30 March 1954
Supreme Court


Case number: Writ Petition (Civil) 72 of 1954






DATE OF JUDGMENT: 30/03/1954


CITATION:  1954 AIR  375            1954 SCR 1150  CITATOR INFO :  F          1956 SC  66  (17,26)  F          1958 SC  36  (25)  R          1959 SC 375  (30)  R          1960 SC 493  (11)  RF         1961 SC  29  (22)  D          1961 SC 751  (24)

ACT:    Constitution  of  India, art. 20(2)--Enquiry  made  under Public  Servants  (Inquiries) Act, 1850-Whether  amounts  to prosecution and punishment within the meaning of art. 20(2).

HEADNOTE:   Held that an enquiry made and concluded under -the  Public Servants  (Inquiries) Act, 1850 (A-at XXXVII of 185O),  does not  amount to prosecution and punishment for an offence  as contemplated by art. 20(2) of the Constitution.   Maqbool  Hussain  v. The State of  Bombay  ([1953]  S.C.R. 703);  Willis on Constitutional Law, p. 528; and Shenton  v. Smith  ([18951  A.C. 229); Venkata Rao v. The  Secretary  of State for India (64 I.A. 55); Government of India Act, 1935, s. 240(3); referred to.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL ORIGIINAL JURISDICTioN: Petition No. 72 of 1954.   Petition  under  article 32 of the  Constitution  for  the enforcement of fundamental rights.    A.     K. Basu, K. S. Jayaram and C. B. Pattabhiraman (R. Ganapathy  and  C.  V.  L.  Narayan,  with  them)  for   the petitioner.    M.     C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India and C.   K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (Porus A.   Mehta  and P. G. Gokhate, with them) for respondent No. 1. 1954.   March 30.  The Judgment of the Court was  delivered by    MUKHMRJEA J.-This is a. petit ion under article 32 of the Constitution,   praying  for  a  writ,  in  the  nature   of



certiorari,  for calling up the records of certain  criminal proceedings  started against the petitioner by the  Special, judge.  Sessions Court, Delhi, and for quashing the safe  on the ground that these proceedings are without jurisdiction, having been commenced 1151 in  violation  of the fundamental right  of  the  petitioner guaranteed under article 20(2) of the Constitution.   The  petitioner was a member of the Indian  Civil  Service and till lately was employed as Secretary to the Ministry of Commerce and Industries in the Government of India.  Certain imputations of misbehaviour by the petitioner, while holding offices  of  various descriptions under  the  Government  of India, came to the notice of the Central Government and  the latter  being  satisfied that there were  prima  facie  good grounds  for making an enquiry directed a formal and  public enquiry  to  be  made  as to the truth  or  falsity  of  the allegations made Against the petitioner, in accordance  with the  provisions  of the Public Servants (Inquiries)  Act  of 1850.  The substance of the imputations was drawn up in  the form  of specific charges and Sir Arthur Trevor Harries,  an ex-Chief  Justice of the Calcutta High Court, was  appointed Commissioner under section 3 of the said Act to conduct  the enquiry  and report to the Government, on the result of  the same,  his  opinion  on  the  several  articles  of   charge formulated against the petitioner.  The order of the Central Government directing the enquiry is dated the 21st February, 1953.   The  charges  were drawn up  under  six  heads  with various sub-beads under each one of them.  The first  charge alleged  that  the  petitioner was  guilty  of  misbehaviour inasmuch  as  he  showed undue favour  to  Messrs.   Millars Timber and Trading Company Limited in the matter of issue of import  and  export licences, by abusing his position  as  a public  servant in the discharge of his duties, that is,  by accepting  illegal  gratification  or  valuable  things  for import and export licences recommended or to be  recommended by  him.   The  second charge was to  the  effect  that  the petitioner accepted or obtained valuable things for  himself and other members of his family, without paying for them, on different  dates  from Messrs.  Millars Timber  and  Trading Company  Limited  for recommending  their  applications  for import  licences  and export permits.  The  fourth  and  the fifth charges  149 1152 were  similar in nature to charges 1 and 2 except that  they related to the Petitioners dealings with another firm  known as Sunder Das Saw Mills.   The  enquiry  proceeded in the manner laid  down  in  ,the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act.  The charges were read  out to the petitioner and his plea of "not guilty" was  formally recorded.  Evidence was adduced both by the prosecute or and the defence and the witnesses on both sides were examined on oath  and  cross.  examined and  re-examined  in  the  usual manner.   The Commissioner found, on a consideration of  the evidence,  that four of the charges under various  sub-heads were proved against the petitioner and submitted a report to that effect to the Government on the 4th of May, 1953.  By a letter dated the 15th of May, 1953, the Government  informed the  -petitioner  that,  on  careful  consideration  of  the report,   the   President  accepted  the  opinion   of   the Commissioner  and  in view of the findings  on  the  several charges  arrived  at  by the  latter  was  provisionally  of opinion   that   the   petitioner   should   be   dismissed. Opportunity  was given to the petitioner by this  letter  in



