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PETITIONER: S.GOPAL REDDY

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       11/07/1996

BENCH: ANAND, A.S. (J) BENCH: ANAND, A.S. (J) MUKHERJEE M.K. (J)

CITATION:  1996 SCC  (4) 596        JT 1996 (6)   268  1996 SCALE  (5)78

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                  THE 11TH DAY OF JULY, 1996 Present:             Hon’ble Dr. Justice A.S.Anand             Hon,ble Mr.Justice M.K.Mukherjee P.P.Rao,  Sr.Adv.   A.Sudarshen  Reddy,   B.Rajeshwar   Rao, Ramkrishna  Reddy,  Vimal  Dave,  Advs.  with  him  for  the appellant Guntur Prabhakar, Adv. for the Respondent                       J U D G M E N T The following Judgment of the Court was delivered: S.Gopal Reddy V. State of Andhra Pradesh                       J U D G M E N T DR. ANAND,J.      The appellant  alongwith  his  brother  was  tried  for offences under  Section 420  IPC read  with Section  4 Dowry Prohibition Act,  1961. The  trial Court convicted them both and sentenced them to undergo 9 months R.I. and to a fine of Rs. 500/-  each and  in default  to undergo  S.I.  for  four months for the offence under Section 420 IPC and to R.I. for 6 months  and a  fine of Rs. 1000/- each and in default S.I. for six  months  for  the  offence  under  Section  4  Dowry Prohibition Act,  1961 (hereinafter  the Act).  In an appeal against  their   sentence  and  conviction,  the  Additional Metropolitan Sessions  Judge  held  that  no  offence  under Section 420  IPC was made out and set aside their conviction and sentence  for the  said offence  while confirming  their conviction and  sentence for  the offence under Section 4 of the  Act.  Both  the  convicts  unsuccessfully  invoked  the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court.      This appeal  by special leave filed by the appellant is directed against  the order  of the  High  Court  of  Andhra Pradesh dated  16.10.1990 dismissing  the Criminal  Revision Petition filed by the convicts. The brother of the appellant

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filed SLP  (Crl.) 2336  of 1990 against the revisional order of the  High Court  but that  S.L.P. was  dismissed by  this Court on 15.2.1991.      The prosecution case is as follows :      The appellant  (hereinafter the  first accused)  is the younger brother  of the  petitioner (hereinafter  the second accused) in  S.L.P. (Crl.) No.2336 of 1990, which as already noticed was  dismissed on 15.2.1991 by this Court. The first accused had  been selected for Indian Police Service and was undergoing training  in the  year 1985  and on completion of the training  was posted  as an  Assistant Superintendent of Police in  Jammu &  Kashmir Police  force. His  brother, the second accused,  was at  the relevant  time working with the Osmania University  at  Hyderabad.  P.W.1,  Shri  G.Narayana Reddy, the  complainant,  was  practising  as  a  lawyer  at Hyderabad. PW1  has four  daughters. Ms.Vani  is the  eldest among the  four daughters. She was working as a cashier with the State  Bank of  India at Hyderabad. PW 1 was looking for marriage alliance  for his  daughter Ms. Vani. A proposal to get Ms.Vani  married to the first accused was made by P.W.2, Shri Lakshma  Reddy, a  common friend  of the  appellant and PW1. Lateron  P.W.2 introduced  the second accused to P.W.1, who later  on also  met Ms  Vani and  approved of the match. After some  time, the  first accused also met Ms.Vani at the Institute of  Public Enterprises  and both  of them approved each other for marriage. It is alleged that on 6.5.1985, the second accused  accompanied by P.W.2 and some others went to the house  of P.W.1  to pursue the talks regarding marriage. There were  some talks  regarding giving  of dowry  and  the terms were  finally agreed  between them  on 7.5.1985 at the house of  the second  accused. The  first  accused  was  not present either  on 6.5.1985  or on  7.5.1985. It  is alleged that as  per the  terms settled  between the  parties, P.W.1 agreed to  give to  his daughter  (1) house at Hyderabad (2) jewels, cash  and clothes worth about at rupees one lakh and (3) a  sum of Rs 50,000/- in cash for purchase of a car. The date of  marriage, however, was to be fixed after consulting the first  accused PW1, however, later on insisted on having an engagement  ceremony and  contacted the first accused but the first  accused persuaded  P.W.1 not  to rush through the same as  it was not possible for him to intimate the date to his friends  at a  short notice.  The first  accused came to Hyderabad from  Dehradun, where  he was undergoing training, on 6.8.1985  and stayed  at Hyderabad  till  15.8.1985.  The first accused  attended the  birthday party  of the youngest sister of  Ms.Vani on  15.8.1985 and  later on  sent a  bank draft of  Rs.100/- as  the birthday gift for her to Ms.Vani. In the  letter Ex.P1  which accompanied the bank draft, some reference was  allegedly made  regarding the  settlement  of dowry. It  is alleged  that the first accused later on wrote several letters  including exhibits  P6,P7,P9 and P10 to Ms. Vani It  is the prosecution case that the second accused, on being approached  by PW1  for fixing  the date  of marriage, demanded Rs.  1 lakh instead of Rs. 50,000/- for purchase of car. The  second accused  also insisted that the said amount should be  paid before  marriage. The  ’dowry’ talks between the second  accused and PW1, however, remained inconclusive. Lateron the  date of  marriage was  fixed as  2.11.1985.  On 1.10.1985, the  first  accused  allegedly  wrote  a  letter, exhibit P6,  to Ms.Vani  asking her  to cancel  the date  of marriage or  to fulfil  the demands  made by his elders. The first accused  came to  Hyderabad on  20.10.1985 when  P.W.1 told  him   about  the   demand  of  additional  payment  of Rs.50,000/- made  by the  second accused for the purchase of car. The  first accused told P.W.1 that he would consult his

