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PETITIONER: S.   RAJAGOPAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: C.   M. ARMUGAM & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/05/1968

BENCH: BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA BENCH: BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA SHAH, J.C.

CITATION:  1969 AIR  101            1969 SCR  (1) 257  CITATOR INFO :  F          1976 SC 939  (3,5,16)  E          1984 SC 411  (7,8)  R          1984 SC 600  (15,16)

ACT: Constitution  (Scheduled Castes) Order 1950-Scheduled  Caste Hindu becoming a Christian-Reconverted to Hinduism-Does  not become  a  member of his previous caste unless  accepted  by caste.

HEADNOTE: The  appellant  filed  his nomination  papers  at  the  1967 General Election from a constituency reserved for members of the   Scheduled   Castes  mentioned  in   the   Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order 1950.  At the election he  defeated respondent  No. 1 who thereupon filed an  election  petition under  s. 81 of the Representation of the People  Act  1951. The  contention in the petition was that the  appellant  was not  a Hindu but a Christian and therefore not qualified  to be  a candidate from ’a constituency reserved for  Scheduled Castes.  The High Court held on the facts that the appellant had  become a Christian in 1949. and his later  reconversion to Hinduism remained unproved.  In appeal to this Court, HELD  : (i) On the facts the High Court rightly came to  the conclusion that the appellant was converted to  Christianity in 1949.  On his conversion the appellant lost the caste  to which he originally belonged because    the        Christian religion does not recognise caste. [264 F-G] (ii) The evidence produced by the appellant established that at least by 1967    when the General Election took places he was  again ’professing’ the Hindu Religion so that  he,  was not disqualified under para 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes)  Order 1950.  The word ’Profess’ in that para  means an open declaration or practice by a person of the  religion in question. [263 F-G] Punjab  Rao v. D. P. Meshwaran & Ors. [1965] 1  S.C.R.  849, 859, applied. Karwade v. Shambhakar, I.L.R. 1959 Bom. 229, referred to. (ii) However mere reconversion to Hinduism does not enable a person  to  revert  to his previous caste.  Even  if  it  be assumed  that  a  reconvert can  resume  membership  of  his previous  caste, a point on which opinion is not  expressed,

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this  can happen only if the caste as supreme judge  of  its interests  accepts  him  again as a  full  member.   In  the present case the appellant had not given evidence to satisfy this   requirement,  and  therefore  his  election  from   a Scheduled Caste constituency could not be upheld. [268  D-E, 269 D-E] G.   Michael  v. Mr. S. Venkateswaran, Additional  Secretary to Government Public (Elections) Department, Madras,  A.I.R. 1952  Mad. 474, B. Shyamsunder v. Shankar Deo  Vedalankar  & Ors.,  A.I.R. 1960 Mys. 27, Chatttirbhu Vithaldas jasani  v. Moreshwar   Parasliram   &   Ors.,   [1954]   S.C.R.    817, Administrator-General of Madras v. Anandachari & ors, I.L.R. 9  Mad. 466, Gitritsaani Nadar v. Irulappa Konar (died)  and Ors,  67 M.L.J. Rep. 389, Mrs. Agnes Dorothy Vermani v.  Mr. Bryant David Vermanii, A.I.R. 1943 Vol. 30 Lah. 51 and Goona Durgaprascda  Rao  alias  Pedda  Babu  and  Anr.  v.   Goona Sudarsanaswami and 28 ors I.L,.R. 1940 Mad. 653, impplied. 255 [General  question  whether  membership of a  caste  can  be acquired  by  conversion or reconversion  to  Hinduism  left -open.] [267 F-G]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1553 of1967. Appeal from the judgment and order dated August 30, 1967  of the Mysore High Court in Election Petition No. 4 of 1967. A.   K.  Sen,  S.  S.  Javali  and  M.  Veerappa,  for   the appellant. Sarjoo  Prasad,  S.  Balakrishnan and S.  S.  Khanduja,  for respondent No. 1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bhargava, J. The appellant, S. Rajagopal, the first  respon- dent  C.  M. Armugam, and the other  three  respondents  all filed  nominations for election to the Legislative  Assembly of the State of Mysore in the last General Elections held in 1967.   The  nomination  papers  were  scrutinised  on  21st January,  1967, when respondent No. 1 (hereinafter  referred to  as  "the respondent") raised an  objection  against  the nomination   of  the  appellant  on  the  ground  that   the nominations were in respect of a seat reserved for a  member of  a  Scheduled  Caste, and the appellant was  not  an  Adi Dravida  Hindu,  but  an Indian Christian, so  that  he  was disqualified to stand as a candidate for this reserved seat. The  Returning Officer rejected the objection  and  accepted the  nomination paper of the appellant.  Respondents Nos.  2 to  4  withdrew  their candidature,  so  that,  when  actual election took place, the two contesting candidates were  the appellant  and the respondent.  The  Constituency  concerned was Kolar Gold Fields and polling in that constituency  took place on 15th February, 1967.  The appellant was declared as the  successful candidate on the ground that he  received  a larger number of votes than the respondent.  The  respondent then  filed  an election petition under section  81  of  the Representation  of  the People Act,  1951,  challenging  the validity of the election of the appellant on the same ground that  he had taken before the Returning Officer, viz.,  that the appellant was not qualified to ’be a candidate ’to  fill the  seat reserved for a member of the Scheduled Caste  from the Kolar Gold Fields Constituency.  The respondent admitted that  the  appellant was originally born as an  Adi  Dravida Hindu, but it was pleaded that he got himself converted as a Christian  some  time in the year 1949, shortly  before  lie obtained admission in Woorhees High School at Vellore and to

