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PETITIONER: SHRIOMANI GURUDWARA PRABANDHAK COMMITTEE, AMRITSAR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHRI SOM NATH DASS & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       29/03/2000

BENCH: A.P.Misra, M.Jagannadha Rao

JUDGMENT:

     MISRA, J.

     The  question raised in this appeal is of far reaching consequences  and  is  of great significance to one  of  the major religious followers of this country.  The question is: whether  the  Guru  Granth  Sahib could be  treated  as  a juristic  person or not?  If it is, then it can hold and use the  gifted  properties given to it by its followers out  of their love, in charity.  This is by creation of an endowment like  others  for public good, for enhancing  the  religious fervour,  including  feeding  the poor etc..   Sikhism  grew because of the vibrating divinity of Guru Nanakji and the 10 succeeding  gurus, and the wealth of all their teachings  is contained  in  Guru Granth Sahib.  The last of the  living guru  was  Guru Gobind Singhji who recorded the sanctity  of Guru  Granth Sahib and gave it the recognition of a living Guru.  Thereafter, it remained not only a sacred book but is reckoned  as a living guru.  The deep faith of every earnest follower,   when  his  pure   conscience  meets  the  divine under-current  emanating from their Guru, produces a feeling of  sacrifice  and surrender and impels him to part with  or gift  out  his wealth to any charity may be  for  gurdwaras, dharamshalas etc..  Such parting spiritualises such follower for  his  spiritual  upliftment,   peace,  tranquility   and enlightens  him with resultant love and universalism.   Such donors  in the past, raised number of Gurdwaras.  They  gave their  wealth in trust for its management to the trustees to subserve their desire.  They expected trustees to faithfully implement the objectives for which the wealth was entrusted. When  selfishness  invades  any trustee, the core  of  trust starts  leaking out.  To stop such leakage, legislature  and courts  step in.  This is what was happening in the  absence of  any  organised management of Gurudwaras,  when  trustees were  either mismanaging or attempting to usurp such trusts. The  Sikh  Gurdwaras and Shrines Act 1922 (VI of  1922)  was enacted  to meet the situation.  It seems, even this  failed to  satisfy  the aspirations of the Sikhs.  The main  reason being  that it did not establish any permanent committee  of management  for  Sikh gurdwaras and did not provide for  the speedy  confirmation by judicial sanction of changes already introduced  by  the  reforming party in  the  management  of places  of worship.  This was replaced by the Sikh Gurdwaras Act,  1925  (Punjab  Act  No.  8 of 1925)  under  which  the present  case  arises.  This Act provided a legal  procedure

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through  which  gurdwaras and shrines regarded by  Sikhs  as essential  places  of  Sikh worship to  be  effectively  and permanently brought under Sikh control and management, so as to  make it consistent with the religious followings of this community.

     About  56  persons  of   villages  Bilaspur,  Ghodani, Dhamot,  Lapran and Buani situated in the Village  Bilaspur, District  Patiala  moved petition under Section 7(1) of  the said Act for declartion that the disputed property is a Sikh Gurdwara.   The  State Government through  Notification  No. 1702    G.P.   dated  14th September,  1962  published  the aforesaid  petition in the Gazette including the  boundaries of  the  said  gurdwaras which were to be declared  as  Sikh Gurdwaras.   Thereafter, a composite petition under Sections 8 and 10 of the said Act was filed by Som Dass son of Bhagat Ram,  Sant Ram son of Narain Dass and Anant Ram son of  Sham Dass  of Village Bilaspur, District Patiala, challenging the same.   They  claimed  it to be a dharamshala  and  Dera  of Udasian being owned and managed by the petitioners and their predecessors  since  the time of their forefathers and  that they  being the holders of the same, received the said  Dera in  succession,  in accordance with their  ancestral  share. They  also claimed to be in possession of the land  attached to  the  said Dera.  They denied it to be a  Sikh  Gurdwara. This  petition  was forwarded by the Government to the  Sikh Gurdwara   Tribunal,  hereinafter  referred   to   as   the Tribunal.   In reply to the notice, the Shiromani  Gurdwara Parbandhak  Committee, hereinafter referred to as the SGPC (appellant),  claimed it to be a Sikh Gurdwara, having  been established  by  the Sikhs for their worship, wherein  Guru Granth  Sahib was the only object of worship and it was the sole  owner  of  the  gurdwara  property.   It  denied  this institution  to  be  an   Udasi  Dera.   However,  appellant Committee  challenged the locus standi of the respondent  to file  this  objection to the notification.  The  appellants case  was under Section 8 and objection could only be  filed by   any  hereditary  office-holders  or   by  20  or   more worshippers  of  the  gurdwara, which they  were  not.   The Tribunal  held  that the petitioners before it  (respondents here),  admitted  in  their   cross-  examination  that  the disputed   premises  was  being  used   by  them  as   their residential house that there was no object of worship in the premises,  neither  they were performing any public  worship nor  they  were  managing  it.  So it  held  they  were  not hereditary  office  holders, as they neither managed it  nor performed  any  public worship.  Thus, their petition  under Section 8 was rejected on 9th February, 1965 by holding that they  have  no locus standi.  Aggrieved by this  they  filed first  appeal  being  FAO  No.  40 of 1965  which  was  also dismissed  by  the  High Court on 24th  March,  1976,  which became  final.   Thereafter, the Tribunal took the  petition under  Section  10 in which the stand of SGPC was  that  the land  and  the  buildings were the properties  of  Gurdwara Sahib  Dharamshala  Guru  Granth Sahib  at  Bilaspur.   The respondents  and their predecessors along with their  family members  had  all  along been its managers and they  had  no personal rights in it.  The Tribunal framed two issues:

     (1)   What   right,  title  or  interest   have   the petitioners in the property in dispute?

     (2)  What  right, title or interest has  the  notified

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Sikh Gurdwara in the property in dispute.

     The  Tribunal decided both issue No.  1 and issue  No. 2 in favour of present appellants and held that the disputed property  belonged to the SGPC.  Thus respondents  petition under  Section  10 was also rejected on 4th September  1978. Tribunals conclusion is reproduced hereinbelow:

     The    above    discussion       shows    that    the respondent-Committee  has  been successful in  bringing  its case  rightly  in Clauses 18 (1)(a) and 18(1)(d) of the  Act and  has been successful in discharging its onus as  regards issue  no.   2  and the issue is, iala is the owner  of  the property in dispute consisting of Gurdwara building, the pla

     of  which is given in the Notification No.  1702  G.P. dated  14.9.68  at  page  2527  and  the  agricultural  land measuring 115 Bighas 12 Biswas the detail of which are given in the copy of Jamabandi for the year 1955-56 A.D.  attached to the above-said Notification at page 2529 and is comprised of  Khasra  Nos.   456 min, 457, 451, 644  and  452  bearing Khawat No.  276 Khatauni nos.  524 to 527.

