28 March 1973
Supreme Court
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S. P. WATEL AND OTHERS Vs STATE OF U.P.(with connected appeals)

Bench: SIKRI, S.M. (CJ),RAY, A.N.,PALEKAR, D.G.,DWIVEDI, S.N.,MUKHERJEA, B.K.


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PETITIONER: S. P. WATEL AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF U.P.(with connected appeals)

DATE OF JUDGMENT28/03/1973

BENCH: DWIVEDI, S.N. BENCH: DWIVEDI, S.N. SIKRI, S.M. (CJ) RAY, A.N. PALEKAR, D.G. MUKHERJEA, B.K.

CITATION:  1973 AIR 1293            1973 SCR  (3) 783  1973 SCC  (2) 238

ACT: U.P.  Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms  Act, 1956--Land  leased for planting a grove, erecting  buildings etc.--Does  not  fall exclusively under  s.  2(1)(d)-Section 2(1)(d) must be interpreted as relating to agricultural land only--Thus  construed  if  protected  by  Art.  31A  of  the Constitution--Land   in   question   not   proved   to    be ’agricultural  area’--Notification under s. 8 of Act  cannot be  issued in respect of it--Abatement of suits and  appeals under  Rule 39 of the U.P. Urban Areas  Zamindari  Abolition and Land Reforms Rules 1957.

HEADNOTE: Plot  No.  4635A (old number 5199) admeasuring bigha  and  2 biswas  and located in the Meerut municipal area was  leased by the Lala Nanak Chand Trust to the predecessor-in-interest of  the  present respondents.  According to the  lease  deed dated  June 23, 1926 the lease was granted "for the  purpose of  planting a grove, erecting buildings and  digging  wells etc.".  The period of the lease was 30 years but the  lessor agreed that on the expiration of that period he would at the request of the lessee renew the lease for another 30  years. On  the expiry of the initial period of 30 years on July  1, 1956  the  lessor Trust instituted a suit  for  recovery  of possession of the aforesaid land.  The suit was dismissed by the  trial court but decreed by the first  appellate  court. The  respondents  thereafter, on permission granted  by  the said  first  appellate  court  instituted  a  suit  for  the specific performance of the agreement to re-let the land for another  term  of 30 years.  The suit was dismissed  on  the ground  of  limitation by the trial court, as  well  as  the first  appellate  court.   In both  the  suits  the  present respondents  filed second appeals in the High Court.   While these  appeals were pending the U.P. Urban  Areas  Zamindari Abolition  and  Land Reforms Act, 1956 was enforced  in  the city  of  Meerut.   The  land in  dispute  was  declared  an agricultural area’ under the Act and a notification under s. 8  of  the Act vesting the land in the State was  issued  on July  16,  1964.  Rule 39 of the Uttar Pradesh  Urban  Areas

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Zamindari  Abolition and Land Reforms Rules,  1957  provided for  abatement of certain suits and appeals.   Applying  the rule  the High Court abated the two aforesaid appeals  filed by the respondents before it.  The Trustees appealed to this Court  by  special leave.  They also filed a  writ  petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution praying that the notifica- tion  under s., 8 of the Act dated July 16, 1964 be  quashed as  violative  of  Articles  14,  19(1)(f)  and  31  of  the Constitution.   It was further contended that s. 2(1)(d)  of the Act whereby land held on lease duly executed before  the first  day  of  July  1955  for  the  purposes  of  erecting buildings  thereon  was included in the  term  ’agricultural area’ was protected by Art. 31-A of the Constitution. HELD  : (i) The lease was not exclusively a building  lease. Admittedly   no   building  had   been   constructed.    The respondents  claimed  to have planted a grove.  If  so,  the land  would be covered by s. 2(1)(c)(viii) The  lease  could not therefore be held to fall exclusively under s.  2(1)(d). [790B] 784 (ii)  In  Durga Prasad’s case the Allahabad High  Court  has pointed  out  the history of cl. (d).  The  High  Court  has taken the view that s. 2(1)(d) is limited to lands which are being  used for agricultural purposes.  The conclusion  must be held to be correct though for different reasons, On  this construction  of  s.  2(1)(d) it cannot be  said  that  this provision  is not connected with agricultural  reforms.   It could  accordingly  receive the protection of Art.  31A  and would  be immune from attack-on the ground of  violation  of Articles 14, 19 and 31. [792C] Durga Prasad v. Board of Revenue U.P. Allahabad and  others, A.I.R. 1970 All. 159, referred to. (iii)  The report of the Commission would not show that  the land in dispute was a grove within the meaning of s. 2(6) of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939.  As the appellants had given the old number of the plot in their petition the Government  did not reply to the allegation in the petition.  Accordingly it was  not  possible to express any concluded opinion  on  the question  whether the land in dispute was  an  ’agricultural area’ on the date specified under s. 2(1) and was being used for  horticulture., The issue must be decided afresh by  the appropriate  authority under the Act.  If it is held by  him that  the land in dispute is an ’agricultural area’ and  the State Government issues a notification under s. 8 of the Act with  respect to the land, the appeals will be, disposed  of by  the High Court in accordance with the provisions of  the Act. [793C] [Notification dated June 16, 1964 quashed, and orders of the High Court abating the appeals and suits set aside.]