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the Woorhees Christian Hostel attached to that School.   The respondent’s  case  was  that,  thereafter,  the   appellant continued to be a Christian and, consequently, he could  not be held to be a member of the Scheduled Caste for his candi- dature   for  the  reserved  seat  under  the   Constitution (Scheduled  (astes)  Order. 1 950.  The  appellant  resisted this plea taken in 256 the  election petition on various grounds, but we  are  only concerned  in  this appeal with two of those  grounds  which formed  the subject-matter of issues 1 and 3 framed  by  the High Court of Mysore at the trial of the election  petition. Those issues are as follows               "(1)  Does  the petitioner prove that  on  the               date  of election the respondent No. 1 was  an               Indian  Christian (Protestant)  by  conversion               and  not a member of the Scheduled Caste  (Adi               Dravida),  professing Christian  Religion  and               therefore, not qualified to stand for election               to  the  Mysore  Legislative  Assembly  as   a               candidate for the seat reserved for  Scheduled               Castes from the Kolar Gold Fields Constituency               and his election should be declared void under               section  100 (1) (a) of the Representation  of               People Act, 1951 ?               (3)   Even if it is true that respondent No. 1               got  himself converted to  Christianity,  does               the   respondent  prove  the  facts  and   the               circumstances  set  out  in  para  11  of  the               written  statement and do they  constitute  in               fact  and  in  law conversion  back  to  Hindu               religion  as alleged; and is it enough in  law               to  give him the benefit of  The  Constitution               (Scheduled Castes) Order 1950 ?" The High Court took the evidence, both documentary and oral, adduced by the parties on these issues and then decided both the  issues  against  the appellant and  in  favour  of  the respondent.   That Court, therefore, held that the  election of  the appellant was void, because he was not qualified  to be  a  candidate for the seat reserved for a member  of  the Scheduled Caste and, consequently, set aside the election of the  appellant.   The appellant has now come  up  in  appeal against   that   judgment   under  section   116A   of   the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 was made  by the President in exercise of his powers conferred by  clause (1)  of Article 341 of the Constitution which is as  follows :-               "341.  (1) The President may with  respect  to               any State or Union territory, and where it  is               a State, after consultation with the  Governor               thereof,  by public notification, specify  the               castes, races or tribes or parts of or  groups               within castes, races or tribes which shall for               the purposes of this Constitution be deemed to               be Scheduled Castes in relation to that  State               or Union Territory, as the case may be."               257               The  relevant provisions of this  Order,  with               which  we  are  concerned,  are  contained  in               paragraphs 2 and 3 and item 1 (2) of Part VIII               of  the  Schedule to the Order, which  are  as               follows :-               "2.  Subject to the provisions of this  Order,               the  castes, races or tribes or parts  of,  or

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             groups within, castes, or tribes, specified in               Parts I to XIII of the Schedule to this  Order               shall,  in  relation to the  States  to  which               those Parts respectively relate, be deemed  to               be Scheduled Castes so far as regards  members               thereof  resident in the localities  specified               in  relation  to them in those Parts  of  that               Schedule.               3.    Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in               paragraph   2,  no  person  who  professes   a               religion different from the Hindu or the  Sikh               religion shall be deemed ’to be a member of  a               Scheduled Caste.                                THE SCHEDULE                              PART VIII-Mysore               1. Throughout the State except Coorg, Belgaum,               Bijapur,   Dharwar,  Kanara,   South   Kanara,               Gulbarga,Raichur   and  Bidar  districts   and               Kollegal taluk of Mysore district:-               1.               2.    Adi Dravida.               3. These  provisions make it quite clear that a person, who  is an Adi Dravida, is qualified to be a candidate for the  seat reserved for a member of the Scheduled Caste from this Kolar Gold Fields Constituency in the State of Mysore, provided he satisfies  the additional requirement of paragraph 3 of  the Order of not professing a religion different from the  Hindu or  the Sikh religion at the time when his qualification  to be  a candidate has to be determined.  In the present  case, therefore, the validity of the candidature of the  appellant depended  on the question whether, in January and  February, 1967, when he was nominated as a candidate for the  reserved seat and was declared elected, he was or was not a member of the  Adi Dravida Caste and professing a  religion  different from  the  Hindu  or the Sikh religion.   The  case  of  the respondent,  as mentioned above, was that the appellant  had become  a  Christian in 1949 and was still  -professing  the Christian  religion  at the time of the  election  in  1967. This plea was met by the appellant by pleading that he never became  a  convert to Christianity and that, in  any   case, even  if it be held that he had once become a  Christian  in the year 1949, he was professing the 258 Hindu religion at the relevant time in the year 1967.  These are  the  pleas  that  are  reflected  in  issues  1  and  3 reproduced above. The High Court, in deciding the first issue in favour of the respondent  and against the appellant, relied  primarily  on the evidence of P.W. 9, I. J. Rajamanikyam. who, in the year 1949,  was employed as an Assistant Master in Woorhees  High School  at  Vellore  and  was the  Asstt.   Manager  of  the Woorhees   Christian   Hostel.   P.W.  9  stated   that   an application, Ext.  P. 11, for admission of the appellant  as an inmate of the Woorhees Christian Hostel was made by C. A. Joseph  who was the Manager of the Hostel.  This Hostel  was meant for the residence exclusively of persons belonging  to the Christian faith.  In the application.  Ext.  P. 11,  the appellant  was shown as an Indian Christian and not  as  Adi Dravida  or  Hindu.  At that time, it  became  necessary  to ascertain  whether  the appellant was in fact  a  Christian. According   to  him,  C.  A.  Joseph  ascertained  all   the particulars  of the appellant and it was on that basis  that he  showed  the appellant in the application  as  an  Indian Christian.   C. A. Joseph, who was the Manager,  interviewed