     Aggrieved  by  this,  respondents filed  first  appeal being  FAO No.  449 of 1978.  During its pendency, the  SGPC on  the basis of final order passed by the High Court in FAO No.   40 of 1965 against the order of the Tribunal rejecting Section  8  application, filed suit No.  94 of 1979  against the  respondents  under  Section  25-A of the  Act  for  the possession  of  the building and the land.  The  respondents contested    the   suit   by    raising   objection    about mis-description  of  the  property in the  plaint  and  also raising an is

     e  about  jurisdiction  since   the  income  from  the gurdwara  was  more than Rs.  3,000/- per annum for which  a committee  was  to be constituted before any suit  could  be filed.   On  contest, the said suit of SGPC was decreed  and respondents  objections  were rejected, against  which  the respondents  filed FAO No.  2 of 1980.  The High Court  vide its order dated 11th February, 1980 directed this FAO No.  2 of  1980 to be listed for hearing along with FAO No.  449 of 1978.   It  is  also relevant to refer to,  which  was  also stated  by  the  respondents in their  petition  before  the Tribunal, that a notification under Section 9 of the Act was published  declaring  the  disputed gurdwara to  be  a  Sikh Gurdwara.

     It  is necessary to give some more facts to appreciate the  contentions  raised  by  the  respective  parties.   In jamabandi  Ex.  P-1 of 1961-62 BK, (which would be 1904  AD) Mangal  Dass  and Sunder Dass, Bhagat Ram sons of  Gopi  Ram Faqir  Udasi  were mentioned as owners in possession of  the land.   They  had also mortgaged part of this land  to  some other  persons.   This village Bilaspur where  the  disputed gurdwara exists formed part of the erstwhile Patiala Estate. The then ruler of the Patiala Estate issued Farman-

     Shahi dated 18th April, 1921.  Its contents are quoted hereunder:

     In  future,  instructions be issued that so long  the appointment  of  a  Mahant is not approved  by  Ijlas-I-khas through  Deori Mulla, until the time, the Mahant is entitled to  receive turban, shawl or Bandhan or Muafi etc.  from the

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Government,  no  property or Muafi shall be entered  in  his name in the revenue papers.

     It  should  also  be  mentioned that  the  land  which pertains  to  any  Dera  should not  be  considered  as  the property  of any Mahant, nor the same should be shown in the revenue papaers as the prope

     y  of  the  Mahant,  but these should  be  entered  as belonging to the Dera under the management of the Mahant and that  the Mahants shall not be entitled to sell or  mortgage the  land of the Dera.  Revenue Department be also  informed about it and the order be gazetted.

     On Maghar 10, 1985 BK (1920 AD) at the insta

     e  of Rulia Singh and others the patwari made a report in  compliance  with the aforesaid Farman-e- Shahi  for  the change  of  the  entries  in favour of  Guru  Granth  Sahib Barajman  Dharamshala  Deh.  This was based on the  enquiry and   evidence  produced  before   him.   In  this  mutation proceeding  which led to the mutation viz., Ex.  P8,  Narain Dass,  Bhagat  Ram  and Atma Ram Sadh  appeared  before  the Revenue  Officer  and stated that their ancestors  got  this land which was gift

     in  charity (Punnarth) by the then proprietors of  the village.   This  land  was  given to the  ancestors  of  the respondent for the purpose that they should provide food and comfort  to the travellers passing through this village.  In the  same proceeding Kapur Singh, Inder Singh Lambardars and other  right-  holders of the said village also stated  that their  fore-fathers had given this land in the name of Guru Granth  Sahib Barajman Dharamshala Deh under the charge  of these  persons  for  providing  food   and  comfort  to  the travellers.   But  Atma Ram and otherietors of the  village. This  land was given to the ancestors of the respondent  for the purpose that they should provide food and comfort to the travellers  passing  through  this  village.   In  the  same proceeding  Kapur  Singh, Inder Singh Lambardars  and  other right-holders  of  the said village also stated  that  their fore-fathers had given this land in the name of Guru Granth Sahib  Barajman  Dharamshala Deh under the charge of  these persons  for  providing food and comfort to the  travellers. But  Atma Ram and others, ancestors of respondents were  not performing  their  duties.  This default was for a  purpose, which  is revealed through the last settlement that they got this  land  entered in their personal names, in the  revenue records  against  which  a matter was pending  before  Deori Mualla  in the mutation proceedings.  Based on the evidence, the  Revenue Officer after enquiry recorded the finding that Atma  Ram and others admitted that this land had been  given to  them  without  any compensation for providing  food  and shelter  to  the travellers which they were not  performing. He  further  held  that  Atma   Ram  and  others  could  not controvert  the  aforesaid assertion made by the  villagers. So, based on this enquiry and evidence on record, he ordered the  mutation,  in the name of Guru Granth  Sahib  Barajman Dharamshala Deh by deleting the name of Atma Ram and others from  the  column  of  ownership of the  land.   He  further observed, so far as the question of appoinment of Manager or Mohatmim  was  concerned  that it was to be decided  by  the Deori  Mualla as the case about this was pending before  the Deori  Mualla.   Similarly, in the other mutation No,.   693 which is Ex.  9 in 27th Maghar 1983 (1926 AD) also, mutation

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was  ordered  by removal of the name of Narain Dass,  Bhagat Ram  sons  of  Gopi  Ram in favour  of  Guru  Granth  Sahib Barajman  Dharamshala Deh.  Since that date till the filing of  the petitions by the respondents under Sections 8 and 10 of  the  Act  entries in the ownership column  of  the  land continued  in  the  name  of  "Guru  Granth  Sahib  Barajman Dharamshala  Deh  and no objection was filed either by  the ancestors of respondents or respondents themselves.