terms  of article 311(2) of the Constitution to  show  cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him and it was stated that any representation, which he might desire to make, would be taken into consideration before the  final order  was  passed.  The petitioner, it seems,  did  make  a representation  which was considered by the  Government  and after consultation with the Union Public Service  Commission the  President  finally  decided to impose  the  penalty  of dismissal  upon the petitioner.  The order of dismissal  was passed  on  the  17th  of  September,  1953.   On  the  23rd February, 1954, the police submitted a charge-sheet  against the  petitioner  before the Special Judge,  Sessions  Court, Delhi, charging him with offences under sections 161/165  of the Indian Penal Code and section 5(2) of the Prevention  of Corruption  Act  and upon that, summons were issued  by  the learned Judge directing the petitioner to appear be-fore his court  on the 11th of March. 1954. , It is the  legality  of this proceeding that has been challenged 1153 before us in this writ petition.  The petitioner’s case,  in substance,  is that the proceedings that have  been  started against him are without jurisdiction inasmuch as they amount to  fresh  prosecution for offences for which  he  has  been prosecuted  and punished already and this comes  within  the prohibition  of  article  20(2) of  the  Constitution.   The sole.-point for our consideration is, whether in the  events that have happened in this case, there has been a  violation of  the  fundamental right of the petitioner  under  article 20(2) of the Constitution which would justify the issue of a writ for enforcement of the same?    The  scope  and  meaning of  the  guarantee  implied  in. article  20(2) of the Constitution has been  indicated  with sufficient  fullness in the pronouncement of this  court  in Maqbool  Hussain Y. The State of Bombay(1). . The  roots  of the principle, which this clause enacts, are to be found  in the  well  established  rule  of  English  law  which  finds expression  in the maxim "Nemo debet bis vexari"-a man  must not be put twice in peril for the same offence.  If a man is indicted again for the same offence in an English court,  he can  plead, as a complete defence, his former  acquittal  or conviction, or as it is technically expressed, take the plea of   "autrefois   acquit"  or  "autrefois   convict".    The corresponding  provision in the Federal Constitution of  the U.S.A.  is contained in the Fifth Amendment, which  provides inter alia: "Nor shall any person be subjected for the  same offence to be put twice in jeopardy of life and limb".  This principle  has  been recognised and adopted  by  the  Indian Legislature and is embodied in the provisions of section  26 of  the General Clauses Act and section 403 of the  Criminal Procedure Code.    Although  these  were  the  materials  which  formed  the background  of the guarantee of the fundamental right  given in article 20(2) of the Constitution, the ambit and contents of  the  guarantee, as this court pointed out  in  the  case referred  to  above,  are much narrower than  those  of  the common  law  rule  in England or  the  doctrine  of  "double jeopardy" in the American   (1) [1953] S.C.R- 703. 1154 Constitution.  Article,20(2)of our Constitution,it is to  be noted, does not contain the principle of "autrefois  acquit" at all.  It seems that our Constitution makers did not think it necessary to raise one part of the common law rule to the level  of a fundamental right and thus make it  immune  from legislative   interference.   This  has  been  left  to   be



