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PETITIONER: S.   P. JINADATHAPPA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: R.   P. SHARMA AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/04/1961

BENCH: SARKAR, A.K. BENCH: SARKAR, A.K. GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. GUPTA, K.C. DAS AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA MUDHOLKAR, J.R.

CITATION:  1961 AIR 1523            1962 SCR  (2)  22  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1975 SC 446  (19)

ACT: Rent Control-Allotment of accommodation-Statute  authorising controller to select tenant-Constitutionality of-If violates fundamental  right of  landlord-Discrimination-Guidance  for choosing tenant-Mysore House Rent and Accommodation  Control Act,  1951 (Mys.  XXX of 1951), s.  3(3)(a)-Constitution  of India, Arts.14 and 19(1)(f).

HEADNOTE: Section 30(3)(a) of the Mysore House Rent and  Accommodation Control  Act, 1951, authorised the Controller to select  any Government, local authority, public institution, officer  of a  government, local authority or public institution or  any other  person as a tenant of a vacant house.  Under the  Act the  owner  was  bound to let the house  to  the  tenant  so selected.  The petitioner was the owner of a house for  whom the controller selected a tenant under these provisions.  He challenged the constitutionality of S. 3(3)(a) in so far  as the  selection  of  "other persons" was  authorised  on  the grounds that: (i) it put an unreasonable restriction on  his fundamental  right to property and (ii) it offended Art.  14 of the Constitution as it provided no guidance for  choosing the  tenant and enabled the controller to make an  arbitrary choice. Held,  that  S.  3(3)(a) of the Act was valid  and  did  not violate Art. 14 or 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. An individual was a member of the public and the restriction caused  by his selection was in the interest of the  general public.   The  restriction  was not  unreasonable.   It  was enforced only when the owner did not want the house for  his own  use.   It could make no reasonable  difference  to  him whether  an  individual was selected  or  government,  local authority, public institution or any officer of any of these was  selected.   The Act made provision for selection  of  a suitable tenant.  This was further secured by providing  for an  appeal to the District judge and thereafter  a  revision petition to the High Court.

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There was ample guidance given in the Act to the  Controller to  choose  a suitable tenant.  Every one had been  given  a right to apply for being selected as a tenant; and the owner bad been given the right to have his views also  considered. The  ultimate  decision  was a  judicial  decision,  and  if required, of the highest tribunal in the State.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 71 of 1958.                              23 Writ Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. S.   K. Venkataranga Ayengar and S. J. S. Fernandez, for the petitioner. B.   R. L. Iyengar, for respondent No. 1. R.   Gopalakrishnan and T. M. Sen, for the respondent No. 2. 1961.  April 17.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKAR,  J.-This petition under Art. 32 of the  Constitution raises  a  question  of the constitutional  validity  of  s. 3(3)(a)  of the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation  Control Act, 1951 (Mysore XXX of 1951).  Shortly put, that provision enables  an  authority  set  up by the  Act  to  select  any Government, local authority, public institution, officer  of a  government, local authority or public institution or  any other person as the tenant of a vacant house.  Under the Act the  owner  is bound to let the premises to  the  tenant  so selected.   The  petitioner,  for whom  a  tenant  had  been selected  under this provision, challenges its  validity  on the  ground that it puts an unreasonable restriction on  his fundamental  right  to property under Art. 19(1)(f)  of  the Constitution  and  is outside the protection of el.  (5)  of that article. The  petitioner  had a building in respect of which  he  had made  some  sort of arrangement with one Misri Lal  for  the making  of  certain  alterations in it and  for  letting  it thereafter  to him for the purpose of a boarding house.   He later gave a notice as required by s. 3(2)(a) of the Act  to respondent  No.  2, the Controller, who  had  the  authority under  s.  3(3)(a) to select a tenant, that  the  house  had become  vacant.   Thereupon  respondent  No.  2   considered applications  for  the tenancy of the house of  which  there were  two.  One was from Misri Lal mentioned above  and  the other  was from respondent No. 1, who was a private  indivi- dual  carrying  on  business of  a  boarding  house  keeper. Respondent No. 2 selected respondent No. 1 as the 24 person  to whom the house should be let by  the  petitioner. He  fixed the rent at Rs. 350 per month which was  the  rent demanded  by the petitioner.  There does not appear to  have been  any specification of the terms of the tenancy  and  no question as to such terms arises in this case. The  petitioner  was dissatisfied with this decision  as  he wanted  that  the premises should be let to Misri  Lal,  and appealed to the District Judge under s. 15 of the Act.   The District  Judge affirmed the decision of respondent  No.  2. The  petitioner then went up in revision to the  High  Court under  s.  17  of  the Act but the  High  Court  refused  to interfere.  Before the District Judge and the High Court the petitioner bad contended that Misri Lal was a more  suitable tenant  than  respondent  No. 1.  But  such  contention  was rejected.   Having  failed  in the High  Court  he  has  now challenged the Act itself by the present petition. The,  only  question  is  whether  s.  3(3)(a)  imposes   an