     It  was  for  the first time objection was  raised  by respondents  through their counsel before the High Court  in FAO  No.   449  of  1978 regarding validity of  Ex.   P  8-9 contending that the entry in the revenue records in the name of Guru Granth Sahib was void as Guru Granth Sahib was not a juristic  person.  The case of the respondents was that  the Guru Granth Sahib was only a sacred book of the Sikhs and it would  not  fall  within the scope of  the  word,  juristic person.   On  the  other  hand, with  vehemence  and  force learned  counsel  for the appellant, SGPC submits that  Guru Granth  Sahib  is  a juristic person and hence it  can  hold property,  can  sue and be sued.  On this question,  whether Guru  Granth Sahib is a juristic person, a difference  arose between  the  two  learned judges of the Bench of  the  High Court.  Mr.  Justice Tiwana held, it to be a juristic person and  dismissed  both the FAOs, namely, FAO No.  449 of  1978 and  2  of 1980 upholding the judgment of the Tribunal.   On the  other  hand  Mr.   Justice Punchhi, (as  he  then  was) recorded dissent and held, the Guru Granth Sahib not to be a juristic  person,  but did not decide the issue  on  merits. The  case  was then referred to a third judge,  namely,  Mr. Justice  Tiwatia  who agreed with the view of  Mr.   Justice Punchhi  and held the Guru Granth Sahib not to be a juristic person.   After  recording  this finding the  learned  judge directed  that  the  FAO may be placed before  the  Division Bench for final disposal of the appeal on merits.

     The  question, whether Guru Granth Sahib is a juristic person  is  the  main point which is argued in  the  present appeal  to  which we are called upon to adjudicate.   It  is relevant  to  mention  here that after adjudication  of  the question whether the Guru Granth Sahib is a juristic person, the  matter  again went back to the same Bench  which  again gave rise to another conflict between Justice Tiwana and Mr. Justice  Punchhi.   Justice  Tiwana   held  on  merits  that mutations  were  valid and respondents had no right to  this property.   But  Mr.  Justice Punchhi held to  the  contrary that  the  mutation  was invalid and this property  was  the private  property of the respondents.  Thereafter, the  said FAO  No.   449  of 1978 and FAO No.  2 of 1980  were  placed before  the  third  judge, namely,  Justice  J.B.Gupta,  who concurred with the view taken by Mr.  Justice Punchhi, as he then was.  He recorded the following conclusion:

     in  view  of the findings that Guru Granth Sahib  is not  a  juristic  person, and that the  notification  issued under  section  9  was not conclusive, in view of  the  Full Bench  Judgment of this Court in Mahant Lachhman Dass  Chela Mahant Moti Rams case (supra), the findings of the Tribunal are  liable to be set aside.  The Tribunal mainly based  its findings  on the mutations, Exhibits P.8 and P.9, which  are in the name of Guru Granth Sahib, since Guru Granth Sahib is not a juristic person, any mutation a sanctioned in its name in  the  present  case was of no consequence.  There  is  no other  cogent evidence except the said mutations relied upon by the Tribunal in that behalf.  Similar was the position as

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regards  the building.  In that behalf, the Tribunal  relied upon  the  notification issued earlier.  The same being  not conclusive,  there  was  not   other  reliable  evidence  to conclude that the building formed part of the Sikh Gurdwara, notified  under  Section.  In these circumstances, I  concur with  the view taken by M.M.Punchhi, J.  in the order  dated December 16, 1986.

     The  foundation of his decision on merits is based  on the  finding that Guru Granth Sahib is not a juristic person and  hence  Exs.  P8 and P9, the mutations in its name  were not  sustainable.  The present appellants preferred  Special Leave  Petition  No.  7803 of 1988 in this Court, which  was dismissed  in  default  on  16th   November,  1995  and  its restoration  application was also dismissed on 19th  August, 1996.   In this petition it was specifically stated that the present  Civil  Appeal No.  3968 of 1987 is pending in  this Court.   However,  it is significant as we have said  above, the  judgment of Mr.  Justice Gupta concurring the  judgment of  Mr.  Justice Punchhi, as he then was, was mainly on  the basis  that  the  mutation in the name in  favour  of  Guru Granth  Sahib Barajman Dharamshala Deh was void in as  much as  Guru  Granth Sahib was not a juristic person.  Thus  the foundation  of that decision rests on the question which  we are considering.

     The  crux of the litigation now rests on the question, whether Guru Granth Sahib is a juristic person or not.  Now, we proceed to consider this issue.

     The  very words Juristic Person connote  recognition of  an  entity to be in law a person which otherwise  it  is not.  In other words, it is not an individual natural person but an artificially created person which is to be recognised to  be  in  law  as  such.   When  a  person  is  ordinarily understood  to  be a natural person, it only means  a  human person.  Essentially, every human person is a person.  If we trace  the history of a Person in the various countries we find  surprisingly it has projected differently at different times.  In some countries even human beings were not treated to  be as persons in law.  Under the Roman Law a Slave was not  a person.  He had no right to a family.  He was treated like  an animal or chattel.  In French Colonies also, before slavery  was  abolished, the slaves were not treated  to  be legal  persons.  They were later given recognition as  legal persons only through a statute.  Similarly, in the U.S.  the African-Americans  had no legal rights though they were  not treated as chattel.

     In  Roscoe Pounds Jurisprudence Part IV, 1959 Ed.  at pages 192-193, it is stated as follows:-

     In  civilized  lands even in the modern world it  has happened  that all human beings were not legal persons.   In Roman  law  down to the constitution of Antoninus  Pius  the slave  was  not  a person.  He enjoyed  neither  rights  of family  nor  rights  of patrimony.  He was a thing,  and  as such,  like  animals,  could  be the  object  of  rights  of property..In the French colonies, before slavery was there abolished, slaves were put in the class of legal persons by the  statute  of  April 23, 1833 and obtained  a  somewhat extended  juridical capacity by a statute of 1845.  In  the United  States  down to the Civil War, the free  negroes  in many  of  the  states were free human beings with  no  legal rights.

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     With the development of society, where an individuals interaction  fell  short,  to upsurge  social  developments, cooperation   of   a  larger   circle  of  individuals   was necessitated.   Thus,  institutions  like  corporations  and companies were created, to help the society in achieving the desired  result.  The very constitution of State,  municipal corporation,  company etc.  are all creations of the law and these  Juristic  Persons arose out of necessities  in  the human  development.  In other words, they were dressed in  a cloak to be recognised in law to be a legal unit.

     Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol.  LXV, page 40 says:

     Natural  person.  A natural person is a human  being; a  man, woman, or child, as opposed to a corporation,  which has  a  certain  personality impressed on it by law  and  is called  an  artificial  person.  In the  C.J.S.   definition Person  it is stated that the word person, in its  primary sense, means natural person, but that the generally accepted meaning  of the word as used in law includes natural persons and artificial, conventional, or juristic persons.

     Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol.  VI, page 778 says:

     Artificial  persons.  Such as are created and devised by  human  laws for the purposes of society and  government, which are called corporations or bodies politic.

     Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Edn., 305 says:

     A  legal  person is any subject-matter other  than  a human  being to which the law attributes personality.   This extension,   for  good  and   sufficient  reasons,  of   the conception  of personality beyond the class of human  beings is   one  of  the  most   noteworthy  feats  of  the   legal imagination.

