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PETITIONER: S. GUIN & OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: GRINDLAYS BANK LTD.

DATE OF JUDGMENT11/12/1985

BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) MISRA, R.B. (J)

CITATION:  1986 AIR  289            1985 SCR  Supl. (3) 818  1986 SCC  (1) 654        1985 SCALE  (2)1264  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1992 SC1701  (34)

ACT:      Indian Penal  Code and  Banking Regulation of Act, 1949 Prosecution -  Trial -  Acquittal - Appeal disposed of after long delay  quashing acquittal  order -  Re-trial ordered  - Whether justified.      Criminal Procedure  Code -  S.482 -  Inherent powers  - Exercise of.

HEADNOTE:      The appellants  were prosecuted  under  s.  341  Indian Penal Code  and under  s.36AD of  the Banking Regulation Act 1949, on  a complaint  filed by the Operation Manager of the respondent-Bank in  the  Court  of  the  Chief  Metropolitan Magistrate. It  was alleged  that the appellants had without reasonable cause  obstructed the  officers of  the Bank from lawfully entering the premises of the branch of the Bank and had obstructed  the transactions  of normal  business. After trial the appellants were acquitted.      The  respondent-Bank   filed  an   appeal  against  the judgment of  acquittal before  the  High  Court,  which  was disposed of  after nearly six years. The High Court set said the judgment  of acquittal and remanded the case for retrial for offences  punishable under  s. 341  read with s.34 or s. 149 Indian Penal Code.      The appellants  appealed  to  this  Court  against  the judgment of the High Court ordering re-trial.      Allowing the appeal, ^      HELD: 1.  The judgment  of the  High Court is set aside and the  order  of  acquittal  passed  by  the  Metropolitan Magistrate is restored without expressing any opinion on the issues of fact and law. [821 F]      2. Whatever  might have been the error committed by the Magistrate, it  Was not  just proper  for the  High Court to have remanded  the case  for fresh  trial, when the order of the acquittal  had been nearly six years before the judgment of the High Court.[820 D-E] 819      3. The  pendency of  the Criminal  Appeal for six years before the  High Court  is itself  a regrettable  feature of

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this case.  The order  directing re-trial  has  resulted  in serious prejudice  to the  appellants. Having  regard to the nature of  the acts  alleged to  have been  committed by the appellants this  was a  case in  which the High Court should have directed the dropping of the proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under s.482 Criminal Procedure Code even if it came to the conclusion that the acquittal was wrong. A fresh trial nearly seven years after the alleged incident is bound to result in harassment and abuse of judicial process. [820 E-G]      S. Veerabadrn  Chettier v.  E.V.  Ramaswami  Naicker  & Ors., [1959] S.C.R. 1211, relied upon.

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL  APPELLATE   JURISDICTION  :  Criminal  Appeal No.848 of 1985.      From the  Judgment and  Order dated  19.12.1984 of  the Calcutta High Court in Crl. A. No. 315 of 1978.      D.N. Mukharjee and P.K. Chakravorty for the Appellants.      U.R.  Lalit,  V.N.  Koura  and  Ashok  Grover  for  the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      VENKATARAMIAH, J. This appeal by special leave is filed by the  appellants against  the  judgment  and  order  dated December 19,  1984 in Criminal Appeal No. 315 of 1978 on the file of  the Calcutta  High Court setting aside the judgment of acquittal  passed in  C-3064 of  1977 on  the file of the Metropolitan Magistrate, 12th Court, Calcutta.      This appeal  arises out of a complaint filed before the Chief Metropolitan  Magistrate,  Calcutta  by  one  Manindra Narayan Choudhury,  Operation Manager  of the Grindlays Bank Ltd. against  the twelve  appellants, referred to above, for offences punishable under section 341, Indian Penal Code and section 36AD  of the  Banking Regulation  Act, 1949  said to have been  committed  by  them  on  October  31,  1977.  The complaint alleged that the appellants had without reasonable cause obstructed the officers of the Bank, particularly Shri G. Vaidya  from lawfully entering the premises of the branch of the  Bank at  41,  Chowringhee  Road,  Calcutta  and  had obstructed the transaction of normal business at the said 820 branch. It  was also alleged that they had thereby committed the offence punishable under section 147, Indian Penal Code. The prosecution  further  alleged  that  all  of  them  were constructively liable  for the  offences said  to have  been committed by  them under  section 34,  Indian Penal Code. It was  urged  that  these  acts  had  been  committed  by  the appellants pursuant  to  a  call  of  strike  given  by  the employees of  the Bank. The Magistrate issued summons to the appellants for offences punishable under section 341, Indian Penal Code and under section 36AD, of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. After trial, the Magistrate by his judgment dated June 27, 1978 acquitted all the appellants. Against the said judgment of  acquittal an  appeal was filed by the Grindlays Bank Ltd.  before the  High Court  of Calcutta  in  Criminal Appeal No.  315 of 1978. The said appeal came to be disposed of after  nearly six  years on  December 19,  1984. The High Court felt  that the  trial court  had missed the essence of the offences  with which the appellants had been charged and therefore there  was failure  of justice. Hence it set aside the judgment  of acquittal  passed  by  the  Magistrate  and remanded the  case for retrial for offences punishable under section 341  read with  section 34  or section  149,  Indian

