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PETITIONER: S.   A. VENKATARAMAN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE(and connected appeal)

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/12/1957

BENCH: IMAM, SYED JAFFER BENCH: IMAM, SYED JAFFER SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P. KAPUR, J.L.

CITATION:  1958 AIR  107            1958 SCR 1040

ACT:     Criminal   trial-Public  servant  accused  of   criminal misconduct-Dismissal   from   service   before   taking   of cognizance  by  Court-Sanction to Prosecute,  if  necessary- Interpretation-Prevention  of  Corruption Act, 1947  (II  Of 1947), ss. 5(2), 6.

HEADNOTE: The  appellant who was a public servant was  dismissed  from service  after  departmental  inquiry.   Thereafter  he  was charged  with  having  committed  the  offence  of  criminal misconduct under S. 5(2), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and  was convicted.  No sanction under s. 6 of the  Act  was produced, before the trial Court.  It was contended that the Court could not take cognizance of the offence without there being a proper sanction to prosecute : Held,  that no sanction under s. 6 of the Act was  necessary for the prosecution of the appellant as he was not a  public servant  at  the  time of the taking of  cognizance  of  the offence. In  construing the provisions of a statute it  is  essential for  a Court, in the first instance, to give effect  to  the natural  meaning of the words used therein, if  those  words are  clear enough.  It is only in the case of any  ambiguity that  a Court is entitled to ascertain the intention of  the legislature.  Where a general power to take cognizance of an offence  is  vested  in  a Court,  any  prohibition  to  the exercise  of  that power, by any provision of law,  must  be confined  to the terms of the prohibition.  The words in  s. 6(1)  of the Act are clear enough and must be  given  effect to.  The more important words in cl. (c) of s. 6(1) are " of the  authority competent to remove him from his office ".  A public servant who has ceased to be a public servant is  not a  person removable from any office by competent  authority. The  conclusion  is inevitable that at the time a  Court  is asked to take cognizance not only must the offence have been committed  by a public servant but the person  accused  must still  be  a public servant removable from his office  by  a competent authority before the provisions of s. 6 can apply.

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JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 130  of 1956. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated May  12, 1955, of the Punjab High Court in  Criminal  Appeal No.  52-D  of 1954, arising out of the  judgment  and  order dated December 6, 1954, of the Court of the Special Judge at Delhi in Corruption Case No. 1 of 1954. 1038 N.   C.  Chatterjee and C. V. L. Narayan, for the  appellant in Cr.  A. No. 130 of 56. Jai Gopal Sethi and Naunit Lal, for the appellant in Cr.  A. No. 25 of 56. C.K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, A.M.  Chatterjee, H.  R. Khanna and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent  in  both the appeals. 1957.   December 3. The following Judgment of the Court  was delivered by IMAM  J.-A  question  of law, common’ to  these  appeals  by special leave, requires determination; hence they were heard together.  Special leave in Criminal Appeal No. 130 of  1956 was  limited  to the question whether the  trial  court  had jurisdiction  to take cognizance of the offence for want  of sanction  under  s. 6 of the Prevention of  Corruption  Act, 1947  (11  of  1947), hereinafter referred to  as  the  Act. Criminal  Appeal  No.  25 of 1956 was  not  so  limited  and additional  points  were raised for  our  consideration,  to which   reference   will  be  made  when  that   appeal   is specifically dealt with. The  question  of  law, common in  both  these  appeals,  is whether there was any necessity for a sanction under s. 6 of the  Act before a court could take cognizance of an  offence under s. 161 of the Indian Penal Code or s. 5(2) of the  Act or  both, alleged to have been committed by a person who  at the  time the court was asked to take cognizance was  not  a public  servant but was so at the time of the commission  of the offence. In  Criminal  Appeal  No. 130 of  1956,  the  appellant  was convicted  under  s. 5(2) of the Act and  sentenced  to  six months’ simple imprisonment by the Special Judge, Delhi.  He appealed  against his conviction and sentence to the  Punjab High  Court.  That Court while admitting the  appeal  issued notice  upon  the appellant to show cause why  his  sentence should not be enhanced.  The High Court ultimately dismissed his  appeal  and  enhanced  the  sentence  of  six   months’ imprisonment  to  two years’ rigorous imprisonment.   As  in this appeal special leave has been granted limited 1039 to the question already stated, it is unnecessary to set out the prosecution case against the appellant. In Criminal Appeal No. 25 of 1956 the appellant had  applied to  the  Allahabad High Court under s. 561A of the  Code  of Criminal  Procedure  for  the quashing  of  the  proceedings pending   against  him  before  the  Special   Judge.    The application   was  dismissed.   It  is  against  the   order dismissing  his application that this appeal has been  filed by the appellant. It is admitted that at the time the Special Judges concerned purported to take cognizance the appellants were not  public servants and that no order of sanction under s. 6 of the Act by  a  competent authority was on the record.  At  the  time that  the  appellants  are alleged  to  have  committed  the offence they were public servants. Section 6 of the Act states:

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"6.   Previous  sanction necessary for  prosecution  (1)  No court  shall take cognizance of an offence punishable  under section  161  or section 164 or section 165  of  the  Indian Penal  Code  (Act 45 of 1860), or under sub-section  (2)  of section  5 of this Act, alleged to have been committed by  a public servant, except with the previous sanction, (a)in  the  case of a person who is employed  in  connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from  his office  save  by  or  with  the  sanction  of  the   Central Government, of the Central Government, (b)in  the  case of a person who is employed  in  connection with  the affairs of a State and is not removable  from  his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of the State Government, (c)in  the  case  of  any other  person,  of  the  authority competent to remove him from his office. (2)Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises  whether the  previous  sanction as required  under  sub-section  (1) should  be given by the Central or State Government  or  any other  authority,  such  sanction shall  be  given  by  that Government or authority which 132 1040 would have been competent to remove the public servant  from his office at the time when the offence was alleged to  have been committed." There  is  no  dispute  that if at the  time  when  a  court purports to take cognizance of offences punishable under  s. 161,  164 or s. 165 of the Indian Penal Code or s.  5(2)  of the  Act committed by a public servant and that person is  a public servant, cognizance cannot be taken by a court unless a  sanction by the competent authority has  been  previously accorded.  The real controversy in these appeals is  whether such  a  sanction  is  required  before  a  court  can  take cognizance  in  the  case of a person who is  not  a  public servant  at the time the court is asked to take  cognizance, although  the offence alleged against him was  committed  by him as a public servant.  To determine this question s. 6 of the Act requires to be interpreted. In substance, it was urged on behalf of the appellants  that on a proper interpretation of s. 6 of the Act the status  of the  accused  at the time of the commission of  the  offence alleged  against him was the essence of the matter  and  not his  status  at  the  time  the  court  was  asked  to  take cognizance of the offence, in which case a sanction under s. 6  of  the  Act  was necessary before  a  court  could  take cognizance although at that stage the accused had ceased  to be a public servant. On the other band, the Solicitor-General contended that on a proper  interpretation of the provisions of s. 6 of the  Act not only an offence mentioned therein must be committed by a public  servant  but  that that person  is  still  a  public servant  removable from his office by a competent  authority at  the  time a court was asked to take  cognizance  of  the offence. Before we proceed to construe the provisions of s. 6 of  the Act it is necessary to refer to some of the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the appellants.  It was said that in  construing  the  provisions of a statute  a  court  must attempt to ascertain the intention of the legislature and it must do this not only from the language of the statute,  but also from the 1041 consideration  of the social conditions which gave  rise  to it, and of the mischief which it was intended to remedy.  It