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 105 of 1969. Petition  under Article 32 of the Constitution of India  for the enforcement of fundamental rights and Civil and  Appeals Nos. 1402 and 1403 of 1969. Appeals  by special leave from the judgment and order  dated July  25, 1968 of the Allahabad High Court at  Allahabad  in Second Appeal Nos. 425 of 1960 and 1649 of 1962. R.  K. Garg and S. C. Agarwal for the petitioners  (in  writ petition) and for the appellants (in appeals) G.  N. Dikshit and 0. P. Rana, for the respondents (in  writ petition) C.  B. Agarwala and M. Al.  Kshatriya, for  the  respondents

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(in appeals). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DWIVEDI,  J.-These three cases have a common origin and  are accordingly being disposed of by a common judgment. The city of Meerut is a municipality in Uttar Pradesh.  Plot No.  4635A (old number 5199) is located therein.  It has  an area of bigha and 2 biswas.  It formed part of the zamindari estate belonging to Lala Nanak Chand Trust.  The trust is  a charitable  trust  vested  in the  Treasurer  of  Charitable Endowments 785 and  is  managed  by  the  Collector  of  Meerut  through  a committee  of trustees.  On June 23, 1926, a lease deed  was executed  on  behalf  of  the trust and  in  favour  of  one Bateshwar Dayal.  By the deed the aforesaid plot was let  to Bateshwar Dayal.  The lease was granted "for the purpose  of planting a grove, erecting buildings and digging wells etc." The  yearly rent was fixed at Rs. 12/8/-.  The lease  was  a for a terms of 30 years with effect from June 1, 1926.   The lessee  agreed  to  surrender the  land  and  all  buildings standing thereon to the lessor on the expiry of the  period of  lease.  The buildings would become the property  of  the lessor.  He would have them without paying any  compensation to the lessee.  The lessor agreed that on the expiration  of the  period of lease he would at the request of  the  lessee grant  to  the  lessee a new lease for another  term  of  30 years. The  initial  period of 30 years expired on  July  1,  1956. Thereupon  the  trust instituted suit No. 690  of  1956  for recovery   of  possession  over  the  aforesaid  land   from Bateshwar  Dayal.   During pendency of this  suit  Bateshyar Dayal died on March 6, 1958.  The suit was dismissed by  the trial  court on October 24, 1958.  It was, however,  decreed by  the  first appellate court on November  30,  1959.   The appellate  court granted six months’ time to the  defendants to  institute a suit in the appropriate court  for  specific performance  of the agreement to re-let for another term  of 30 years. Bhagwat  Dayal  and others, heirs of Bateshwar  Dayal,  then instituted suit No. 34 of 1960 in the appropriate court  for specific performance of the agreement to re-let the land for another  term of 30 years.  The Trust contested  this  suit, inter alia, on the ground that it was barred by  limitation. This  plea  was upheld by the trial court and the  suit  was dismissed  on October 30, 1961.  The first  appellate  court affirmed, the decree of the trial court on March 23, 1962. Bhagwat  Dayal  and  other’s filed a second  appeal  in  the Allahabad High Court against the judgment and decree  passed in  the  suit filed by the Trust on January 5,  1960.   They also  filed a second appeal against the judgment and  decree in their own suit on April 23, 1962. While  those  appeals  were pending,  the  U.P.  Urban  Area Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1956  (hereinafter called  the  Act) was enforced in the city of  Meerut.   The land  in dispute was declared "agricultural area" under  the said Act.  Thereafter a notification was issued on June  16, 1964 under s. 8 of the Act vesting the land in the State. 786 Bhagwat  Dayal  then moved an application  before  the  High Court  for abating the two appeals as well as the two  suits out of which those appeals had arisen in accordance with the provisions  of  the  Act.  The High Court  passed  an  order abating  both the suits and appeals.  The order was made  on July 25, 1968.  Against this order the appellants have filed two appeals in this Court by special leave.