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the  appellant  and then asked P.W. 9 to admit  him  to  the Hostel.  P.W. 9 further stated that, in that connection, the appellant  showed  to him his  baptismal  certificate  which indicated  that  he  had been baptized as  a  Christian  ,it Ponnai  Anicut Festival which is hold by the  Christians  in the  month  of March or April every year.  On  being  cross- examined  he indicated that the certificate had been  issued by  the Presbyter of Yehamur Church situated in North  Arcot District,  15  miles from Vellore.  He  also  deposed  that, during  his stay in the Hostel, the appellant was  observing the  Christian  Religion and was taking kindly  towards  the religious activities of the hostel, though it appeared that, being  a  recent convert to Christianity he  was  not  quite conversant  with the form,, of worship or service.   P.W.  9 was  himself  supervising the religious observances  by  the inmates  of  the hostel.  This evidence given by P.W.  9  is further corroborated by the document, Ext.  P. 12, which  is the  register of admissions and withdrawals of the  Woorhees High School.  In ,that admission register, against item  No. 14-Religion  of the Student pertaining to the appellant  the entry is Indian Christian.  Thus, the oral evidence given by P.W.  9 showing that the appellant was a Christian  when  he was  admitted to the Woorhees High School and  the  Woorhees Christian  Hostel is corroborated by the entry made in  Ext. P.  11 by C. A. Joseph as guardian of the appellant and  the entry  in the Register of Admissions and Withdrawals of  the Woorhees  High School Ext.  P. 12.  On  this  corroboration, the  High Court believed the statement of this witness  that the  appellant  had shown to him his  Baptismal  Certificate also.   The  High  Court noted the fact that  there  was  no reason  at  all  for this witness  to  give  false  evidence against the appellant; 259 and the only suggestion made that he bore a grievance to the appellant, as the appellant refused to make a recommendation for   him  for  a  particular  appointment,  has  not   been established  and  has no basis.  The High  Court  also  took notice of various other piece of evidence which corroborated the  statement  given  by P.W. 9. Learned  counsel  for  the appellant has not been able to advance before us any  cogent reason for disagreeing with this assessment of the  evidence of  this witness by the learned Judge of the High Court  who had  the benefit of watching this witness when his  evidence was actually recorded before him. The main argument for challenging the evidence of this  wit- ness on behalf of the appellant was that the respondent,  in adducing  evidence  before  the  High  Court  to  prove  the conversion of the appellant to Christianity, did not  summon the  Baptismal Register of the Church which would have  been the best evidence available for this purpose. This  argument was considered and rejected by the High Court we agree  with the  view taken by that Court.  There was no clear  evidence that every Church was maintaining a baptismal register.   It was only in his cross-examination that it was elicited  from P.W.  9 that the baptismal certificate shown to him  by  the appellant  had  been  issued by  the  Presbyter  of  Yehamur Church.   The  respondent, when he came in  the  witness-box stated that he had not been informed of this fact earlier by P.W.  9  so  that he was not in a  position  to  summon  the baptismal register of that Church.  No doubt, the  appellant examined  some witnesses of whom particular mention made  by made  of  R.W. 9, Rev.  Ashirvadam, who stated  that,  as  a general  practice,  in all Churches  several  registers  are maintained  and  one  of these registers  is  the  Baptismal Register.   Even  if this evidence be accepted at  its  full