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brother and  inform him  about it  and left  for his  native place. lt  is alleged  that on  his return from the village, the first accused asked P.W.1 to give Rs.75,000/- instead of Rs.50,000/- as  agreed upon earlier instead of Rs. 1 lakh as demanded by the second accused. According to the prosecution case this  talk took place in the presence of Shri Narasinga Rao (not  examined) The  first accused  suggested that P.W.1 should give  Rs.50,000/- immediately towards the purchase of the car and the balance of Rs.25,000/- should be paid within one year  after the  marriage but  PW1 did  not  accept  the suggestion. According to the prosecution case ‘Varapuja’ was performed by PW1 and his other relatives at the house of the second accused  on 31.10.1985  At that  time P.W.1 allegedly handed over  to the  first accused,  a document Exhabit P-13 dated 12.10.1985,  purporting to  settle a house in the name of his  daughter Ms.Vani alongwith a bank pass book, Exhibit P-12 showing  a cash  balance of  Rs.50,881/- in the name of Ms.Vani. The  first  accused  is  reported  to  have,  after examining the  document Exhibit  P-13, flared up saying that the settlement  was for  a Double  Storeyed  House  and  the document Exhibit  P-13 purporting to settle the house in the name of  Ms.Vanl was  only  a  single  storey  building.  He threatened to  get the marriage cancelled if P.W.1 failed to comply with  the settlement  as arrived  at on  the  earlier occasions. The  efforts  of  P.W.1  to  persuade  the  first accused not to cancel the marriage did not yield any results and ultimately  the marriage  did not  take place. The first accused then  returned all  the articles that had been given to him  at the time of ‘Varapuja’. Aggrieved, by the failure of the  marriage negotiations,  P.W.1 on  22.1.1986  sent  a complaint to  the Director  of National Police Academy where the first  accused was undergoing training Subsequently, PW1 also went to the Academy to meet the Director when he learnt from the  personal assistant  to the Director of the Academy that the  first accused  was getting married to another girl on 30th  of March,  1986 at  Bolaram and  showed to  him the wedding invitation  card.  P.W.1,  thereupon,  gave  another complaint  to  the  director  on  26.3.1986,  who,  however, advised him  to approach  the concerned police for necessary action. P.W.1 filed a report Ex.P20 at Chikkadapalli Police Station  on   28.3.1986.  The  Inspector  of  Police  P.W.7, registered the  complaint as Crime Case No.109/1986 and took up the  investigation.  During  the  investigation,  various letters purported  to have been written by the first accused to Ms.Vani  were sent  to the  handwriting expert P.W.3, who gave his  opinion regarding  the existence  of  similarities between the  specimen writings  of the first accused and the disputed writings.  Both the  first accused and his brother, the second  accused, were thereafter chargesheeted and tried for offences  punishable under  section 420 I.P.C. read with an offence  punishable  under  section  4  of  the  Act  and convicted and sentenced as noticed above.      Mr. P.P.Rao  the learned  senior counsel  appearing for the appellant  submitted that the courts below had committed an error  in not  correctly interpreting the ambit and scope of section  4 of  the Dowry  Prohibition Act, 1961 read with the definition  of ‘dowry’  under section 2 of the said Act. According to  the learned  counsel, for "demand" of dowry to become an  offence under  Section 4  of the  Act, it must be made at the time of marriage and not during the negotiations for marriage.  Reliance in  this behalf is placed on the use of the  expressions ‘bride’ and ‘bridegroom’ in Section 4 to emphasise that  at the  stage of  pre-marriage negotiations, the boy  and the  girl are  not ‘bridegroom’ and ‘bride’ and therefore  the   ‘demand’  made  at  that  stage  cannot  be

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construed as  a ‘demand’ of dowry punishable under Section 4 of the  Act. On  merits, counsel argued that reliance placed by the  trial  court  as  well  as  the  appellate  and  the revisional court  on various letters purporting to have been written  by  the  first  accused  was  erroneous  since  the appellant had  denied their  authorship  and  there  was  no satisfactory evidence on the record to connect the appellant with   those   letters   except   the   "inconclusive"   and uncorroborated evidence  of the  handwriting expert.  Mr.Rao further argued  that  in  the  present  case  there  was  no unimpeachable evidence available on the record to bring home the  guilt   of  the   appellant  and  the  failure  of  the prosecution to  examine Ms.Vani  and Shri Narsinga Rao was a serious lacuna  in the prosecution case. Argued Mr. Rao that the evidence  of PW1,  the complainant  had not received any corroboration at  all and  since the evidence of PW1 was not wholly reliable,  conviction of  the appellant  without  any corroboration of  the evidence of PW1 was not justified. Mr. Rao urged  that the complainant had exaggerated the case and roped in  the appellant,  whose elder brother alone had made the demand  for dowry, out of anger and frustration and that let alone  ‘demanding dowry’, the first accused was not even a privy  to the  demand of  dowry  as  made  by  the  second accused, his elder brother.      Learned  counsel  for  the  respondent-State,  however, supported the judgment of the trial court and the High Court and argued  that the  case against  the appellant  had  been established beyond  a reasonable  doubt and  that this court need not  interfere in  exercise of  its jurisdiction  under Article 136  of the  Constitution of  India with findings of fact arrived at after appreciation of evidence by the courts below. According to Mr. Prabhakar, the interpretation sought to be placed by Mr. Rao on Section 4 of the Act would defeat the very  object of  the Act,  which was enacted to curb the practice of "demand" or acceptance and receipt of dowry" and that the  definition of ‘dowry’ as contained in Section 2 of the Act  included the demand of dowry ‘at or before or after the marriage’.      The curse of dowry has been raising its ugly head every now and  then but  the  evil  has  been  flourishing  beyond imaginable proportions.  It was  to curb this evil, that led the Parliament  to enact  The Dowry Prohibition Act in 1961. The Act  is intended  to prohibit  the giving  or taking  of dowry end makes its ‘demand’ by itself also an offence under Section 4 of the Act. Even the abetment of giving, taking or demanding dowry  has been  made an offence. Further, the Act provides that  any agreement  for giving  or taking of dowry shall be  void and the offences under the Act have also been made non-compoundable  vide Section 8 of the Act. Keeping in view the  object which  is sought  to be achieved by the Act and the  evil it attempts to stamp out, a three Judges Bench of this  court in L.V. Jadhav vs. Shankar Rao Abasaheb Pawar & Others (1983 4 SCC 231) opined that the expression "Dowry" wherever used in the Act must be liberally construed.      Before proceeding  further, we consider it desirable to notice  some   of  the  relevant  provisions  of  the  Dowry Prohibition Act,1961.      "Section  2-   ‘dowry’  means   any      property or valuable security given      or  agreed   to  be   given  either      directly or indirectly-      (a) by  one party  to a marriage to      the other party to the marriage; or      (b) by  the parents of either party      to  a  marriage  or  by  any  other