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The  appellants say that they have filed the  writ  petition No.  105 of 1969 byway of abundant caution.  The  prayer  in the  petition is that the notification issued under s. 8  of the Act should be quashed.  Itis alleged in paragraph 4 of the petition that the disputed plotis  a part of  Kothi Babu  Wali.   In  paragraph 20 of the writ  petition  it  is reiterated   that  the  disputed  plot  forms  part   of   a residential  Kothi within the municipality of Meerut and  is nonagricultural  area.   It  is alleged  that  the  impugned notification is violative of the provisions of Articles  14, 19  (1) (f) and 3 1 of the Constitution and  is  accordingly unconstitutional. Before mentioning the arguments of Shri R. K. Garg,  counsel for  the appellants, it is necessary to have a look  at  the relevant  provisions  of the Act.  The preamble to  the  Act states that it is expedient to provide for the abolition  of Zamindari  system  in agricultural areas  situate  in  urban areas  in  Uttar  Pradesh and "for the  acquisition  of  the rights,  title  and interest of intermediaries  between  the tiller  of the soil and the State in such areas and for  the introduction of the land reforms therein." Section 2 in  the definition  clause,  Sub-section  (1)  of  it  defines   the expression  "agricultural  area".   As  this  provision   is important  for  this case, we are setting out  its  relevant portion. "Agricultural area" as respects any urban area means an area which,  with reference to such date as the State  Government may notify in that behalf, is-               (a) in the possession of or held or deemed  to               be  held by an intermediary as sir,  khudkasht               or an intermediary’s grove;               (b)  held  as a grove by or  in  the  personal               cultivation of a permanent lessee in Avadh; or               (c) included in the holding of-               (i)   a fixed-rate tenant,               (ii)an ex-proprietary tenant,               (iii)an occupancy tenant,               (iv)a  tenant  holding on special  terms  in               Avadh.               (v)   a rent-free grantee,               (vi)a grantee at a favourable rate of rent. 787               (vii)a hereditary tenant,               (viii)a grove-holder,               (ix)a sub-tenant referred to in  sub-section               (4)  of section 47 of the U.P.  Tenancy  Act,.               1938, or               (x) a non-occupancy tenant of land other  than               land referred to in sub-section (3) of Section               30 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939,               and is used by the holder thereof for purposes               of agriculture or horticulture :               Provided  always that land which on  the  date               aforesaid  is occupied by building  not  being               "improvements" as defined in Section 3 of  the               U.P.  Tenancy Act, 1939, and land  appurtenant               to  such buildings. shall not be deemed to  be               agricultural area.               (d)   held on a lease duly executed before the               first  day of July, 1955 for the  purposes  of               erecting buildings thereon; or               (e) held or occupied by an occupier........ Section  2(7)  defines an "intermediary", inter alia,  as  a proprietor  of an agricultural area, Section 2 (12)  defines "proprietor" as a person owning whether in trust or for  his

