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PETITIONER: S. L. KAPOOR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: JAGMOHAN & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT18/09/1980

BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH SEN, A.P. (J)

CITATION:  1981 AIR  136            1981 SCR  (1) 746  1980 SCC  (4) 379  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1981 SC 818  (85,89,92)  RF         1981 SC 873  (66)  R          1986 SC 180  (48,51)  RF         1987 SC1239  (5)  RF         1988 SC1531  (188)  D          1988 SC1737  (87)  R          1990 SC1480  (113)

ACT:      Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, Sec. 238(1)-Supersession of Municipal  Committee   ordered-allegations  on  which  order passed-committee  whether  entitled  to  offer  explanation- failure to  observe principle of audi alteram partem-whether vitiates order.      Administrative Law-Natural  Justice-Hearing-opportunity whether  to   be  a   ‘double  opportunity’-one  on  factual allegation and another on proposed penalty.

HEADNOTE:      The  Punjab  Municipal  Act,  1911  which  is  the  law applicable to  the New Delhi Municipal Committee empowers by Section 238(1),  the Delhi  Administration by a notification to supersede  a Municipal  Committee if  in  its  view,  the Municipal   Committee   is   incompetent   to   perform   or persistently makes default in the performance of, the duties imposed by  the Act  or under  any other  Act, or exceeds or abuses its powers.      Exercising  the  powers  under  this  section  the  Lt. Governor,  Delhi,   superseded  the   New  Delhi   Municipal Committee on  the ground that it had made persistent default in the performance of the duties imposed on it under the law and had  abused its powers resulting in wastage of municipal funds.  Four   grounds  were  enumerated  in  the  order  of supersession.      In their  writ petition two non-official members of the superseded committee  impugned  the  order  of  supersession contending that  the order  was passed in complete violation of the  principles of natural justice and total disregard of fair-play. The  Full Bench  of the High Court dismissing the writ petition  held that  although the Committee should have been given  an opportunity  to state  its  case,  since  the

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Committee was  aware of  the  allegations  in  3  out  of  4 grounds, mere  failure  to  observe  principles  of  natural justice did not vitiate the order.      In appeal  to this Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellants  that the  Committee had  no  opportunity  to offer their  explanation in  regard to  the  allegations  on which the  order of  supersession was  passed and failure to observe principles  of natural justice vitiated the order of supersession.      On behalf  of the  Respondents, it was contended that : (1) Section  238(1) of  the Punjab  Municipal  Act  did  not contemplate that  an opportunity  should  be  given  to  the Committee before  an order  of supersession  was passed, (2) neither the  Committee nor  its members  had any  beneficial interest  in  the  continuance  of  the  Committee  and  the supersession of the Committee did not 747 involve any civil consequences entitling it to a right to be heard, (3)  when the question of the disqualification of any individual member  was involved,  section 16  of the  Punjab Municipal Act  expressly provided  for an  opportunity being given to  the member  concerned, whereas  section 238(1) did not provide  for such  as opportunity  and so  by  necessary implication  the   principle  of  audi  alteram  partem  was excluded, and  (4) section 238(1) also contemplated emergent situation where  quick action  might be necessary to avert a disaster and  in such  a situation if the demands of natural justice were  to be  met, the  very object of the provisions would be frustrated.      Allowing the appeal, ^      HELD : (1) The order dated February 27, 1980 of the Lt. Governor superseding  the New  Delhi Municipal  Committee is vitiated by  the failure  to observe  the principle  of audi alteram partem. [767D]      (2) (i) An administrative body may in a proper case, be bound to  give a person who is affected by their decision an opportunity of  making representation.  It  all  depends  on whether he  has some  right or  interest, or some legitimate expectation, of  which it  would not be fair to deprive him. [754 C].      Schmidt  and  Anr.  v.  Secretary  of  State  for  Home Affairs, (1969) 2 Chancery Divn. 149 referred to.      (ii) In  its comprehensive connotation, everything that affects a  citizen in  his  civil  life,  inflicts  a  civil consequence. [753H]      (iii) In  the region  of public law locus standi person aggrieved, right and interest have a broader import. [754B]      Mohinder Singh  Gill  &  Anr.  v.  The  Chief  Election Commissioner, New  Delhi & Ors. [1978] 2 SCR 272 @ 308, 309, referred to.      (3) A  Committee so  soon as  it is constituted at once assumes a certain office and status, is endowed with certain rights and  burdened with certain responsibilities, all of a nature commanding  respectful regard  from the public. To be stripped of  the office  and status,  to be  deprived of the rights, to  be removed  from  the  responsibilities,  in  an unceremonious  way   as  to  suffer  in  public  esteem,  is certainly to  visit the  committee with  civil consequences. [756H; 757A]      (4)  The   status  and   office  and   the  rights  and responsibilities and  the expectation  of the  Committee  to serve  its  full  term  of  office  would  certainly  create sufficient interest  in the  Municipal Committee  and  their loss, if  superseded, would  entail civil consequences so as

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to  justify   an  insistence  upon  the  observance  of  the principles  of   natural  justice   before   an   order   of supersession is passed. [757B]      Alfred Thangarajah  Durayappah v. W. J. Fernando & Ors. [1967] 2 A.C. 337 applied.      (5) It  is not  always a  necessary inference  that  if opportunity is expressly provided in one provision (Sec. 16) and not  so provided in another [Sec. 238(1)] opportunity is to be  considered as  excluded from that other provision. It may be  a weighty consideration to be taken into account but the weightier  consideration is  whether the  administrative action entails civil consequences. [757D-E]      Mohinder Singh  Gill  &  Anr.  v.  The  Chief  Election Commissioner, New  Delhi &  Ors. [1978]  2 SCR  p. 272 @ 316 referred to. 748      (6) A  Municipal Committee  under the  Punjab Municipal Act is  a public  body consisting of both officials and non- officials and  one cannot  imagine anything  momentous being done in  a matter  of  minutes  and  seconds.  And,  natural justice may  always be  tailored to  the situation.  Minimal natural  justice,  the  barest  notice  and  the  ‘littlest’ opportunity in  the shortest  time, may serve. The authority acting under  section  238(1)  is  the  master  of  its  own procedure.  There  need  be  no  oral  hearing.  It  is  not necessary to put every detail of the case to the Committee : broad grounds  sufficient to  indicate the  substance of the allegations may  be given.  Even minimal  natural justice is not excluded  when  alleged  grave  situation  arises  under section 238. [757H; 758A-B]      (7) If  grave situations arise, the public interest can be sufficiently  protected by  appropriate  prohibitory  and mandatory action  under the other relevant provisions of the statute in  sections 232  to 235 of the Act. Minimum natural justice is,  therefore,  not  excluded  when  alleged  grave situations arise under section 238. [758C-D]      (8) The  opportunity which is required to be given need not be a ‘double opportunity’ one on factual allegations and another on the proposed penalty. Both may be rolled into one but the  person proceeded against must know that he is being required to  meet the  allegations which  might  lead  to  a certain action  being taken  against him.  If that  is  made known the requirements are met. [762B-C]      (9) Where  on the  admitted or  indisputable facts only one conclusion  is possible  and  under  the  law  only  one penalty is  permissible, the Court may not issue its writ to compel the  observance of  natural justice  not  because  it approves the  non-observance of  natural justice but because Courts do not issue futile-writs. [762E]      Ridge v. Baldwin & Ors. [1964] AC 40 @ 68, John v. Rees and ors.  [1970 1  Chancery p.  345 @  402, Annamunthoda  v. Oilfields Workers’ Trade Union, [1961] 3 All E.R. 621 (H.L.) @ p.  625, Margerits  Fuentes et al. v. Tobert L. Shevin, 32 L. Ed.  2d. 556 @ 574, Chintepalli Agency Taluk Arrack Sales Cooperative  Society   Ltd.  etc.   v.  Secretary   (Food  & Agriculture) Govt.  of Andhra Pradesh etc., [1978] 1 SCR 563 @ 567, 569-70, referred to.      (10) The  principles of  natural  justice  know  of  no exclusionary rule  dependant on  whether it  would have made any difference  if natural  justice had  been observed.  The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and  proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural  justice is  unnecessary. It  ill  comes  from  a person who  has denied  justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced. [766-E-F]

