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PETITIONER: S.P. GOEL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: COLLECTOR OF STAMPS, DELHI

DATE OF JUDGMENT08/12/1995

BENCH: AHMAD SAGHIR S. (J) BENCH: AHMAD SAGHIR S. (J) KULDIP SINGH (J)

CITATION:  1996 AIR  839            1996 SCC  (1) 573  JT 1995 (9)   545        1995 SCALE  (7)174

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T S. Saghir Ahmad,J.      Special lave granted.      Built  up  property  No.C-83,  Okhla  Industrial  Area, Phase-I. New  Delhi 110 020 constitutes the basis of dispute between the  parties in the present appeal which is directed against the judgment and order dated hay 18, 1995, passed by the National  Consumers  Redressai  Commission.  New  Delhi, whereby the  complaint of  the appellant  under the Consumer Protection Act.  1986 was  dismissed on  the ground that the District Consumer  Forum as also the State Commission had no jurisdiction to  adjudicate upon the claim petition filed by the appellant  to the  effect that  there was "deficiency of service" an  the part  of the  respondent in not registering the document  or issuing  certified copy thereof in spite of full registration charges having been paid.      The document  of which  the registration  was sought by the appellant  is a "Will" dated 24th July, 1987 executed in his favour,  as also in favour of his wife, Smt. Shanti Rani Goel, by  one Shri  P.N.  Mishra  which  was  presented  for registration on  24th August, 1987 before the Sub-Registrar- III, New  Delhi who,  instead of  registering the  document, impounded it  as he  was of  the opinion  that it  was not a "Will" but  a Deed of Conveyance which was not duly stamped. He,  therefore,   sent  the  document  in  original  to  the Collector of  Stamps for  action under  Section  40  of  the Stamps Act  with the  suggestion  that  the  instrument  was chargeable with  3% of  the amount of consideration as Stamp Duty and  5% as  Transfer Duty. The Collector of Stamps, New Delhi issued several notices to the appellant and ultimately in response  to one  such  notice,  the  appellant  appeared before the  Collector and  was apprised of the fact that the document presented  by him for registration was not a "Will" but a  conveyance deed  and, therefore,  he was  required to furnish the  Valuation Report,  Receipts, General  Power  of

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Attorney etc.  so that  the document  may be  required to be properly stamped and registered.      While the  matter was pending before the Collector, the appellant filed  a complaint  on 6th  September, 1991 before the District  Forum, Delhi,  constituted under  the Consumer Protection  Act,   1986  for   various  reliefs,   including registration of  the  "Will"  as  also  for  the  supply  of certified copy  thereof besides  compensation for harassment since 1987.  The District  Forum, Delhi, by order dated 12th May, 1993,  allowed the  claim with  the  finding  that  the Collector of  Stamps had  not taken  any decision  as to the nature of  document for  about six years and was, therefore, liable to pay Rs.700/- as compensation and Rs.500/- as costs of litigation  particularly as the appellant having paid the registration charges  shall be  treated to  have  hired  the services of  the Sub-Registrar  and the  Collector of Stamps within the meaning of Consumer Protection Act.      Two  separate   appeals,   one   by   the   complainant (appellant) and  the other  by the  respondent,  were  filed against the  above order  of the  District  Forum-I,  Delhi, before the  State Commission  which by  its order dated 11th April, 1994  not only  upheld the  decision of  the District Forum but  also  enhanced  the  amount  of  compensation  to Rs.5,000/-.      The respondent, thereafter, filed a revision before the National Forum  which, by the impugned judgment, allowed the revision with  the finding  that the  District Forum as also the State  Commission had  no jurisdiction  to entertain and adjudicate upon  the claim of the appellant particularly, as he was  not a  "consumer" within  the  meaning  of  Consumer Protection Act, 1986.      "Consumer" has  been defined  in Section 2(1)(d) of the Act as under:-      "2(1)(d). "consumer"  means  any  person      who-(i)   buys    any   goods    for   a      consideration which  has  been  paid  or      promised  or   partly  paid  and  partly      promised,  or   under  any   system   of      deferred payment  and includes  any user      of such  goods other than the person who      buys such  goods for  consideration paid      or promised  or partly  paid  or  partly      promised,  or   under  any   system   of      deferred payment  when such  use is made      with the  approval of  such person,  but      does not  include a  person who  obtains      such  goods   for  resale   or  for  any      commercial purpose; or      (ii) [hires  or avails  of any  services      for a  consideration which has been paid      or promised  or partly  paid and  partly      promised,  or   under  any   system   of      deferred  payment   and   includes   any      beneficiary of  such services other than      the person  who [hires or avails of] the      services  for   consideration  paid   or      promised,  or  partly  paid  and  partly      promised,  or   under  any   system   of      deferred payment, when such services are      availed of  with  the  approval  of  the      first mentioned person;      [Explanation- For  the purpose  of  sub-      clause (i),  "commercial  purpose"  does      not include  use by  a consumer of goods      bought and  used by  him exclusively for