regulated  by  the  general law of the land.   In  order  to enable  a citizen to invoke the protection of clause (2)  of article  20 of the Constitution, there must have  been  both prosecution  and punishment in respect of the same  offence. The  words   prosecuted and punished" are to  be  taken  not district  butively  so as to mean  prosecuted  or  punished. Both  the factors must co-exist in order that the  operation of  the  clause  may be attracted.   The  position  is  also different  under  the  American  Constitution.   There   the prohibition  is not against a second punishment but  against the  peril  in which a person may be placed by reason  of  a valid  indictment  being  presented against  him,  before  a competent court, followed by proper arraignment and plea and a  lawful impanelling of the jury.  It is not  necessary  to have a verdict at all(1).    It has also been held by this court in Maqbool  Hussain’s case(2)  that  the  language of article  20  and  the  words actually  used  in  it afford a clear  indication  that  the proceedings   in   connection  with  the   prosecution   and punishment of a person must be in the nature of a  criminal proceeding, before a court of law or judicial tribunal,  and not before a tribunal which entertains a departmental or  an administrative enquiry even though set up by a statute,  but which is not required by law to try a matter judicially  and on legal evidence.  In that case the proceedings were  taken under  the  Sea Customs Act before a Customs  authority  who ordered  confiscation  of  goods.  It  was  held  that  such proceedings  were  not  "Prosecution",  nor  the  order   of confiscation  a "punishment" within the meaning  of  article 20(2) inasmuch as the Customs authority was not a court or a judicial tribunal and merely exercised administrative powers vested in him for revenue purposes. (1)  Vide Wills on Constitutional Law, p. 528. (2)  [1953] S.C.R.- 703. 1155    The  facts  of this case are no doubt different  and  the point that requires determination is, whether the petitioner can  be said to have, satisfied all the conditions that  are necessary  to enable him to claim the protection of  article 20(2)  The  charges,  upon which  the  petitioner  is  being prosecuted  now, are charges under sections 161 and  165  of the Indian Penal Code and section 5(2) of the Prevention  of Corruption Act.  We will assume for our present purpose that the  allegations  upon  which these charges  are  based  are substantially  the same which formed the subject  matter  of enquiry  under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act of  1850. The  question narrows down to this : whether the  petitioner had  already been (1) prosecuted and (2) punished for  these offences ?   Mr. Basu, appearing on behalf of the petitioner,  contends that his client was, in fact, prosecuted for these identical offences before the Commissioner appointed under Act XXXVII. of  1850.  This, it is argued, was not a  mere  departmental enquiry  of  the  type  referred  to  in  Maqbool  Hussain’s case(1).   The Commissioner was a judicial tribunal  in  the proper sense of the expression.  He had to adjudicate on the charges judicially, on evidence, recorded on oath, which  he was  authorised by law to administer.  The  prosecution  was conducted by a prosecutor appointed under the Act,  charges were read out to the accused person and his plea was  taken; witnesses on both sides were examined on oath and they  were cross-examined  and re-examined.  The Commissioner  had  all the  powers  of a court; he could summon  witnesses,  compel production  of  relevant  documents and  punish  people  for contempt.  At the close of the enquiry, the Commissioner did



