ITEM NO.44                 COURT NO.3               SECTION IIA

           S U P R E M E   C O U R T   O F   I N D I A                          RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS                      Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl) No(s).1250/2006 (From the judgement and order dated 25/11/2004 in  CRLOP No. 35807/2004  of The HIGH COURT OF MADRAS)

S. PALANISAMY                                        Petitioner(s)

                     VERSUS

P.R. SENNIAPPAN & ORS.                               Respondent(s) (With appln(s) for c/delay in filing SLP,exemption from filing O.T.,stay,exemption from filing c/c of the impugned order and office report )

Date: 25/11/2008  This Petition was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.B. SINHA         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE CYRIAC JOSEPH

For Petitioner(s) Mr. K.K. Mani,Adv. Mr. C.K.R. Lenin Sikar, Adv. Mr. Mayur R. Shah, Adv.

For Respondent(s) Mr.V. Ramasubramaniam, Adv.                      Mr. V. Balachandran,Adv.

          UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following                                O R D E R  

Delay condoned.

Leave granted.

The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order.

    [ Meenu Sethi ]               [ Pushap Lata Bhardwaj ]       A.R.-cum -P.S.             Court Master

Signed order is placed on the file

               IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL  APPEAL NO.1918  OF 2008 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl) No.1250/2008)

    S.Palanisamy              ...Appellant

Versus

    P.R.Senniappan & Ors.      ...Respondents                        

O  R  D  E  R

Delay condoned.

Leave granted.

Having  heard  learned  counsel  for  the  parties,we  are  of  the

opinion that although, the High Court was correct in observing that the appellant

before us has exceeded his jurisdiction conferred on him under Section 107 of the

Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  neither  any  malafide  was

attributed nor any finding having been arrived at that his action was accentuated by

any extraneous consideration, we are of the opinion that it committed a serious error

in  directing the Government of  Tamil  Nadu to initiate a  departmental proceeding

against him. For the self same reasons, we are of the opinion that the observations

made  against  the  appellant  in  paras  6,7  and  8  of  the  impugned  order  were  not

warranted. The appellant committed a mistake while exercising his jurisdiction. It is

an error of judgment on his  part but it must be borne in mind that the standard

expected of a judicial officer, in our opinion, may not be expected from an Executive

Magistrate. Furthermore,he was not heard before the impugned observations were

made.

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In V.Sujatha vs.  State of  Kerala and Ors,  1994 Suppl.  3 SCC 436, this

Court has observed as under:

"26. These appeals by Mrs. V Sujatha need a neat  and  formal  disposal.   We  have  allowed  criminal appeals  arising  out  of  SLP(Crl.)  No.  180  of  1989  and Criminal  Appeal  No.  625  of  1988.   In  both  the  upset judgments  of  Padnamabhan,  J.  adverse  remarks  have been made against Mrs. V Sujatha, the appellant herein. Those  judgments  of  the  High  Court  do  not  remain operative and the judgments and orders passed by her in both cases have been restored.  The adverse remarks in a sense are no longer legally tenable or existing, but they do stay written in court records all the same.  In the special leave  petitions  before  us,  certain  new  facts  have  been sought  to  be  introduced  by  Smt.  V.  Sujatha  vis-a  vis Padmanabhan, J.  We do not, for cause of propriety, since Padmanabhan, J, is not a party before us, wish to make mention thereof in these proceedings, except to state that it is suggestive that at one point of time, apparently cordial relations existed between the two.  We are told at the Bar that both of them have since retired. It has been lamented by learned counsel for Mrs. V Sujatha that her career was spoiled by such adverse remarks, which remarks the Press blew  up  beyond  proportions  to  tarnish  her  image  and name. Be that as it may, this will not prompt us to do the exercise of culling out and reproducing herein, the adverse remarks, from the upset judgments of Padmanabhan, J. or to  reproduce  herein  her  grievances  in  the  special  leave petitions and record them in this judgment, again for the sake of  propriety,  for  we must  bury and bury deep the harsh and unnecessary provocative language employed in these documents.

But before we do that, we do need to say what already has been  said  by  this  Court  time  and  again,  for  Judges  to employ

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mellow and temperate language in their judgments, when referring to members of the judicial family.  Some of these cases are as follows :

(i)Ishwari  Prasad  Mishra  v. Mohammad  Isa.  (SCR  at pp.746-47)

"In the present case, the High Court has used intemperate language and has even gone to the length of suggesting a corrupt motive against the judge who decided the suit in favour of the appellant.  In our opinion, the use

of such intemperate language may, in some cases, tend to show either a lack of experience in judicial matters or an absence  of  judicial  poise  and  balance..No doubt,  if  it  is shown that the decision of the trial court in a given case is the  result  of  a  corrupt  motive,  the  High  Court  must condemn it and take further steps in the matter. But the use of strong language and imputation of corrupt motives should  not  be  made  light-heartedly  because  the  judge against whom the imputations are made has no remedy in law to vindicate his position."

(ii) H. Lyngdoh v.Cromlyn Lyngdoh. (SCC p.757, para 5)

"Before  we  part  with  the  case,  we  were distressed to note certain personal remarks made by the learned Chief Justice against one of the Hon'ble Judges of that  Court.   To  us  these  remarks  do  not  appear  to  be either  proper  or  just.   By  making  these  remarks  the learned Chief Justice has let down his office as well as his court.  In the objective discharge of judicial functions thee is  little  justification,  nay,  none-at-all  to  assume  any attitude  other  than  of  judicial  restraint  or  to  use  a language  while  referring  to  one's  colleagues  other  than that which has been hitherto adopted by long usage."

(iii) Such restraint was due even for parties, or their witnesses  as  seen  in  A.M.  Mathur  v.  Pramod  Kumar Gupta,

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referring to the decision of this Court in State of M.P. v. Nandlal  Jaiswal  where  Bhagwati,  C.J.,  speaking for  the Court had observed: (SCC p.615, para 43)

"  We  may  observe  in  conclusion  that  judges should  not  use  strong  and  carping  language  while criticizing the conduct of parties or their witnesses.  They must act with sobriety,  moderation and restraint.   They must  have  the  humility  to  recognize  that  they  are  not infallible and any harsh and disparaging strictures passed by  them  against  any  party  may  be  mistaken  and unjustified and if so, they may do considerable harm and mischief and result in injustice."

Cases need not be multiplied on the point.

27. Therefore, one of the main principles is that a  judge  should  take  special  care  in  making  disparaging remarks against a judge of a subordinate court or against a  person  or  authority  whose  conduct  comes  in  for

consideration before him in cases to be decided by him. Making uncalled for remarks against the said persons or authorities would be violation of  judicial discipline."

For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the

impugned  judgment,  so  far  as  it  relates  to  adverse  remarks  made  against  the

appellant as also the directions issued to the Government of Tamil Nadu to initiate

proceedings against him should be set aside.

The appeal is allowed accordingly.

......................J.       [S.B. SINHA]

      .....................J                                       [ CYRIAC JOSEPH ]

New Delhi, November 25, 2008.

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