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    person,  to  either  party  to  the      marriage or to any other person;      at or  before or after the marriage      as consideration  for the  marriage      of the  said parties,  but does not      include dower  or mahr  in case  of      person to  whom the Muslim Personal      law      (Shariat) applies.      . . . . . . . . .      . . . . . . . . .      Section  3-Penalty  for  giving  or      taking dowry-  If any person, after      the commencement of this Act, gives      or takes  or abets  the  giving  or      taking  of   dowry,  he   shall  be      punishable with  imprisonment for a      term which  shall not  be less than      five years,  and  with  fine  which      shall  not  be  less  than  fifteen      thousand rupees  or the  amount  of      the value  of such dowry, whichever      is more.           Provided that  the Court  may,      for adequate and special reasons to      be recorded in the judgment, impose      a sentence  of imprisonment  for  a      term    of     less    than    five      years(Substituted  for   the  words      "six months"  w.e.f. 19th November,      1986).      Section-4:  Penalty  for  demanding      dowry-if   any    person    demands      directly or  indirectly,  from  the      parents  or   other  relatives   or      guardian of  a bride  or bridegroom      as the  case may  be, any dowry, he      shall    be     punishable     with      imprisonment for a term which shall      not be  less than  six  months  but      which may  extend to  two years and      with fine  which may  extend to ten      thousand rupees.           Provided that  the Court  may,      for adequate and special reasons to      be  mentioned   in  the   judgments      impose a  sentence of  imprisonment      for  a   term  of   less  than  six      months."      The definition  of the  term ’dowry’ under Section 2 of the Act  shows that  any property or valuable security given or "agreed to be given" either directly or indirectly by one party to the marriage to the other party to the marriage "at or before or after the marriage" as a "consideration for the marriage  of   the  said   parties"  would   become  ’dowry’ punishable under  the Act.  Property or valuable security so as to  constitute ’dowry’ within the meaning of the Act must therefore be  given or  demanded "as  consideration for  the marriage".      Section 4  of the  Act aims  at discouraging  the  very "demand" of  "dowry" as  a ’Consideration  for the marriage’ between the parties thereto and lays down that if any person after the  commencement of  the Act,  "demands", directly or indirectly, from  the parents  or guardians  of a ’bride’ or ’bridegroom’, as  the case  may be, any ’dowry’, he shall be

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punishable with  imprisonment which may extend to six months or with  fine which  may extend  to Rs.5,000/- or with both. Thus, it  would be  seen that section 4 makes punishable the very  demand   of  property   or  valuable   security  as  a consideration for  marriage,  which  demand,  if  satisfied, would constitute  the graver  offence under section a of the Act punishable  with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less  than five  years and  with fine  which shall not be less than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the value of such dowry whichever is more.      The definition  of the  expression ’dowry’ contained in Section 2  of the  Act cannot  be  confined  merely  to  the ’demand’ of money, property or valuable security ’made at or after the  performance of  marriage’ as is urged by Mr. Rao. The legislature  has in  its wisdom  while providing for the definition of ’dowry’ emphasised that any money, property or valuable security  given, as  a consideration  for marriage, ’before, at  or after  the marriage  would be covered by the expression ’dowry’  and  this  definition  as  contained  in Section 2  has to  be read  wherever the  expression ’dowry’ occurs in  the Act.  Meaning  of  the  expression  ’dowry’as commonly used  and understood is different than the peculiar definition thereof  under the  Act. Under  Section 4  of the Act, mere  demand of ’dowry’ is sufficient to bring home the offence to an accused. Thus, any "demand" of money, property or valuable  security made  from the bride or her parents or other relatives  by the  bridegroom or  his parents or other relatives or  vice-versa would  fall within  the mischief of ’dowry’ under  the Act  where such  demand is  not  properly referable  to   any  legally   recognised   claim   and   is consideration of  marriage. Marriage  in this  context would include a proposed marriage also more particularly where the non-fulfilment of  the "demand  of dowry"  leads to the ugly consequence of  the marriage  not taking  place at  all. The expression ’dowry’  under the Act must be interpreted in the sense which  the Statute  wishes to  attribute  to  it.  Mr. P.P.Rao,  learned   senior  counsel   referred  to   various dictionaries  for   the  meaning  of  ’dowry’,  ’bride’  and ’bridegroom’ and  on the  basis of  those meanings submitted that ’dowry’  must be construed only as such property, goods or valuable  security which  is given to a husband by and on behalf of  the wife at marriage and any demand made prior to marriage would  not amount  to dowry. We cannot agree. Where definition has been given in a statute itself, it is neither proper nor  desirable to  look to  the dictionaries  etc. to find out the meaning of the expression. The definition given in the  statute is  the determinative-  factor. The Act is a piece of  social legislation which aims to check the growing menace of  the social  evil of dowry and it makes punishable not only  the actual  receiving of  dowry but  also the very demand of  dowry made  before or  at the  time or  after the marriage where such demand is referable to the consideration of marriage.  Dowry as a quid pro for marriage is prohibited and not  the giving  of traditional presents to the bride or the bride  groom by  friends and  relatives. Thus, voluntary presents given  at or  before or  after the  marriage to the bride  or   the  bridegroom,  as  the  case  may  be,  of  a traditional nature,  which are  given not as a consideration for marriage but out of love, affection on regard, would not fall within  the mischief  of the  expression  ’dowry’  mare punishable under the Act.      It is  a well  known rule of interpretation of statutes that the  text and  the context  of the  entire Act  must be looked into  while interpreting  any of the expressions used in a  statute. The  courts must look to the object which the