     Legal  persons,  being the arbitrary creations of  the law,  may  be  of as many kinds as the law  pleases.   Those which  are  actually recognised by our own system,  however, are   of   comparatively  few   types.    Corporations   are undoubtedly  legal  persons,  and the better  view  is  that registered  trade  unions  and friendly societies  are  also legal    persons   though    not    verbally   regarded   as corporations..If, however, we take account of other systems than  our  own,  we  find   that  the  conception  of  legal personality  is not so limited in its application, and  that there  are several distinct varieties, of which three may be selected for special mention.

     1.   The  first  class of legal  persons  consists  of corporations,  as  already defined, namely, those which  are constituted  by  the personification of groups or series  of individuals.   The dividuals who thus form the corpus of the legal person are termed its members

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     2.   The second class is that in which the corpus,  or object  selected  for  personification, is not  a  group  or series  of persons, but an institution.  The law may, if  it pleases,  regard a church or a hospital, or a university, or a  library,  as a person.  That is to say, it may  attribute personality,  not to any group of persons connected with the institution, but to the institution itself.

     3.   The  third kind of legal person is that in  which the  corpus is some fund or estate devoted to special uses a charitable fund, for example or a trust estate.

     Jurisprudence  by  Paton, 3rd Edn., page 349  and  350 says:

     It  has already been asserted that legal  personality is an artificial creation of the law.  Legal persons are all entities  capable of being right-and-duty- bearing units-all entities  recognised by the law as capable of being  parties to  a  legal relationship.  Salmond said:  So far as  legal theory  is  concerned,  a person is any being whom  the  law regards as capable of rights and duties.

     Legal  personality  may be granted to entities  other than individual human beings, e.g.  a group of human beings, a  fund,  an idol.  Twenty men may form a corporation  which may  sue and be sued in the corporate name.  An idol may  be regarded  as a legal persona in itself, or a particular fund may  be incorporated.  It is clear that neither the idol nor the  fund  can  carry  out   the  activities  incidental  to litigation or other activities incidental to the carrying on of  legal  relationships, e.g., the signing of  a  contract; and,  of necessity, the law recognises certain human  agents as  representatives of the idol or of the fund.  The acts of such  agents, however (within limits set by the law and when they  are acting as such), are imputed to the legal  persona of  the  idol  and are not the juristic acts  of  the  human agents  themselves.   This is no mere academic  distinction, for it is the legal persona of the idol that is bound to the legal  relationships created, not that of the agent.   Legal personality  then  refers to the particular device by  which the  law  creates or recognizes units to which  it  ascribes certain powers and capacities.

     Analytical  and Historical Jurisprudence, 3rd Edn.  At page 357 describes

     person:

     We may, therefore, define a person for the purpose of jurisprudence  as any entity (not necessarily a human being) to which rights or duties may be attributed.

     Thus,  it  is  well  settled   and  confirmed  by  the authorities on jurisprudence and courts of various countries that  for  a  bigger  thrust  of  socio-political-scientific development  evolution  of a fictional personality to  be  a juristic  person became inevitable.  This may be any entity, living, inanimate, objects or things.  It may be a religious

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institution  or  any  such useful unit which may  impel  the courts  to recognise it.  This recognition is for subserving the needs and faith of the society.  A juristic person, like any  other  natural  person is in law  also  conferred  with rights  and obligations and is dealt with in accordance with law.   In other words, the entity acts like a natural person but  only  through  a  designated  person,  whose  acts  are processed  within  the  ambit  of law.   When  an  idol  was recognised  as a juristic person, it was known it could  not act  by  itself.   As  in the case of minor  a  guardian  is appointed,  so in the case of idol, a Shebait or manager  is appointed  to  act on its behalf.  In that  sense,  relation between an idol and Shebait is akin to that of a minor and a guardian.   As a minor cannot express himself, so the  idol, but   like  a  guardian,  the   Shebait  and  manager   have limitations  under which they have to act.  Similarly, where there  is any endowment for charitable purpose it can create institutions  like  a church, hospital, gurudwara etc.   The entrustment  of  an endowed fund for a purpose can  only  be used  by the person so entrusted for that purpose in as much as he receives it for that purpose alone in trust.  When the donor  endows  for  an  idol  or for a  mosque  or  for  any institution,  it  necessitates  the creation of  a  juristic person.  The law also circumscribes the rights of any person receiving such entrustment to use it only for the purpose of such  a  juristic  person.  The endowment may be  given  for various  purposes,  may be for a church, idol,  gurdwara  or such  other  things that the human faculty may conceive  of, out  of  faith  and conscience but it gains  the  status  of juristic  person  when  it is recognised by the  society  as such.

     In  this  background,  we  find  that  this  Court  in Sarangadeva  Periya  Matam  & Anr.  Vs.   Ramaswami  Goundar (dead) by legal representatives, AIR 1966 SC 1603, held that a Mutt was the owner of the endowed property and that like an  idol the Mutt was a juristic person and thus could  own, acquire  or  possess any property.  In Masjid Shahid Ganj  & Ors.    Vs.    Shiromani   Gurdwara  Parbandhak   Committee, Amritsar,  AIR  1938 Lahore 369, a Full Bench of  that  High Court  held  that  a  mosque was a  juristic  person.   This decision  was  taken  in appeal to the Privy  Council  which confirmed the said judgment.  Sir George Rankin observed:

     In  none  of  these cases was a mosque party  to  the suit,  and in none except perhaps the last is the fictitious personality  attributed  to  the  mosque   as  a  matter  of decision.   But  so far as they go these cases  support  the recognition  as  a  fictitious  person of  a  mosque  as  an institution-apparently  hypostatizing an abstration.   This, as the learned Chief Justice in the present case has pointed out,  is  very different from conferring personality upon  a building  so as to deprive it of its character as  immovable property.

     There  may  be an endowment for a pious  or  religious purpose.   It may be for an idol, mosque, church etc..  Such endowed  property  has  to be used for  that  purpose.   The installation  and  adoration  of an idol or any image  by  a Hindu  denoting  any god is merely a mode through which  his faith  and  belief  is  satisfied.   This  has  led  to  the recognition of an idol as a juristic person.