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must  supplement  the written word so as to give  force  and life to the intention of the legislature.  Reliance was also placed  upon certain decisions construing the provisions  of s.  197  of the Code of Criminal Procedure.   Reference  was also made to Art. 361 of the Constitution and s. 197A of the Code of Criminal Procedure in aid of the construction  which the  learned  Counsel contended for with  reference  to  the words used in s. 6 of the Act. In  construing the provisions of a statute it  is  essential for  a court, in the first instance, to give effect  to  the natural  meaning of the words used therein, if  those  words are  clear enough.  It is only in the case of any  ambiguity that  a court is entitled to ascertain the intention of  the legislature by construing the provisions of the statute as a whole  and taking into consideration other matters  and  the circumstances  which  led to the enactment of  the  statute. Observations of Denning L. J. as he then was, in the case of Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher (1) were relied upon  by Mr. Chatterjee.  It is, however, clear that the observations of  the  learned  Judge  were made  with  reference  to  the provision  of  a  statute which was  ambiguous.   We  cannot construe the observations to mean that where the language of a  statute was free from ambiguity a duty was cast upon  the court  to do anything more than to give effect to the  words used.   Although  reference  was made to  Art.  361  of  the Constitution  and s. 197A of the Code by Mr. Sethi,  we  are unable to see how the words used therein assist us in  -con- struing the provisions of s. 6 of the Act. Reliance  was  placed on the decisions of  the  Nagpur  High Court  in the case of S. Y. Patil v. Vyankatswami (2  )  and the  decision of the Court of the Judicial  Commissioner  of Sind  in  the case of Suganchand v. Seth Naraindas  (3),  in support  of the submission that even if a person had  ceased to be a public servant before the prosecution started,  such a person was (1)(1949) 2 K. B. 481, 498.    (2) I. L. R. (1939) Nag. 419. (3)A. I. R. (1932) Sind.  I77. 1042 protected  by  the provisions of s. 197 of the  Code  and  a sanction was necessary before a court could take cognizance. It  is true that so far as s. 197 of the Code  is  concerned these  two decisions do lend support to the submission  made by the learned Counsel for the appellants.  It is,  however, to  be noticed that the decision of the Nagpur  High  Court, which  was  of a single Judge, was overruled by  a  Division Bench  of  that  Court in the case of The  State  v.  Hifzul Rahman  (1), where it was held that the person accused  must be a public servant at the time of the accusation and s. 197 of the Code afforded no protection to a public servant if he had  ceased to hold office.  In the case of  Prasad  Chandra Banerji v. Emperor(2), the Calcutta High Court held that the protection  given by s. 197. of the Code applied only  to  a person  who  is  still  a public servant  at  the  time  the prosecution is launched and does not extend to a person  who is no longer a public servant at that time but was in office when the offence charged was alleged to have been committed. Accordingly,  no  sanction  under s. 197  of  the  Code  was necessary  in order to prosecute a person who had ceased  to be  a  public servant at the time of the  launching  of  the prosecution.   A similar view was taken by the  Bombay  High Court in the case of Imperator v. Joshi (3), and by a single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Emperor  v. Suraj Narain Chaube (4).  It would thus appear that the High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay, Allababad and Nagpur are  agreed that  s. 197 of the Code affords no protection to  a  person

