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PETITIONER: S. RAMA IYER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SUNDARASA PONNAPOONDAR

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/02/1966

BENCH: BACHAWAT, R.S. BENCH: BACHAWAT, R.S. SUBBARAO, K. HIDAYATULLAH, M.

CITATION:  1966 AIR 1431            1966 SCR  (3) 474

ACT: Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, (25 of 1955),  s. 6B  and  Code of Civil Procedure (Act 5 of  1908),  s.  115- Decision  by  Revenue  Court  that  petitioner  was  not   a cultivating tenant-If revisable by High Court.

HEADNOTE: The respondent, claiming to be the cultivating tenant of the appellant,  filed  an application before the  Revenue  Court under ss. 3(3) of the Madras Cultivating Tenants  Protection Act,  1955,  praying  for  a  declaration  that  the  amount deposited by him in the Court represented the correct amount of rent due from him to the appellant.  The appellant denied that the respondent was his cultivating tenant.  The Revenue Court  held  that  the respondent was  not  the  appellant’s cultivating  tenant.  The High Court in a revision  petition under  s.  6B  of  the Act read with s.  115  of  the  Civil Procedure  Code, held that the respondent was a  cultivating tenant  of  the  appellant and  that  the  amount  deposited represented   the  correct  amount  due  from  him  to   the appellant. In  appeal  to this Court the appellant contended  that  the High  Court had no jurisdiction, in revision, to  set  aside the finding of the Revenue Court that the respondent was not the appellant’s cultivating tenant. HELD  :  The Revenue Court under the Act  can  exercise  its jurisdiction   only  if  a  relationship  of  landlord   and cultivating  tenant exists between the  contending  parties. If  its jurisdiction is challenged it must enquire into  the existence  of  the  preliminary fact and decide  if  it  has jurisdiction.  if by an erroneous decision on a question  of fact  or law touching its jurisdiction a  subordinate  court assumes  a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or fails  to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, its decision is not final and  is subject to the revisional jurisdiction of  the  High Court.  Therefore, the High Court had power to enquire  into the  correctness  of the Revenue Court’s  decision,  and  on finding  hat the tenancy existed and that the Revenue  Court had erroneously refused to exercise the jurisdiction  vested in  it  by  s. 3 (3), the High Court could  set  aside  that decision  under S. 11 (b) of the Civil Procedure  Code  read

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with s. 6B of the Act. [447 H 478 B; 478 D]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 797 of 1963. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated March  27, 1959 of the Madras High Court in C.R.P. No.  1282 of 1958. R.   Ganapathy Iyer, for the appellants. R.   Thiagarajan, for the respondent. The  Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bachawat,  J. On April 24, 1958, the respondent claiming  to be  the  cultivating tenant of the appellant in  respect  of certain   lands   in  Manapparavaivattam,   Nannilam   Taluk deposited Rs. 462/-                             475 as  rent for 1367 fasli in the Revenue Court (the  Court  of the  Revenue Divisional Officer), Tanjore under s.  3(3)  of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955  (Madras Act  No.  25 of 1955) and filed an  application  before  the Court  praying for a declaration that the  amount  deposited represented  the correct amount of rent due from  him.   The appellant  denied  that the respondent was  his  cultivating tenant.   On July 31, 1958, the Revenue Court, Tanjore  held that  the  respondent was not a cultivating  tenant  of  the appellant  and  could not claim the benefit of s.  3(3)  and dismissed the application.  The respondent filed a  petition in revision before the Madras High Court under s. 6-B of the Act  read with s. II 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure.   The High Court came to the conclusion that the respondent was  a cultivating  tenant of the appellant and by its order  dated March  27, 1959, allowed the revision petition and  declared that the amount deposited by the respondent represented  the correct amount due from him to the appellant.  The appellant now appeals to this Court by special leave. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the finding of  the Revenue  Court  that the respondent was  not  a  cultivating tenant  was  a  finding of fact and the High  Court  had  no jurisdiction  to  set it aside on revision.   On  the  other hand, counsel for the respondent submitted that the  finding was  in respect of a collateral fact upon the  existence  of which  the jurisdiction of the Revenue Court under  s.  3(3) depended  and the High Court had ample power to  revise  the finding under s. 6-B of the Act. Section 6-B is in these terms               "The  Revenue  Divisional  Officer  shall   be               deemed  to be a Court subordinate to the  High               Court  for the purposes of section 115 of  the               Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central) (Act 5               of  1908), and his orders shall be  liable  to               revision   by   the  High  Court   under   the               provisions of that section." Section  6-B empowers the High Court to revise the  decision of  the Revenue Divisional Officer under s. 115 of the  Code of Civil Procedure, and for the purposes of the section, the Officer is deemed to be a subordinate Court.  Section 115 is in these terms :                "The High Court may call for it the record of               any  case which has been decided by any  Court               subordinate to such High Court and in which no               appeal  lies thereto, and if such  subordinate               Court appears-               (a)  to  have  exercised  a  jurisdiction  not               vested in