     In Deoki Nandan Vs.  Murlidhar & Ors, AIR 1957 SC 137,

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this Court held:

     In  Bhupati  Nath Smrititirtha Vs.  Ram Lal  Maitra, ILR  37 Cal 128 (F), it was held on a consideration of these and  other text that a gift to an idol was not to be  judged by the rules applicable to a transfer to a sentient being, and  that  dedication of properties to an idol consisted  in the  abandonment by the owner of his demoinion over them for the  purpoe  of  their being appropriated for  the  purposes which  he  intends.  Thus, it was observed by  Sir  Lawrence Jenkins  C.J.   at p.  138 that the pious purpose is  still the  legatee,  the establishment of the image is merely  the mode  in which the pious purpose is to be effected and that the dedication to a deity may be a compendious expression of  the pious purposes for which the deciation is designed. Vide  also the observations of Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee at  p. 155.     In    Hindu    Relgious    Endowments   Board    V. Veeraraghavacharlu,  AIR 1937 Mad 750 (G), Varadachariar  J. dealing  with this question, referred to the decision in ILR 37 Cal 128 (F), and observed:

     As  explained  in the case, that purpose of making  a gift  to  a temple is not to confer a benefit on God but  to confer  a  benefit on those who worship in that  temple,  by making it possible for them to have the worship conducted in a  proper and impressive manner.  This is the sense in which a  temple  and  its  endowments are  regarded  as  a  public trust.

     In  Som Prakash Rekhi Vs.  Union of India & Anr., 1981 (1)  SCC  449, this Court held that a legal person is  any entity  other than a human being to which the law attributes personality.   It  was stated:  Let us be clear  that  the jurisprudence  bearing  on  corporations  is  not  myth  but reality.   What  we mean is that corporate personality is  a reality  and  not an illusion or fictitious construction  of the law.  It is a legal person.  Indeed, a legal person is any subject-matter other than a human being to which the law attributes  personality.   This  extension,  for  good  and sufficient  reasons, of the conception of personalityis one of  the  most  noteworthy feats of the  legal  imagination. Corporations  are  one species of legal persons invented  by the  law and invested with a variety of attributes so as  to achieve certain purposes sanctioned by the law.

     This  Court in Yogendra Nath Naskar Vs.   Commissioner of  Income  Tax, Calcutta, 1969 (1) SCC 555, held  that  the consecrated  idol in a Hindu temple is a juristic person and approved  the  observation  of  West J.   in  the  following passage  made in Manohar Ganesh Vs.  Lakshmiram, ILR 12  Bom 247;

     The  Hindu Law, like the Roman Law and those  dervied from  it, recognises not only incorporate bodies with rights of  property  vested  in  the  Corporation  apart  from  its individual  members  but  also   juridical  persons   called foundations.  A Hindu who wishes to establish a religious or charitable  institution may according to his law express his purpose  and endow it and the ruler will give effect to  the bounty  or  at  least, protect it so far at any rate  as  is consistent with his own Dharma or conception or morality.  A trust  is not required for the purpose;  the necessity of  a

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trust  in  such a case is indeed a peculiarity and a  modern peculiarity  of the English Law.  In early law a gift placed as  it  was  expressed on the altar of God, sufficed  it  to convey  to  the  Church  the lands thus  dedicated.   It  is consistent with the grants having been made to the juridical person  symbolised  or personified in the  idol.  {Emphasis supplied}

     Thus,  a trust is not necessary in Hindu Law though it may be required under English Law.

     In fact, there is a direct ruling of this Court on the crucial  point.   In  Pritam   Dass  Mahant  Vs.   Shiromani Gurdwara  Prabandhak  Committee,  1984  (2)  SCC  600,  with reference to a case under Sikh Gurdwara Act, 1925 this Court held  that the central body of worship in a Gurdwara is Guru Granth  Sahib, the holy book, is a Juristic entity.  It  was held:

     From  the foregoing discussion it is evident that the sine  qua  non for an institution being a Sikh  gurdwara  is that  there should be established Guru Granth Sahib and  the worship  of the same by the congregation, and a Nishan Sahib as indicated in the earlier part of the judgment.  There may be  other rooms of the institution meant for other  purposes but  the crucial test is the existence of Guru Granth  sahib and  the  worship  thereof by the  congregation  and  Nishan Sahib.

     Tracing the ten Sikh gurus it records:

     They  were ten in number each remaining faithful  to the  teachings of Guru Nanak, the first Guru and when  their line was ended by a conscious decision of Guru Gobind Singh, the  last  Guru, succession was invested in a collection  of teachings  which  was given the title of Guru Granth  Sahib. This is now the Guru of the Sikhs.

     xx xx

     The  holiest  book of the Sikhs is Guru  Granth  Sahib compiled  by the Fifth Master, Guru Arjan.  It is the  Bible of  Sikhs.   After giving his followers a central  place  of worship,  Hari-Mandir,  he wanted to give them a holy  book. So  he  collected the hymns of the first four Gurus  and  to these he added his own.  Now this Sri Guru Granth Sahib is a living  Guru  of  the Sikhs.  Guru means  the  guide.   Guru Granth Sahib gives light and shows the path to the suffering humanity.   Where a believer in Sikhism is in trouble or  is depressed he reads hymns from the Granth.

     When  Guru  Gobind Singh felt that his wordly  sojourn was  near,  he  made the fact known to his  disciples.   The disciples asked him as to who would be their Guru in future. The  Guru immediately placed five pies and a coconut  before the holy Granth, bowed his head before it and said:

     The  Eternal  Father Willed, and I raised  the  Panth. All  my  Sikhs are ordained to believe the Granth  as  their preceptor.  Have faith in the holy Granth as your Master and consider  it The visible manifestation of the Gurus.  He who hath a pure heart will seek guidance from its holy words.

     The  Guru  repeated these words and told the  disciple not to grieve at his departure.  It was true that they would

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not  see his body in its physical manifestation but he would be  ever  present  among the Khalsas.   Whenever  the  Sikhs needed  guidance or counsel, they should assemble before the Granth  in  all  sincerity and decide their future  line  of action  in the light of teachings of the Master, as embodied in the Granth.  The noble ideas embodied in the Granth would live  for  ever  and  show  people the  path  to  bliss  and happiness.  (Emphasis  supplied) The  aforesaid  conspectus visualises  how Juristic Person was coined to subserve  to the  needs of the society.  With the passage of time and the changes  in the socio-political scenario, collective working instead  of individualised working became inevitable for the growth of the organised society.  This gave manifestation to the  concept of Juristic Person as an unit in various  forms and  for various purposes and this is now a well  recognised phenomena.   This  collective working, for a greater  thrust and  unity  gave  birth to cooperative  societies,  for  the success  and implementation of public endowment it gave rise to  public trusts and for purpose of commercial  enterprises the  juristic person of companies were created, so on and so forth.  Such creations and many others were either statutory or  through recognition by the courts.  Different  religions of   the   world  have   different  nuclei   and   different institutitonalised   places  for   adoration,  with  varying conceptual  beliefs  and  faith but all with the  same  end. Each  may  have  differences in  the  perceptive  conceptual recognition  of  god  but  each  religion  highlights  love, compassion, tolerance, sacrifice as a hallmark for attaining divinity.   When  one  reaches  this divine  empire,  he  is beholden,  through  a feeling of universal  brotherhood  and love   which  impels  him  to   sacrifice  his  wealth   and belongings,  both for his own bliss and for its being useful to  a  large section of the society.  This sprouts  charity, for public endowment.  It is really the religious faith that leads  to  the  installation of an idol in a  temple.   Once installed,  it is recognised as a juristic person.  The idol may be revered in homes but its juristic personality is only when it is installed in a public temple.