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who is not a public servant at the time he is accused of  an offence before a court although at the time he committed the offence he was a public servant.  The decision of the Punjab High Court in the case of The State v. Gurcharan Singh  (5), was  brought to our notice wherein it was held that in  view of the form of wording in the two sections, namely s. 197 of the  Code  and a. 6 of the Act, the  same  principles  would apply  to  them,  having  regard to  the  decisions  of  the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts and the protection  afforded by s. 197 of (1)I. L. R. (1951) Nag. 764. (2) 1. L. R. (1944) 1 Cal. 113. (3) I. L. R. (1947) Bom. 706. (4) 1. L. R. (1938) All. 776. (5)  A. I. R. (1952) Pun.89.                             1043 the Code was available to a person who was a public  servant while  still in office but was not available to him when  he had  already  been  discharged from service  before  he  was prosecuted.    These   cases  may   render   assistance   in understanding the reason why a public servant, while he is a public  servant,  cannot be prosecuted  without  a  previous sanction for offences, committed by him as a public  servant and  thus  may, be of some indirect help in  construing  the words used in s. 6 of the Act.  Section 6, however, must  be construed   with  reference  to  the  words   used   therein independent  of any construction which may have been  placed by these decisions on the words used in s. 197 of the Code.    Before an attempt is made to construe the words contained in  s. 6 of the Act some reference may be made to the  power vested in a court to take cognizance of an offence.  Section 190  of  the Code of Criminal Procedure  confers  a  general power  on a criminal court to take cognizance  of  offences, but  the  exercise  of  such  power  in  certain  cases   is prohibited  by the provisions of ss. 195 to 199 of the  Code unless  the conditions mentioned therein are complied  with. Under the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 (XLVI of 1952), Special  Judges are appointed to try offences under s.  161, 162,  163, 164, 165 or s. 165A of the Indian, Penal Code  or s. 5(2) of the Act.  They are authorized to take  cognizance of these offences without the accused person being committed to  them for trial.  The exercise of this general  power  to take  cognizance  by  them is  prohibited  with  respect  to offences  committed  under s. 161, 164 or s. 165  of  Indian Penal  Code or under s. 5(2) of the Act by a public  servant without the previous sanction of a competent authority.   In our  opinion,  if a general power to take cognizance  of  an offence  is  vested  in  a court,  any  prohibition  to  the exercise  of  that power, by any provision of law,  must  be confined to the terms of the prohibition.  In enacting a law prohibiting  the  taking of cognizance of an  offence  by  a court,  unless  certain conditions were complied  with,  the legislature did not purport to condone the offence.  It  was primarily concerned to 1044 see  that prosecution for offences in cases coveted  by  the prohibition  shall not commence without complying  with  the conditions contained therein, such as a previous sanction of a  competent authority in the case of a public servant,  and in  other  cases with the consent of the  authority  or  the party  interested  in the prosecution or  aggrieved  by  the offence.   There can be little doubt that in the case  of  a public   servant  the  Central  Government  or   the   State Government  or  the authority competent to remove  him  from service   is  vitally  interested  in  the  matter  of   his prosecution.   Such authority is directly concerned  in  the matter  as  it  has to decide whether to accord  or  not  to

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accord  its  sanction  for the prosecution  of  one  of  its servants.  The authority concerned may refuse to accord such sanction on the ground that the prosecution is frivolous  or vexatious  or on the ground that in the public ;Interest  it would  be inexpedient to do so.  Without some  safeguard  of this  kind a public servant may find it impossible to  carry on his official duties efficiently.    The  object  of  the  Act was  to  suppress  bribery  and corruption.     Its   provisions   are   severe.     Certain presumptions  of guilt of offences committed under  ss.  161 and  165A of the Indian Penal Code were enjoined by s. 4  of the  Act  unless  the contrary was proved  by  the  accused. Section  5  of  the  Act created  the  offence  if  criminal misconduct  on  the  part of a public  servant,  an  offence unknown  to any of the provisions of the Indian  Penal  Code dealing  with bribery or corruption.  Sub-section  (2)  made such  an  offence  punishable with  imprisonment  which  may extend  to  a term of 7 years, or with fine, or  with  both. Under sub-s. (3) a court shall presume that the accused  was guilty  of misconduct if it was proved that he or any  other person  on  his  behalf was in  possession,  for  which  the accused   person  could  not  satisfactorily   account,   of pecuniary  resources  or property  disproportionate  to  his known sources of income.  These provisions of the Act  indi- cate  that it was the intention of the legislature to  treat more  severely  than hitherto corruption on the  part  of  a public  servant  and  not  to  condone  it  in  any   manner whatsoever.  If s. 6 had Dot found a place in                             1045  the  Act  it is clear that cognizance of an  offence  under s.161,  164  or  s. 165 of the Indian Penal  Code  or  under s.5(2)  of the Act committed by a public servant  could   be taken  by  a  court even if he had ceased  to  be  a  public servant.   The mere fact that he had ceased to be  a  public servant  after  the  commission of  the  offence  would  not absolve  him  from  his crime.   Section  6  certainly  does prohibit the taking of cognizance of his offence, without  a previous  sanction, while he is still a public  servant  but does  that prohibition continue after he has ceased to be  a public  servant  ? It is to determine  that  question  which requires  us to examine and construe the provisions of s.  6 of the Act and to express our opinion thereon.    When the provisions of s. 6 of the Act are examined it is manifest  that two conditions must be fulfilled  before  its provisions  become  applicable.  One is  that  the  offences mentioned therein must be committed by a public servant  and the other is that that person is employed in connection with the  affairs  of the Union or a State and is  not  removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the  Central Government  or the State Government or is a  public  servant who  is  removable from his office by  any  other  competent authority.   Both  these  conditions  must  be  present   to preventa   court  from  taking  cognizance  of  an   offence mentioned  in the section without the previous  sanction  of the  Central  Government  or the  State  Government  or  the authority  competent to remove the public servant  from  his office.   If  either  of these conditions  is  lacking,  the essential  requirements of the section are. wanting and  the provisions of the section do not stand in the way of a court taking  cognizance without a previous sanction.  An  offence under s. 161 of the Indian Penal Code can be committed by  a public  servant  or  by a person expecting to  be  a  public servant,  but  s.  6 of the Act refers only  to  an  offence committed  by  a  publicservant  under  that  section.   If, therefore, at the time a court was asked to take  cognizance