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value,  the  only conclusion to be drawn from it is  that  a baptismal   register  must  have  been  maintained  by   the Presbyter of Yehamur Church; but there is no evidence at all to indicate that in such a register entries were used to  be made  even  of baptisms which took place not in  the  Church itself,  but at a fair like the Ponnai Anicut Festival.   It is  significant that even the appellant himself, who  had  a better  opportunity of summoning the baptismal  register  of Yehamnur  Church than the respondent, because the fact  that the  baptismal certificate had been issued by the  Presbyter of  that Church was disclosed by P.W. 9 only in  his  cross- examination  on  27th  July, 1967 during the  trial  of  the election petition and not earlier, did not care to have that register  summoned.   A request was put  forward  before  us during  the hearing of this appeal to direct the  production of  that  register. but we do not think that  there  is  any justification  under  0.  41  r. 27 of  the  Code  of  Civil Procedure  for  summoning  it at  this  stage,  particularly because,  even  if that resister is brought, a lot  of  oral evidence  would  have to be recorded in order  to  have  the register properly proved and to give ,in opportunity to  the party. 260 against  whom  inferences  follow from  it,  to  meet  those inferences.   In the circumstances, we have not  entertained the  request for summoning of that register at  this  stage. This is all the more so as we find that there is no evidence to  show  that  an  entry relating to  the  baptism  of  the appellant  must necessarily find a place in the register  in view  of  the fact that the appellant was  baptized  at  the Ponnai Anicut Festival and not in the Church.  Consequently, the  non-summoning of that register by the  respondent  does not  detract from the value to be attached to the  statement of P.W. 9. This evidence finds support from other documentary and  oral evidence which has been relied upon by the High Court.  P.W. 10,  S.  A. Thomas, is a P.W.D. Contractor  and  has  stated that,  in the time of his father, who was also working as  a Contractor, the appellant took service with his father.   At that  time also, the appellant was employed as  a  Christian and  his  service  card  was  prepared  showing  him  as   a Christian.  Then, there is evidence that, subsequently,  the appellant  entered Government service and even there in  the service  cards he was shown as a Christian.  Some  witnesses have  come  to prove that the  appellant  actually  attended Church  for prayers after his conversion in 1949.   Evidence was  also  given to show that the appellant  worked  as  the organizer of a body known as the Kavinjar Nataka Sabha where his  name was shown as Victor Rajagopal, indicating that  he had adopted a personal name after conversion as a  Christian which is not adopted by Hindus.  We do not think that it  is necessary for us to discuss that evidence in detail.  We are inclined to agree with the High Court that all this oral and documentary  evidence provides very strong corroboration  of the   statement  of  the  principal  witness  P.W.   9   and establishes  the fact that the appellant had been  converted to  Christianity in 1949 before he joined the Woorhees  High School. We were also taken through ’the evidence of the respondent’s witnesses,  some of whom tried to -prove that the  appellant had  never  attended any Christian  Church.   The  principal witness,  on  whose  evidence reliance was  placed  in  this behalf, was R.W. 9, the Presbyter of the Maskam Church.   It was elicited from him that the appellant was not entered  in the  register of members of the congregation of the  Church;

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but  the cross-examination of the witness shows that  it  is not  necessary  that  every one  attending  the  Church  for prayers  must also be a member of the congregation  and  his name  must find a place in that register.  The  evidence  of some other witnesses, who have come to state that they never saw  the  appellant  going for prayers to  the  Church.  can ’.hardly carry any weight, because it is not necessary  that they  should have been present on those occasions  when  the appellant  actually  attended  the  Church  services.    The learned  Judge  of the High Court, who ’had the  benefit  of watching the demeanour of all the 261 witnesses examined before him, did not consider the evidence of  these witnesses sufficient to rebut the proof  given  on behalf of the respondent. Reference  was  also made by learned counsel to  some  docu- mentary  evidence  before us, but none  of  those  documents establishes   that  the  appellant  was  not  converted   to Christianity  in 1949.  Some of these documents are  of  the period  prior  to  1949 and consist of  papers  relating  to schools attended by the appellant in which the appellant  is shown  as  an Adi Dravida Hindu.  They are  consistent  even with  the  case  of the respondent,  because  the  plea  put forward was that the appellant was converted to Christianity in  1949  and  that  he was  a  Hindu  earlier.   Particular reliance was placed on a transfer certificate issued by  the K.G.F.  High School which mentions the date of issue of  the Transfer   Certificate   as  10th  June,  1949.    In   that certificate  there  is  an  entry  that  the  appellant  was studying  free,  because he was Adi Dravida Hindu.   It  was urged  that  this document would indicate that right  up  to 10th  June,  1949, the appellant was a Hindu.  This  is  not correct.   The  certificate  mentions  the  actual  date  of leaving  the school as 1st March, 1949, and the capacity  in which the appellant was allowed to study free can only refer to  the period ending on that date.  The case set up by  the respondent  and  accepted  by the High  Court  is  that  the appellant was converted to Christianity at the Ponnai Anicut Festival which took ,)lace in the end of March or  beginning of April, 1949, so that this entry showing the appellant  as a Hindu up to 1st March, 1949 does not militate against  the finding  that  he  was converted  to  Christianity  at  that Festival. The remaining documents relied upon by the appellant  relate to  much later period and they also cannot, therefore,  show that the appellant was not converted to Christianity in  the year  1949.  The earliest of these documents is of the  year 1956.   That document is the entry in the birth register  in respect  of  the first child born to the  appellant’s  wife. Then, there are entries relating to birth of other  children in  1959  and 1961.  In these documents also,  however.  the caste  or  the religion of the appellant is  not  mentioned. The community of the appellant’s wife alone is shown as  Adi Dravida.   In this case, it is -not disputed that  when  the appellant  married  in 1955, his wife was a Hindu,  so  that these  entries showing her as Adi Dravida cannot Prove  that the  appellant was a Hindu and not a Christian.  There,  are subsequent  entries  in school records where  the  appellant showed  the  caste of his children as  Adi  Dravida  Hindus. These  documents are of a very much later period and  relate to a firm when the appellant had already been elected from a reserved  seat  as a member of the Scheduled  Caste  in  the election  of 1962.  It. however. appears that, before,  this election in 1962, the appellant decided to show 262

