S. PALANI VELAYUTHAM & ORS. v.

DISTRICT COLLECTOR, TIRUNVELVELI, TAMIL NADU & ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 5743 of 2009)

AUGUST 7, 2009 [R.V. RAVEENDRAN AND P. SATHASIVAM, JJ.]

[2009] 12 SCR 1215

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J. 1. Leave granted. Heard the learned  counsel.

2. Certain lands in Pazhavoor village were acquired under the  

Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Lands for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act.  

Notice  regarding acquisition  was served on respondents  3 to  6  

who were shown as the owners of the land in the revenue records.  

Respondents 3 to 6 informed the Collector (first respondent) that  

they  were  only  life  estate  holders  and  that  the  vested  

remaindermen should be served with notice. But notice was not  

issued to them. On the other hand, second respondent passed an  

award on 3.6.1997. Thereafter, possession of the acquired lands  

was  taken  and  made  into  plots  and  distributed  to  intended  

beneficiaries.

3.  Appellants  1  to  4  filed  a  writ  petition  alleging  that  the  

acquired  lands  originally  belonged  to  one  S.  Kanthimathinatha  

Pillai; that under a registered will, he bequeathed the said lands to  

his grandchildren (appellants and respondents 7 to 18) subject to a  

life interest in favour of his sons (respondents 3 to 6); and that thus  

the appellants and respondents 7 to 18, who were the children of  

respondents 3 to 6, were the vested remaindermen in regard to the

said lands. They contended that the acquisition proceedings were  

illegal and liable to be quashed for want of notice of acquisition to  

the vested remaindermen who were persons interested. The said  

contention raised in the writ petition was purely a legal contention.  

A learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court  accepted the  

said legal contention and held that the acquisition without issue of  

notice to them was illegal. He therefore allowed the writ petition by  

order dated 13.11.2001 and set  aside the acquisition,  reserving  

liberty  to  respondents  1  and  2  to  initiate  fresh  acquisition  

proceedings  after  appropriate  notice  to  the  writ  petitioners.  The  

order of the learned Single Judge was challenged by respondents  

1 and 2 in a writ appeal.  

4. A division bench of the High Court, by the impugned order  

dated 17.3.2008, allowed the appeal,  set aside the order of the  

learned Single Judge, and dismissed the writ petition. The division  

bench held that the Collector was not obliged to serve the notice of  

acquisition on anyone other than the persons whose names were  

entered in the revenue records as owners; and that as the vested  

remaindermen, had not got their names entered as holders/owners  

in  the  revenue records,  they were  not  entitled  to  any separate  

notice. The division bench also issued a direction to respondents 1  

and 2 herein to initiate criminal action against the appellants and  

private  respondents  7  to  18  herein  “for  playing  fraud  on  the  

Government and the Court, for making wrongful gains by filing a  

writ  petition  which  was  not  maintainable.”  The  appellants  have  

challenged the said judgment.  

5.  The first question is whether the vested remaindermen of  

acquired lands were entitled to notice of acquisition, even if their

names were not entered in the revenue records. The Collector (or  

others exercising the functions of Collector) is required to issue, in  

addition to  the public  notice to  all  persons interested,  individual  

notices  to  persons  known  or  believed  to  be  interested  in  the  

acquired land. There is a significant difference between ‘persons  

known or  believed to  be interested’  and ‘persons interested’.  A  

‘person interested’ no doubt would include all persons claiming an  

interest in the compensation on account of the acquisition of land,  

including the vested remaindermen.  

6. On the other hand, ‘a person known to be interested’ refers  

to persons whose names are recorded in the revenue records, as  

persons having an interest in the acquired lands, as the owner,  

sharer,  occupier  or  holder  of  any  interest.  They  are  entitled  to  

notice. There is no obligation on the part of the Collector to hold an  

enquiry to find out whether there are any other persons interested  

in  the  land  or  whether  there  are  any  vested  remaindermen,  in  

addition  to  those  whose  names  are  entered  as  the  

owners/holders/occupiers  of  the  acquired  land.  Nor  does  the  

Collector have any obligation to issue notices to persons whose  

names are not entered in the revenue records. This does not mean  

that  the  persons  whose names are  not  entered  in  the  revenue  

records do not have any right in the acquired land or that they lose  

their claim to compensation. Their interests and rights in regard to  

compensation  are  protected  by  the  provision  relating  to  

apportionment  of  compensation  and  provision  for  referring  the  

disputes to a civil court for apportionment of compensation.  