     Faith and belief cannot be judged through any judicial scrutiny.   It  is a fact accomplished and accepted  by  its followers.   This faith necessitated the creation of a  unit to  be  recognised as a Juristic Person.  All  this  shows that a Juristic Person is not roped in any defined circle. With  the changing thoughts, changing needs of the  society, fresh juristic personalities were created from time to time.

     It  is submitted for the respondent that decisions  of courts  recognised  an idol to be a as juristic  person  but they  did not recognise a temple to be so.  So, on the  same parity,  a  gurdwara  cannot be a juristic person  and  Guru Granth  Sahib can only a sacred book.  It cannot be  equated with  an  idol  nor does Sikhism believe in  worshiping  any idol.   Hence  Guru  Granth  Sahib cannot be  treated  as  a juristic  person.  This submission in our view is based on a misconception.   It is not necessary for Guru Granth Sahib to  be  declared  as  a juristic person that  it  should  be equated  with  an  idol.   When  belief  and  faith  of  two different  religions are different, there is no question  of equating  one  with  the other.  If Guru Granth  Sahib  by itself  could stand the test of its being declared as  such, it can be declared to be so.

     An  idol  is a Juristic Person because it is  adored after its consecration, in a temple.  The offerings are made

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to  an  idol.  The followers recognise an idol to be  symbol for God.  Without the idol, the temple is only a building of mortar,  cement  and  bricks  which  has  no  sacredness  or sanctity  for  adoration.   Once recognised as  a  Juristic Person,  the  idol can hold property and gainfully  enlarge its coffers to maintain itself and use it for the benefit of its  followers.   On  the other hand in the case  of  mosque there  can  be  no idol or any images of  worship,  yet  the mosque  itself  is  conferred with the  same  sacredness  as temples  with  idol,  based  on  faith  and  belief  of  its followers.   Thus  the case of a temple without idol may  be only  brick, mortar and cement but not the mosque.   Similar is the case with the Chruch.  As we have said, each religion have  different  nuclei, as per their faith and  belief  for treating any entity as a unit.

     Now  returning  to the question, whether  Guru  Granth Sahib  could  be a Juristic Person or not, or  whether  it could  be  placed on the same pedestal, we may first have  a glance  at  the Sikh religion.  To comprehend  any  religion fully  may indeed be beyond the comprehension of any one and also  beyond  any  judicial  scrutiny for  it  has  its  own limitations.   But its silver lining could easily be  picked up.   In  the Sikh religion, Guru is revered as the  highest reverential  person.   The first of such most revered  Gurus was  Guru Nanak Dev, followed by succeeding Gurus, the Tenth being  the  last living, viz., Guru Gobind Singh Ji.  It  is said  that  Adi Granth or Guru Granth Sahib was compiled  by the  Fifth Guru Arjun and it is this book that is  worshiped in  all  the gurudwaras.  While it is being read, people  go down  their  knees to make reverential obeisance  and  place their offerings of cash and kind on it, as it is treated and equated  to  a living Guru.  In the Book A History  of  the Sikhs by Kushwant Singh, Vol.  I, page 307:

     The  compositions of the gurus were always considered sacred  by  their  followers.  Guru Nanak said that  in  his hymns  the true Guru manifested Himself, because they  were composed  at  His orders and heard by Him (Var  Asa).   The fourth guru, Ram Das said:  Look upon the words of the True Guru as the supreme truth, for God and the Creator hath made him  utter  the  words:  (Var Gauri).  When  Arjun  formally installed  the  Granth  in the Harimandir,  he  ordered  his followers  to  treat  it  with the same  reverence  as  they treated  their  gurus.   By the time of Guru  Gobind  Singh, copies  of the Granth had been installed in most  Gurdwaras. Quite  naturally, when he declared the line of succession of gurus  ended,  he asked his followers to turn to the  Granth for guidance and look upon it as the symbolic representation of the ten gurus.

     The  Grant  Sahib is the central object of worship  in all Gurdwaras.

     It is usually draped in silks and placed on a cot.  It has  an  awning over it and, while it is being read, one  of the congregations stands behind and waves a flywhisk made of Yaks  hair.   Worshippers  go down on their knees  to  make obeisance  and place offerings of cash or kind before it  as they  would  before a king:  for the Granth is to them  what the  gurus  were to their ancestors  the Saca  Padsah  (the true Emperor).

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     The  very first verse of the Guru Granth Sahib reveals the  infinite wisdom and wealth that it contains, as to  its legitimacy for being revered as guru:-

     The  First verse states:  The creator of all is One, the only One.  Truth is his name.  He is doer of everything. He  is  without  fear  and  without  enmity.   His  form  is immortal.   He is unborn and self-illumined.  He is realized by Gurus grace.

     The  last living guru, Guru Gobind Singh, expressed in no  uncertain  terms that henceforth there would not be  any living  guru.  The Guru Granth Sahib would be the  vibrating Guru.   He  declared that henceforth it would be your  Guru from  which you will get all your guidance and answer.   It is  with this faith that it is worshiped like a living guru. It  is with this faith and conviction, when it is  installed in  any  gurudwara  it becomes a sacred  place  of  worship. Sacredness of Gurudwara is only because of placement of Guru Granth  Sahib  in it.  This reverential recognition of  Guru Granth  Sahib also opens the hearts of its followers to pour their  money and wealth for it.  It is not that it needs it, but  when  it is installed, it grows for its followers,  who through  their obeisance to it, sanctify themselves and also for  running  the  langer  which is an inherent  part  of  a Gurdwara.

     In this background, and on over all considerations, we have  no  hesitation to hold that Guru Granth Sahib  is  a Juristic  Person.  It cannot be equated with an Idol  as idol  worship  is  contrary to Sikhism.  As a concept  or  a visionary  for  obeisance, the two religions are  different. Yet,  for  its legal recognition as a juristic  person,  the followers  of both the religions give them respectively  the same  reverential value.  Thus the Guru Granth Sahib it  has all  the  qualities  to  be  recognised  as  such.   Holding otherwise  would mean giving too restrictive a meaning of  a juristic   person,   and  that   would  erase   the   very jurisprudence which gave birth to it.