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himself as a Hindu, and,. coseqaently, he made  applications and  got entries altered in his service cards so as to  show him  as  Adi Dravida Hindu instead of a Christian.   It  was thereafter  that  he contested the election  to  the  Mysore Legislative Assembly in 1962 from the reserved  constituency claiming himself to be a member of a Scheduled Caste.   This evidence  relating  to this period cannot again be  held  to disprove the conversion of the appellant to Christianity  in the  year  1949  which has been  amply  established  by  the evidence given by the respondent discussed above.  At  best, it  can  only show that by this time the  appellant  started putting himself forward as a Hindu.  Consequently, we affirm the  finding  of  the  High Court  that  the  appellant  was converted to Christianity in the year 1949, so that he  lost the  capacity of an Adi Dravida in which capacity  alone  he could  have  been held to be a member of a  Scheduled  Caste under the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950. This brings us to the second question whether the  appellant at  the  time of election in the year 1967,  was  professing Hindu  religion  as  alleged by him  ;and  whether  on  that account  he could claim that he was a member of a  Scheduled Caste,  having  again become an Adi Dravida Hindu.   We  are inclined  to  accept  the evidence given on  behalf  of  the appellant that, though he had been converted to Christianity in  1949, he did later on profess the Hindu  religion.   The circumstances which established this fact are :               (i)   that  he  married a  Hindu  Adi  Dravida               woman in the year 1955;               (ii)  that against the entries of the children               in  birth registers of the  Municipality,  the               caste  of the mother was shown as Adi  Dravida               Hindu;               (iii) that  his  children were brought  up  as               Hindus;               (iv)  that, when his children were admitted in               school,  they  were  shown as  Hindus  in  the               school records;               (v)   -that  in  1961, the appellant  made  an               application  for  correction  of  his  service               cards  and  had the entry of his  religion  as               Christianity   altered,   so   that   he   was               subsequently  shown  as Adi Dravida  Hindu  in               those cards;               (vi)  that, in 1962, in the general elections,               he  stood  as  a  candidate  from  a  Reserved               Scheduled Caste Constituency; and               (vii) that  he again stood as a  candidate  in               this  general election of 1967 from  the  same               Reserved Scheduled Caste Constituency. 263 We  do not consider it necessary to discuss in  detail  the, evidence which has been given on behalf of the appellant  to prove all  these facts enumerated above - Almost all of them are  supported by documentary evidence.  The  only  question that  needs consideration is whether these  facts  establish that,  at  the  time of the general election  in  1967,  the appellant was professing Hindu religion.  The word "profess" used  in paragraph 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled  Castes) order,  1950  came up for interpretation by  this  Court  in Punjab Rao v. D. P. Meshram & Others(1).  After referring to the  decision  of  the  Bombay  High  Court  in  Karwade  v. Shambhakar  (2) and the meaning of the word "profess"  given in  Webster’s  New  World  Dictionary,  and  Shorter  Oxford Dictionary, the Court held :-               "It  seems to us that the meaning "to  declare