record  his  finding against the petitioner on some  of  the charges.   He  had  undoubtedly  no  power  to  impose   any punishment  and  had  only  to forward  his  report  to  the Government.   Under  section  22 of the  Act,  however,  the Government  was  entitled  to pass such  orders  within  its authority,  as it considered proper and in exercise of  this authority  the President did impose upon the petitioner  the penalty  of dismissal. (1)  [1953] S.C. R. 7o3. 1156   It is immaterial, it is argued, for the purPose of article 20(2)  of the.constitution that the -prosecution was  before one authority and punishment was inflicted by another.   The petitioner  was  both  prosecuted and  punished  and  he  is sought to be prosecuted on the same chages over again.  This constitutes,  according  to  the learned  counsel,  a  clear violation  of the guarantee implied in article 20(2) of  the constitution.   The    questions raised are  undoubetdly  of some importance and require to be carefully exaimined. It  is  true  that the Commissioner appointed  to  make   an enquiry  under Act XXXVII of 1850 is invested with some   of the   powers  of  a court, particularly  in  the  matter  of summoning   witnesses  and  compelling  the  production   of documents  and  the report, which he has to make has  to  be made  on legal evidence adduced under sanction of oath  and tested by cross-examination.  But from these facts alone the conclusion does not necessarily follow that an enquiry  made and   concluded  under  Act  XXXVII  of  1850   amounts   to prosecution  and punishment for an offence as  contemplated. by article 20(2) of the Constitution.  In order to arrive at a proper decision on this point, it is necessary to  examine the entire background-of the provisions relating to  enquiry into  the  conduct of public servants and to  ascertain  the exact scope and purpose of the enquiry as is contemplated by Act  XXXVII of 1850 and the ultimate result that flows  from it.  It  is  a well established principle of English  law  that, except  where  it is otherwise provided by  a  statute,  all public  officers  and  servants  of  the  Crown  hold  their appointments  at the pleasure of the Crown.  Their  services can  be terminated without assigning any reason and even  if any  public  servant  considers that he  has  been  unjustly dismissed, his remedy is not by way of a law suit but by  an appeal  of  an  official or  political  character(1).   This principle of law was applied in lndia ever since the  advent of  British   rule in this country and the  servants  in the employ,  of  the  East India Company also  came  within  the purview  of this (1)  Vide Shenton v. Smith [1895) A.C. 229. 1157 rule.  It is to be remembered that it was during the  period of   the  East  India  Company  that  the  Public   Servants (Inquiries) Act was passed in 1850.  The object of the  Act, as stated in the preamble, was to regulate enquiry into  the behaviour  of  public  servants, not  removal  from  service without  the  sanction of the Government.  The  enquiry  was quite optional with the Government and did not affect in any way the powers of the Government to dismiss its servants  at pleasure  and this was expressly provided by section  25  of the Act, the wording of which is as follows:    "  Nothing in this Act shall be construed to  affect  the authority  of the Government to. suspending or removing  any public  servant for any cause without an enquiry under  the Act.  "    After assumption of the Government of India by the Crown,



this  rule  of English common law continued  unaltered  till 1919  when  section  96B  was  introduced  by  the   amended Government  of India Act of that year.  Sub-section  (1)  of section  96B of the Government- of India Act, 1919, runs  as follows:       "  Subject to the provisions of this Act and of  rules made  thereunder, every person in the civil service  of  the Crown  in India holds office during His  Majesty’s  pleasure and  may  be  employed in any manner required  by  a  proper authority  within  the scope of his duty, but no  person  in that  service may be dismissed by any authority  subordinate to that by which he was appointed ....................."   Thus  one  restriction imposed by this  section  upon  the unfettered  right of the Government to dismiss its  servants at  its pleasure, was that no servant could be dismissed  by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. The section by its opening words also makes the exercise  of the power subject to the rules made under the Act and it was in  pursuance of the provision of section 96-B(2)  that  the Civil  Service  (Classification, Control and  Appeal)  Rules were  framed  which with the later amendments are  in  force even  now.   Part XII of these rules deal with  Conduct  and ]Discipline of Civil Servants and rule 49 of this part  lays down that the different penalties provided, 1l58 by  the  different  clauses of the rule may,  for  good  and sufficient reasons, be imposed upon members of the  services comprised in clauses (1) to (5) in rule 14.  These penalties include, amongst others, censure, withholding of  increment, dismissal,  reduction in rank and removal.  Rule  55,  which finds  a place in the same chapter, lays down the  procedure to be followed before passing an order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank against any member of the service.   No such  order shall be passed unless the person concerned  has been  informed,, in writing, of the grounds on which  it  is proposed to take action against him and has been afforded an adequate  opportunity of defending himself.  An enquiry  has to be made regarding his conduct and this may be done either in  accordance with. the provisions of the  Public  Servants (Inquiries) Act of 1850 or in a less formal and less  public manner as is provided for in the rule itself.   These rules have no statutory force and it was held by the Privy  Council  that  when an  officer  was  dismissed  from service  without  complying  with the  provisions  of  these rules, he had no right of action against: the Crown(1).   In other  words,  the rules, which were not incorporated  in  a statute, did not impose any legal restriction upon the right of the Crown to dismiss its servants at pleasure.   The position was altered to some extent in the  Government of  India  Act,  1935, and in addition  to  the  restriction imposed  by section 96-B(1) of the Government of India  Act, 1919,  that  a civil servant could not be  dismissed  by  an authority  subordinate to that by which he was appointed,  a further  statutory  provision  was  made(2),  that  a  civil servant could not be dismissed or reduced in rank unless the person  concerned  was  given a  reasonable  opportunity  of showing  cause  against  the action  proposed  to  be  taken against him.  Article 311(2) of the present Constitution has further added the word " removal " after " dismissal " and (1)  Vide  Vankata Rao v. The Secretary of State for  India, 64 I.A. 55. (2)  Vide  section  240(3) Of the Government of  India  Act, 1935. 1159 before  reduction in rank " and thus in all the three  cases