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             it by law, or               (b) to have failed to exercise: a jurisdiction               so vested,               or               476               (c)   to  have  acted in the exercise  of  its               jurisdiction   illegally  or   with   material               irregularity,               the High Court may make such order in the case               as it thinks fit. In the present case, no question of revision under sub-s (c) of  s. 115 arises, and we are concerned only with the  power of  revision  under  sub-ss. (a) and (b) of  s.  115.   Sub- section (a) empowers the High Court to correct an  erroneous assumption of jurisdiction; sub-s.(b) empowers it to correct an  erroneous refusal of jurisdiction.  The decision of  the subordinate  Court  on  all questions of law  and  fact  not touching  its  jurisdiction is final and  however  erroneous such  a decision may be, it is not revisable  under  sub-ss. (a)  and  (b)  of  s. 115.  On the  other  hand,  if  by  an erroneous decision on a question of fact or law touching its jurisdiction, e.g., on a preliminary fact upon the existence of  which  its jurisdiction depends, the  subordinate  Court assumes  a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or fails  to exercise  a  jurisdiction  so vested, its  decision  is  not final,  and  is subject to review by the High Court  in  its revisional jurisdiction under sub-ss. (a) and (b) of s. 115. The question is, on which side of the line the present  case lies,  and  whether the decision of the  Revenue  Divisional Officer  that the respondent is not a cultivating tenant  of the appellant is subject to review by the High Court in  its revisional jurisdiction.  The Revenue Divisional Officer  is an inferior Court of limited Jurisdiction functioning  under the  Madras  Cultivating Tenants Protection Act,  1955.   To ascertain the limit and extent of its jurisdiction, we  must examine the provisions of the Act. The Act came into force on September 27, 1955 and was amend- ed  from time to time.  Originally, the Act  was  temporary, recently  .it, has been made permanent.  The Act was  passed for  the  protection  of certain  cultivating  tenants  from eviction.   Section  2  defines,  enter  alia,  ’cultivating tenant’  and ’landlord’.  ’Cultivating tenant’ is  a  person who  carries  on personal cultivation on the  land  under  a tenancy  agreement,  express or implied,  and  includes  any person  who  continues  in  possession  of  the  land  after determination of the tenancy agreement and the heirs of such person.   ’Landlord’ means the person entitled to evict  the cultivating  tenant  from  his  holding or  a  part  of  it. Section  1(1) protects the cultivating tenant from  eviction at  the instance of the landlord whether in execution  of  a decree  or order of Court or otherwise.  Section  3(2)  sets out the grounds of eviction, and if one of these grounds  is made  out, the protection from eviction given by s. 3(i)  is taken away.  Section 3(3) enables the cultivating tenant  to deposit  the  rent in Court.  Section 3(3)(b)  requires  the Court  to "cause notice of the deposit to be issued  to  the landlord and determine, after a summary enquiry, whether the amount deposited represents the correct amount of 477 rent  due  from  the cultivating  tenant".   The  expression "Court"  in s. 3(3) means the Court which passed the  decree or  order for eviction, or where there is no such decree  or order,  the Revenue Divisional Officer.  The Act also  vests jurisdiction in the Revenue Divisional Officer to  entertain and decide an application by the landlord for eviction of  a