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    (11) In  regard to  the grant  of contract for building the City  Centre and  payment of  mobilisation advance,  the correspondence that  passed was  between the  Government  of India and  the New Delhi Municipal Committee and not between the  Delhi   Administration  and  the  New  Delhi  Municipal Committee. The  authority competent  to  take  action  under section 238(1)  of the  Punjab Municipal  Act was  the Delhi Administration and  not the  Government of India. It cannot, therefore, be  said that  the Delhi Administration ever gave any opportunity to the New Delhi Municipal Committee to make any representation in regard to this ground. [760D-F]      (12) With  regard to  the  reemployment  of  a  retired official against  whom vigilance  case was  recommended, the letter from the Delhi Administration 749 to the  New Delhi Municipal Committee cannot be construed as a notice  to the  New  Delhi  Municipal  Committee  to  come forward with  its explanation. The letter was peremptory and final and  there was  nothing to  indicate  that  any  other action was  contemplated and  that the  Municipal  Committee could offer its explanation if so minded. [760H-761C]      (13) The  charge that the Municipal Committee created a number of  posts and made appointments indicated that though the  Delhi   Administration,  objected  to  these  irregular appointments, the  correspondence does  not reveal  that any action was  proposed against the Municipal Committee. [761D; G]      (14) The New Delhi Municipal Committee was never put on notice of  any action proposed to be taken under section 238 of the  Punjab Municipal Act and no opportunity was given to the Municipal  Committee to explain any fact or circumstance on the  basis that  action was  proposed. If  there was  any correspondence between the New Delhi Municipal Committee and any other  authority about  the subject matter of any of the allegations, if  information was  given and  gathered it was for entirely different purposes. [761H; 762A]      (15) Every  wrong action  of a Municipal Committee need not necessarily lead to the inference of incompetence on the part of the Committee or amount to an abuse of the powers of the Committee.  It is  a matter  to be  decided by the State Government on  the facts of each case. A Committee may admit that what  it has  done is  wrong and yet may plead that its action does  not reveal  incompetence or  an  abuse  of  its powers. It may plead some misapprehension about the state of facts or  state of  the law,  it may plead that in any event the drastic  action contemplated  by section  238(1) is  not called for and it should not be invoked. [766G-H; 767A]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1516 of 1980.      Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and  Order dated 9-5-1980 of the Delhi High Court in C.W. No. 404/80.      Soli J.  Sorabjee, V.  M. Tarkunde  and P. N. Lekhi for the Appellant.      Lal Narain  Sinha, Att.  Genl. R. N. Tandon and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by.      CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.-In exercise of the powers conferred by Sec.  12 of  the Punjab Municipal Act 1911, as applicable to New  Delhi, the  Lt. Governor  of the  Union Territory of Delhi, by a notification dated September 29, 1979, appointed nine non-official members and four ex-officio members to the

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New Delhi Municipal Committee to hold office for a period of one year  with effect  from October  4, 1979.  However, well before the  expiry of  the term  for which  the members were appointed, on February 27, 1980, the Lt. 750 Governor, in exercise of the powers conferred by Sec. 238(1) superseded the  New Delhi Municipal Committee with immediate effect and  appointed Shri  P. N. Bhel as the person who may exercise and  perform all powers and duties of the New Delhi Municipal   Committee   until   the   said   Committee   was reconstituted.      The preamble  to the order of supersession recited that the Committee  was  incompetent  to  perform  and  had  made persistent default  in the performance of the duties imposed on it under the law had further abused its powers, resulting in wastage  of Municipal  funds. Four  instances or  grounds were mentioned.  The first  ground was that a clause for the payment of  a mobilisation  advance of Rs. fifteen lakhs was included in  the contract awarded to M/s. Tarapore & Co. for the construction of City Centre though such a clause did not find a  place in  the original  contract with  M/s. Mohinder Singh &  Co. The  contract we  may mention  here,  had  been awarded to  M/s. Tarapore  & Co.  on  the  failure  of  M/s. Mohinder Singh  & Co.  to complete  the work. It was alleged that the  contract was  awarded to  Tarapore &  Co.,  at  an enhanced  cost   without  the  prior  approval  of  the  Lt. Governor. The inclusion of the clause relating to payment of mobilisation advance  was also  without the  approval of the Lt. Governor.  The second  ground was  that one B. K. Mittal was  re-employed   by  the  New  Delhi  Municipal  Committee notwithstanding  the   advice  of   the  Central   Vigilance Commission  that   ‘major  penalty  proceedings’  should  be initiated against  him. The  third ground  was that although the Central  Vigilance Commission  advised the  removal from service of V. P. Sangal, the Municipal Committee resolved to impose the  minor penalty  of stoppage  of a few increments. The fourth ground was that the Municipal Committee created a number of  posts including  that of Director of Horticulture and appointed  Shri Sharma  to  that  post  inspite  of  the directive of the Lt. Governor not to create posts unless the staffing pattern  was studied  by the Administrative Reforms Department.      Two of  the non-official  members of the superseded New Delhi Municipal  Committee, Shri  S. L.  Kapoor and another, filed Civil  Writ Petitions in the Delhi High Court to quash the order  of supersession dated February 27, 1980. The Writ Petitions were heard by a Full Bench of five judges and were dismissed on  May 9,  1980. S.  L. Kapoor has preferred this appeal after  obtaining Special  Leave of  this Court  under Art. 136 of the Constitution.      Before the  High Court,  as before  us,  the  principal submission  of  the  learned  counsel  for  the  petitioner- appellant was  that the  order of supersession was passed in complete violation of the principles of 751 natural justice  and total  disregard of  fair-play. It  was pointed  out   that  no   notice  to   show  cause   against supersession was ever issued to the Committee, there was not the slightest  hint until  the order was made that there was any proposal  to supersede  the Committee  and the Committee never had  any opportunity  either before or after the order of  supersession  was  passed  to  offer  their  explanation against the  allegations made  in the order of supersession. The Full  Bench upheld  the claim of the petitioners that it was necessary  to hear  the Committee  before an order under