which are covered by rule 55 of the Civil Services Rules, a civil  servant has now a constitutional right to claim  a  - reasonable  opportunity of showing cause against the  action proposed to be taken in regard to him.    As the law stands at present, the only purpose, for which an  enquiry  under Act XXXVII of 1850 could be made,  is  to help  the  Government  to  come  to  a  definite  conclusion regarding  the  misbehaviour of a public  servant  and  thus enable  it  to determine provisionary the  punishment  which should be imposed upon him prior to giving him a  reasonable opportunity  of showing cause, as is required under  article 311(2)  of the Constitution.  An enquiry under this  Act  is not at all compulsory and it is quite open to the Government to adopt any other method if it so chooses.  It is a  matter of convenience merely and nothing else.  It is against  this background  that  we  will have  to  examine  the  material provisions  of the Public Servants (Inquiries),Act  of  1850 and  see whether from the. nature and result of the  enquiry which the Act contemplates it is at all possible to say that the  proceedings taken or concluded under the Act amount  to prosecution and punishment for a criminal offence.    It  may be pointed out that the words  "prosecution"  and "punishment"  have  no  fixed  connotation  and  they,   are susceptible  of both a wider and a narrower meaning; but  in article 20(2) both these words have been used with reference to  an "offence" and the word "offence" has to be  taken  in the sense in which it is used in the General Clauses Act  as meaning I an act or omission made punishable by any law for the  time being in force." It follows that  the  prosecution must  be in reference to, the law which creates the  offence and the punishment must also be in accordance with what that law  prescribed The acts alleged to have been committed  by, the petitioner in the present case and on the basis of which the charges have been framed against him do come within  the definition  of "offences" described in sections 161 and  165 of the Indian Penal Code and 150 1160 section  5(2)  of  the Prevention of  Corruption  Act.   The Public  Servants (Inquiries) Act does not itself create  any offence nor does it provide any, punishment for it.  Rule 49 of the Civil Services Rules mentioned above merely speaks of imposing certain penalties upon public servants for good and sufficient   reasons.   The  rule  does  not   mention   any particular offence and obviously can create none.  It is  to enable  the  Government  to come to  the  conclusion  as  to whether  good  and  sufficient  reasons  exist,  within  the meaning of rule 49 of the Civil Services Rules, for imposing the  penalties  of removal, dismissal or reduction  in  rank upon a public servant that an enquiry may be directed  under Act XXXVII of 1850.  A Commissioner appointed under this Act has  no duty to investigate any offence which is  punishable under   the  Indian  Penal.   Code  or  the  Prevention   of Corruption  Act and he has absolutely no jurisdiction to  do so.  The subject-matter of investigation by him is the truth or otherwise of the imputation of misbehaviour made  against a public servant and it is only as instances of misbehaviour that  the several articles of charge are investigated,  upon which  disciplinary action might be taken by the  Government if it so chooses.  The mere fact that the word-"prosecution" has  been  used, would not make the  proceeding  before  the Commissioner  one  for prosecution of an  offence.   As  the Commissioner has to form his opinion upon legal evidence, he has  been  given the power to summon  witnesses,  administer oath  to  then  and also to compel  production  of  relevant