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    the purpose  of earning  his livelihood,      by means of self-employment;]" "Service" has been defined in Section 2(1)(0) as under:-      "2(1)(0). "service" means service of any      description which  is made  available to      potential   users   and   includes   the      provision of  facilities  in  connection      with  banking,   financing,   insurance,      transport,   processing,    supply    of      electrical or  other  energy,  board  or      lodging or  both, [housing construction]      entertainment,    amusement    or    the      purveying of  news or other information,      but does  not include  the rendering  of      any service  free of  charge or  under a      contract of personal service;" "Deficiency" has been defined in Section 2(1)(g) as under:-      "2(1)(g). "deficiency"  means any fault,      imperfection, shortcoming  or inadequacy      in the  quality, nature  and  manner  of      performance  which  is  required  to  be      maintained by  or under  any law for the      time  being   in  force   or  has   been      undertaken to  be performed  by a person      in pursuance  of a contract or otherwise      in relation to any service;" The meaning of two important definitions, namely, "consumer" and "service"  have since  been considered  by this Court in Lucknow Development  Authority vs.  M.K. Gupta,  AIR 1994 SC 787=1994(1)  SCC   243,  in   which  this  Court  (regarding "consumer") observed as under:-      "It is  in two  parts. The  first  deals      with goods  and the other with services.      Both parts  first declare the meaning of      goods  and   services  by  use  of  wide      expressions.  Their   ambit  is  further      enlarged by use of inclusive clause. For      instance, it  is not  only purchaser  of      goods or  hirer  of  services  but  even      those who  use  the  goods  or  who  are      beneficiaries of  services with approval      of the person who purchased the goods or      who hired services are included in it." Regarding "service", the Court observed as under:-      "It is  in three parts. The main part is      followed by inclusive clause and ends by      exclusionary  clause.  The  main  clause      itself is  very wide.  It applies to any      service  made   available  to  potential      users. The  words ‘any’  and ‘potential’      are  significant.   Both  are   of  wide      amplitude. The  word ‘any’  dictionarily      means ‘one  or same  or all’. In Black’s      Law Dictionary  it  is  explained  thus,      "word ‘any’  has a  diversity of meaning      and may be employed to indicate ‘all’ or      ‘every’ as  well as  ‘same’ or ‘one’ and      its meaning  in a  given statute depends      upon the  context and subject-word ‘any’      in the  context  it  has  been  used  in      clause(0) indicates  that  it  has  been      used in  wider sense  extending from one      to all.  The other  word ‘potential’  is      again very wide. In Oxford Dictionary it      is defined  as capable  of  coming  into