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own  benefits  an agricultural area.  Section  2(16)  states that  the  words and expressions,  "grove",  "grove-holder", "grove-land" and "holding"shall have the meaning assigned to them  in the U.P Tenancy Act, 1939.  Section 3 provides  for demarcation of agricultural area in urban areas.  Section  4 provides  for  publication  of  preliminary  proposals  with respect  to demarcation of agricultural areas.  It  provides also  for inviting objections to the proposals.   Final  de- marcation is made by the Commissioner under s. 5. Section  8 provides that after agricultural areas have been  demarcated under  s.  5,  the  State Government may,  at  any  time  by notification in the gazette, declare that as from a date  to ’be specified all such areas situate in the urban area shall vest  in  the State.  From that date all  such  agricultural areas shall stand transferred to and vest in the State  free from   all  encumbrances.   Section  10  provides  for   the consequences of vesting.  All rights, title and interest  of an  intermediary  in an agricultural area cease  and  become vested ill the State free from all encumbrances.  All  suits and proceedings of the nature to be prescribed by rules, and pending  in  any court,, on the date of  vesting,  shall  be stayed. Section  17(1)  is important for our purposes,  and  we  are quoting the material portion of it. 788               "Section 17.  Settlement of certain lands with               intermediaries  or cultivators as  bhumidhars-               (1)  subject to the provisions of  Section  16               and 18-               (a)   all lands in an agricultural area-               (i) in possession of, or held or deemed to  be               held  by an intermediary as Sir, khudkasht  or               an intermediary’s grove,               (ii)held  as a grove by, or in the  personal               cultivation of a permanent lessee in Avadh,               (iii) held ’by a fixed-rate tenant or a  rent-               free as  such, or (iv)held as such by-               (i)   an occupancy tenant,               (ii)  a hereditary tenant,               (iii)a tenant on patta dawami or istamrari or               (iv)  held by a grove-holder               (1) an occupancy tenant   possessing the right               (ii) a hereditary tenant  to transfer               (iii) a tenant on patta  the holding by sale.               dawami or istamarari               on the date immediately preceding the date  of               vesting, and               (b) all lands in an agricultural area held  on               lease duly made before the first day of  July,               1955,  for  the purpose of  erecting  building               thereon,               shall  be  deemed to be settled by  the  State               Government  with  such  intermediary,  lessee,               tenant,  grantee or groveholder, as  the  case               may be, who shall subject to the provisions of               this  Act,  be  entitled  to  take  or  retain               possession as a bhumidhar thereof." Section  19(j) provides that notwithstanding  anything  con- tained in the Act, every person who, on the date immediately preceding  the date of vesting occupied or held land  in  an agricultural area as a sub-lessee from a person holding land under  a  lease referred to in cl. (b)  of  sub-section  (1) shall  be  deemed  to be an asami  thereof.   Section  20(1) provides that a bhumidhar of the land referred to in cl. (b) of sub-s.(1) of S. 17, may, within one year from the date of

