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PETITIONER: S.   M. NANDY & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT19/02/1971

BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. (CJ) BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. (CJ) MITTER, G.K. HEGDE, K.S. GROVER, A.N. REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN

CITATION:  1971 AIR  961            1971 SCR  (3) 791  1971 SCC  (1) 688  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1973 SC1461  (1041)

ACT: West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act,  1948-If ultra vires Constitution under Art. 19(1) (f) and (5).

HEADNOTE: On  the question whether the West Bengal  Land  (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948, was ultra vires the Constitution under Art. 19 (1) (f) read with 19(5). HELD : The State of West Bengal was faced with many emergent problems created by the partition of India and the  impugned Act was enacted in order ’to provide for requisitioning  and speedy acquisition of land under s. 3 for a number of public purposes    mentioned    therein.    The    necessity    for requisitioning  must  necessarily  be  left  to  the   State Government.  Though there is no express provision  to make a representation against an order of requisition under s. 3(2) there  is no bar to such a representation being made and  to its being considered by the State Government or  appropriate Governmental  Authorities.  If. however, any order  is  made for  any collateral purpose, or has been made  for  purposes not  mentioned in s. 3 of the Act, or is mala fide., it  can always  be challenged in a civil court.  Under ss. 7(3)  and (4),  8 and 8A of the Act, fair compensation has  been  pro- vided  for requisitioning which is determinable by  a  civil court,  if  there  is a dispute regarding  the  amount,  and ultimately by the High Court and this Court.  Therefore, the restrictions   imposed   by  the  impugned   Act   are   not ,unreasonable. [792 C, D; 794 D-F]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 500, of 1967. Appeal from the judgment and order dated January 13, 1965 of the  Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Original  Order  No. 104 of 1963.

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Arun Kumar Datta and D. N. Mukherjee, for the appellants. Niren  De,-Attorney-General and P. K. Chakravarti,  for  the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri, C.J. The following question has been referred to  the Constitution Bench under the proviso to art. 145(3) of  the’ Constitution :               "Whether the West Bengal Land (Requisition and               Acquisition)  Act  1948  is  ultra  vires  the               Constitution  under  art. 19(1)(f)  read  with               art. 19(5)? 792 The  learned  counsel  for the appellant,  Shri  Arun  Kumar Dutta,  challenges  the West Bengal  Land  (Requisition  and Acquisition)  Act,  1948-hereinafter  referred  to  as   the impugned action theground   that   it   does   not   impose reasonable restrictions withinart.   19(5)   of    the, Constitution.  He urges three ground in thisrespect. First, he says, that there is no provision for a noticeto     the owner  or  the occupier of the property before an  order  of requisition  is passed, secondly, there is no provision  for an  appeal against the order of requisition, and thirdly,  a civil suit is barred under s. 1 1 of the impugned Act. In  order  to appreciate the points raised  by  the  learned counsel  it is necessary to set out the scheme of  the  Act. The  impugned  act  was  enacted in  order  to  provide  for requisitioning  and speedy acquisition of land for a  number of  public purposes.  These purposes are-:  (1)  maintaining supplies   and  services  essential  to  the  life  of   the community;  (2)  provide proper  facilities  for  transport, communication,  irrigation or drainage; and (3) creation  of better  living  conditions in urban or rural  areas  by  the construction  or re-construction of dwelling places in  such areas.   The  State  of  West  Bengal,was  faced  with  many emergent  problems created. by the partition of  India,  and this  Act  was designed to meet these problems in  a  speedy manner.    Section  3  enables  the  State   Government   to requisition  land  for  the  purposes  mentioned  above.   A Collector  of a district, an Additional District  Magistrate or  the  First Land Acquisition  Collector,  Calcutta,  when authorised  by  the  State Government in  this  behalf,  may exercise    within   his   jurisdiction   the   powers    of requisitioning conferred by sub-s. (1).  Sub-s. (2) of s.  3 provides for service of this order in the prescribed  manner on  the  owner of land and also on the  occupier  not  being owner  of land.  Under sub-s. (3) of S. 3 the Collector,  or any  person authorised by him in writing in this  behalf  is entitled  to  execute  the order  in  the  manner  mentioned therein,  if  the  order  passed under  sub-s.  (2)  is  not complied  with  by  any person.  There  is  nothing  in  the impugned  Act which prevents a person on whom an  order  has been served under sub-s. (2) to make a representation to the Collector  Or  the  State Government against  the  order  of requisition Section 4 enables the State Government to use or deal with the land for the purposes aforesaid. We  are not concerned with acquisition in this case  but  we may mention that the State Government may acquire ’any  land requisitioned  under the Act by publishing a notice  in  the official  gazette  that such land is required for  a  public purpose referred to in sub.s.  (1 ) of, s . 3. Section 6 enables the St-ate Government to derequisition  or release from requisition any land. 793 The  impugned  Act  provides  for  fair.  compensations   in respect,  of  the requisitioned land under 8.  7(3)  and  s.