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Penal Code. Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, the appellants have filed this appeal.      After going  through the judgment of the Magistrate and of the  High Court we feel that whatever might have been the error committed  by the  Magistrate, in the circumstances of the case,  it was  not just and proper for the High Court to have remanded  the case  for fresh  trial, when the order of acquittal had  been  passed  nearly  six  years  before  the judgment of  High Court. The pendency of the Criminal Appeal for six  years before the High Court is itself a regrettable feature of this case. In addition to it, the order directing retrial has resulted in serious prejudice to the appellants. We are  of the  view that having regard to the nature of the acts alleged  to have  been committed  by the appellants and other attendant  circumstances, this was a case in which the High  Court   should  have  directed  the  dropping  of  the proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under section 482, Criminal  Procedure Code  even if for some reason on it came to the conclusion that the acquittal was wrong. A fresh trial nearly seven years after the alleged incident is bound to result  in harassment  and abuse  of judicial process. We may at  this state refer to the decision of this Court in S. Veerabadran Chettiar  v. E.  V. Ramswami  Nacker  &  Ors.  , [1959] S.C.R.  1211. In  that case this Court disagreed with the High  Court on  the interpretation of section 295 of the Indian Penal Code and the order of dismissal of complaint by the Courts  below, but  it proceeded to observe at page 1218 thus : 821           "But the  question  still  remains  whether,  even           after expressing  our strong disagreement with the           interpretation of the section by the courts below,           this Court  should direct  a further  inquiry into           the complaint,  which has  stood dismissed for the           last about  5  years.  The  action  complained  of           against the accused persons, if true, was foolish,           to put  if mildly,  but as  the  case  has  become           stale, we  do not direct further inquiry into this           complaint. If  there is  a recurrence  of  such  a           foolish behaviour  on the  part of  any section of           the community, we have no doubt that those charged           with the  duty of  maintaining law and order, will           apply the  law in  the  sense  in  which  we  have           interpreted the  law.  The  appeal  is  therefore,           dismissed."      We are  of the  view that following the above principle the High  Court should  have dismissed  the appeal before it even if  it disagreed with the view taken by the trial court with regard  to the  gist of  the offence  punishable  under section  341   Indian  Penal  Code,  having  regard  to  the inordinate delay  of nearly  six years that had ensued after the judgment  of acquittal,  the nature and magnitude of the offences alleged  to have  been committed  by the appellants and the  difficulties that  may have  to be  encountered  in securing the  presence of witnesses in a case of this nature nearly 7  years after  the incident.  The termination of the criminal proceedings  in that  way would  secure the ends of justice as  it would  bring about reconciliation between the management and  the employees and also put an end to a stale criminal proceedings  in which  the  public  had  no  longer sufficient interest.  We accordingly  set aside the judgment of the  High Court and restore the order of acquittal passed in this  case by the Metropolitan Magistrate without however expressing any  opinion on  the  issues  of  facts  and  law involved in the case.

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    The appeal is accordingly allowed. A.P.J.                                       Appeal allowed. 822