chief  Justice decides the matter in question, his decision shall be final. Unfortunately,  however,  in the present. case it  has  been found  by  the Division Bench that dealt  with  this  matter subsequently  that a search of the record did not  show  any general  or  special order which would  have  justified  the exercise of jurisdiction under s. 5 by Krishnaswamy Naidu J. No  doubt Shri Krishnaswamy Ayyangar stated before  us  that the  practice in the Madras High Court always was  to  refer disputes as to proper court fees arising between suitors  on the Original Side and the Registry to the Chamber Judge  and it was always assumed, says Shri Ayyangar, that the  Chamber Judge  on the Original Side was appointed generally to  deal with such disputes.  It is difficult for us to make any such assumption in dealing with the present suit.  Unless we  are satisfied 1028 from  the  record that Krishnaswamy Naidu J.,  bad,  at  the material time, been appointed either generally or  specially to  act under s. 5, it would be difficult to accede  to  the argument  that  the  order  passed by  him  in  the  present proceedings  is  final.   It is frankly  conceded  that  the record  does  not  show  any general  or  special  order  as contemplated  by  s. 5. That is why we must  hold  that  the learned judges of the Division Bench were right in  refusing to attach finality to the order passed by Krishnaswamy Naidu J. It  is  then urged by Shri Krishnaswamy  Ayyangar  that  the learned judges were in error in purporting to exercise their jurisdiction  under s. 12(2) of the Act when  they  directed the appellant to pay additional court fees on the plaint  on the basis of the valuation of Rs. 15,00,000.  His contention is  that  s. 12 does not apply to the appeals  arising  from judgments  and decrees passed in suits on the Original  Side of  the  Madras High Court.  It is perfectly true  that  the question  about  the levy of fees in High  Courts  on  their Original  Sides is governed by s. 3 of the Act and,  if  the matter had to be decided solely by reference to the Act,  it would  not  be  possible  to apply  any  of  the  provisions contained  in  Chapter III of the Act either  to  the  suits filed  on the Original Side of the Madras High Court  or  to the  appeals  arising  from judgments and  decrees  in  such suits.   But it is common ground that, on the plaints  filed on  the Original Side of the Madras High Court,  court  fees are  leviable  under the relevant  provisions  contained  in Chapter  III  of  the  Act and the levy  of  these  fees  is authorised  by  O. 11, r. I of the High  Court  Fees  Rules, 1933.    It  is,  therefore,  necessary  to   inquire   what provisions of the Act have been extended to the suits  filed on the Original Side.  The authority and jurisdiction of the Madras  High  Court  in enacting r. I of O. 11  are  not  in

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dispute.  What is in dispute before us is the effect of  the said  rule.   The  appellant’s case is that  the  said  rule merely contemplates the levy of certain specified court fees as  indicated  in  the  provisions  of  the  Act  which  are expressly  made applicable to the Original Side.   No  other provision of the Act, according to the appellant, 1029 can be said to have been extended and so the learned  judges were  in error in purporting to exercise their  jurisdiction under s. 12(2).  We are not satisfied that this argument  is well-founded.  Order II, r. I reads thus: " O. II, r. 1 of Madras High Court Fees Rules, 1933:- Order II. 1.   The fees and commissions set out in Appendix II  hereto shall be charged by the Registrar, Sheriff, The Reserve Bank of India and the Imperial Bank of India, as the case may be, upon the several documents, matters and transactions therein specified  as  chargeable.   The  commission  chargeable  to Government shall be charged by the Reserve Bank of India and credited  to  Government.  *(To  other  documents  including Memoranda of appeals the Registrar shall apply so far as may be  the law for the time being in force relating  to  court- fees, as regards the scale of such fees, the manner of  levy of  such  fees, the refund of such fees and in  every  other respect,  in  the  manner  and to  the  extent  that  it  is applicable   to   similar  documents   filed   in   original proceedings in a District Court and in appeals from  decrees and orders of a District Court). *Added by R. 0. C. No. 2219 of 1949." It  cannot  be disputed that as a result of  this  rule,  s. 7(iv) (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) of the Act along  with the  proviso as well as Art. 17-B of Schedule II of the  Act applied  to  suits filed on the Original Side  of  the  High Court.  The latter portion of the order which has been added in 1949 obviously makes applicable to the suits and  appeals on the Original Side of the High Court provisions of the Act as  regards the scale of fees, the manner of their levy  and the  refund of fees.  It also makes the relevant  provisions of  the Act applicable in "every other respect".  