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statute seeks  to achieve  while  interpreting  any  of  the provisions of the Act. A purposive approach for interpreting the Act is necessary. We are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with  Mr. Rao that it is only the property or valuable security given at the time of marriage which would bring the same within  the definition  of ’dowry’ punishable under the Act, as  such an  interpretation would be defeating the very object for  which the  Act was  enacted. Keeping in view the object of  the Act, "demand of dowry" as a consideration for a proposed  marriage would  also come  within the meaning of the expression dowry under the Act. If we were to agree with Mr. Rao that it is only the demand made at or after marriage which is punishable under Section 4 of the Act, Some serious consequences, which  the legislature  wanted to  avoid,  are bound  to   follow.  Take  for  example  a  case  where  the bridegroom or his parents or other relatives make a ’demand’ of dowry  during marriage  negotiations  and  lateron  after bringing the bridal party to the bride’s house find that the bride or  her parents  or relative  have not met the earlier ’demand’ and call off the marriage and leave the bride house should they  escape the punishment under the Act. The answer has to  be an  emphatic ’no’.  It would  be adding insult to injury if we were to countenance that their action would not attract the  provisions of  Section 4  of the  Act. Such  an interpretation would  frustrate the  very object  of the Act and would  also run  contrary  to  the  accepted  principles relating to the interpretation of statutes.      In Reserve  Bank  of  India  Etc.  Etc..  vs.  Peerless General Finance And Investment Co. Ltd. & Others Etc.. Etc.. (1987)  1  SCC  424  while  dealing  with  the  question  of interpretation of a statute, this court observed:      "Interpretation must  depend on the      text and  the context. They are the      bases of  interpretation.  One  may      well  say   if  the   text  is  the      texture, context  is what gives the      colour.  Neither  can  be  ignored.      Both    are     important.     That      interpretation is  best which makes      the  textual  interpretation  match      the contextual.  A statute  is best      interpreted when we know why it was      enacted. With  this knowledge,  the      statute must  be read,  first as  a      whole and  then section by section,      clause by  clause, phrase by phrase      and word  by word.  If a statute is      looked at,  in the  context of  its      enactment, with  the glasses of the      statutemaker,  provided   by   such      context, its  scheme, the sections,      clauses, phrases and words may take      colour and  appear  different  than      when  the   statute  is  looked  at      without the glasses provided by the      context. With these glasses we must      look at  the Act  as  a  whole  and      discover what  each  section,  each      clause, each  phrase and  each word      is meant  and designed to say as to      fit into  the scheme  of the entire      Act. No  part of  a statute  and no      word of  a statute can be construed      in isolation.  Statutes have  to be      construed so  that every word has a

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    place  and  everything  is  in  its      place."      Again, in N.K.Jain & Others vs. C.K.Shah & Others(1991) 2 SCC 495 it was observed that in gathering the meaning of a word used in the statute, the context in which that word has been used  has significance and the legislative purpose must be noted  by reading  the statute  as a whole and bearing in mind the  context in  which the  word has  been used  in the statute.      In Seaford  Court Estates  Ltd. vs. Asher, (1949) 2 All ER 155(CA), Lord Denning advised a purposive approach to the interpretation of a word used in a statute and observed:      "The English  language  is  not  an      instrument     of      mathematical      precision. Our  literature would be      much the poorer if it were. This is      where  the  draftsmen  of  Acts  of      Parliament have often been unfairly      criticised.  A   judge,   believing      himself  to   be  fettered  by  the      supposed rule  that he must look to      the  language   and  nothing  else,      laments  that  the  draftsmen  have      note, provided for this or that, or      have been  guilty of  some or other      ambiguity. It would certainly Leave      the  judges   trouble  if  Acts  of      Parliament were drafted with divine      prescience and  perfect clarity. In      the absence  of it,  when a  defect      appears, a judge cannot simply fold      his hands  and blame the draftsman.      He  must   set  to   work  on   the      constructive task  of  finding  the      intention  of  Parliament,  and  he      must do  this  not  only  from  the      language of  the statute,  but also      from a  consideration of the social      conditions which  gave rise  to  it      and of  the mischief  which it  was      passed to  remedy, and then he must      supplement the  written word  so as      to give  ’force and  life’  to  the      intention  of   the  legislature  A      judge  should   ask   himself   the      question how,  if the makers of the      Act had themselves come across this      ruck in  the texture  of  it,  they      would have  straightened it out? He      must then  do so as they would have      done. A  judge must  not alter  the      material of which the Act is woven,      but he  can and should iron out the      creases."                      (emphasis supplied)      An argument,  similar to  the one  As raised by Mr. Rao regarding the use of the expressions ’bride’and ’bridegroom’ occurring in  Section 4  of the Act to urge that "demand" of property or  valuable security would not be "dowry" if it is made during  the negotiations for marriage until the boy and the girl  acquire the status of ’bridegroom’ and ’bride’, at or immediately  after the  marriage, was raised and repelled by this court in L.V. Jadhav’s case (supra).      In L.V.  Jadhav’s case  (supra) while  interpreting the meaning of  ’dowry’ under  Section 2  of  the  Act  and  co-