documents.   These,  may  be  some of  the  trappings  of  a judicial tribunal, but they cannot make the proceeding  any- thing  more  than  a mere fact  finding  enquiry.   This  is concluisively  established by the provisions of  section  21 and  22  of  the  Act.  At the close  of  the  enquiry,  the Commissioner  has  to  submit a  report  to  the  Government regarding his finding on each one of the charges made:  This is  a mere expression of opinion and it lacks both  finality and  authoritativeness  which are ,he essential tests  of  a judicial pronouncement.  The )pinion is not even binding  on the  Government Under section 22 of the Act, the  Government can, after 1161 receipt  of the report, call upon the Commissioner to  take, further  evidence  or  give  further  explanation  of   his opinion.   When Special Commissioners are  appointed,  their report could be referred to the court or other authority  to which  the  officer  concerned is  subordinate  for  further advice  and  after  taking -the  opinion  of  the  different authorities  and  persons,  the  Government  has  to  decide finally what action it should take.    Then  again neither section 21 nor section 22 of the  Act says anything about punishrment.  There is no to express any power in the Commissioner even opinion about punishment  and section  22 only contemplates such order as  the  Government can pass in its capacity as employer in respect to  servants employed  by  it.   As has been said already,  an  order  of dismissal  of a servant cannot be regarded as  a  punishment for  an offence punishable under particular sections of  the Indian Penal Code or of the Prevention of Corruption Act.  A somewhat analogous case would be that of a member of the Bar whose   name  is  struck  off  the  rolls  on   grounds   of professional   misconduct,  in  exercise   of   disciplinary jurisdiction  by  the proper  authority.   The  professional misconduct might amount to a criminal offence, but if we are to  accept the petitioner’s contention as correct,  the  man cannot  be  prosecuted  for it, even  though  the  authority inflicting the penalty of removal was not a competent  court to  investigate any criminal charge nor was  the  punishment imposed   in   exercise  of  disciplinary   jurisdiction   a punishment for an offence.    In our opinion, therefore, in an enquiry under the Public Servants  (Inquiries)  Act  of 1850, there  is  neither  any question of investigating an offence in the sense of an  act or  omission  punishable by any law for the  time  being  in force,  nor  is there any question  of  imposing  punishment prescribed  by the law which makes that act or  omission  an offence.  The learned Attorney General raised a point before us  that  the test of the guarantee under article  20(2)  is whether the person has been tried and punished, not for  the same act, but 1162 for  the  same  offence  and  his  contention  is  that  the offences  here are different, though they may arise -out  of the same acts.  In the view that we have taken this question does  not  arise for consideration at all.  It is  also  not necessary  to express any opinion on the question raised  by the learned counsel for the petitioner as to whether for the purpose  of  attracting the operation of article  20(2)  the punishment  must  be imposed by the  same  authority  before which the prosecution was conducted.  The result is that, in our opinion, the petition fails and in dismissed.                      Petition dismissed.                   APPENDIX PROCEEDINGS AT THE SITTING