The  words "in  every  other respect" in the context  clearly  indicate that s. 12 which confers upon the appellate court  authority or jurisdiction to examine the question about the 1030 sufficiency or otherwise of the court fees paid not only  on the  memorandum of appellant but also on the plaint  in  the suit  which  comes before the court of appeal  is  obviously intended  to apply.  It would indeed be illogical  to  apply the  relevant  provisions of the Act for the levy  of  court fees  on plaints and memoranda of appeal and not  to  confer jurisdiction  on  the  appropriate  court  to  examine   the sufficiency  or  otherwise of the court fees  paid  in  that behalf.   The power to entertain claims for refund of  court fees  has been specifically mentioned.  A claim  for  refund can  be  validly made, for instance in a case  where  excess court fee has been paid.  That is why the provisions of  ss. 13, 14 and 15 had to be applied in terms.  If a litigant  is entitled  to make a claim for refund of court fees in  cases governed  by  the  relevant provisions  of  the  Act,  there appears  to  be no reason why it should not be open  to  the court to entertain the question about inadequate payment  of court fees.  Logically, if excess court fees paid should and can   be  refunded  in  these  proceedings,  inadequate   or insufficient court fees paid can and should be dealt with on that footing and orders passed to pay the deficit court fees in such cases.  It is matters of this kind that are  clearly

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covered by the expression "in every other respect" to  which we have just referred.  We, therefore, hold that the learned judges  below were justified in assuming jurisdiction  under sub-ss.  (1) and (2) of s. 12.  Section 12 consists  of  two parts.  Sub-section (1) provides that the question about the proper payment of court fees on the plaint or memorandum  of appeal shall be decided by the court in which such plaint or memorandum of appeal is filed.  It also lays down that  such decision  is  final between the parties to the  suit.   Sub- section (2) confers upon the court of appeal, reference,  or revision, jurisdiction to deal with the question of adequacy of  court fee paid on the plaint whenever the suit in  which such plaint has been filed comes before it and if the  court is satisfied that proper court fees have not been paid  then it  can  pass an order requiring the party to  pay  so  much additional  fee as would have been payable if  the  question had been rightly decided 1031 in  the first instance.  Since the decision of  Krishnaswamy Naidu  J. cannot attract the finality mentioned in, s. 5  of the  Act, it was open to the Division Bench to consider  the correctness of the view taken by the learned Chamber  Judge; and  as  they were satisfied that the plaint  did  not  fall under  Art. 17-B of Schedule II, they were entitled to  pass appropriate orders under s. 12(1) and (2). The  appellant,  however, contends that the  learned  judges were  in  error in directing him to pay court  fees  on  the basis  of the value of Rs. 15,00,000 both on his plaint  and on  his  memorandum of appeal because he  argues  that  this decision  is  inconsistent with the earlier order  that  the proper court fees to be paid on the memorandum of appeal had to  be determined under s. 7(iv)(b) of the Act.  This  order has been passed by the Division Bench under s. 5 of the  Act and  it is final between the parties.  This order gives  the appellant  leave  to  value  his claim  for  the  relief  of partition  and be exercised his option by valuing it at  Rs. 50,000.  The valuation thus made by the appellant in respect of  the value of his relief of partition for the payment  of court fees should and must be taken to be the valuation even for the purposes of jurisdiction and it is on this valuation alone  that the appellant can be justly called upon  to  pay court  fees  both  on the plaint and on  the  memorandum  of appeal.  The learned judges were, therefore, in error in not allowing the appellant leave to make amendment in the plaint so as to bring the plaint in conformity with the  provisions of  s.  7,  sub-s. (iv) of the Act.  That in  brief  is  the appellant’s case. On  the  other hand, on behalf  of  the  IntervenerAdvocate- General of Madras as well as on behalf of the respondent, it was  sought to be urged before us that both the  plaint  and the memorandum of appeal ought to be valued for the purposes of  payment of court fees under s. 7(v) of the Act.   It  is conceded that the question of court fees must be  considered in  the light of the allegations made in the plaint and  its decision cannot be influenced either by the pleas in the 131 1032 written  statement or by the final decision of the  suit  on the  merits.   The  argument, however, is that  if  all  the material  allegations  contained in the  plaint  are  fairly construed  and  taken as a whole it would  appear  that  the plaintiff  has  been  ousted  from  the  enjoyment  of   the properties in suit and his claim for partition in  substance is  a claim for possession of ..the suit properties  and  as such falls within the provisions of a. 7, sub-s. (v) of  the