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relating it to the requirements of Section 4 of the Act, the Bench observed:      "........ Section 4 which Lays down      that      "if   any    person    after    the      commencement of  this Act, demands,      directly  or  indirectly  from  the      parents or  guardian of  a bride or      bridegroom, as the case may be, any      dowry, he  shall be punishable with      imprisonment which  may  extend  to      six months  or with  fine which may      extend to  five thousand  rupees or      with both".  According to Webster’s      New  World  Dictionary,  1962  edn.      bride means  a woman  who has  just      been married  or  is  about  to  be      married, and bridegroom means a man      who has  just been  married  or  is      about to  be married.  If  we  give      this  meaning   of  a  bride  or  a      bridegroom to  the  word  bride  or      bridegroom used in Section 4 of the      Act, property  or valuable security      demanded and  consented to be given      prior to  the time  when the  woman      had become  a bride  or the man had      become a  bridegroom,  may  not  be      "dowry" within  the meaning  of the      Act.   Act.  We  are  also  of  the      opinion that  the object of Section      4 of  the Act  is to discourage the      very   demand   for   property   or      valuable security  as consideration      for a  marriage between the parties      thereto. Section  4  prohibits  the      demand  for  ’giving’  property  or      valuable security  which demand, if      satisfied,  would   constitute   an      offence under  Section 3  read with      Section 2 of the Act.           There is no warrant for taking      the view  that the  initial  demand      for giving  of property or valuable      security would  not  constitute  an      offence......... "      Therefore,  interpreting   the  expression  ’dowry  and ’demand’ in  the context of the scheme of the Act, we are of the opinion  that any  ’demand of  ’dowry’ made before at or after  the   marriage,  where  such  demand  is  made  as  a consideration for  marriage would  attract the provisions of Section 4 of the Act.      The alarming  increase in cases relating to harassment, torture, abetted suicides and dowry deaths of young innocent brides has  always sent stock waves to the civilized society but unfortunately the evil has continued unabated. Awakening of the  collective consciousness  is the  need of  the  day. Change of  heart and  attitude is  needed.  A  wider  social movement not only of educating women of their rights but all of the  men folk  to respect  and recognise  the basic human values is  essentially needed to bury this pernicious social evil. The  role of  the  courts,  under  the  circumstances, assumes a  great importance. The courts are expected to deal with such  cases in  a realistic manner so as to further the object of the legislation. However, the courts must not lose

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right of  the fact  that the  Act, though  a piece of social legislation, is  a penal  statute. One of the cardinal rules of interpretation in such cases is that a penal statute must be strictly construed. The courts have, thus, to be watchful to see  that emotions  or  sentiments  are  not  allowed  to influence their judgment, one way or the other and that they do not  ignore the  golden thread  passing through  criminal jurisprudence that  an accused  is presumed  to be  innocent till proved  guilty and that the guilt of an accused must be established beyond  a reasonable  doubt. They must carefully assess the  evidence  and  not  allow  either  suspicion  or surmise or  conjectures to state the place of proof in their zeal to  stamp out  the evil  from the  society while at the same  time   not  adopting   the  easy   course  of  letting technicalities or minor discrepancies in the evidence result in acquitting  an accused. They must critically analyses the evidence and decide the case in a realistic manner.      It is  in the  light of  the scheme  of the Act and the above principles  that we  shall now  consider the merits of the present  case. This  Court, generally speaking, does not interfere with  the findings  recorded  on  appreciation  of evidence by  the courts  below except where there appears to have occurred  gross miscarriage  of justice  or there exist sufficient reasons  which justify the examination of some of the relevant evidence by this court itself.      There is  no dispute that the marriage of the appellant was settled with Ms. Vani, daughter of PW1 and ultimately it did not   take  place and  broke down. According to PW1, the reason for  the brake  down of  the marriage was his refusal and inability  to comply with the "demand" for enhancing the ’dowry’ as made by the appellant and his brother, the second accused. The  High Court  considered  the  evidence  on  the record and observed"      "From the  evidence of  PW1  it  is      clear  that  it  is  only  the  2nd      petitioner that  initially demanded      the dowry  in connection  with  the      marriage of  his  younger  brother,      the first  petitioner. He alone was      present when  PW1 agreed  to give a      cash of  Rs. 50,000/-  for purchase      of car,  a house,  jewels, clothing      and cash valued at rupees one lakh.      This took  place in  the  month  of      June, 1985  when PW1 approached the      second petitioner  for fixation  of      date for  marriage some time in the      month of September, 1985. According      to  PW1,   the  second   petitioner      demanded  rupees   one   lakh   for      purchase of  car. But, however, PW1      persuaded the  second petitioner to      fix the  date leaving  that  matter      open to  be decided in consultation      with the first petitioner. When the      first petitioner  came to Hyderabad      in October,  1985 PW1 complained to      him about the demand for additional      dowry and that the first petitioner      would appear  to have told PW1 that      he would  discuss with  his brother      and  inform  him.  Then  the  first      petitioner went to his native place      and return  to Hyderabad  and asked      PW1  to   give  Rs.   75,000/-  for