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    being,  possibility’.   In  Black’s  Law      Dictionary it  is defined  as ‘extending      in possibility but not in act. Naturally      and  probably   expected  to  come  into      existence at  some future  time,  though      not  now   existing;  for  example,  the      future product of grain or trees already      planted,  or   the   successive   future      installments or  payments on  a contract      or engagement,  already made.’  In other      words service which is not only extended      to  actual   users  but  those  who  are      capable of  using it  are covered in the      definition. The clause is thus very wide      and extends  to any  or  all  actual  or      potential users. But the legislature did      not stop  there. It expanded the meaning      of the  word further  in modern sense by      extending it  to even such facilities as      are   available   to   a   consumer   in      connection with  banking, financing etc.      Each   of   these   are   wide   ranging      activities in  day to day life. They are      discharged both by statutory and private      bodies. In  absence of  any  indication,      express or implied there is no reason to      hold that  authorities  created  by  the      statute are beyond purview of the Act." "Consumer" has  also been  explained by this Court in Morgan Stanley Mutual  Fund vs.  Kartick Das,  1994 (4) SCC 225, as under:-      "The consumer as the term implies is one      who consumes.  As  per  the  definition,      consumer is  the one who purchases goods      for  private  use  of  consumption.  The      meaning  of   the  word   ‘consumer’  is      broadly stated  in the  above definition      so as  to include  anyone  who  consumes      goods or  services at  the  end  of  the      chain of  production. The  comprehensive      definition aims  at covering  every  man      who pays  money as  the price or cost of      goods   and   services.   The   consumer      deserves to get what he pays for in real      quantity  and  true  quality.  In  every      society, consumer  remains the centre of      gravity of  all business  and industrial      activity. He  needs protection  from the      manufacturer,    producer,     supplier,      wholesaler and retailer."      Learned counsel  for the  appellant contended  that  in view of  these decisions, the matter involved in the present appeal does  not require  any further  prob as the questions relating  to   the  interpretation  of  the  definitions  of "consumer" or  "services", or,  for that matter, "Deficiency in Service" stand conclusively decided.      We have  carefully considered  the aforesaid  decisions but we are strongly of the view that they are not applicable to  the   present  case  as  the  concept  of  the  Consumer Protection Act  is different  than the scope and object, or, for that  matter, purpose of the two other Acts, namely, the Registration Act and the Stamp Act.      Registration  of   documents  is   regulated   by   the provisions of  Registration Act,  1908  whereas  payment  of Stamp  Duty  on  documents  presented  for  registration  is

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regulated by  the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. Both the Acts deal with the State Revenue.      Under  the   Registration  Act,  the  State  Government appoints an  Inspector General of Registration and of number of Registrars  and Sub-Registrars  for "Districts" and "Sub- Districts" who functions under Inspector General and perform such duties as are assigned to them under law.      Section 17  of  the  Registration  Act  enumerates  the documents of  which registration is compulsory while Section 18  constrains   the  list   of  those  documents  of  which registration   is    optional.   Documents   presented   for registration have  to be  properly stamped  irrespective  of their being  either compulsory  or optionally  registerable, unless they are not chargeable with any stamp duty under the Stamp Act.      What is  the stamp  duty which  is  to  be  paid  on  a document depends  upon the nature of the document. The Stamp Act contains  a Schedule  appended to  it in  which  various categories of  documents and the stamp duty payable on those documents have been specified.      In  the   instant  case,   we  are  concerned  with  an "Instrument Conveyance".  "Instrument" as defined in Section 2(14) of  the Stamp Act includes every document by which any right or  liability purports  to be,  created,  transferred, limited, extended,  extinguished or  recorded. Section 2(10) of the Stamp Act defines "Conveyance" as under:-      "2(10).     Conveyance-     "Conveyance"      includes a  conveyance on sale and every      instrument by  which  property,  whether      movable  or  immovable,  is  transferred      inter vivos  and which  is not otherwise      specifically provided  for  by  Schedule      I." This definition  has to  be read  along with Section 3 which provides as under:-      "3. Instruments  chargeable with  duty -      Subject to  the provisions  of this  Act      and the exemptions contained in Schedule      I, the  following instruments  shall  be      chargeable  with   duty  of  the  amount      indicated in that Schedule as the proper      duty therefore, respectively, that is to      say -      (a)   every instrument mentioned in that      Schedule   which,    not   having   been      previously executed  by any  person,  is      executed in  India on or after the first      day of July, 1899;      (b)   every  bill  of  exchange  payable      otherwise than  on demand, or promissory      note drawn  or made  out of  India on or      after that  day and accepted or paid, or      presented for  acceptance or payment, or      endorsed,   transferred   or   otherwise      negotiated, in India; and      (c)   every  instrument  (other  than  a      bill of  exchange  or  promissory  note)      mentioned in  that Schedule,  which, not      having been  previously executed  by any      person, is  executed out  of India on or      after that  day, relates to any property      situate, or  to any matter or thing done      or to  be done, in India and is received      in India:           Provided   that   on   duty   shall