     Now,  we  proceed to examine the judgment of the  High Court  which had held to the contrary.  There was difference of  opinion  between  the two Judges and finally  the  third Judge agreed with one of the differing Judges, who held Guru Granth Sahib to be not a Juristic Person.  Now, we proceed to  examine the reasonings for their holding so.  They first erred,  in  holding that such an endowment is void as  there could not be such a juristic person without appointment of a Manager.   In other words, they held that a juristic  person could  only  act through some one, a human agency and as  in the  case  of an Idol, the Guru Granth Sahib also could  not act  without  a  manager.  In our view, no  endowment  or  a juristic person depends on the appointment of a Manager.  It may  be proper or advisable to appoint such a manager  while making  any  endowment  but in its absence, it may  be  done either  by  the trustees or courts in accordance  with  law. Mere  absence  of  a  manager negative the  existence  of  a juristic  person.   As  pointed out in  Manohar  Ganesh  Vs. Lakshmiram,  ILR  12  Bom 247, (approved  in  Yogendra  Nath Naskars  case,  1969 (1) SCC 555) referred to above, if  no manager  is  appointed by the founder, the ruler would  give effect to the bounty.  As pointed in Vidyapurna Tirtha swami

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Vs.   Vidyanidhi  Tirtha Swami & Ors., ILR 27 Mad.  435  (at 457),  by Bhashyam Ayyangar, J.  (approved in Yogendra  Nath Naskars case, 1969 (1) SCC 555) the property given in trust becomes  irrevocable and is none was appointed to manage, it will   be  managed  by  the   court  as  representing   the sovereign.   This can be done by the Court in several  ways under  Section 92, CPC or by handing over management to  any specific  body recognised by law.  But the trust will not be allowed by the Court to fail.  Endowment is when donor parts with his property for it being used for a public purpose and its  entrustment is to a person or group of person in  trust for  carrying  out the objective of such entrustment.   Once endowment is made, it is final and it is irrevocable.  It is the  onerous  duty  of  the   persons  entrusted  with  such endowment,  to carry out the objectives of this entrustment. They  may appoint a manager in the absence of any indication in  the  trust  or get it appointed through Court.   So,  if entrustment  is  to  any juristic person,  mere  absence  of manager  would  not negate the existence a juristic  person. We,  therefore, disagree with the High Court on this crucial aspect.

     In  Words and Phrases Permanent Edition, Vol.   14A, at page 167:-

     Endowment means property or pecuniary means bestowed as  a permanent fund, as endowment of a college, hospital or library,  and  is understood in common acceptance as a  fund yielding income for support of an institution.

     The  further difficulty the learned Judges of the High Court  felt  was  that  there could  not  be  two  Juristic Persons  in the same building.  This they considered  would lead  to two juristic persons in one place viz., gurudwara and  Guru  Grant Sahib.  This again, in our opinion, is  a misconceived  notion.  They are no two Juristic Persons at all.   In  fact both are so interwoven that they  cannot  be separated  as  pointed  by  Tiwana,   J.   in  his  separate judgment.   The  installation of Guru Granth Sahib is  the nucleus  or  nectar of any gurudwara.  If there is  no  Guru Granth Sahib in a Gurdwara it cannot be termed as gurudwara. When  one refers a building to be a gurudwara, he refers  it so  only  because  Guru Granth Sahib is  installed  therein. Even  if one holds a Gurdwara to be a juristic person, it is because  it holds the Guru Granth Sahib.  So, there do not exist two separate juristic persons, they are one integrated whole.  Even otherwise in Ram Jankijee Deities and Ors.  Vs. State  of Bihar and Ors., 1999 [5] SCC 50, this Court  while considering two separate deities, of Ram Jankijee and Thakur Raja  they were held to be separate Juristic Persons.  So, in  the same precincts, as a matter of law, existence of two separate juristic persons were held to be valid.

     Next  it was the reason of the learned Judges that, if Guru  Granth Sahib is a Juristic Person then every copy of Guru  Granth Sahib would be a Juristic Person.  This again in  our  considered opinion is based on erroneous  approach. On  this  reasoning  it could be argued that every  idol  at private  places,  or  carrying it with one self  each  would become  a  Juristic Person.  This is a misconception.   An idol becomes a juristic person only when it is consecrated and  installed at a public place for public at large.  Every idol is not a juristic person.  So every Guru Granth Sahib

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cannot  be  a juristic person unless it takes juristic  role through  its  installation in a gurudwara or at  such  other recognised public place.

     Next submission for the respondent is that Guru Grant Sahib  is  like  any  other sacred  book,  like  Bible  for Christians,  Bhagwat Geeta and Ramayana for Hindus and Quran for  Islamic  followers and cannot be a  Juristic  Person. This  submission also has no merit.  Though it is true  Guru Granth  Sahib is a sacred book like others but it cannot  be equated  with these other sacred books in that sense.  As we have  said above, Guru Granth Sahib is revered in gurudwara, like  a Guru which projects a different perception.  It is the  very  heart and spirit of gurudwara.  The reverence  of Guru  Granth  on the one hand and other sacred books on  the other  hand  is based on different conceptual faith,  belief and application.

     One  other reason given by the High Court is that Sikh religion  does  not  accept idolatry and hence  Guru  Granth Sahib cannot be a juristic person.  It is true that the Sikh religion does not accept idolatry but, at the same time when the tenth guru declared that after him, the Guru Granth will be  the Guru, that does not amount to idolatry.  The  Granth replaces the guru henceforward, after the tenth Guru.

     For  all these reasons, we do not find any strength in the  reasoning of High Court in recording a finding that the Guru  Grant  Sahib  not  a Juristic  Person.   The  said finding is not sustainable both on fact and law.

     Thus, we unhesitantly hold Guru Granth Sahib to be a Juristic Person.

     Next  challenge is that the basis for mutating of  the name  of  Guru Granth Sahib Birajman Dharamshala  Deh,  by deleting the name of the ancestors of the respondents, based on  Faraman-I-shahi issued by the then ruler of the  Patiala State  dated  18.4.1921 is liable to be set aside,  as  this Faraman-i-Shahi  did not direct the recording of the name of Guru   Granth  Sahib.   For   ready  reference  the   said Faraman-i-Shahi is again quoted hereunder:-

     In  future,  instructions be issued that so long  the appointment  of  a  Mahant is not approved  by  Ijlas-I-Khas through Deori Mualla, until the time, the Mahant is entitled to  receive turban, shawl or Bandhan or Muafi etc.  from the Government,  no  property or Muafi shall be entered  in  his name in the revenue papers.