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    purchase of car. The High Court further observed :      " Thus  the demand for dowry either      initially or at later emanated only      from  the  second  petitioner,  the      elder   brother   for   the   first      petitioner. From  the  evidence  it      would appear  that the  petitioners      come  from  a  lower  middle  class      family and  fortunately  the  first      petitioner was  selected for I.P.S.      and  from   the  tone   of  letters      written by  the first petitioner to      Kum. Vani particularly from Ex. P-6      letter it  would appear that he was      more interested in acting according      to the  wishes respondent   who  he      probably felt  was responsible  for      his coming up in life. The recitals      in Ex.P-6  would show  that he  did      not like  to hurt  the feelings  of      the second  petitioner and probably      for that  reason he  could not  say      anything  when  his  elder  brother      demanded for  more dowry. We cannot      say how  the first petitioner would      have acted  if only  he had freedom      to act according to his wishes. But      the first petitioner was obliged to      act according  to the wishes of his      elder brother  in asking  for  more      dowry. However,  I feel  that  this      cannot  be   a   circumstances   to      exonerate him  from  his  liability      from demand  of dowry under Section      4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.                      (Emphasis supplied)      From the  above noted observations, it appears that the High Court  felt that  the appellant  was perhaps  acting as "His Master’s  Voice" of  his elder  brother. The High Court accepted the  evidence of PW1 to hold that the appellant had demanded enhanced  dowry of Rs 75000/ for purchase of car on his return  from the  native village  and had  repeated  his demand at  the him;  of "Varapuja" and lateron did not marry Ms Vani  as PW1  was unable to meet the demands as projected by the  appellant and  his elder  brother.  The  High  Court appears to  have too  readily accepted  the version  of  PW1 without properly analyzing and appreciating the same.      Since, PW1  is the  sole witness, we have considered it proper to examine his evidence with caution.      From our  critical analysis  of the  evidence of PW1,it emerges that  at the  time of  initial demand  of dowry as a consideration for  marriage of the appellant it was only the brother of  the  appellant,  the  second  accused,  who  was present and  it was  the second  accused alone with whom the negotiations took place in presence of PW2 According to PW1, the brother  of the  appellant later  on demanded rupees one lakh  for  the  purchase  of  car  as  against  the  initial agreement of  rupees fifty  thousand or  the  said  purpose. Admittedly, the  first accused  was not present at either of the two  occasions. According to PW1 when the appellant came to Hyderabad  in October,  1985 he  (PW1) complained  to him about the  demand for a additional dowry made by his brother and the  appellant told him that he would discuss the matter with  his  brother  and  inform  him.  It  was,  thereafter.

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According  to  PW1  that  then  the  appellant  returned  to Hyderabad  from   his  native   place  that   he  asked  the complainant (PW1)  to give  Rs.75,000/- for  purchase of the car. Shri  Narsingh Rao  is stated  to have  been present at that time,  but he  has not  been examined at the trial. The above statement  of PW1 has, however, surfaced for the first time at  the trial  only. These  is no  mention of it in the first  information  report,  Ex.P-20  or  even  in  the  two complaints which  had been  sent by  PW1  to  the  Director, National Police  Academy prior  to the  lodging of Ex. P-20. PW1 admitted  in his evidence "I have not stated in Ex. P-20 and in  my 161  statement that A-1 on return from his native place demanded  rupees  seventy  five  thousand  instead  of rupees one  lakh for  purchase of  car and  that I said that what was  the agreed  for  purchase  of  car  was  only  Rs. 50,000/- and  not Rs.  75,000/-  .  This  story,  therefore, appears to  be  an  after  thought,  made  with  a  view  to implicate the  appellant with  the commission  af an offence under Section  4 of  the Act.  Had this  been the  state  of affairs, we  see no reason as to why the fact would not have found mention  at least  in  the  complaints  made  to  ’the Director of  the Academy where the appellant was under-going training. PW1,  being a lawyer, must be presumed to be aware of the  importance and relevance of the statement attributed to the appellant to incorporate it in the complaints and the FIR. We  find this  part  of  the  evidence  of  PW1  rather difficult to  accept without  any independent corroboration. There is  no corroboration  available on  the record as even Shri Narsingh Rao has not been examined.      According to  PW1, the  demand of dowry was repeated by the appellant  at the time of "Varapuja" which was performed on 31.10.1985  at the  house of the second accused also. PW1 stated that  he handed  over the documents pertaining to the house, rupees  fifty thousand  in cash and pass book showing the deposit  of about  rupees fifty  thousand in the bank in the  name  of  Ms.Vani  to  the  appellant  alongwith  other articles  of  ’varapuje’and  on  seeing  the  documents  the appellant flared  up and  said that since the settlement was for a  two storeyed  house and not a single storey house, as reflected in Ex.P13, he would cancel the marriage unless the ’demands’ as  made earlier  were  fulfilled.  The  story  of "varapuja" which has been too readily accepted by the courts below, again  appears to  us to  be of a doubtful nature and does not  inspire confidence. The following admission of PW1 in his evidence, in the context of "varapuja" allegedly held on 31.10.1985 has significance :      "It is  not true  that Varapuja  is      puja of  brideroom according  to my      understanding. I  did not  take any      prohit for Varapuja. I did not take      any photograph  on that occasion. I      did get  any Lagna Patrika prepared      for the  marriage. It  is not  true      that I  am deposing  falsely   that      there was Varapuja and that offered      money on that occasion.           I started marriage preparation      probably in the month of September,      or October,  I cannot  say on  what      date  I   booked   hall   for   the      marriage.   Ex.    P.8   is    only      cancellation   receipt    of    the      marriage  hall.   I  have  not  got      invitation cards printed. I did not      write  any   letters   to   anybody