OF THE SUPREME COURT ON NOVEMBER 5,1954. MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., BIJN KUMAR.  MUKHERJEA, S. R. DAS, VIVIAN BOSE N. H. BHAGWATI, B. JAGANNADHADAS, T. L. VEMNKATARAMA AYYAR, JJ.   MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J.-We are meeting here this  morning on  a very sad occasion to mourn the death of  our  brother, Mr.  Justice  Ghulam  Hasan,  who  suddenly  collapsed  this morning  at  about 1 A.m. During my absence  from  Delhi  to Patiala, where I had gone to visit the High Court of  Pepsu, he  was taken ill and was absent from Court on Monday  last. On my- return I made enquiries from him and he told me  that he  had  slight  congestion in the lungs  but  that  he  was feeling much better and would in all likelihood attend Court on  Friday.  I saw him myself on Wednesday evening.  He  was quite  cheerful and looked well, and he told me that he  was feeling much better and would in all likelihood attend Court on Friday, failing that on Monday.  On Thursday morning  his condition  had  much improved, but late in the  evening  he felt  uncomfortable and was removed to hospital,,  where  he suddenly  collapsed.   This  is  the  short  story  of   the termination  of a successful career on the Bench and at  the Bar of a very devoted and patriotic citizen of India.    Shri Ghulam Hasan was born on the 3rd July, 1891.   After a distinguished University career and an equally 1164 distinguished career at the Bar, he was raised to the  Bench of  the Oudh Chief Court in 1940 and became its Chief  Judge in  1946.   He was appointed Senior Judge of  the  Allahabad High  Court  in  1948 on the amalgamation of  the  two  High Courts in the United Provinces.  On retirement from the High Court,  he  was appointed a member of the  Labour  Appellate Tribunal  and on the 8th September, 1952, he became a  Judge of this Court.  Prior to his appointment as a Judge, he  was a  Member of the U. P. Legislative Assembly for  two  years. He war, also Chairman of the Executive Committee of the  Red Cross  and  St. John Ambulance Association,  U.  P.  Branch, since  1942.   He received the honour of Knighthood  of  the Order of St. John in 1947 in recognition of his humanitarian services.   He was interested in educational activities  and was  a member of the Court of the Aligarh University  and  a member  of the Executive Committee of that  University.   He had  varied  social and cultural interests which  are  quite well known and it is hardly necessary to refer to them.   Both  as  a Member of the Bar and the Bench,  Shri  Ghulam Hasan distinguished himself by his vast learning, his  sense of  detachment and high judicial integrity.  He  was  always courteous  and patient in his relations with the Bar, as  in his  relations  with  his  colleagues.  If  I  may  say  so, courtesy  was  writ large on his face.  His  full  grasp  of facts, his thorough knowledge of law and his quick prception of the real points in a case were of great assistance to  us in  dealing with the many complicated questions  that  arose for  determination  in  this Court.   He  had  a  singularly equable  and gentle temperament.  His simple and  unaffected manner attracted friends in every sphere and he will be very much missed not only by me and his colleagues in this  Court but  also  in the social life of this city, which  would  be distinctly poorer for his loss.   We have lost an esteemed colleague and a learned, just and upright  Judge,  and the country has lost  a  patriotic  and



great  citizen.   He leaves behind his widow, a son,  and  a daughter.   We  all mourn his loss with the members  of  his family and offer condolence to all of them, 1165   I  am sure gentlemen of the Bar will desire  to  associate themselves  with  the Bench in conveying  an  expression  of heart-felt  sympathy and condolence to the bereaved  family. May his soul rest in peace.   The Court will remain closed today as a mark of respect to the deceased.   M.C. SETALVAD, ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR INDIA.--My Lords,  the Bar respectfully associates itself with deep regret in  your Lordships  expression of grief and sympathy.  I recall  how about  three  years ago this Court assembled  to  mourn  the death  of  its first Chief Justice.  The hand  of  fate  has smitten with equal suddenness on this occasion.   It is a little over two years ago that his Lordship became a  member of your Lordship Court.  His affable  personality, his  genial and his uniform courtesy made a deep  impression on all those who came into contact with him.  Members of the Bar  will  never forget the keen practical  sense  which  he brought  to bear on all questions that came before him,  the patience  with  which  he heard  them,  and  the  invariable kindness he showed to them.    The Bar tenders its deep and heart-felt sympathy to those near and dear to him in their great, sudden and  irreparable loss.                   END OF VOL.  V.