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vesting,  apply to the Assistant Collector, Incharge of  the Sub-Division  for ejectment of asami belonging to the  class mentioned in S. 19(j) on the ground that he wants to use the land held by the asami for the purpose of erecting buildings thereon.   If  the Assistant Collector is  satisfied  after inquiry  that the applicant intends to use the land for  the purpose   of  erecting  buildings  thereon,  be  may   order ejectment  of the asami from such land.  After ejectment  of the  asami,  the applicant shall erect  a  building  thereon within  three years of the date of the order  of  ejectment. If the bhumidhar does not file an application for  ejectment or  if the order of ejectment passed on any  application  is not executed within the prescribed period of limitation, the asami shall become a sirdar of the land.  The rights,  title and 789 interest  of  the  bhumidhar shall be deemed  to  have  been acquired  under  s.  10,  "as  if  the  bhumidhar  were   an intermediary on the date of vesting." If the bhumidhar fails to erect buildings within three years, he.shall be liable to pay  to  the  asami or any person claiming  through  him  an amount equal to five times the rent payable by asami at  the time of his ejectment. According  to  s. 24 an intermediary whose right,  title  or interest in any agricultural area is acquired under the  Act shall  be entitled to receive compensation as  provided  for therein. Rules have been framed under the Act.  They are known as the Uttar  Pradesh  Urban  Areas Zamindari  Abolition  and  Land Reform Rules, 1957.  Rule 38 provides for stay, inter  alia, of  suits  and  appeals arising under s.  180  of  the  U.P. Tenancy Act or of a similar nature pending in a civil court. Rule 39 provides for abatment of such suits and appeals.  In the present case the second appeals and the suits from which they  had  arisen were abated under this rule  by  the  High Court. Section  2(6) of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 defines  "grove- land"  as meaning "any specific piece of land in a mahal  or mahals  having  trees planted thereon in such  numbers  that they preclude, .or when full grown will preclude the land or any  considerable portion thereof from being used  primarily for any other purpose, and the trees on such land constitute a grove." Section 2(7) defines the word "holding".  It means a  parcel or parcels of land held under one lease.   Section 2(10)  defines the word "land" as meaning land which is  let or  held  for  growing of crops, or  as  grove-land  or  for pasturage.   It  does not include land for  the  time  being occupied by buildings or appurtenant thereto other than  the buildings  which are improvements.  The word  "grove-holder" is  defined  in s. 205 of the said Act.  A  person  who  has planted a grove on land which was let or granted to him by a landlord  for  the purpose of planting a grove is  called  a "grove-holder" of the grove. The first argument_ of Shri Garg is that the lease  involved in  ’these  cases was a lease for the  purpose  of  erecting buildings  and that accordingly it falls within the  purview of  cl.  (d) of sub-section (1) of s. 2 of the Act.   It  is urged that cl. (d) is violative of Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the  Constitution  and is invalid.  On  that  premise  being correct,  it is further said that the land in  dispute  will not  be an agricultural area within the meaning of the  said expression under the Act.  Consequently, the notification of the  State  Government  acquiring the  land  in  dispute  is invalid. The lease is "for the purpose of planting a grove,  erecting

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buildings and digging well etc." It may be observed that the lease  is  not an exclusively building  lease.   Instead  of erecting buildings, 790 the  lessee could, plant a grove.  Admittedly  no  buildings have  been  ,constructed.  The case of the  respondents  was that  Bateshwar  Dayal had planted a  grove.   If  Bateshwar Dayal  had planted a grove and if the grove was existing  on the date specified under s. 2 of the Act and was then  being used by the respondents as a grove the land in dispute would be  covered ’by s. 2 ( 1 ) (c) (viii) ,of the Act.  In  that event  it will be out of the purview of s. 2(1) (d)  of  the Act.   As the lease is liable to be placed under  either  of these  two,  classes,  it will not be correct  to  place  it exclusively ,,under cl. (d). The  Act  as  a whole is protected by  Article  31A  of  the Constitution.   Shri Garg’s contention, however, is that  as s.  2  (1) (d) is not at all  connected  with  agricultural reforms, it cannot receive the protection of Article 31A and will  be open to challenge for violation of Articles 14,  19 and 31.  In terms S. 2(1)(d) does not appear to be connected with  the  object  of  agricultural  reform.   But  a  close scrutiny  of  its context and the object of  the  Act  would ,reveal that it is so connected. All  other  clauses of s. 2(1) except cl. (d),  are  clearly connected  with  the object of  agricultural  reform.   They include in an "agricultural area" only such land as is being used for growing crop or as a grove or as a pasture land  on the date specified in s. 2 (1). The proviso to s. 2 (1)  (c) expressly  excludes from "agricultural area" land  which  is occupied  by  buildings, not being  improvements,  and  land appurtenant  to  such  buildings.   Having  regard  to  this proviso,  it is difficult to believe that s. 2 (1 ) (d)  was intended by the legislature to apply to land which is not an agricultural area.  "Agriculture" means "the science and the art  of cultivating the soil; including the gathering in  of the  crops, and The rearing of live-stock; farming  (in  the widest sense)". (Shorter ,Oxford Dictionary, 3rd Edn.   Vol. I,  p.37). So, ordinarily "agricultural area" would mean  an area  used  for  cultivation  or  farming.   ’Section   2(1) includes  groves  also.  Clause (d) should take  its  colour from  this inherent meaning of "agricultural area" which  is being defined in s. 2(1). section  17(1) confers bhumidhari rights on certain  classes of  persons over certain kinds of lands.  Section 17(1)  has two  clauses  (a) and (b).  Lands specified in cl.  (a)  are used for growing crops or as a grove.  It is significant  to observe the difference between the language of s. 2 (1)  (d) and   s.  17  (1)  (b)  While  section  2(1)(d)  refers   to "agricultural  area", section 17(1)(b) is expressly  limited to  "lands  in  agricultural area held  on  lease.  for  the purpose  of  erecting  buildings thereon."  As  the  subject matter of S. 2(1)(d) and s. 17(1)(b) should be identical, it appears to us that the expression "agricultural area’ in  s. 2  (1)  (d) should be construed as "lands  in  agricultural area".  If the defini- 791 tion of "land" in the U.P. Tenancy Act is applied to s. 17 ( 1),   as  it  should  be,  section  17(1)(b)   will   confer bhumindhari  rights  on a lessee of land which is  used  for growing  crops or as a grove or as a pasture  land  although the lease may have been granted for erecting buildings.  The marginal note to the section supports this construction. Section  19(j)  provides  that a sub-lessee  from  a  person "holding  land under a lease referred to in cl. (b) of  sub-