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    informing them  of the  marriage or      inviting them  to the marriage as I      received letter  from A-1 to cancel      the  marriage   in  the   month  of      October,itself cancellation  of the      date  of   marriage  was  prior  to      Varapuja.                          (emphasis ours)      The above  admission creates  a lot  of doubt about the performance of ’varapuja.’ According to PW1, he had received a letter  from the appellant to the marriage in the month of October itself.  Therefore, if the marriage had been it does not stand  to reason  as to  why ’vrapuja’ should have take? place at all. The holding of ’Varapuja’ appears to be highly improbable. No  corroboration of  any nature to support this part of the evidence of PW1 is forthcoming on the record.      That the  marriage between  the parties  did  not  take place is  not  in  dispute  but  these  is  no  satisfactory evidence on  the record to show that the appellant cancelled the marriage  on account  of non-fulfilment  of dowry demand allegedly made  by him.  The letter which PW1 claims to have himself received  from the  appellant regarding cancellation of marriage  prior  to  ’varapuja’  ceremony  has  not  been produced.  Reliance   instead  has   been  placed   by   the prosecution on  letter  Ex  P-6  allegedly  written  by  the appellant to  Ms.Vani cancelling  the date  of marriage.  We shall refer  to the  documentary evidence in the latter part of the  judgment. The  failure of  PW1 to produce the letter allegedly received  by him from the first accused invites an adverse presumption  against him  that had  he produced  the letter,  the  same  would  have  belied  his  evidence.  The evidence of  PW1, who  is the  sole  witness,  suffers  from serious inconsistencies  and exaggerations. He admittedly is the most  interested person to establish his case. He is the complainant an  the  case.  It  was  he  who  had  made  two complaints  to  the  Director  of  National  Police  Academy against the  appellant before lodging the FIR, Ex.P20. He is a lawyer  by profession.  He would  be presumed  to know the importance of  the ’demand  made by the appellant on the two occasions. He, however, has offered no explanation as to why those facts  are conspicuous  by their  absence from the FIR and the  two complaints made to the Director of the Academy. PW1, does  not appear to us to be a wholly reliable witness. He has made conscious improvements at the trial to implicate the  appellant   by  indulging  in  exaggerations  and  that detracts  materially   from   his   reliability.   Prudence, therefore,  requires   that  the   Court  should   look  for corroboration of his evidence in material particulars before accepting the same. Neither Ms Vani nor Shri Narsingh Rao in whose presence  the appellant is said to have demanded dowry have been examined as Witnesses. The failure to examine them is a serious lacuna in the prosecution case. It was Ms. Vani who could  have deposed about the circumstances which led to the breakdown  of the  metrimonial negotiations,  before its maturity. Various  letter which  PW1 produced  at the  trial were allegedly  written by  the appellant to the handwriting expert prosecution has sought to corroborate the evidence of PW1 regarding  the authorship  of those letters. The opinion of PW3,the  Assistant  Director  in  the  State  Forensic  & Science Laboratory,  Hyderabad, in  our view can not be said to be  of inching  type to attribute the authorship of those letters to the appellant. PW3 during his statement deposed :      "In  my   opinion  (1)   there  are      similarities   indicating    common      authorship between the red enclosed

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    writings marked as S-12 to S-23 and      the red enclosed writings marked as      Q.4 to  Q.7. But  definite  present      standards.(2)  No  opinion  can  be      given on  the authorship of the red      enclosed  signatures  and  writings      marked as  Q-1 to Q-3 and Q-8 to Q-      15  on   the   basis   of   present      standards.                      (emphasis supplied) The expert further opined :      "When     all      the      writing      characteristics   are    considered      collectively,  they   led  to   the      conclusion    that     there    are      similarities   indicating    common      authorship between  the    standard      writings marked  S-12 to  S-25  and      the questioned  writings marked Q-4      to Q-7. But no definite opinion can      be  given   on  the  basis  of  the      present     standards     Extensive      admitted writings  are required for      offering definite opinion.                      (emphasis supplied) During his cross-examination PW3 admitted :           "Q.   From    the    available      standards you  cannot say  that the      signatures of  Exs. P.7  and P.9 is      the same  person who wrote Exs. P.7      and P.9.      Ans:  we  can  compare  truly  like      live,  signatures  with  signatures      and writings  with writings and not      a signature  with a writing."      Thus, the  evidence of  PW3, is not definite and cannot be said to be of a clinching nature to connect the appellant with the  disputed letters.  The evidence  of an  expert  is rather weak type of evidence and the courts do not generally consider it  as offering  ’conclusive’ proof  and  therefore safe to  rely upon the same without seeking, independent and reliable corroboration.  In Magan  Bihari Lal  Vs. State  of Punjab (AIR  1977 SC 1091), while dealing with evidence of a handwriting expert, this Court opined:           "We   think    it   would   be      extremely hazardous  to condemn the      appellant merely on the strength of      opinion evidence  of a  handwriting      expert. It is now well settled that      expert  opinion   must  always   be      received  with  great  caution  and      perhaps none  so with  mare caution      than the  opinion of  a handwriting      expert. There  is  a  profusion  of      precedential authority  which holds      that  it   is  unsafe   to  base  a      conviction solely on expert opinion      without substantial  corroboration.      This  rule   has  been  universally      acted upon and it has almost become      a rule  of law. It was held by this      Court in  Ram Chandra  Vs. State of      U.P. AIR  1957 SC  381 that  it  is      unsafe to  treat expert handwriting      opinion  as  sufficient  basis  for