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Sec. 238(1)  of the  Punjab Municipal  Act was  passed. But, held, the  High Court,  the Committee  was made aware of the allegations and had been given opportunity to state its case or version  in the  case of  atleast three  out of  the four grounds and  therefore, there  was no failure to observe the principles of  natural justice.  Even  otherwise,  the  High Court expressed  the view  that undisputed  facts were there and they spoke for themselves and no purpose would have been served by  giving formal  notice to  the  Committee  of  the allegations and the proposal to take action to supersede the Committee since  the result would have been the same. In the view of  the High  Court  there  was  no  prejudice  to  the Committee by  the failure  to observe  natural justice. Shri Soli Sorabjee, learned counsel for the appellant, questioned the conclusion  of the High Court that the Committee had the opportunity to  offer their  explanation in  regard  to  the allegations on  which the  order of supersession was passed. He also  canvassed the  view that the failure to observe the principles of  natural justice  did not vitiate the order of supersession since  the observance  of natural justice would have, on the undisputed facts, led to the same result.      The learned  Attorney General  who appeared for the Lt. Governor contended  that Sec. 238(1) of the Punjab Municipal Act did  not contemplate and did not require, as a matter of interpretation, that  any opportunity should be given to the Committee before an order of supersession was passed. It was submitted that  although much  of the  distinction between a judicial act  and an  administrative act had vanished, there was still  a thin  but discernible  line between the two and that in  the case  of an  administrative act  some  positive beneficial  interest  must  be  established  before  natural justice could be insisted upon. It was said that neither the Committee nor its members had any beneficial interest in the continuance of the Committee and therefore, the supersession of the Committee did not involve any Civil consequences such as would  give rise to a right to be heard. The argument was initially pushed  further and  it was submitted that, in any case, an  individual member  of the Committee, none of whose individual rights had been infringed, had no locus standi to maintain 752 the petition. The submission about locus standi was however, withdrawn by  the learned  Attorney General at a later stage and it is unnecessary for us to consider that question.      First, the  question whether  the rule  of Audi Alteram Partem is  attracted :  Sec. 11  of the Punjab Municipal Act provides  that   there  shall   be  established   for   each Municipality  a   Committee  having   authority   over   the Municipality consisting  of such  number of  members as  the State Government  may fix  in that  behalf. Sec. 12 provides that every such Committee shall consist of members appointed by the  State Government  either by name or by office, or of members selected  from among  inhabitants in accordance with rules made  under  the  Act.  Sec.  13  empowers  the  State Government to stipulate the term of office for which members of the  Committee shall  be appointed  and elected.  Sec. 18 makes every  Committee a  body  Corporate  having  perpetual succession and a common seal, with power to acquire and hold property to contract etc. etc. Every member of the Committee is deemed  to be  a public servant by Sec. 19. Sec. 56 vests in the  Committee the  various kinds  of property  specified therein. Sec.  61 empowers  the Committee  to impose  varied taxes. There  are innumerable  other provisions  of the  Act which prescribe the powers and duties of the Committee. Sec. 16 empowers the State Government to remove any member of the

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Committee if  he  comes  to  suffer  any  of  the  specified disqualifications  but   only  after  the  State  Government communicates to  the member  concerned the  reasons for  his proposed removal  and gives  him an opportunity of tendering an  explanation   in  writing.   Sec.   232   empowers   the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner to suspend the execution of any  resolution or order of the Committee or prohibit the doing of  any act which is about to be done or is being done in pursuance  of or  under  the  cover  of  the  Act  or  in pursuance of  any sanction  or  permission  granted  by  the Committee if  in his opinion the resolution, order or act is in excess  of the powers conferred by law or contrary to the public interest  or likely  to  cause  waste  or  damage  to Municipal funds  or property. Sec. 233 authorises the Deputy Commissioner, in  case  of  emergency  to  provide  for  the execution of  any work  or the  doing  of  any  act  if  the immediate execution  of the  work or the doing of the Act is necessary for  the service or the safety of the public. Sec. 234 enables  the Commissioner to provide for the performance of any  duty to the Committee if the Committee makes default in performing  such duty after being required to perform it. Sec. 236  empowers the  State Government to require that the proceedings of the Committee shall be in conformity with law and vests  in the  Government necessary  powers to  annul or modify any proceedings which it may consider 753 not to  be in  conformity with  law. Sec. 238 is what we are directly concerned with and it reads as follows :           "238(1)  Should  a  Committee  be  incompetent  to      perform or persistently make default in the performance      of, the  duties imposed  on it  by or under this or any      other Act,  or exceed  or abuse  its powers,  the State      Government may  by notification,  in which  the reasons      for so  doing shall be stated, declare the Committee to      be superseded :           (2)  When  a   committee  is  so  superseded,  the      following consequences shall ensue :                (a) all  members of the committee shall, from           the date of the notification, vacate their seats;                (b) all  powers and  duties of  the committee           may, until  the  committee  is  reconstituted,  be           exercised and  performed by  such persons  as  the           State Government may appoint in that behalf;                (c) all  property  vested  in  the  committee           shall, until  the committee is reconstituted, vest           in the State Government;           (3) The  State Government  may, if  it shall think      fit, at  any time  constitute another  committee in the      place of any committee superseded under this section".      The old  distinction between  a  judicial  act  and  an administrative act  has  withered  away  and  we  have  been liberated from the psittacine incantation of ‘administrative action’. Now, from the time of the decision of this Court in State of  Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Devi & Ors. "even an administrative order  which involves  civil consequences.... must  be   made  consistently  with  the  rules  of  natural justice". What  are civil  consequences?  The  question  was posed and  answered by  this Court  in Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. v.  The Chief  Election Commissioner,  New Delhi & Ors. Krishna Iyer  J., speaking  for the  Constitution Bench said (at p. 308-309):           "But what  is a  civil  consequence,  let  us  ask      ourselves,  by   passing  verbal   booby-traps?  ‘Civil      consequence’ undoubtedly cover infraction of not merely      property or  personal rights  but of  civil  liberties,