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section  (1) of s. 17". shall be an asami.   This  provision also shows that the agricultural area referred to in s. 2(1) (d) should on the relevant date be used for growing crops or as a grove or as a pasture land. It  is  not  possible to take the view that  s.  2  (1)  (d) compasses  a  wider  geography than s. 17(1)  (b).   Such  a construction  would  create an anomaly.   The  lessee  would become  bhumidhar  of only such portion of the  land  as  is being used ’,or growing crops or as a grove or as a  pasture land.  The rest of the agricultural area let out to him  for the  purpose  of  erecting  buildings  would  vest  in   the Government.   But  he  would get no  compensation  for  that portion, for under s. 24 compensation is payable only to  an intermediary.  But he is not an "intermediary" as defined in s. 2(7), nor a sub-intermediary as defined in s. 2(14).  lie is deemed to be an intermediary for a limited purpose  under s. 20(4) but that provision is not material for our purpose. This  anomaly will not result if "agricultural area"  in  s. 2(1) (d) and ’land in an agricultural’ area in s. 17 (1) (b) are construed as perfectly over-lapping. The preamble to the Act shows that the object of the Act  is to  acquire  right,  title  or  interest  of  intermediaries between  the tiller of the, soil and the State and  for  the introduction of land reforms therein.  Having regard to  the context  already pointed out and this object of the  Act  it seems  to us that s. 2 (1) (d), though apparently  expressed in  wide  language, is limited to lands which,  are  on  the relevant date being used for growing crops or as grove or as pasture  land.   It does not apply to lands  which  are  not being so used. The  history of the framing of s. 2 (1) (d)  fortifies  this inference.   The  Bill  which consummated  in  the  Act  was introduced  in the Legislative Assembly on August  6,  1955. It  was  referred to a Joint Select  Committee.   The  Joint Select Committee’s report and the Bill as amended by it were published  in the Uttar Pradesh Gazette, dated  February  4, 1956.  Clause (d) of s. 2(1) was incorporated in the amended Bill by the Joint Select Committee.  It read as follows : "held on a lease duly executed before the first day of July, 1955  for  the purpose of erecting  buildings  thereon,  but which  is being used for the purposes of agriculture  either by the bolder thereof 792 or by any person claiming under him." Clause (d) was  passed in  this  form by the Legislative Assembly  on  December  3, 1956.   The Bill then went to the Legislative Council.   But before reaching there it was pruned by the Secretary of  the Assembly.  He deleted the last part of cl. (d) as passed  by the  Legislative Assembly.  The Legislative  Council  passed cl. (d) as pruned by the Legislative Secretary.   Thereafter the  Bill  received the assent of the Governor  and  of  the President.   It  seems that the Secretary thought  that  the deleted  portion  of  cl.  (d)  was  redundant;  and  so  he eliminated it. In Durga Prasad versus Board of Revenue  U.P. Allahabad  and  others,(1)  the  Allahabad  High  Court  has pointed  out  this history of cl. (d).  The High  Court  has taken  the view that s. 2(1) (d) is limited to  lands  which are  being used for agricultural purposes.  We have come  to the same conclusion though for different reasons. On this construction of s. 2 (1) (d) it cannot ’be said that this  provision is not connected with agricultural  reforms. It would accordingly receive the protection of Art. 31A  and would  be immune from attack on the ground of  violation  of Articles 14, 19 and 31. It would follow from the foregoing discussion that only such