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    conviction, but  it may  be  relied      upon when  supported by other items      of internal and external  evidence.      This Court  again  pointed  out  in      Ishwari Prasad  Vs.  Md.  Isa,  AIR      1963 SC  1728 that  expert evidence      of   handwriting   can   never   be      conclusive  because  it  is,  after      all,  opinion  evidence,  and  this      view  was  reiterated  in    Shashi      Kumar Vs. Subodh Kumar, AIR 1964 SC      529 where  it was  pointed  out  by      this Court  that expert’s  evidence      as  to  handwriting  being  opinion      evidence can  rarely, if ever, take      the place  of substantive  evidence      and   before    acting   on    such      evidence, it  would be desirable to      consider whether it is corroborated      either by  clear direct evidence or      by  circumstantial  evidence.  This      Court   had   again   occasion   to      consider the  evidentiary value  of      expert   opinion   in   regard   to      handwriting in Fakhruddin Vs. State      of M.P.  AIR 1967  SC 1326  and  it      uttered a  note of caution pointing      out that  it   would  be  risky  to      found a  conviction solely  on  the      evidence of  a  handwriting  expert      before acting  upon such  evidence,      the court  must always  try to  see      whether it is corroborated by other      evidence,         direct         or      circumstantial."      We are  unable to  agree, in  the established facts and circumstanced of  this case,  with the view expressed by the courts below  that PW1 is a competent witness to speak about the handwriting of the appellant and that the opinion of PW3 has received  corroboration from  the evidence  of PW1.  PW1 admittedly did  not receive  any of those letters. He had no occasion  to   be  familiar  with  the  handwriting  of  the appellant.  He   is  not  a  handwriting  expert.  The  bald assertion of PW1 that he was "familiar" with the handwriting of the appellant and fully "acquainted" with the contents of the  letters,  admittedly  not  addressed  to  him,  without disclosing how  he was  familiar with the handwriting of the appellant,  is  difficult  to  accept.  Section  67  of  the Evidence Act  enjoins that  before a  document can be looked into, it  has to  be proved. Section 67, of course, does not prescribe any  particular mode  of proof.  Section 47 of the Evidence  Act  which  occurs  in  the  chapter  relating  to ’relevancy of  facts’ provides  that the opinion of a person who is  acquainted with  the  handwriting  of  a  particular person  is   a  relevant   fact.  Similarly,  opinion  of  a handwriting expert  is also  a relevant fact for identifying any handwriting.  The ordinary  method of proving a document is by  calling as  a witness the person who had executed the document or  saw it being executed or signed or is otherwise qualified and  competent to  express his  opinion as  to the handwriting.  There   are  some  other  modes  of  proof  of documents also  as  by  comparison  of  the  handwriting  as envisaged under  Section 73  of the  Evidence Act or through the evidence of a handwriting expert under Section 45 of the Act, besides by the admission of the person against whom the

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document is  intended  to  be  used.  The  receiver  of  the document,  on   establishing  his   acquaintance  with   the handwriting of  the person  and competence  to identify  the writing  with  which  he  is  familiar,  may  also  prove  a document. These  modes are  legitimate  methods  of  proving documents but  before they  can be  accepted they  must bear sufficient strength to carry conviction. Keeping in view the in-conclusive and  indefinite nature  of the evidence of the handwriting expert  PW3 and  the lack  of competence  on the part of  PW1 to  be familiar  with the  handwriting  of  the appellant, the  approach adopted  by  the  courts  below  to arrive at  the conclusion  that the  disputed  letters  were written by  the appellant  to Ms.Vani  on the  basis of  the evidence of  PW1  and  PW3  was  not  proper.  The  doubtful evidence of PW1 could neither offer any corroboration to the inconclusive  and  indefinite  opinion  of  the  handwriting expert PW3  nor could  it receive any corroboration from the opinion of  PW3. We  are not  satisfied, in  the established facts and  circumstances of  this case, that the prosecution has established  either the genuineness or the authorship of the disputed letters allegedly written by the appellant from the evidence  of PW1 or PW3. The courts below appear to have taken a  rather superficial view of the matter while relying upon the  evidence of  PW1 and  PW3 to  hold  the  appellant guilty. We  find it  unsafe to  base the  conviction of  the appellant on  the basis of the evidence of PW1 or PW3 in the absence of  substantial independent corroboration,internally or externally,  of their  evidence, which  in this  case  is totally wanting.      To us it appears that the demand of dowry in connection with and  as consideration for the marriage of the appellant with Ms.Vani  was made  by  the  second  accused  the  elder brother  of  the  appellant  and  that  no  such  demand  is established to have been directly made by the appellant. The High Court  rightly found  the second  accused, guilty of an offence under  Section 4  of the  Act against  which  S.L.P. (Criminal)  No.2336  of  1990,  as  earlier  noticed  stands dismissed by  this court  on 15.2.1991.  The evidence on the record does not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that any demand of  dowry within  the meaning  of Section 2 read with Section 4  of the  Act was made by the appellant. May be the appellant was  in agreement with his elder brother regarding ’demand’ of  ’dowry’ but convictions cannot be based on such assumptions  without  the  offence  being  proved  beyond  a reasonable doubt.  The courts  below  appear to have allowed emotions and  sentiments, rather than legally admissible and trustworthy  evidence,  to  influence  their  judgment.  The evidence on  the record  does not establish the case against the appellant  beyond a  reasonable doubt. He is, therefore, entitled to the benefit of doubt. This appeal, thus,succeeds and is allowed. The conviction and sentence of the appellant is hereby  set aside.  The appellant  is on  bail. His  bail bonds shall stand discharged.