7. Persons are “believed “ to be interested in the acquired land,  

if their names are disclosed to the Collector as persons having an

interest in the acquired land (though their names are not entered in  

the revenue records) either in correspondence or otherwise and  

whom the Collector believes as having an interest in the acquired  

lands. The question whether a person is believed to be interested  

in  the  acquired  land,  would  depend  upon  the  subjective  

satisfaction of the Collector. The Collector is not expected to hold  

mini enquiries to find out whether the persons whose names are  

disclosed,  (other  than  those  whose  names  are  entered  in  the  

revenue records) are persons interested in the acquired land or  

not. Therefore no person has any right to assert that the Collector  

should recognise him to be a person interested in the acquired  

land, and issue notice to him, merely because someone informs  

the Collector  that  such person is  also having an interest,  if  his  

name  is  not  entered  in  the  revenue  records.  Of  course,  if  the  

Collector  is  prima facie satisfied from his records that  someone  

other than those whose names are entered in the revenue records,  

are  also  interested  in  the  land,  he  may at  his  discretion,  issue  

notice to them. If he is not satisfied, he need not issue notice to  

them.  Who  is  to  be  ‘believed  to  have  an  interest’  is  purely  

subjective administrative decision. Such persons have no right to  

claim that notice of acquisition should be issued to them.  

7. Therefore we agree with the division bench that notice of  

acquisition  has  to  be  issued  only  to  those  whose  names  are  

entered or recorded as owners/ holders/occupiers in the revenue  

records and not to others.

8.  The next  question is  whether  the  High Court  could  have  

directed  prosecution  of  writ  petitioners  and  the  private  

respondents.  Let  us recall  the facts  relevant  once again in  this

context.  Respondents 3 to 6 are the life interest holders whose  

names  are  entered  in  the  revenue  records.  Appellants  and  

respondents  7  to  18  are  their  children,  who  are  the  vested  

remaindermen  in  regard  to  the  acquired  lands.  Notices  were  

served in the acquisition proceeding on respondents 3 to 6. They  

stated that they were only life-interest holders and notice should be  

served  on  the  vested  remaindermen  also.  But  that  was  not  

accepted and the acquisition was completed. A writ petition was  

filed by the appellants challenging the acquisition on the ground  

that the vested remaindermen in regard to the acquired lands were  

not issued notice of acquisition. It is relevant to note that they did  

not  allege or  contend  that  they did  not  have  knowledge of  the  

acquisition. The learned Single Judge accepted the contention and  

set  aside  the  acquisition  proceedings.  In  the  writ  appeal,  

respondents 1 and 2 contended that the persons other than those  

whose  names  were  entered  in  the  revenue  records  were  not  

entitled to notice and therefore the learned Single Judge had erred  

in  quashing  the  acquisition,  that  too  after  possession  of  the  

acquired lands was taken and they were distributed as plots to  

landless weaker sections.  It  was not  the case of  respondents 1  

and 2 that the persons claiming to be vested remaindermen were  

served any notice. The Division Bench allowed the writ appeal filed  

by respondents 1 and 2 herein.  

9.  The Division Bench reversed the decision  of  the  learned  

Single Judge purely on a legal  ground,  that  the persons whose  

names are entered in the revenue records as owners, are alone  

entitled to notice, and others though may have an interest, will not  

be entitled to notice of acquisition. It did not record any finding that  

the claim of the writ  petitioners (appellants herein) that they and

respondents 7 to 18 were the vested remaindermen, was false.  

The division bench however drew an inference that the persons  

claiming to be the vested remaindermen, being close relatives of  

the persons who were served notices, should be imputed with the  

knowledge of the acquisition proceedings and therefore their writ  

petition contending that they did not have notice of the acquisition,  

was  misconceived.  But  what  was missed was the  fact  that  the  

specific  contention  of  appellants  was  that  they  were  entitled  to  

notice of acquisition from the Collector and that such notice was  

not given,  and that  they did not contend that  they did not have  

knowledge of acquisition. There was also no material to show that  

the writ petitioners and the private respondents, who are ordered  

to be prosecuted, had furnished any false information or made any  

false  claim.  There  was  no  evidence of  any fraud.  When a  writ  

petition is filed seeking to enforce or protect the interests or rights  

of the writ petitioners, purely based on legal contentions, it cannot  

be termed that filing of the writ petition was “playing of a fraud by  

the writ petitioners against the Government or court.”

10.  Courts  should  avoid  the  temptation  to  become  

authoritarian.  We  have  been  coming  across  several  instances,  

where in their anxiety to do justice, courts have gone overboard,  

which  results  in  injustice,  rather  than  justice.  It  is  said  that  all  

power is trust and with greater power comes greater responsibility.  

The power to order a prosecution has to be used sparingly and in  

exceptional circumstances, either to maintain the majesty of law or  

to ensure that clearly established offences relating to fraud/forgery  

with  reference to  court  proceedings  do not  go unprosecuted or  

unpunished.  Ordering  prosecutions  in  a  casual  manner  while  

reversing the decision of a learned Single Judge in a writ petition,

without  any  investigation  or  enquiry  either  by  itself  or  by  any  

independent  investigation agency,  is  to  be deprecated.  Criminal  

law cannot  be set  into  motion against  a litigant,  as a matter  of  

course.  