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7(4).    Sub-s.  (3)  provides  that  where  any   land   is requisitioned  under  S. 3, there. shall be  paid  to  every person interested compensation in respect.  Of-               (a)   the, requisition of such land; and               (b)   any  damage  done during the  period  of               requisition  to such land other than what  may               have been sustained by natural causes. Sub-s.  (4)  lays  down the principles  to  be  followed  in determining  the  compensation.  If the  Collector  and  the person interested agree to the compensation the Collector is enabled  to  make an, award ordering payment of  the  agreed compensation.  If there is disagreement, sub-s. (4) provides that   the  compensation  pay-able  shall,  be  the   amount determined by the- Court on reference made by the  Collector under  cl.  (b)  of  sub-s. (1) of s.  8.  Under  s.  8  the Collector is obliged to refer the matter to the decision  of the  Court  if  there is any  disagreement  with  regard  to compensation,  and  sub-s. (2) of s. 8 prescribes  the  same procedure as the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, in this regard, and the State Government is directed to apply the principles set  out in sub-s, (1) of s. 23 of that Act, and in cl.  (a) of sub-s. (2) of s. 7 of the, impugned Act, which provides               "7(2)(a) When the compensation has been deter-               mined under subsection (1) the Collector shall               make   an   award  in  accordance   with   the               principles  set out in section 11 of the  Land               Acquisition Act, 1894, and no amount  referred               to  in sub-section (2) of section 23 of,               that Act, shall be included in the award :               Provided that interest at the rate of six  per               centum per annum on the amount of compensation               under   the,  award  from  the  date  of   the               publication of the- ’notice, under sub-section               (1a)  of  section  4 until  payment  shall  be               included  in  the  amount  payable  under  the               award." It seems to us that these provisions give fair  compensation and’ enable a Civil Court to determine the question in  case of  a dispute.  An appeal lies under s. 8 A from  the  award made by a Court on- a reference under s. 8 as if such  award was  an Originals decree passed by the Court in exercise  of its   civil   jurisdiction.    Not   only   therefore   fair compensation is provided but the determination of the amount of  compensation  rests  with a Civil Court  in  case  of  a dispute.  Although the learned counsel took objection to the court which has to make an award, we see nothing-- 794 wrong  with  the  definition of the word  "Court"  the  word "Court" has been defined to mean:               "  "Court"  means a principal Civil  Court  of               original jurisdiction, and includes the  Court               of any Additional Judge, Subordinate Judge  or               Munsif whom the State Government may  appoint,               by name or by virtue of his office, to perform               concurrently  with  any such  principal  Civil               Court,  all  or any of the  functions  of  the               Court  under  this Act  within  any  specified               local limits and, in the case of a Munsif,  up               to  the limits of the  pecuniary  jurisdiction               with  which he is vested under section  19  of               the  Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts  Act,               1887." Section 1 1 provides that "save as otherwise expressly pro- vided in this Act, no decision or order made in exercise  of any power conferred by or under this Act shall be called  in

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question in any Court." It seems to us that if any order  is made  for  any  collateral  purpose or  has  been  made  for purposes  not  mentioned  in s. 3 or is mala  fide,  it  can always be challenged. We  are, therefore, of the opinion that it is  difficult  to hold  that  restrictions  imposed by the  impugned  Act  are unreasonable.   Fair  compensation  has  been  provided  for requisitioning,  which is determinable by a Civil Court  and ultimately  by  the  High  Court  ,or  the  Supreme   Court. Regarding   the   necessity  for  requisitioning   it   must necessarily  be  left to the State Government.  It  is  true that there is no express provision to make  a.representation against  an  order of requisition but there is no bar  to  a representation being made after an order is served under  s. 3   (2)  of  the  Act.   We  have  no  doubt  that  if   the representation  raises  a point which overrides  the  public purpose  it  would  be favourably considered  by  the  State Government  or other Government authorities as the case  may be. Accordingly  the question referred to us is answered in  the negative.  The case will now go back to the  Division  Bench for disposal according to law.  V.P.S.                         Act held intra vires. 795