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Act.   The  question  about proper court  fees  leviable  on plaints in which Hindu plaintiffs make claims for  partition under  varying  circumstances  has  given  rise  to  several conflicting decisions in the High Courts of India.  We  are, however, not called upon to consider the point as to whether s.  7(v)  would  apply to the present suit  or  whether  the present suit would fall under s. 7(iv)(b).  In our  opinion, the decision of the Division Bench of the Madras High  Court that  the  memorandum  of appeal should  be  taxed  for  the purposes of court fee under s.     7(iv)(b)  of the  Act  is final  under the provisions of s.5 of the Act and it  cannot be reopened at this stage. It may be that when the  Division Bench of the Madras High Court considered this matter  under reference made by the Master under s. 5, the respondent  was not  heard.  Normally the dispute between the  litigant  and the Registry in respect of court fees arises at the  initial stage  of the presentation of the plaint or the  appeal  and the defendant or the respondent is usually not interested in such a dispute unless the question of payment of court  fees involves  also  the question of jurisdiction  of  the  court either to try the suit or to entertain the appeal.  There is no  doubt that the question about the adequacy of the  court fees  leviable on the appellant’s memorandum of  appeal  was properly referred by the Master to the learned Chief Justice of  the  Madras  High  Court and has  been  decided  by  the Division  Bench of the said High Court in pursuance  of  the requisite  order made by the Chief Justice in  that  behalf. In  such a case, the decision reached by the Division  Bench must be held to be final under s. 5 of the Act.  That is why we  have  not  allowed  the  merits  of  this  order  to  be questioned in the present 1033 appeal.   We  must,  therefore, deal  with  the  appellant’s contention  on  the  basis  that  the  court  fees  on   his memorandum  of appeal must be levied under s. 7(iv)  (b)  of the Act. The question which still remains to be considered is whether the Division Bench was justified in directing the  appellant to  pay court fees both on the plaint and on the  memorandum of appeal on the basis of the( valuation for Rs.  15,00,000. In  our  opinion, the appellant is justified  in  contending that  this  order is erroneous in law.   Section  7,  sub-s. (iv)(b)  deals with suits to enforce the right to  share  in any property on the ground that it is joint family  property and  the amount of fees payable on plaints in such suits  is "according  to  the  amount at which the  relief  sought  is valued  in  the plaint or memorandum of appeal."  Section  7 further  provides that in all suits falling under  S.  7(iv) the  plaintiff shall state the amount at which the value  of the  relief  is  sought.  If the scheme laid  down  for  the computation of fees payable in suits covered by the  several sub-sections of s. 7 is considered, it would be clear  that, in  respect of suits falling under sub-s. (iv), a  departure has been made and liberty has been given to the plaintiff to value  his  claim  for  the purposes  of  court  fees.   The theoretical  basis of this provision appears to be  that  in cases  in which the plaintiff is given the option  to  value his  claim, it is really difficult to value the  claim  with any precision or definiteness.  Take for instance the  claim for partition where the plaintiff seeks to enforce his right to  share  in any property on the ground that  it  is  joint family  property.   The  basis  of the  claim  is  that  the property  in  respect of which a share is claimed  is  joint family  property.  In other words, it is property  in  which the  plaintiff has an undivided share.  What  the  plaintiff

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purports to do by making a claim for partition is to ask the court  to give him certain specified  properties  separately and  absolutely on his own account for his share in lieu  of his undivided share in the whole property.  Now it would  be clear  that  the  conversion  of  the  plaintiff’s   alleged undivided  share  in  the joint  family  property  into  his separate 1034 share  cannot be easily valued in terms of rupees  with  any precision or definiteness.  That is why legislature has left it to the option of the plaintiff to value his claim for the payment  of  court  fees.  It really  means  that  in  suits falling  under  s.  7  (iv)(b)  the  amount  stated  by  the plaintiff  as  the  value of his  claim  for  partition  has ordinarily  to  be accepted by the court  in  computing  the court  fees payable in respect of the said relief.   In  the circumstances  of  this case it is unnecessary  to  consider whether, under the provisions of this section, the plaintiff has  been  given an absolute right or option  to  place  any valuation whatever on his relief. What  would be the value for the purpose of jurisdiction  in such  suits  is  another question  which  often  arises  for decision.   