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    material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In its      comprehensive connotation,  everything that  affects  a      citizen  in   his   civil   life   inflicts   a   civil      consequence". 754 The learned Judge then proceeded to quote from Black’s Legal Dictionary and  to consider the interest of a candidate at a Parliamentary election. He finally said:           "The appellant  has a  right to  have the election      conducted  not   according  to  humour  or  hubris  but      according to  law and  justice. And  so natural justice      cannot be  stumped out  on this score. In the region of      public law locus standi and person aggrieved, right and      interest have a broader import".      In Schmidt  and Another  v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs Lord Denning M.R., observed : "The speeches in Ridge v. Baldwin  [1964] AC  40, show  that an administrative body may, in  a proper  case, be  bound to  give a  person who is affected  by   their  decision   an  opportunity  of  making representations. It all depends on whether he has some right or interest or, I would add, some legitimate expectation, of which it  would not  be fair to deprive him". It was held in that case  that a  foreign alien  had no  right to enter the country except  by leave, but, if he was given leave to come for a limited period and his permit was sought to be revoked before the expiry of the time limit, he ought to be given an opportunity  of   making  representation,   for  he   had  a legitimate expectation  of being  allowed to  stay  for  the permitted time.      In Alfred  Thangarajah Durayappah  v. W.  J. Fernando & Ors. the  Municipal Council  of  Jaffna  was  dissolved  and superseded by  the Governor-General  on the  ground that  it appeared to  him that  the  Council  was  not  competent  to perform the  duties imposed  upon it.  The Mayor  sought  to question the  dissolution and supersession of the Council in the Supreme  Court of Ceylon, on the ground that there was a failure to observe the principles of natural justice. One of the questions  which arose for consideration was whether, as a matter of interpretation, natural justice was not excluded from action  under Sec. 277 of the Municipal Ordinance under which provision  the dissolution  and supersession  had been made. The  argument was that words such as "where it appears to ......."  or  "if  it  appears  to  the  satisfaction  of ......." or  "if  the.........considers  it  expedient  that ............."  or   "if  the   .........is  satisfied  that ........."  stood  by  themselves  without  other  words  or circumstances or  qualifications, a  duty to  act judicially was excluded,  and so, was natural justice. The argument was accepted by  the Supreme  Court  of  Ceylon  but  the  Privy Council disagreed with the approach. They observed 755 that there  were three  matters which should always be borne in mind  when considering whether the principle Audi Alteram Partem should be applied or not. The three matters were:           "first, what  is the  nature of  the property, the      office held, status enjoyed or services to be performed      by the  complainant of  injustice.  Secondly,  in  what      circumstances or  upon what  occasions  is  the  person      claiming to  be entitled  to exercise  the  measure  of      control entitled to intervene. Thirdly, when a right to      intervene is  proved, what  sanctions in  fact  is  the      latter entitled  to impose  upon the  other. It is only      upon a  consideration of  all these  matters  that  the      question  of  the  application  of  the  principle  can      properly be determined".

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The Privy Council then proceeded to examine the facts of the case upon those considerations and said:           ‘As to  the first matter it cannot be doubted that      the  Council   of  Jaffna   was  by  statute  a  public      corporation entrusted like all other municipal councils      with  the  administration  of  a  large  area  and  the      discharge of  important duties.  No one  would consider      that its  activities should  be lightly interfered with      ............ The  legislature  has  enacted  a  statute      setting up  municipal authorities  with a  considerable      measure of  independence from  the  central  government      within defined local areas and fields of government. No      Minister should  have the  right to  dissolve  such  an      authority without  allowing it  the right  to be  heard      upon that matter unless the statute is so clear that it      is plain it has no right of self defence.           Upon the  second  matter  it  is  clear  that  the      Minister can  dissolve the  council on one of the three      grounds :  that it  (a) is not competent to perform any      duty or  duties imposed  upon  it  (for  brevity  their      Lordships will  refer to this head as incompetency); or      (b) persistently  makes default  in the  performance of      any duty or duties imposed upon it; or (c) persistently      refuses or  neglects to  comply with  any provision  of      law.....It seems  clear to their Lordships that it is a      most  serious   charge  to  allege  that  the  council,      entrusted   with    these   very    important   duties,      persistently makes  default in  the performance  of any      duty  or  duties  imposed  upon  it.  No  authority  is      required to support the view that in such circumstances      it is plain and obvious that the principle audi alteram      partem must apply.           Equally it  is clear  that if a council is alleged      persistently to  refuse or  neglect to  comply  with  a      provision of law it must be 756      entitled (as  a matter  of the most elementary justice)      to be  heard in  its defence.  Again  this  proposition      requires no  authority to support it. If, therefore, it      is clear  that in  two of the three-cases, the Minister      must act  judicially, then it seems to their Lordships,      looking at  the section  as a  whole, that  it  is  not      possible to  single out  for  different  treatment  the      third case, namely, incompetence......           The third  matter can be dealt with quite shortly.      The sanction  which the Minister can impose and indeed,      if he  is satisfied  of  the  necessary  premise,  must      impose upon  the erring council is as complete as could      be imagined; it involves the dissolution of the council      and therefore  the confiscation  of all its properties.      It was  at one  moment faintly  argued that the council      was a  trustee and  that it  was  not  therefore  being      deprived of any of its property but this argument (soon      abandoned) depended  upon a  complete misconception  of      the law  of corporations.....For  the purposes  of  the      application  of   the  principle   it  seems  to  their      Lordships that  this must  apply equally to a statutory      body having  statutory powers,  authorities and  duties      just as  it does  to an individual. Accordingly on this      ground  too  the  Minister  should  have  observed  the      principle.           For these  reasons their  Lordships have  no doubt      that in  the circumstances  of this  case the  Minister      should have observed the principle audi alteram partem:      Sugathadasa v.  Jayasinghe [1958]  59 N.L.R.  (457) was