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cultivating  tenant-s. 3(4), an application  by  cultivating tenants evicted before and after the commencement of the Act for  restoration of possession-ss, 4(1) and 4(5), an  appli- cation  by  the  landlord for the resumpticin  of  land  for personal   cultivations.  4-A(1),  an  application  by   the cultivating  tenant  for restoration of  possession  from  a landlord  so resuming possessions. 4-A(2), applications  for resumption   of   possession  by  the  landlord   from   his cultivating  tenant and by the cultivating tenant from.  his sub-tenant provided the applicant was a member of the Armed- Forces-ss.   4-AA(2)  and  4-AA(3).   On  receipt   of   any application, under ss. 3(4), 4(i), 4(5), 4-A(1), 4-A(2),  4- AA(2)  and  4-AA(3),  the  Revenue  Divisional  Officer   is required to hold a summary enquiry into the matter and  pass necessary orders aftergiving a reasonable opportunity to the landlord  and  the  tenant to  make  their  representations. Section  4-B empowers the RevenueDivisional Officer  in  the case  of any tenancy to impose a penalty on the landlord  or the cultivating tenant forhis refusal to sign or failure  to lodge  a  lease  deed  in  accordancewith  its   provisions. Section 6 provides that no Civil Court shall, except to  the extent specified in s. 3(3), have jurisdiction in respbct of any  matter  which the Revenue Divisional  Officer  is  em-- powered by or under the Act to determine, or shall grant  an injunction  in  respect of any action taken or to  be  taken under such power.  Section 6-A req uires the Civil Court  to transfer  to  theRevenue  Divisional Officer  any  suit  for possession  or  injunction in relation to any  land  pending before  it,  if  it is satisfied that  the  defendant  is  a cultivating  tenant.  We have already noticed s. 6-B,  which confers  powers  of revision on the High Court.   Section  7 gives the State Government the power to make rules. The  Act  gives generous protection to  cultivating  tenants from eviction, and severely restricts the right of landlords to  resumepossession, of their land from  their  cultivating tenants.   In caseof disputes between the landlord  and  the cultivating   tenant,  theRevenue  Divisional   Officer   is authorised  to  entertain  and  decideapplications  by   the landlord  for eviction and resumption of posses-sion and  by the cultivating tenant for restoration of possession and  to impose   penalties  on  the  landlord  or  the  tenant   for infraction  of s. 4-B.  To attract the jurisdiction  of  the Revenue Divisional officer, there must be a dispute  between a  landlord  and cultivating tenant.  The existence  of  the relation  of  landlord and cultivating  tenant  between  the contending  parties  is  the  essential  condition  for  the assumption   of  jurisdiction  by  the  Revenue   Divisional Officer- 478 in all proceedings under the Act.  The Tribunal can exercise its  jurisdiction  under the Act only if  such  relationship exists.  If the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is  challenged, it  must enquire into the existence of the preliminary  fact and decide if it has jurisdiction.  But its decision on  the existence  of  this preliminary fact is not  final;  such  a decision  is  subject  to review by the High  Court  in  its revisional  jurisdiction under s. 6-B.  The enquiry  by  the Tribunal  is summary, there is no provision for appeal  from its  decision, and the legislature could not  have  intended that  its  decision  on this preliminary  fact  involving  a question  of  title would be final and not  subject  to  the overriding powers of revision by the High Court. In the present case, the Tribunal found that the  respondent was not  the cultivating tenant of the appellant,  and  on such finding declined to exercise the jurisdiction vested in

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it by s. 3(3) to determine the correct amount of rent due by the  respondent to the appellant.  The High Court had  power to  enquire  into the correctness of this decision,  and  on finding  that  the  tenancy existed  and  the  Tribunal  had erroneously  refused to exercise the jurisdiction vested  in it  by s. 3(3), the High Court could set aside the  decision under .sub-s. (b) of s. 115 of the Code read with s. 6-B  of the  Act.  On :a review of the entire oral  and  documentary evidence, the High ’Court found that the respondent was  the cultivating tenant of the appellant.  It is not shown  that this   finding  is  erroneous.   We  :see  no   reason   for interfering with the decision of the High Court. The  appeal  is  dismissed.  There will be no  order  as  to costs. Appeal dismissed. 479