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    chargeable in respect of -      (1)   any  instrument executed by, or on      behalf  of,   or  in   favour  of,   the      Government in  cases where, but for this      exemption,  the   Government  would   be      liable to  pay the  duty  chargeable  in      respect of such instrument;      (2)    any   instrument  for  the  sale,      transfer or  other  disposition,  either      absolutely or  by  way  of  mortgage  or      otherwise,  of   any  ship   or   vessel      registered under  the Merchant  Shipping      Act, 1894,  or under  Act 19 of 1838, or      the   Indian   Registration   of   Ships      Act,1841 (57 and 58 Vict, Section 60, 10      of 1841), as ameded by subsequent Acts." The relevant  entry relating  to "Conveyance" is Entry 23 of Schedule I  of the  Stamp Act  in which  the amount of stamp duty had  been indicated  with reference  to the  amount  of consideration involved  in the  transaction mentioned in the Deed of  Conveyance. It  is specifically provided in Section 35 of the Stamp Act that:-      "No  instrument   chargeable  with  duty      shall be  admitted in  evidence for  any      purpose by  any person  having by law or      consent of  parties authority to receive      evidence,  or   shall  be   acted  upon,      registered or  authenticated by any such      person or  by any public officer, unless      such instrument is duly stamped." It is, thus, apparent that a document or instrument which is not duly  stamped  will  not  be  registered  and  the  Sub- Registrar before  whom the  document is  presented may  well refuse its  registration and may, even, impound the document in the  course of  performance of his statutory duties under Section 33(1) of the Stamp Act which provides as under:-      "33(1). Every  person having  by law  or      consent of  parties authority to receive      evidence, and  every person in charge of      a public  office, except  an officer  of      police,  before   whom  any  instrument,      chargeable, in  his opinion,  with duty,      is produced  or comes in the performance      of his functions, shall if it appears to      him that  such instrument  is  not  duly      stamped, impound the same." Under this  Section, every  instrument  which  is  not  duly stamped is liable to be impounded.      After impounding  the instrument, the Sub-Registrar has to send  the  document  in  original  to  the  Collector  as required by  Section 38  (2) of  the  Stamp  Act.  What  the Collector would  do on  receipt of  an instrument  impounded under Section  33 and  send to  him under  Section 38(2)  is indicated in Section which provides as under:-      "40.   Collector’s    power   to   stamp      instruments impounded -      (1)   When  the Collector  impounds  any      instrument under Section 33, or receives      any instrument sent to him under Section      38;  sub-section   (2),  not   being  an      instrument chargeable  [with a  duty not      exceeding ten naye paise] only or a bill      of exchange or promissory note, he shall      adopt the following procedure:-      (a)   if  he is  of  opinion  that  such