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             one’s belief in : as to profess Christ" is one               which we have to bear in mind while construing               the aforesaid order, because it is this  which               bears  upon religious belief and  consequently               also  upon a change in religious  belief.   It               would thus follow that a declaration of  one’s               belief must necessarily mean a declaration  in               such  a  way that it would be known  to  those               whom it may interest.  Therefore, if a  public               declaration  is made by a person that  he  has               ceased  to belong to his old religion and  has               accepted another religion he will be taken  as               professing the other religion.  In the face of               such  an open declaration it would be idle  to               enquire  further as to whether the  conversion               to another religion was efficacious.  The word               "profess" in the Presidential Order appears to               have  been  used  in  the  sense  of  an  open               declaration  or  practice by a person  of  the               Hindu (or the Sikh) religion." In our opinion, if this test is applied to the present case, it  must  be held that at least by the year 1967,  when  the present  election in question took place, the appellant  had started  professing  the  Hindu  religion.   He  had  openly married  a  Hindu wife.  Even though -the marriage  was  not celebrated  according  to the strict Hindu  rites  prevalent amongst Adi Dravidas, the marriage was not in Christian form and  is alleged to have been in some reformed Hindu  manner. Thereafter,  the appellant in 1961 took the step  of  having his  service  cards corrected so as to show him  as  an  Adi Dravida Hindu instead of a Christian.  This was followed  by his  candidature as a member of the Adi Dravida Hindu  Caste in the general elections in 1962; and, subsequently, he gave out the caste of his children as Adi Dravida Hindus.   These various steps taken by the appellant clearly amount to a (1) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 849 at p. 859. (2) I.L.R.1959 Bom. 229. 264 public  declaration of his professing the Hindu faith.   The first  step of the marriage cannot, of course, by itself  be held  to  be  a  sufficient  public  declaration  that   the appellant  believed  in Hindu religion; but  the  subsequent correction  of  entries in service cards  and  his  publicly standing  as a candidate from the reserved  Scheduled  Caste Constituency  representing himself as an Adi  Dravida  Hindu taken together with the later act of showing his children as Adi Dravida Hindus in the school records must be held to  be a  complete public declaration by the appellant that he  was by  this  time professing Hindu religion.  Finally,  in  the general elections of 1967 also, the appellant, by contesting the  seat reserved for a member of a Scheduled Caste on  the basis  that he was an Adi Dravida Hindu, again purported  to make  a  public declaration of his faith  in  Hinduism.   In these  circumstances, we hold that, at the relevant time  in 1967,  the appellant was professing Hindu religion, so  that paragraph  3 of the Constitution (Scheduled  Castes)  Order, 1950 did not apply to him. This, however, does not finally settle the matter in  favour of the appellant, because, even if it be held that paragraph 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 did not disqualify the appellant. it is necessary for the  appellant to show that he satisfied all the requirements of  paragraph 2 of that Order.  Under paragraph 2, a person to be eligible for a reserved seat must be a member of a caste specified by the President in the Order.  The appellant claims that, when

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he  started professing Hindu religion again, he reverted  to his  original caste of birth, viz.., Adi Dravida Hindu.   It is  the  justification of this claim that  is  contested  on behalf of the respondent.  It has been urged that, when  the appellant  became a Christian, he ceased to be a  member  of the Adi Dravida caste as specified in the Presidential Order and.  on again professing the Hindu religion, the  appellant cannot claim that ’he automatically reverted to a membership of that caste. We  agree with the High Court that, when the  appellant  em- braced  Christianity in 1949, he lost the membership of  the Adi  Dravida Hindu caste.  The Christian religion  does  not recognis  any  caste classifications.   All  Christians  are treated  as equals and there is no distinction  between  one Christian and another of the type that is recognised between members  of different castes be longing to  Hindu  religion. In  fact,  caste  system prevails  only  amongst  Hindus  or possibly  in  some religions closely allied  to  the,  Hindu religion  like Sikhism.  Christianity is prevalent not  only in  India.  but almost all over the world and  nowhere  does Christianity  recognise  caste  division.   The  tenets   of Christianity  militate against persons Professing  Christian faith  being  divided or discriminated on the basis  of  any such   classification  as  the  caste,  system,   It   must, therefore, be ’held that, when the appellant go, 265 converted  to Christianity in 1949, he ceased to  belong  to the Adi Dradiva caste. In this connection, we may take notice of a decision of  the Madras  High  Court in G. Michael v. Mr.  S.  Venkateswaran, Additional   Secretary  to  Government  Public   (Elections) Department, Madras(1), where that Court held.--               "Christianity   and   Islam   are    religions               prevalent not only in India but also in  other               countries in the world.  We know that in other               countries  these religions do not recognise  a               system of castes as an integral part of  their               creed or tenets."               Attention of that Court was drawn to the  fact               that  there  were  several cases  in  which  a               member  of  one of the lower castes,  who  had               ’been converted to Christianity, had continued               not only to consider himself as still being  a               member  of  the  caste,  but  had  also   been               considered  so by other members of  the  caste               who had not been converted.  Dealing with this               aspect, the Court held               "This is somewhat analogous to cases in  which               even  after  conversion certain  families  and               groups  continue to be governed by the law  by               which  they were governed before  they  became               converts.    But  these  are  all   cases   of               exception  and the general rule is  conversion               operates  as an expulsion from the  caste;  in               other  words,  a convert ceases  to  have  any               caste." In the present case, therefore, we agree with the finding of the  High  Court  that  the  appellant,  on  conversion   to Christianity, ceased to belong to the Adi Dravida caste and, consequently,  the burden lay on the appellant to  establish that,  on his reverting to the Hindu religion by  professing it  again,  he also became once again a member  of  the  Adi Dravida Hindu caste, Reliance  was  also placed on behalf of the appellant  on  a decision  of  the  Mysore High Court in  B.  Shyamsunder  v.