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    wrongly decided". Narrow as  were the  considerations  applied  by  the  Privy Council to  determine whether  the  principle  audi  alteram partem applied  or not, Alfred Thangarajah, Durayappah v. W. J. Fernando  & Ors. (Supra) appears to us furnish a complete answer to  the submission  of the  learned Attorney  General that, as  a matter of interpretation, Sec. 238 of the Punjab Municipal Act  did not  contemplate and did not require that an opportunity  should be  given to  the Committee before an order of  supersession was  passed. We  may notice here that the language  of Sec.  238(1) of the Punjab Municipal Act is very nearly  the same  as the language of Sec. 277(1) of the Municipal Ordinance  which  was  interpreted  by  the  Privy Council in Alfred Thangarajah Durayappah v. W. J. Fernando & Ors. (Supra)  We  have  already  referred  to  some  of  the relevant provisions  of the Punjab Municipal Act to indicate some of  the rights  and duties  of the Committee under that Act. A  Committee so  soon as  it is  constituted, at  once, assumes a certain office and status, is endowed with certain rights and  burdened with certain responsibilities, all of a nature commanding respectful regard 757 from the public. To be stripped of the office and status, to be  deprived   of  the   rights,  to  be  removed  from  the responsibilities, in  an unceremonious  way as  to suffer in public esteem,  is certainly  to visit  the  Committee  with civil consequences. In our opinion the status and office and the rights  and responsibilities  to which  we have referred and the  expectation of the Committee to serve its full term of office  would certainly create sufficient interest in the Municipal Committee  and their  loss, if  superseded,  would entail civil  consequences so  as to  justify an  insistence upon the  observance of  the principles  of natural  justice before an order of supersession is passed.      One of  the submissions of the learned Attorney General was that when the question was one of disqualification of an individual member,  Sec. 16  of  the  Punjab  Municipal  Act expressly provided  for an  opportunity being  given to  the member concerned  whereas Sec.  238(1) did  not provide  for such an  opportunity and,  so, by  necessary implication, it must be  considered that  the principle  Audi Alteram Partem was excluded.  We are unable to agree with the submission of the learned  Attorney General.  It is not always a necessary inference that  if opportunity  is expressly provided in one provision and  not so provided in another, opportunity is to be considered  as excluded from that other provision. It may be a  weighty consideration to be taken into account but the weightier consideration is whether the administrative action entails civil  consequences. This was also the view taken in Mohinder  Singh   Gill  &   Anr.  v.   The  Chief   Election Commissioner, New  Delhi & Ors. where it was observed (at p. 316) :           "We have  been told  that wherever  the Parliament      has intended  a hearing  it has  said so in the Act and      the rules  and inferentially where it has not specified      it is otiose. There is no such sequitur. The silence of      a statute  has no  exclusionary effect  except where it      flows from necessary implication. Art. 324 vests a wide      power and  where some  direct consequence on candidates      emanates from its exercise we must read this functional      obligation".      Another submission  of the learned Attorney General was that Sec. 238(1) also contemplated emergent situations where swift action  might be  necessary to avert disaster and that in such situations if the demands of natural justice were to

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be  met,   the  very   object  of  the  provision  would  be frustrated. It  is difficult  to visualise  the  sudden  and calamitous situations  gloomily  foreboded  by  the  learned Attorney General  where there  would not be enough breathing time to  observe natural  justice, at least in a rudimentary way. A Municipal Committee 758 under the  Punjab Municipal  Act is a public body consisting of both  officials and  non-officials and one cannot imagine anything momentous  being done  in a  matter of  minutes and seconds. And,  natural justice may always be tailored to the situation. Minimal  natural justice,  the barest  notice and the ‘littlest’ opportunity, in the shortest time, may serve. The authority  acting under Sec. 238(1) is the master of its own procedure.  There need  be no  oral hearing.  It is  not necessary to put every detail of the case to the Committee : broad grounds  sufficient to  indicate the  substance of the allegations may  be given. We do not think that even minimal natural justice  is excluded  when alleged  grave situations arise under Sec. 238. If indeed such grave situations arise, the  public   interest  can  be  sufficiently  protected  by appropriate prohibitory and mandatory action under the other relevant provisions of the statute in Sections 232 to 235 of the Act.  We guard  ourselves against  being  understood  as laying down  any proposition of universal application. Other statutes  providing  for  speedy  action  to  meet  emergent situations may  well be construed as excluding the principle audi alteram  partem. All that we say is that Sec. 238(1) of the Punjab Municipal Act does not.      The next  question for  consideration  is  weather  the Committee   was   given   an   opportunity   to   make   its representations against the allegations upon which the order of supersession  was ultimately  founded.  We  have  already mentioned that  the first allegation was about the agreement to pay  ‘mobilisation advance’  to M/s.  Tarapore &  Co.  It appears that  the work  of construction  of New  Delhi  City Centre was  initially awarded  to Mohinder  Singh &  Co.  in October, 1976  but on account of their inability to complete the work within the stipulated time it was decided to invite "restricted tenders"  from other  contractors. That was done and the  contract was  awarded to  Tarapore & Co. One of the conditions  of  the  contract  which  was  accepted  by  the Committee was  that the  contractor should be paid 7 1/2% of the value  of the  tender as  ‘mobilisation  advance’  :  On December  31,   1979,  the  New  Delhi  Municipal  Committee addressed a letter to the Secretary (Local Self Government), Delhi Administration  requesting the  sanction  of  the  Lt. Governor  for  payment  of  ‘mobilisation  advance’  to  the contractors.  It  was  mentioned  in  the  letter  that  the contractors had  offered to  pay interest  at the rate of 9% per annum  and to give a bank guarantee to cover the advance as well  as the interest. While the question of the grant of approval  by  the  Lt.  Governor  was  under  consideration, Mohinder Singh,  the original  contractor  appears  to  have submitted a  representation to  the Govt. of India about the award of  the contract  to Tarapore  & Co.  On February  11, 1980, the  Deputy Secretary,  Ministry of  Works &  Housing, Government of India, forwarded a 759 copy of  the representation to Shri S.C. Chhabra, President, New Delhi Municipal Committee and requested him "(a) to send a factual report on the subject, and (b) not to make further payments, commitments  or arrangements  or  to  do  anything irrevocable till  the New  Delhi Municipal  Committee  hears from  this   Ministry".  The  President  of  the  New  Delhi