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    instrument is  duly stamped,  or is  not      chargeable with  duty, he  shall certify      by endorsement  thereon that  it is duly      stamped,  or   that   it   is   not   so      chargeable, as the case may be ;      (b)   If  he is  of  opinion  that  such      instrument is  chargeable with  duty and      is not  duly stamped,  he shall  require      the payment  of the  proper duty  or the      amount required  to make  up  the  same,      together with  a  penalty  of  the  five      rupees; or,  if he thinks fit, an amount      not exceeding  ten times  the amount  of      the proper  duty  or  of  the  deficient      portion  thereof,  whether  such  amount      exceeds or falls short of five rupees;           Provided that, when such instrument      has been  impounded only  because it has      been written in contravention of Section      13 or  Section 14, the Collector may, if      he thinks  fit, remit  the whole penalty      prescribed by this section.      (2)   Every certificate under clause (a)      of  sub-section   (1),  shall,  for  the      purposes  of  this  Act,  be  conclusive      evidence of the matters stated therein.      (3)   Where  an instrument has been sent      to the  Collector under Section 38, sub-      section (2),  the Collector  shall, when      he has dealt with it as provided by this      section, return  it  to  the  impounding      officer." The procedure  indicated in  this Section  contemplates that the  Collector   shall  form   an  opinion  as  to  the  (i) chargeability of the instrument with stamp duty and (ii) the amount of  duty payable on that instrument and thereafter he shall require  the payment  of the proper duty or the amount required to  make up  the said  duty together with a penalty which will  be either five rupees or an amount not exceeding ten times  the amount  of the  proper duty  or the deficient portion thereof.      Since the  Collector has to take a decision with regard to the  nature of  the instrument as also with regard to the amount of  stamp duty  payable on  that  instrument,  it  is implicit  that   he  has  to  act  in  accordance  with  the principles of Natural Justice and give an opportunity to the person liable  under law to pay the stamp duty to enable him to show  that the  instrument was either not chargeable with any stamp  duty or that it was properly and duly stamped. He may also  in the  process show  or indicate that the penalty was not liable to be imposed upon him.      The decision  of the  Collector is  not final  as it is provided by Section 45 of the Act that the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority  may, upon  an application made in writing within three  months of  the order  of the Collector, refund the amount  if it  is of  the opinion that the stamp duty in excess of  the amount which was legally chargeable, has been charged and  paid under  Section 40 of the Act. The exercise of power  by the  Collector is always subject to the control of the  Chief Controlling Revenue Authority under Section 56 of the Act. The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority may also refer a  case to  the High Court for its opinion as provided by Section 57 of the Act.      Under Section  33 of  the Stamp Act, power to impound a document or  instrument which  is not  duly stamped, is also