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Bhaskar Deo Vedalankar and Others(2) to urge that on  charge of  religious belief, a person does not automatically  cease to  be a member of the caste in which he was born.  For  the same  principle,  reference was also made to a  decision  of this  Court  in Chatturbhuj Vithaldas  Jasani  v.  Moreshwar Parashram  and Others (3) . Neither of these two  cases,  in our opinion, is applicable to the present case, because,  in both  those cases, though the persons concerned had  started professing   religious  beliefs  different  from  those   of orthodox  Hindus,  they still continued to be  Hindus.   The Mysore  High Court in its decision took notice of this  fact by holding : (1) A.I.R. 1952 Mad. 474.    (2) A.I.R. 1960 Mysore 27. (3)  [1954] S.C.R. 817. 266               "It  is,  therefore, plain  that  Arya  Samaj,               unlike  Christianity  or Islam, is not  a  new               religion  entirely distinct from Hinduism  and               that the mere profession of Arya Samajism by a               person does not make him cease -to be a  Hindu               and  cannot have the effect of  excluding  him               from Hinduism although he was ’born in it.  It               is  equally  clear that such  a  person  never               becomes separated from the religious communion               in which he was born.  The contention urged to               the  contrary  by Mr. Reddy  must,  therefore,               fail." In  the case of Chitturbhuj Vithaldas Jasani(1), this  Court was dealing with the status of a person who belonged to  the Mahar caste, which was one of the Scheduled Castes under the Presidential  Order, and the question arose whether, on  his conversion to the tenets of the Mahanubhava Panth, he ceased to  belong  to  that Scheduled Caste.   It  was  held  that, whatever the views of the founder of this sect may have been about  caste,  it was evident that there had been  no  rigid adherence  to them among his followers in later years.   The Court, -therefore, did not determine whether the Mahanubhava tenets encouraged a repudiation of caste only as a desirable ideal or make it a fundamental of the faith, because it  was evident that present-day Mahanubhavas admitted to their fold persons  who elected to retain their old caste customs.   It was  on this basis that the Court held that it was easy  for the  old caste to regard the converts as one  of  themselves despite the conversion which for all practical purposes  was only  ideological  and involved no change  of  status.   The final conclusion was expressed in ’the following words :-               "On  this evidence, and after considering  the               historical  matterial  placed  before  us,  we               conclude that conversion to this sect  imports               little  beyond an intellectual  acceptance  of               certain ideological tenets and does not  alter               the  convert’s caste status, at any  rate,  so               far as the householder section of the Panth is               concerned." Thus,  neither  of these two cases is similar  to  the  case before us where the appellant was converted to Christianity, a  religion  which  militates  against  the  recognition  of division  of people on caste basis.  Having gone out of  the Hindu  religion,  the appellant could not  claim  thereafter that  he still continued to be a member of the  Adi  Dravida Hindu caste. In  support of the claim that the appellant reverted to  the Adi Dravida Hindu caste when he again started professing the Hindu  religion,  learned  counsel relied  on  a  number  of decisions of various High Courts.  The cases relied upon can

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be divided into (1)  [1954] S. C. R. 817. 267 two  classes.  The First set of cases are those  where  this question  was  examined for the purpose of  determining  the rules  of  succession,  the validity of  marriages,  or  the legitimacy of children.  Such cases which have been  brought to  our  notice  are : Administrator-General  of  Madras  v. Anandachari and Others(1), Gurusami Nadar v. lrulappa  Konar (died)  and  Others(2), Mrs. Agnes Dorothy  Vermani  v.  Mr. Bryant  David Vermani(3), and Goona Durgaprasada  Rao  alias Pedda  Babu  and  Another  v.  Goona  Sudarsanaswami  &   28 Others(4).   In  addition, reliance was also placed  on  the Report  of  proceedings  of the  Appellant  Side  dated  8th November,  1866 printed at page vii of the Appendix in  Vol. III  of  the Madras High Court Regorts.  The second  set  of cases  consist  of recent judgments of the  High  Courts  of Andhra Pradesh and Madras in election petitions arising  out of the general elections of the year 1967 itself.  In  order to rely on these judgments, learned counsel produced  before us copies of the Gazettes in which those judgments have been published.  The cases referred to are : Kothapalli Narasayya v.  jaminana Jogi and Pinninti Jammayya  (Election  Petition No. 9 of 1967), K. Narasinha Reddy v. G. Bhupathi and  Manik Rao (Election Petition No. 18 of 1967), Allam Krishnaiah  v. Orepalli  Venkata  Subbaiah  (Election Petition  No.  10  of (1967), decided by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh on  28th August, 1967, 28th September, 1967, and 5th September,  1967 respectively,  and K. Paramalai v. M. Alangaram and  Another (Election Petition No. 9 of (1967) decided by the High Court of Madras on 5th October, 1967. Almost  all  these cases laid down the  principle  that,  on reconversion  to Hinduism, a person can become a  member  of the same caste in which he was born and to which he belonged before having been converted to another religion.  The  main basis of the decisions is that, if the members of the  caste accept  the reconversion of a person as a member, it  should be  held  that he does become a member of that  caste,  even though  he  may  have  lost  membership  of  that  caste  on conversion to another religion.  In the present case, we  do not  consider  it necessary to express any  opinion  on  the general  question  whether,  if  a  person  is  born  in   a particular  caste and is converted to another religion as  a result  of which he loses the membership of that  caste,  he can  again become a member of that caste on reconversion  to Hinduism.   That is a question which may have to be  decided in any of the appeals that may be brought to this Court from the  judgments  of the Andhra Pradesh and  the  Madras  High Courts  referred  to above.  So far as the present  case  is concerned,  we consider that, even if it be assumed  that  a reconvert  can resume the membership of his previous  caste, the facts established in the present case do (1)  I.L.R. 9 Mad. 466. (3)  A.I.R. 1943, Vol. 30 Lah. 51. (2) 67 M.L.J. Reports, 389. (4) I.L.R 1940 Mad. 653. 268 not  show  that the appellant succeeded in  doing  so.   All these  cases proceed on the basis that, in order  to  resume membership  or  ins  previous  caste,  the  person  must  be reconverted to the Hindu religion and must also ’be accepted by the caste in general as a member alter reconversion.   We do  not  think it necessary to refer to  specific  sentences where  these  principles  have been  relied  upon  in  these various  judgments.  It is, in our opinion, enough  to  Lake