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Municipal Committee submitted the factual report on February 13, 1980, and on February 19, 1980 wrote a letter to Shri M. K.. Mukherjee,  Secretary,  Ministry  of  Works  &  Housing, pointing out  that a  serious situation  and stale-mate  had been created  because of  the  direction  contained  in  the Deputy Secretary’s  letter dated  February 11,  1980 not  to make further  payments to  the contractors  until they again heard from  the Government of India. The circumstances under which the  contract had  been awarded to Tarapore & Co. were explained  and   the  Government   of  India   requested  to communicate their  decision at  an early date. A copy of the letter was  also  sent  to  the  Lt.  Governor  and  to  the Secretary, Local  Self Government,  Delhi Administration. On February 10,  1980 the Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Works & Housing,  Government   of  India   wrote  to   Shri  Shaiza, Secretary,  Local   Self  Government,  Delhi  Administration pointing to  the letter  from  him  (the  Deputy  Secretary, Government of  India) to  the President, New Delhi Municipal Committee, a  copy of which had been sent to Shri Shaiza and referring to  a subsequent  telephonic conversation  between the two of them, and mentioning that a report had since been received from  the New Delhi Municipal Committee. The Deputy Secretary, Ministry  of Works  & Housing  also reminded Shri Shaiza that  he had  given him  to understand  that the  Lt. Governor had not agreed to the grant of mobilisation advance of Rs. 15 lakhs by the New Delhi Municipal Committee to M/s. Tarapore &  Co. He  requested Shri  Shaiza to  expedite  the views of  the Delhi  Administration on Mohinder Singh & Co’s representation and  the  modalities  of  the  grant  of  the contract for  the remainder  of the  work to M/s. Tarapore & Co. It  is to  be noted  here that  though according to this letter  Shri   Shaiza  had   already  informed   the  Deputy Secretary, Government  of India,  that the  Lt. Governor had not agreed to the grant of the mobilisation advance, the New Delhi  Municipal   Committee  themselves  had  not  been  so informed by  the Delhi  Administration until  then, nor even later. What  is even  more curious  is the circumstance that after receiving  Shri Shaiza’s letter, the Deputy Secretary, Government of  India, on  February 22,  1980, wrote  to  the President, New  Delhi Municipal Committee informing him that the Ministry  of Works & Housing had considered the position and that  the New  Delhi Municipal Committee might deal with the matter  according to  law and  that the  request made in sub-para (b)  of  his  D.O.  letter  of  even  number  dated February, 11, 1980, addressed to 760 the  President,  New  Delhi  Municipal  Committee  might  be treated as  withdrawn. This  was to  be without prejudice to any action  that the  Ministry of  Home Affairs  and/or  the Delhi Administration  might like to take in the matter. This was how  the matter stood when the impugned order was passed on February  27, 1980,  by the  Lt. Governor.  The order was signed by  Shri Shaiza,  Secretary, Local  Self  Government, Delhi Administration. It appears that Shri Shaiza had made a notice on  the file on February 12, 1980, apparently for the consideration  of   the  Lt.  Governor.  However,  that  was entirely an  internal  matter  about  which  the  New  Delhi Municipal Committee could have had no knowledge. This is the entire material  placed before  us in  support of  the claim made by  the learned Attorney General on behalf of the Delhi Administration that  the Committee  had the  opportunity  of making its  representation in  regard to  the first  of  the allegations made  in the  impugned order. It is difficult to sustain the  claim of the learned Attorney General even in a remote way.  In the  first  place  the  correspondence  that

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passed was between the Government of India and the New Delhi Municipal Committee and not between the Delhi Administration and  the   New  Delhi  Municipal  Committee.  The  authority competent to  take action  under Sec.  238(1) of  the Punjab Municipal Act  was the  Delhi  Administration  and  not  the Government of India. It cannot, therefore, be contended that the Delhi  Administration ever  gave any  opportunity to the New Delhi  Municipal Committee  to make  any  representation about this  matter. In  the second  place the correspondence that passed  between the  Government of  India and  the  New Delhi   Municipal   Committee   was   in   regard   to   the representation of  Mohinder Singh  & Co.  about the award of the contract  to Tarapore  & Co.;  The letter dated February 11, 1980,  from the  Deputy Secretary,  Ministry of  Works & Housing to the President, New Delhi Municipal Committee does not even  mention the  mobilisation advance.  In  the  third place, throughout the correspondence, there is not a hint or whisper about any proposal to take action under Sec. 238. On the material  before us  we find  it impossible to hold that the New  Delhi Municipal Committee was ever put on notice of any proposed action by the Delhi Administration in regard to first of  the allegations made in the impugned order. If any information  was   sought  from   the  New  Delhi  Municipal Committee and  if any information was given by the Committee such information was furnished and gathered in the course of an exploratory  or fact  finding expedition  and  was  never intended to be an answer to an action-inspired notice.      The second  of the charges or allegations in the notice was that  one B.  K. Mittal had been re-employed despite the advice of the 761 Central  Vigilance   Commission  that  proceedings  for  the imposition of  a major  penalty should  be initiated against him. Our  attention was  invited to  a letter dated November 20, 1979,  from the  Delhi Administration  to the  New Delhi Municipal Committee  in which  the Delhi Administration took to task  and reprimanded  the New  Delhi Municipal Committee for  re-employing  B.  K.  Mittal.  This  letter  cannot  be construed as  a notice  to the New Delhi Municipal Committee to  come  forward  with  its  explanation.  The  letter  was peremptory and final and the indication was that the chapter was closed with the reprimand. Here again, there was nothing to indicate  that any  other action was contemplated against the Municipal  Committee and  that the  Municipal  Committee could offer its explanation if so minded.      In regard  to the  third  of  the  allegations  in  the impugned order  the High  Court  found  that  the  Municipal Committee had  no opportunity  to  meet  the  same.  It  is, therefore, unnecessary for us to consider the matter.      The fourth  charge or allegation was that the Municipal Committee created  a number  of posts  including that  of  a Director (Horticulture)  and also  appointed one  Sharma  to that post, notwithstanding the directive of the Lt. Governor that no  post should  be created  until the staffing pattern was studied  by the  Administrative Reforms  Department. The Municipal Committee  sought the sanction of the Lt. Governor for its  budget estimates.  The Delhi  Administration in its comments addressed  to the  President. New  Delhi  Municipal Committee pointed out that there was an ad-hoc provision for additional  staff   amounting  to   Rs.  33   lakhs  without indicating the details of posts. A directive was issued that until the  Administrative Reforms Department made a study of the staffing  pattern the  ad-hoc provision  of Rs. 33 lakhs should not  be utilised.  Correspondence ensued  between the New Delhi  Municipal Committee and the Delhi Administration,