11. On several occasions, this Court has deprecated certain  

authoritarian practices which result  in  hardship and prejudice to  

litigants and even non-parties. The well-known instances are : (1)  

passing  adverse  remarks  against  government  officers  or  others  

who are not parties to the lis, without giving an opportunity to them  

to  show-cause  or  justify  their  action;  (2)  directing  the  state  to  

recover any losses or damages or costs from a particular officer  

(who  is  not  a  party)  by  holding  him  personally  liable  for  some  

alleged  act  or  omission,  without  giving  him  any  opportunity  to  

explain his position, conduct or action; (3) directing prosecution of  

parties and/or non-parties, in cases which merely warrant levy of  

costs or admonition.  

12.  Under  the Indian Penal  Code,  offences relating  to  false  

evidence  and  offences  against  public  justice  are  contained  in  

Chapter  XI.  In  relation to  proceeding in  any court,  the offences  

enumerated  are  :  giving  false  evidence  or  fabricating  false  

evidence (Sec.  191 to 193);  giving or  fabricating false evidence  

with intent to procure conviction (Sec. 194 and 195); threatening  

any person to  give  false evidence (Sec.  195A);  using evidence  

known to be false (Sec. 196); using as true a certificate known to  

be  false  (Sec.  198);  making  a  false  statement  in  a  declaration  

which is by law receivable as evidence (Sec. 199); using as true  

any declaration receivable as evidence, knowing it to be false (sec.  

200) causing disappearance of evidence of offence, or giving false

information to screen offender (Sec. 201); intentional omission to  

give information of offence by person bound to inform (Sec. 202);  

giving  false  information  in  respect  of  an  offence  (Sec.  203);  

destruction  of  document  or  electronic  record  to  prevent  its  

production as evidence (Sec 204);  false personation (sec.  205);  

fraudulent removal/concealment of property (sec. 206); fraudulent  

claim  to  property  (sec.  207);  fraudulently  suffering  or  obtaining  

decree for sum not due (sec. 208 and 210); dishonestly making a  

false  claim  in  Court  (Section  209);  and  intentional  insult  or  

interruption  to  public  servant  sitting  in  judicial  proceedings  (sec  

228). Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure provides that no  

court  shall  take  cognizance  of  any  offence  punishable  under  

sections  172  to  188  (dealing  with  the  contempt  of  the  lawful  

authority of public servants) or sections 193 to 196, 199, 200, 205  

to  211  and  228,  when  such  offence  is  alleged  to  have  been  

committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any court, except  

on the complaint in writing of that court by such officer of the court   

as that court may authorise in writing in this behalf,  or of  some  

other court to which that court is sub-ordinate.

13. The Division Bench has directed that the respondents in  

the  writ  appeal  before  it  (appellants  and  respondents  3  to  18  

herein) should be prosecuted “under the relevant provisions of law,  

including  IPC,  for  playing  a  fraud  on  the  Court  with  wrong  

particulars”.  The Division Bench has not  specified the provision  

under which they should be prosecuted nor the offence of which  

they are accused. The only provision of relevance is section 209 of  

the  Penal  Code,  which  provides  that  whoever,  fraudulently  or  

dishonestly, or with intent to injure or annoy any persons, makes in  

a  court  any  claim  which  he  knows  to  be  false,  is  liable  to

punishment as provided under law. But four things stand out in this  

case. The first  is that raising a purely legal  contention in a writ  

petition cannot give rise to an inference that  the writ  petitioners  

had fraudulently or  dishonestly  or  with  intent  to  injure or  annoy  

anyone, made any claim knowing it to be false. The second is that  

there was also no material before the division bench to show that  

any person having an interest  in the acquired lands had played  

fraud  upon  the  government  or  the  court.  The  third  is  that  

respondents  7  to  18  who  had  neither  initiated  any  legal  

proceedings,  nor  took any action  in  the  matter,  could  not  have  

been ordered to be prosecuted, thereby showing non-application  

of mind in issuing the direction for prosecution. The fourth is that if  

a fraud had been played on the court,  the High Court  ought  to  

have made a complaint in writing through an authorised officer of  

the court, instead of directing respondents 1 and 2 to prosecute  

the parties.  

14. On the facts and circumstances, the direction to initiate criminal  

prosecution against the appellants and the respondents 3 to 18 was wholly  

unwarranted. We therefore allow this appeal in part and set aside the  

direction to initiate criminal proceedings against the appellants and  

respondents 3 to 18.