This question has to be decided by reading s.  7 (iv) of the Act along with s. 8 of the Suits Valuation  Act. This latter section provides that, where in any suits  other than  those referred to in Court Fees Act s. 7, para.  5,  6 and  9  and  para. 10 cl. (d), court  fees  are  payable  ad valorem  under  the  Act, the  value  determinable  for  the computation of court fees and the value for the purposes  of jurisdiction  shall be the same.  In other words, so far  as suits  falling  under  s.  7, sub-s. (iv)  of  the  Act  are concerned, s. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act provides that the value as determinable for the computation of court fees  and the  value  for the purposes of jurisdiction  shall  be  the same.   There  can be little doubt that the  effect  of  the provisions  of s. 8 is to make the value for the purpose  of jurisdiction  dependent upon the value as  determinable  for computation  of court fees and that is natural enough.   The computation  of court fees in suits falling under s. 7  (iv) of  the  Act depends upon the valuation that  the  plaintiff makes in respect of his claim.  Once the plaintiff exercises his  option  and values his claim for the purpose  of  court fees, that determines the value for jurisdiction.  The value for court fees and the value for jurisdiction must no  doubt be  the  same in such cases; but it is the value  for  court fees stated by the plaintiff that is of primary  importance. It is from this value that the value for jurisdication  must be determined.  The result is that it is the amount at 1035 which  the  plaintiff has valued the relief sought  for  the purposes  of  court  fees  that  determines  the  value  for jurisdiction  in the suit and not vice versa.   Incidentally we  may  point out that according to the  appellant  it  was really  not  necessary in the present case  to  mention  Rs. 15,00,000 as the valuation for the purposes of  jurisdiction since  on plaints filed on the Original Side of  the  Madras High  Court  prior  to 1953 there was no need  to  make  any jurisdictional valuation. The  plaintiffs  failure  to state the amount  at  which  he values  the relief sought is often due to the fact  that  in suits  for  partition the plaintiff attempts to  obtain  the benefit of Art. 17-B of Schedule II in the matter of payment of  court fees.  Where the plaintiff seeks to pay the  fixed court  fee  as  required by the said  article,  he  and  his advisers are apt to take the view that it is unnecessary  to

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state  the amount for which relief is sought to  be  claimed for  the  purposes  of  court fees  and  the  valuation  for jurisdiction purposes alone is, therefore, mentioned.  Often enough,  it  turns  out that the plaint  does  not  strictly attract the provisions of Art. 17-B of Schedule II and  that the  court  fee has to be paid either under s.  7(iv)(b)  or under  s.  7(v)  of  the Act.  If the  court  comes  to  the conclusion  that  the  case falls under s.  7(iv)(b)  or  s. 7(iv)(c) ordinarily liberty should be given to the plaintiff to  amend his plaint and set out specifically the amount  at which  he seeks to value his claim for the payment of  court fees.   It would not be reasonable or proper in such a  case to hold the plaintiff bound by the valuation made by him for the  purposes  of jurisdiction and to infer  that  the  said valuation  should  be also taken as the  valuation  for  the payment of court fees.  In this connection we may point  out that  this is the view taken by the Full Bench  decision  of the Lahore High Court in Karam Ilahi v. Muhammad Bashir (1). As we have already indicated s. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act postulates  that the plaintiff should first value his  claim for  the  purpose  of  court fee and  it  provides  for  the determination of the value for jurisdiction on the basis  of such claim.  In our opinion, therefore, the learned judges (1)  A.I.R. (1949) Lah. 116. 1036 of  the Madras High Court were in error in holding that  the valuation  for jurisdiction showed in the plaint  should  be taken  to be the valuation for the payment of court fees  on the plaint as well as the memorandum of appeal.  In view  of their  prior  decision that the present case fell  under  s. 7(iv)(b),  they should have allowed the appellant  to  amend his valuation for the payment of court fees not only on  the memorandum of appeal but also on the plaint. We  must  accordingly set aside the order under  appeal  and direct  that  the plaintiff should be allowed to  state  the amount of Rs. 50,000 at which he values the relief sought by him  for  the  purpose  of s. 7(iv)(b)  of  the  Act.   Shri Krishnaswamy  Ayyangar has orally requested us to  give  him liberty to make the appropriate amendment in his plaint  and we have granted his request. In the result the appeal would be allowed and the  appellant directed  to pay additional court fees on his plaint on  the basis of the valuation of Rs. 50,000 within two months  from today.  Since the appellant has already paid adequate  court fees  on his memorandum of appeal, no further order need  be passed in that behalf.  There will be no order as to costs.                       Appeal allowed. 1037