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the former  requesting the  latter to withdraw the directive and the latter insisting upon the directive. Shri Sharma was however, appointed  as Director  (Horticulture), by  the New Delhi Municipal  Committee inspite  of the directive. Though the  Delhi   Administration  objected   to   the   irregular appointments   made   by   the   Municipal   Committee   the correspondence does  not reveal that any action was proposed against the Municipal Committee.      Thus on  a consideration  of the entire material placed before us  we do  not have  any doubt  that  the  New  Delhi Municipal Committee  was never  put on  notice of any action proposed to  be taken under Sec. 238 of the Punjab Municipal Act and  no opportunity was given to the Municipal Committee to explain any fact or circumstance on 762 the basis  that  action  was  proposed.  If  there  was  any correspondence between the New Delhi Municipal Committee and any other  authority about  the subject matter of any of the allegations, if  information was  given and  gathered it was for  entirely   different  purposes.   In  our   view,   the requirements of  natural justice are met only if opportunity to represent  is given  in  view  of  proposed  action.  The demands of  natural justice  are not  met even  if the  very person proceeded  against has  furnished the  information on which the  action is  based, if  it is furnished in a casual way or  for some  other purpose.  We do not suggest that the opportunity need  be a  ’double opportunity’  that  is,  one opportunity on  the factual  allegations and  another on the proposed penalty.  Both may  be rolled  into  one.  But  the person proceeded against must know that he is being required to meet the allegations which might lead to a certain action being  taken   against  him.  If  that  is  made  known  the requirements are  met. We  disagree with  the finding of the High Court  that the  Committee had  the opportunity to meet the allegations contained in the order of supersession.      Linked with  this question  is the question whether the failure to observe natural justice does at all matter if the observance of natural justice would have made no difference, the admitted  or indisputable facts speaking for themselves. Where  on  the  admitted  or  indisputable  facts  only  one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the  Court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of  natural justice,  not because it approves the non observance  of natural justice but because Courts do not issue futile writs. But it will be a pernicious principle to apply   in    other   situations   where   conclusions   are controversial,  however,   slightly,   and   penalties   are discretionary.      In Ridge  v. Baldwin  & Ors,  one of  the arguments was that even  if the  appellant had  been heard  by  the  watch committee nothing  that he  could have  said could have made any difference. The House of Lords observed (at p. 68):           "It may  be convenient  at this point to deal with      an argument  that, even  if as  a general  rule a watch      committee must  hear a  constable in  his  own  defence      before dismissing  him, this  case was  so  clear  that      nothing that  the appellant  could have said could have      made any  difference. It  is  at  least  very  doubtful      whether that  could be accepted as an excuse. But, even      if it could, the respondents would, in my view, fail on      the facts.  It may  well be  that no reasonable body of      men could have reinstated the appellant. But as between      the other two courses open to the 763      watch committee  the case is not so clear. Certainly on

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    the facts,  as we  know them, the watch committee could      reasonably have  decided  to  forfeit  the  appellant’s      pension rights,  but I  could not  hold that they would      have acted  wrongly or  wholly unreasonably if they had      in the  exercise of  their discretion decided to take a      more lenient course".      Megarry J.  discussed the  question in  John v.  Rees & Ors. He said (at p. 402):           "It may be that there are some who would decry the      importance which the courts attach to the observance of      the  rules  of  natural  justice.  ’When  something  is      obvious’, they  may say,  ’why force  everybody  to  go      through the  tiresome waste  of time involved in faming      charges and  giving an  opportunity to  be  heard?  The      result is  obvious from the start’. Those who take this      view  do  not,  I  think,  do  themselves  justice.  As      everybody who  has anything  to do  with the  law  well      knows, the  path of  the law is strewn with examples of      open and  shut  cases  which,  somehow,  were  not;  of      unanswerable  charges   which,  in   the  event,   were      completely answered;  of inexplicable conduct which was      fully   explained;    of    fixed    and    unalterable      determinations that,  by discussion, suffered a change.      Nor are  those with  any knowledge  of human nature who      pause to think for a moment likely to underestimate the      feelings  of  resentment  of  those  who  find  that  a      decision against them has been made without their being      afforded any  opportunity to  influence the  course  of      events".      In Annamunthodo v. Oilfields Workers’ Trade Union, Lord Denning, in his speech said (at p. 625):           "Counsel for the respondent union did suggest that      a man  could not  complain  of  a  failure  of  natural      justice  unless   he  could   show  that  he  had  been      prejudiced by  it. Their  Lordships cannot  accept this      suggestion. If  a domestic  tribunal fails  to  act  in      accordance with natural justice, the person affected by      their decision  can always  seek redress in the courts.      It is a prejudice to any man to be denied justice".      In Margarita  Fuentes et  al., v.  Tobert L. Shevin, it was said (at p. 574):           "But even  assuming that the appellants had fallen      behind in  their instalment payments, and that they had      no other valid 764      defenses, that  is immaterial  here. The  right  to  be      heard does  not depend upon an advance showing that one      will surely prevail at the hearing. ’To one who protest      against the  taking of his property without due process      of law,  it is  no answer to say that in his particular      case due  process of  law would  have led  to the  same      result because  he had  no adequate  defense  upon  the      merits’".      In Chintepalli  Agency Taluk  Arrack Sales  Cooperative Society Ltd.,  etc. v.  Secretary (Food & Agriculture) Govt. of Andhra Pradesh etc., there was a non-compliance with sec. 77(2) of  the Cooperative  Societies Act which provided that no order  prejudicial to  any person  shall be passed unless such person  had been  given an  opportunity of  making  his representation. The  argument was  that since the facts were clear the  non-compliance did  not matter.  It was also said that  the   appellant  had  of  his  own  motion  made  some representation  in  the  matter.  This  Court  rejected  the arguments observing (at p. 567, 569-570):           "It is  submitted  that  the  Government  did  not