     It  should  also  be  mentioned that  the  land  which pertains  to  any  Dera  should not  be  considered  as  the property  of any Mahant, nor the same should be shown in the revenue  papers  as  the property of the Mahant,  but  these should  be  entered  as  belonging to  the  Dera  under  the management  of the Mahant and that the Mahants shall not  be entitled  to sell or mortgage the land of the Dera.  Revenue Department  be  also  informed  about it and  the  order  be gazetted.

     It  was  also submitted that it was not known  whether this  Faraman-i-  Shahi was administrative in nature or  was issued  as  a sovereign.  If it was administrative it  could not have the same force of law.

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     We  have  examined this Faraman-i-Shahi.  It does  not direct  the  authorities to mutate the name of Guru  Granth Sahib.  It merely directed, the revenue authority that till Mahants  appointment  is  approved  by  Deors  Mulla,   no property  or Muafi received by a Mahant should be entered in his  name,  in the revenue papers.  Further the land of  any Dera  should  not be considered to be that of Mahant.   This was  only  a  directive which is protective in  nature.   In other  words it only directed that they should be done after ascertaining  the  fact and if the land was of the  Dera  it should not be put in the name of Mahant.  In other words, it stated  -  enquire, find out the facts and do  the  needful. The  mutation  in the case before us was not on  account  of this  Farman-I-Shahi but was made because of the application made  by  one Rulia Singh and others of village Bilaspur  to the  Patwari,  and mutation was done only after  a  detailed enquiry, after examining witnesses and other evidence on the record,  which  resulted into Ex.8 and Ex.  9.  In the  said proceedings  number of witnesses appeared before the Revenue Officer and stated that their ancestors gifted this disputed land  for charity (Punnarth) for the benefit of public,  who were  the  proprietors  and  was  merely  entrusted  to  the ancestors  of the respondents for management.  The claimants had no rights over it.  Admittedly they did not receive this land for any payment nor for any service rendered by them to such  donors.  Their statement was that this land was  given to  them  with clear direction that they should use  it  for providing  food  and  comfort to the  travellers  (Musafran) passing  through  the village.  They further  gave  evidence that  their forefathers gave it in the name of Guru  Granth Sahib  Birajman Dharamshala Deh.  In spite of this,  Atma Ram  and others and their predecessors did not perform their obligations.  On the contrary, with oblique motives they got this  disputed  land  entered in their name in  the  revenue records  which  was an attempt to usurp the  property.   The Revenue  Officer after enquiry held that Atma Ram and  other ancestors  of respondents admitted that this land was  given without  making  any payment and was specifically meant  for providing  food and shelter to the travellers which function they  were  not  performing.   It was  only  after  such  an enquiry, he ordered the mutation by ordering deleting of the name of Atma Ram and others.  With reference to the question of appointment of a manager, he recorded that this had to be decided  by  Deori Mualla, where such a case about this  was pending.   Similar  was the position in the  other  mutation proceedings  about which an application was also made to the Revenue  Officer, where the names of Narain Dass, Bhagat Ram sons of Gopi Ram were deleted and aforesaid name was mutated resulting  into  Ex.  9.  So, the mutation of name  was  not because  of  direction issued by the Farman-I-Shahi.  So  no error  could  be said to have been committed, when Ex.8  and Ex.9,  viz., mutations were recorded.  Faraman-I-Shahi if at all  may  be said to have led to the enquiry but it was  not the basis.

     This takes us to the last point for our consideration. After  the  said difference of opinion between  two  learned Judges,  Mr.  Justice M.M.  Punchhi did not decide the  case on  merits though the other Judge Mr.  Justice Tiwana,  held on  merits  in  favour  of the appellants,  i.e.,  that  the property belonged to Gurdwara.  When the case again returned to  the  same bench for decision on merits there  was  again difference  of opinion.  It was again referred to the  third judge who concurred with Mr.  Justice Punchhi.  Against this

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the  appellants  filed special leave petition in this  court which  was dismissed for default as aforesaid.  However,  we find  that  the third Judge who concurred with Mr.   Justice Punchhi  based  his finding on the ground that Guru  Granth Sahib  was  not a juristic person hence entry Ex.  8 and  9 was  invalid.  But once the very foundation falls, and  Guru Granth  Sahib  is  held to be a juristic  person,  the  said finding cannot stand.  Thus, in our considered opinion there would  not  be any useful purpose to remand the case.   That apart  since this litigation stood for a long time, we think it proper to examine it ourself.

     Learned  senior counsel for the respondents who argued with  ability  and  fairness  said that  in  fact  the  only question  which  arises in this case is whether Guru  Granth Sahib  is  a juristic person.  Examining the merits we  find that  the mutation in the revenue papers in the name of Guru Granth  Sahib  was made as far back as in the year 1928,  in the  presence  of  the  ancestors   of  respondents  and  no objection  was  raised  by anybody till the  filing  of  the present  objection  by  the respondents as  aforesaid  under Section  8/10 of the 1925 Act.  This is after a long gap  of about  forty  years.   Further, this property was  given  in trust  to  the  ancestors  of respondents  for  a  specified purpose  but  they did not perform their obligation.  It  is also  settled,  once an endowment, it never reverts even  to the donor.  Then no part of these rights could be claimed or usurped  by  the  respondents ancestors who  in  fact  were trustees.   Hence  for  these reasons and  for  the  reasons recorded  by Mr.  Justice Tiwana, even on merits, any  claim to  the disputed land by the respondents has no merit.  Thus any,  claim  over this disputed property by the  respondents fails  and  is hereby rejected.  We uphold the findings  and orders  passed by the Tribunal against which FAO No.  449 of 1978 and FAO No.  2 of 1980 was filed.

     For  the aforesaid reasons and in view of the findings which  we have recorded, we hold that High Court committed a serious mistake of law in holding that the Guru Granth Sahib was  not  a juristic person and in allowing the  claim  over this  property in favour of respondents.  Accordingly,  this appeal  is allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the High  Court dated 19-4-1985 and in FAO No.  449 of 1978  and FAO  No.   2  of 1980 are hereby set aside.  We  uphold  the orders  passed by the Tribunal both under Section 10 of  the said  Act in Suit No.  449 of 1978.  Appeal is, accordingly, allowed.  Costs on the parties.

     S.L.P.  (Civil) Nos.  2735-36 of 1989:

     The  main  question  raised  in  these  special  leave petitions  is  the same as has been raised in  Civil  Appeal No.3968  of 1987, which we have disposed of today.  In  view of  this,  the  point  raised by  the  petitioners  in  this petition  is  unsustainable  for  the same  reasons  and  is therefore dismissed.