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unreasonable  ’restriction  on  the  petitioner’s  right  to property.  The validity of no other part of the Act has been challenged in this petition.  The provision challenged is in these words:-               S.    3(3)(a).   On receipt of the  intimation               under  sub-section (2), the Controller  shall,               taking  into consideration any  representation               made  by  the landlord and after  making  such               inquiry as he considers necessary, select  the               State Government or the Central Government  or               the Government of any other State in India, or               any  local  authority or  any  educational  or               other public institution or any officer of any               Government,    authority    or    institution,               aforesaid,  or any other  person  (hereinafter               referred  to as the allotted), to be  inducted               as  a  tenant  in the  house  and  direct  the               landlord  by  a  written  order   (hereinafter               referred  to as the allotment order’)  to  let               the  house  to such allotted at such  rent  as               shall be specified in the allotment order  and               to  deliver  possession of the  house  to  the               allotted on such date as shall be specified in               the said order:               Provided that before making an allotment order               in  favour of any authority or  person,  other               than                                     25               the  State Government, the Central  Government               or  the Government of any State in India or  a               local authority, the Controller shall consider               any  representation of the landlord about  the               suitability  of the proposed tenant and  shall               not allot the house to any person who, in  the               opinion  of the Controller, is  an  unsuitable               tenant: The petitioner does not contend that the provision in so far as  it  allows  the  Controller to  select  as  a  tenant  a Government,  local authority, public institution or  any  of the officers mentioned, imposes any unreasonable restriction on the right to property.  As we understood learned  counsel for  the petitioner, it was conceded that selection of  such tenant would constitute a public purpose and the restriction thereby  imposed, would be reasonable.  It  would  therefore appear  that  it is not contended that the  selection  of  a tenant by the Controller would by itself amount to  imposing an unreasonable restriction on the right to property.  We do not  think that such a contention, if made, would have  been well  founded.  It is clear that the Act deals  with  houses which are vacant.  It does not deprive an owner of his right to live in his own house.  It provides for vacant houses not needed for the use of the owner being made available for the use  of others who are without accommodation.  The  Act  was necessary  because  of  the scarcity of  housing.   It  was, therefore,  passed to regulate the letting of houses and  to control rent and also to prevent unreasonable eviction:  see the preamble to the Act. Does the Act then by leaving it to the Controller to  select any person other than a Government, local authority,  public institution  or  an officer of any of these as  the  tenant, impose an unreasonable restriction on the right to property? We do not think it does so.  If the Controller could validly choose  a Government, a local authority or  any  institution which  as  we  have  said is not  disputed-it  can  make  no difference  that  instead of such a  tenant  the  Controller

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chooses a private individual as a tenant.  The idea of  this provision is that people in need should be 4 26 found  accommodation.  Persons in need of accommodation  are the  public  and  therefore serving  their  need,  would  be serving  a public purpose.  An individual would be a  member of the public and as the accommodation available can be  let out to one, a restriction caused by selection of a member of the  public  would  be one in the interest  of  the  general public.  Such a restriction is furthermore not unreasonable. It  is enforced only when the owner does not want the  house for his own use.  It can then make no reasonable  difference to  the  owner  if a private individual  is  chosen  as  the tenant.   The Act further makes ample provision to see  that the  tenant chosen is suitable.  By providing the appeal  to the  District  Judge and a right to move the High  Court  in revision,  full safeguard has been given to secure  that  an unsuitable person is not foisted on an owner as his tenant. It  is  true  that the Act does not define who  would  be  a suitable  person but we do not think that a  definition  was required.   Any  man  of  experience would  know  who  is  a suitable  tenant.   Further., the owner has been  given  the right to have the suitability of the tenant chosen  examined by  the  highest court.  In the explanation  to  s.  3(3)(a) certain persons have been declared to be unsuitable tenants. We  are  unable  to accept the  contention  of  the  learned counsel   for  the  petitioner  that  the  result  of   this explanation   is   that  all  others  are   suitable.    The explanation  only shows that the persons coming  within  the description are unsuitable.   As to whether others would  be suitable or not     would  have to be decided on the  merits of  each.  Thedecision as to the suitability of a tenant  is not to be controlled by the explanation at all except to the extent  of making certain persons unsuitable as tenants  and taking  it out of the discretion of the authority  concerned to go into the question of their suitability If  the  Act  had left it to the  house-owner  to  choose  a tenant, then there was every likelihood of its purpose being defeated.   It  would be easy for the owner to  make  secret arrangements  for his own gain in creating a  tenancy.   The tenant would obviously be 27 in  a disadvantageous situation in view of the  scarcity  of housing,  in  the matter of bargaining for  the  house.   He could  easily be made to yield to the terms imposed  by  the owner  who  has a much superior  bargaining  situation.   If scope  was left for this kind of thing to happen,  then  the entire object of the Act would have been defeated.  The  Act intends to avoid this situation and hence the provision  for a power in the Controller to select a tenant for the owner. Neither  do we think that any objection to this pro.  vision can  be based on Art. 14 of the Constitution on  the  ground that  it  provided no guidance as to how a tenant is  to  be chosen  and  so enabled the authority concerned to  make  an arbitrary choice.  This contention is not in any event  open to  the  petitioner, an owner, for the  provision  does  not enable  any discrimination being made between one owner  and another.   If  a tenant had challenged the validity  of  the provision relying on Art. 14, which is not the case here, we do  not think that challenge would have been  of  substance. There is, in our view, ample guidance given to the authority as  to how to choose a tenant.  The tenant has first  to  be suitable.   All  persons  are entitled to  apply  for  being selected as tenants and so all have equal chance to get  the

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house.   The  choice will have to be made from  amongst  the applicants and that choice will depend on an examination  of the comparative merits of their claims.  Further, the  owner has a right to have his views in the matter being given  due consideration by the authority selecting the tenant.  Again, the  ultimate decision would be a judicial decision, and  if required, of the highest tribunal in the State. We,  therefore, think that the challenge to the Act  is  ill founded.   In  the  result we dismiss  this  petition.   The petitioner will pay the costs of the appearing respondent. Petition dismissed. 28