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    afford any  opportunity to  the  appellant  for  making      representation before  it. The High Court rejected this      plea on the ground that from a perusal of the voluntary      applications filed  by the  appellant it was clear that      the appellant  had any how met with the points urged by      the respondents  in their  revision petition before the      Government. We  are, however, unable to accept the view      of the High Court as correct".           "As  mentioned   earlier  in   the  judgment   the      Government did not give any notice communicating to the      appellant about  entertainment of  the  application  in      revision preferred  by the respondents. Even though the      appellant had  filed some representations in respect of      the matter,  it would  not absolve  the Government from      giving  notice   to   the   appellant   to   make   the      representation against  the claim  of the  respondents.      The minimal requirement under section 77(2) is a notice      informing  the   opponent  about  the  application  and      affording him an opportunity to make his representation      against whatever  has been  alleged in his petition. It      is true  that a  personal hearing is not obligatory but      the minimal  requirement of  the principles  of natural      justice which  are ingrained  in section  77(2) is that      the party  whose rights  are going  to be  affected and      against  whom   some  allegations  are  made  and  some      prejudicial orders  are claimed  should have  a written      notice of the proceedings from 765      the authority  disclosing grounds of complaint or other      objection  preferably  by  furnishing  a  copy  of  the      petition on  which action is contemplated in order that      a proper and effective representation may be made. This      minimal requirement can on no account be dispensed with      by relying  upon the  principle of absence of prejudice      or imputation of certain knowledge to the party against      whom action is sought for.           It is  admitted that  no notice  whatever had been      given by  the Government  to the  appellant. There  is,      therefore, clear  violation of section 77(2) which is a      mandatory provision.  We do  not agree  with  the  High      Court that  this provision  can by-passed  by resort to      delving into  correspondence between  the appellant and      the Government.  Such non-compliance  with a  mandatory      provision gives  rise to  unnecessary litigation  which      must be avoided at all costs".      The observations  of this  Court in  Chintapalli Agency Taluk Arrack  Sales Cooperative Society v. Secretary (Supra) are clearly  against the submissions of the learned Attorney General.      The matter  has also  been treated as an application of the general  principle that  justice should not only be done but should  be seen  to be  done. Jackson’s  Natural Justice (1980 Edn.)  contains a  very interesting  discussion of the subject. He says:           "The distinction  between justice  being done  and      being seen  to be  done has  been  emphasised  in  many      cases.           The requirement  that justice should be seen to be      done may  be regarded  as a  general principle which in      some cases  can be  satisfied only by the observance of      the rules  of natural  justice or as itself forming one      of those  rules. Both  explanations of the significance      of the  maxim are  found in Lord Widgery C.J’s judgment      in R.  V. Home  Secretary, Ex.  P. Hosenball  (1977)  1      W.L.R. 766, 772, whereafter saying that "the principles

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    of natural  justice are  those fundamental  rules,  the      breach of which will prevent justice from being seen to      be done"  he went  on to  describe the maxim as "one of      the rules generally accepted in the bundle of the rules      making up natural justice".           It is  the recognition  of the  importance of  the      requirement that  justice  is  seen  to  be  done  that      justifies the  giving of  a remedy  to a  litigant even      when it  may be  claimed that  a decision alleged to be      vitiated by  a breach  of natural  justice would  still      have been  reached had  a fair hearing been given by an      impartial tribunal.  The maxim  is applicable precisely      when the  Court is  concerned not with a case of actual      injustice but with the 766      appearance of  injustice,  or  possible  injustice.  In      Altco Ltd.  v. Sutherland  (1971) 2  Lloyd’s  Rep.  515      Donaldson J said that the court, in deciding whether to      interfere where  an arbitrator  had not given a party a      full hearing  was not  concerned with whether a further      hearing would  produce a  different or the same result.      It was  important that  the parties  should not only be      given justice,  but, as  reasonable men, know that they      had justice  or "to  use the time hallowed phrase" that      justice should not only be done but be seen to be done.      In  R.  V.  Thames  Magistrates  Court,  ex.p.  Polemis      (1974)1 W.L.R. 1371, the applicant obtained an order of      certiorari to  quash his  conviction by  a  stipendiary      magistrate on the ground that he had not had sufficient      time to  prepare  his  defence.  The  Divisional  Court      rejected the argument that, in its discretion, it ought      to refuse  relief because  the applicant had no defence      to the charge.           "It is  again absolutely  basic to our system that      justice must  not only  be done  but must manifestly be      seen to  be done. If justice was so clearly not seen to      be done, as on the afternoon in question here, it seems      to me  that it  is no  answer to  the applicant to say:      ’Well, even  if the  case had  been properly conducted,      the result would have been the same’. That is mixing up      doing justice  with seeing  that justice  is done  (per      Lord Widgery C.J. at p. 1375)". In our  view the  principles of  natural justice  know of no exclusionary rule  dependent on  whether it  would have made any difference  if natural  justice had  been observed.  The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and  proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural  justice is  unnecessary. It  will comes  from  a person who  has denied  justice that the person who has been denied justice  is not  prejudiced. As we said earlier where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and  under the law only one penalty is permissible, the Court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice,  not because it is not necessary to observe natural justice  but because  Courts  do  not  issue  futile writs. We  do not  agree with the contrary view taken by the Delhi High Court in the judgment under appeal.      Every wrong  action of  a Municipal  Committee need not necessarily lead  to the  inference of  incompetence on  the part of the Committee or amount to an abuse of the powers of the Committee.  That is  a matter to be decided by the State Government on  the facts of each case. A Committee may admit that what  it has  done is  wrong and yet may plead that its action does  not reveal  incompetence or  an  abuse  of  its powers. It may plead an honest error judgment;

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767 it may  plead some  misapprehension about the state of facts or state  of the  law; it  may plead  that in  any event the drastic action  contemplated by  Sec. 238(1)  is not  called for. Therefore,  merely because  facts are  admitted or  are indisputable it  does not  follow that  natural justice need not be  observed. In  fact in  the present  case one  of the complaints of  the appellant is that relevant facts were not considered by  the Lt.  Governor. Neither the impugned order nor the  note of  Shri Shaiza  shows that  in regard  to the first allegation  two vital  circumstances were  considered: (a) The contractor had agreed to pay interest at the rate of 9% on  the mobilisation  advance;  (b)  the  contractor  had agreed to  offer bank  guarantee to  cover the  mobilisation advance as  well as  the interest.  It was  argued that  had these facts  been brought  to the notice of the Lt. Governor he might  not have  made the  impugned order.  If notice had been given  to  the  Committee,  the  Committee  would  have certainly brought  these facts  to the  notice  of  the  Lt. Governor.      In the light of the discussion we have no option but to hold that  the order  dated February  27, 1980,  of the  Lt. Governor superseding  the New  Delhi Municipal  Committee is vitiated by  the  failure  to  observe  the  principle  Audi Alteram Partem.  The question is what relief should be given to the appellant? The term of the Committee is due to expire on October 3, 1980 which means that just a few days more are left for  the term  to run  out. If now the order is quashed and the  Committee is directed to be reinstated with liberty to the  Lt. Governor to proceed according to law-this should be our  order ordinarily-, it may lead to confusion and even chaos in  the affairs  of the  Municipality.  Shri  Sorabji, learned Counsel  for the  appellant, had  relieved us of our anxiety by  stating "in  view of  the  fact  that  the  term expires on  October 3, 1980, and as the appellant is anxious to have  the stigma cast on him by the notification removed, the appellant  does not  press either  for reinstatement  in office or  for striking  down the  notification so  long  as there is  a just  determination of  the  invalidity  of  the notification".  We   have  held  that  the  notification  is vitiated by the failure to observe the principles of natural justice and  we let  the matter rest there. We neither quash the notification  nor reinstate the Committee. Nor are we to be understood  as having expressed any opinion on the merits of the  supersession. We  allow the  appeal  in  the  manner indicated. The appellant is entitled to his costs. N.V.K.                                       Appeal allowed. 768