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notice  of  the  decision in Goona  Durgaprasada  Rao  alias Peedaa Babu(1), where these two aspects were emphasised by a Full  Beach  of the Madras High Court.  In  that  case,  the first question that arose was whether a person could  become a  convert  to  Hinduism  without  going  through  a  formal ceremony of purification.  It was held that no proof of  any particular  ceremonial  having been observed  was  required. Varadachariar,  J., held that when on the facts  it  appears that  a man did change his religion and was accepted by  his co-religionists  as having changed his religion, and  lived, died and was cremated in that religion, the absence of  some formality  should  not  negative what  is  an  actual  fact. Considering    the    question    of    entry    into    the caste,Krishnaswami  Ayyangar,  J.,  held  that,  in  matters affecting  the  well-being or composition of  a  caste,  the caste itself is the supreme judge.  It was on this principle that  a reconvert to Hinduism could become a member  of  the caste, if the caste itself as the supreme judge accepted him as  a full member of it.  In the appeal before us,  we  find that  the appellant has not given evidence to satisfy  these requirements  in  order to establish that he  did  become  a member  of  Adi Dravida Hindu Caste by the time  of  general elections in 1967. As we have already held earlier, there was no specific cere- mony held for reconversion of the appellant to Hinduism.  We have  found  that he started professing the  Hindu  religion because of his conduct at various stages.  The first step in that  conduct  was the marriage with an  Adi  Dravida  Hindu woman.   Then, there were other steps taken by him, such  as correction  of  his  service  records,  declaration  of  the religion  of  his  sons  as Hindu  and  his  standing  as  a candidate  for elections in 1962 and 1967 as a member  of  a Scheduled Caste.  These have been held by us to amount to  a public declaration of his belief in Hinduism.  The  question is whether, by merely professing the belief in Hinduism, the appellant can also claim that the members of the Adi Dravida Hindu  Caste  readmitted him as a member of that  caste  and started recognising him as such.  In various cases,  import- ance  has  been  attached  to the  fact  of  marriage  in  a particular  caste.  But, in the present case,  the  marriage was the first step taken by the appellant and, though he was married  to  an  Adi Dravida woman,  the  marriage  was  not performed -according to the rites  (1) ILR.1 40mad.653 269 observed  by members of that caste.  The marriage not  being according  to the system prevalent in the caste  itself,  it cannot  be held that marriage can be proof of  admission  of the  appellant in the caste by the members of the  caste  in general.   No other evidence was given to show that  at  any subsequent stage any step was taken by members of the  caste indicating that the appellant was being accepted as a member of  this caste.  It is true that his close  relatives,  like his father and brother-in-law, treated him again as a member of  their own caste, but the mere recognition by a few  such relatives  cannot be held to be equivalent to a  recognition by  the  members of the caste in general.   The  candidature from the reserved seat in 1962 cannot also be held to  imply any  recognition  by the members of the  Adi  Dravida  Hindu caste in general of the appellant as a member of that caste. Consequently,  it  has  to be held that  the  appellant  has failed  to  establish  that he became a member  of  the  Adi Dravida  Hindu caste after he started professing  the  Hindu religion; and this conclusion follows even on the assumption that  a convert to Hinduism can acquire the membership of  a

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caste.   Ordinarily,  the membership of a  caste  under  the Hindu religion is acquired by birth. whether the  membership of  a  caste can be acquired by conversion  to  Hinduism  or after  reconversion  to Hinduism is a question on  which  we have refrained from expressing our opinion, because even  on the  assumption that it can be acquired, we have arrived  it the conclusion that the appellant must fail in this appeal. The appeal is, consequently, dismissed with costs. 3.C.                    Appeal dismissed. 12 Sup.CI/68-3 270