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lands as are being used for growing crops or as grove or  as pasture  land may be acquired under the Act.  It is  alleged in  the writ petition that the land in dispute is a part  of kothi Babu Wali and was not used for agricultural  purposes. The  petition mentions the old number of the plot which  was 5199.   The  new  number of the plot is  4635A.   The  State Government has filed a counteraffidavit.  They have  assumed that  the  petition  refers to the plot now  given  the  new number  5199.  The counter-affidavit does not deal with  the disputed  plot now numbered 4635A.  But the  description  of the plot in dispute given in the petition leaves no room for doubt  about the identity of the plot.  It is strange  that the  counter-affidavit  did  not  squarely  deal  with   the allegations  in  the petition.  The  appellants’  allegation that the land in dispute is non-agricultural land and  forms part  of  a  residential kothi  remains  unanswered  in  the counter-affidavit. In the suit the respondent’s case was that Bateshwar  Dayal, their  predecessor-in-interest, had planted a grove  on  the land   in  dispute.   The  trial  court  had   appointed   a Commissioner for finding out whether there stood a grove  on the land in dispute.  On October 16, 1956, the  Commissioner submitted  his report to the trial court.  It  appears  from his report that about a half of the plot towards the western side was then "quite vacant." On the western boundary of the plot there stood two sheesham and three mango trees; on  the northern ’boundary of the plot there were four (1)  A.I.R. 1970 All 159. 793 guava  trees,  one  plum tree and a  thorny  tree.   In  the eastern  half  of  the  plot  there  were  about  18  or  19 "scattered guava trees".  Trees standing on the boundary  of the plot will not prevent the use of the land for a  purpose other  than grove.  The western half could be used  for  any other purpose.   In  the  eastern  half  the  18  or   19 "scattered" guava trees could apparently not prevent the use of  the land for any other purpose.  The report of the  Com- missioner  would  not show that the land in  dispute  was  a grove within the meaning of s. 2(6) of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939.   As  the appellants had given the old number  of  the plot in their petition, the Government did not reply to  the allegations  in  the  petition.   Accordingly,  it  is   not possible  to express any concluded opinion on  the  question whether  the land in dispute was an "agricultural  area"  on the  date  specified under s. 2(1) and was  being  used  for horticulture.  The issue should now be decided afresh by the appropriate authority under the Act., in  the  result, we allow the writ petition  and  quash  the Government  notification under s. 8 of the Act,  dated  June 16, 1964 with respect to the land in dispute.  We direct the Government  to  proceed afresh with respect to the  land  in dispute in accordance with ss. 3, 4, 5 and 8 of the Act.  If it is found in the course of enquiry under ss. 3, 4, and  5 that  the land in dispute was an ,.,agricultural  area"  and was  being  used  for agriculture  or  horticulture  on  the relevant date, it will be open to the Government to issue  a notification with respect to it under s. 8. If, on the other hand,  it  is  found  in that enquiry that  it  was  not  an "agricultural-area" on the said date, no notification  under s.  8 should be issued with respect to it.  The appeals  are also  allowed.   The orders of the High  Court  abating  the appeals  and the suits are set aside.  The High  Court  will restore the appeals and the suits to their original numbers. The  appeals will be decided on merits when the  appropriate authority  under s. 5 of the Act has held that the  land  in

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dispute is not an "agricultural area".  If it is held by him ,that the land in dispute is an "agricultural area" and  the State Government issues a notification under s. 8 of the Act with respect to the land, the appeals will be disposed of in accordance   with  the  provisions  of  the  Act.   In   the circumstances  of  this case parties shall  bear  their  own cost,,. G.C.                                Appeals allowed. 794