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available to  the courts  including  a  High  Court.  Unless properly  stamped,  instruments  will  not  be  admitted  in evidence nor  shall they be acted upon. The courts, like the Chief Controlling  Revenue Authority, have also the power to refer a  case to  the High  Court under  Section 60  for its decision as  to the sufficiency of the stamp duty payable on the instrument filed or produced before it during the course of trial of a civil suit or criminal or revenue case. If the Court itself  decides that  the instrument  was duly stamped and was,  therefore, admissible  in evidence  or admits  the instrument in  evidence on  payment of duty and penalty, its decisions would  be revisable  under Section 61 by the Court to which an appeal would lie from the decree or order passed by that court.      Thus, in the matter of determination of stamp duty, the courts, including  the High  Court, apart from Collector and the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, are involved either at the stage of registration and determination of Stamp Duty or admissibility of the instrument (document) in evidence in a pending case.      The hierarchy  under the  Registration Act  has already been indicated above but it will be useful to point out here that every  Sub-Registrar performs  the duties of his office under the  superintendence and  control of  the Registrar of the District  while the  Inspector General exercises general superintendence over  all the  registration offices  in  the State. (See, Sections 68 and 69)      It is  also provided  in  the  Act  that  if  the  Sub- Registrar refuses  to register  a document, he has to record his reasons  in the  order which  is appealable  before  the Registrar under  Section 72  of the  Registration  Act.  If, however, the  registration is refused even by the Registrar, then  the  person  claiming  under  the  document  of  which registration was  sought, may,  as provided  by Section  77, file a  suit for  a decree  directing  the  document  to  be registered.      Undoubtedly, proceedings  before the Court are judicial proceedings while the proceedings before the Registrar in an appeal filed  against the order of the Sub-Registrar will be quasi-judicial in nature and will be regulated by principles of Natural Justice.      Running through the twin Acts, namely, the Registration Act and the Stamp Act, we could not, at any stage, reconcile ourselves to  the idea  spoused by  the appellant’s counsel, that there  is an  element of  commercialism involved in the whole process  of registration  of instruments or payment of Stamp Duty  and that  the executant of an instrument, at the time  of   its  presentation  for  registration,  becomes  a "consumer"  entitled   to  "service"  within  the  ambit  of Consumer Protection Act. The reasons are many.      The Registration  Act as  also the  Stamp Act are meant primarily to  augment the  state revenue  by prescribing the stamp duty on various categories of instruments or documents and the  procedure for  collection  of  stamp  duty  through distress or  other means  including criminal  prosecution as non-payment  of  stamp  duty  has  been  constituted  as  an offence. Payment of registration fee or registration charges including  charges  for  issuing  certified  copies  of  the registered documents  or fee  for the  inspection of various registers or  documents  kept  in  the  Registrars  or  Sub- Registrars office etc. constitute another component of state revenue.      In this situation, therefore, the person who presents a document for  registration and  pays the stamp duty on it or the registration  fee, does not become a consumer nor do the

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officers appointed  to implement  the provisions  of the two Acts render  any service  within  the  meaning  of  Consumer Protection Act.  They only  perform their  statutory  duties (some of  which, as  earlier indicated,  are judicial or, at least, quasi-judicial  in nature)  to raise  and collect the State revenue  which is a part of the sovereign power of the State.      Learned counsel  for the  appellant again  invited  our attention  to   the  decision   of  this  Court  in  Lucknow Development Authority’s  case (supra)  and contended that in view of the following observations:-      "Today the  issue thus  is not  only  of      award of  compensation  but  who  should      bear the brunt. The concept of authority      and   power    exercised    by    public      functionaries has  many  dimensions.  It      has  undergone  tremendous  change  with      passage   of    time   and   change   in      socioeconomic  outlook.   The  authority      empowered to  function under  a  Statute      while exercising power discharges public      duty. It  has to act to subserve general      welfare and  common good. In discharging      this duty  honestly and  bona fide  loss      may accrue  to any  person. And  he  may      claim   compensation    which   may   in      circumstances be  payable. But where the      duty is  performed capriciously  or  the      exercise of  power results in harassment      and agony then the responsibility to pay      the loss  determined should be whose? In      a  modern   society  no   authority  can      arrogate to itself the power to act in a      manner  which   is  arbitrary.   It   is      unfortunate that  matters which  require      immediate attention  linger on  and  the      man in  the street  is made  to run from      one end  to other  with no  result.  The      culture of  window clearance  appears to      be  totally   dead.  Even   in  ordinary      matters a common man who has neither the      political  backing   nor  the  financial      strength to match the inaction in public      oriented departments gets frustrated and      it  erodes   the  credibility   in   the      system." The claim  preferred by  the appellant  under  the  Consumer Protection Act  was positively entertainable as the officers under both the Acts has been negligent in the performance of their duties  in as much as the Collector had not determined the nature  of the  document or  the amount  of  stamp  duty payable on  that document for 5 or 6 years and had thus kept the appellant  in a  state of  suspense causing,  to say the least, great  mental  agony  and  annoyance.  This  argument again, in our opinion, is fallacious.      The observations of this Court extracted above on which strong reliance  has been  placed by the learned counsel for the appellant  are undoubtedly  true and  we also  reiterate that a  Government officer may be held liable in tort if, in the discharge of his official administrative duties, he acts maliciously or  with oblique  motive or  mala-fide  but  the position in  the instant  case, is  different in  many vital respects.      We  have   already  indicated   above  that  under  the Registration Act  as also under the Stamp Act, the officers,

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apart from performing administrative duties, also, at times, perform  quasi-judicial   functions.  The  Courts  are  also involved at  some stage  in the  matter of  determination of stamp duty.  The Courts  and the officers are thus component of one  and the  same set up under these Acts. The Presiding Officers of  the Courts  are protected  under  the  Judicial Officers  (Protection)  Act,  1850,  read  with  the  Judges (Protection) Act,  1985. But,  so far  as the  officers  are concerned the position is a little different.      We are,  however, in  the instant  case, concerned with the question of protection of "Collector" and, therefore, we are not  considering the  question of  protection of  "other officers".      Section 1  of the  Judicial Officers  (Protection) Act, 1850 provides, inter-alia, as under :-      "1. No Judge, Magistrate, Justice of the      Peace, Collector, or other person acting      judicially shall be liable to be sued in      any Civil  Court for  any  act  dine  or      ordered  to   be  done  by  him  in  the      discharge of  his judicial duty, whether      or  not   within  the   limits  of   his      jurisdiction :           Provided that  he at  the time,  in      good faith,  believed  himself  to  have      jurisdiction to  do  or  order  the  act      complained of.      ..............................", This Section  contains the  common law  rule of  immunity of Judges which is based on the principle that a person holding a judicial  office should  be in a position to discharge his functions with  complete  independence  and,  what  is  more important,  without  there  being,  in  his  mind,  fear  of consequences. The  scope and purpose of this Act has already been explained by this Court in Anowar Hussain v. Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee and  others., AIR  1965 SC  1651, in which the old decision in  Teyen v.  Ram Lal  (1890) ILR  12 Alld. 115 was approved. The  position of  Judges,  Judicial  Officers  and Magistrates has since been made more secure by the enactment of Judges (Protection) Act, 1985.      In the  instant case,  Collector alone has been arrayed as respondent  and the  claim under  the Consumer Protection Act was filed only against him. "Collector" has been defined in Section 2(9) of the Stamp Act as under:-      "S.2(9) - Collector      (a)   means,  within the  limits of  the      towns of  Calcutta, Madras  and  Bombay,      the Collector  of Calcutta,  Madras  and      Bombay, respectively  and, without those      limits, the Collector of a district, and      (b)   includes a Deputy Commissioner and      any officer  whom the  State  Government      may, by  notification  in  the  official      Gazette, appoint in this behalf." Since "Collector" has been specifically mentioned along with Judges, Magistrates  and Justices  of Peace  in the Judicial Officers (Protection) Act, 1850, it is obvious that immunity from legal  action contemplated  by this  Act will  also  be available to him.      Apart from  the above,  Section 86  of the Registration Act provides as under:-      "86 Registering  officer not  liable for      thing bona  fide done  or refused in his      official  capacity.   -  No  registering      officer shall  be liable  to  any  suit,

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    claim or  demand by  reason of any thing      in good  faith done  or refused  in  his      official capacity." This Section provides complete protection to the Registering Officer for  things done"bona fide" by him under the Act. It is obvious  that action  which is  not bona fide or which is malicious will not be protected.      These provisions  were not  noticed by  this  Court  in Lucknow Development  Authority’s case obviously because this aspect of  the matter  was  not  involved  therein.  In  the instant case,  neither the  appellant pleaded  nor  has  the District or  the State  forum recorded  any finding that the refusal of  the Registering  Officer or  the inaction of the Collector of  Stamps was  malicious, motivated or mala-fide. We need not, therefore, further delve into the matter.      The appeal consequently fails and is dismissed.