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of  an  offence under s. 161 of the Indian Penal  Code,  the accused is a public servant but was not so at the time  that the offence was committed, but at which time he was 1046 merely expecting to be a public servant, a previous sanction would  be unnecessary before a court could take  cognizance. as  the  provisions of the section  would  be  inapplicable. Conversely,  if an offence under s. 161 of the Indian  Penal Code  was committed by a public servant, but, at the time  a court  was  asked to take cognizance of  the  offence,  that person  had  ceased to be a public servant one  of  the  two requirements  to  make s. 6 of the Act applicable  would  be lacking  and a previous sanction would be unnecessary.   The words  in s. 6(1) of the Act are clear enough and they  must be  given effect to.  There is nothing in the words used  in s. 6(1) to even remotely suggest that previous sanction  was necessary  before  a  court could  take  cognizance  of  the offences  mentioned therein in the case of a person who  had ceased  to  be a public servant at the time  the  court  was asked to take cognizance, although he had been such a person at  the  time the offence was committed.  It  was  suggested that  el. (c) in s. 6(1) refers to persons other than  those mentioned  in cls. (a) and (b).  The words " is  employed  " are absent in this clause which would, therefore, apply to a person  who had ceased to be a public servant though he  was so at the time of the commission of the offence.  Clause (c) cannot  be construed in this way.  The expressions " in  the case  of a person " and "in the case of any other  person  " must  refer to a public servant having regard to  the  first paragraph   of  the  sub-section.   Clauses  (a)  and   (b), therefore,  would cover the case of a public servant who  is employed  in connection with the affairs of the Union  or  a State  and is not removable from his office save by or  with the  sanction  of  the  Central  Government  or  the   State Government  and  el. (c) would cover the case of  any  other public servant whom a competent authority could remove  from his office.  The more important words in cl. (c) are "of the authority  competent  to  remove him from  his  office".   A public servant who has ceased to be a public servant is  not a person removable from any office by a competent authority. Section  2 of the Act states that a public servant, for  the purpose of the Act, means a public servant as defined in  s. 21 of the Indian Penal Code.  Under                             1047 cl.  (c), therefore, any one who is a public servant at  the time a court was asked to take cognizance, but does not come within  the description of a public servant under  cls.  (a) and  (b),  is accused of an offence committed by  him  as  a public  servant  as specified in s. 6 would be  entitled  to rely  on  the provisions of that section and object  to  the taking  of cognizance without a previous sanction.  To  read cl.  (c) in the way suggested on behalf of  the  appellants, would  be  to  give a meaning to this clause  which  is  not justified  by  the words employed therein.  It  was  further suggested that the provisions of sub-s. (2) of s. 6 indicate that  it  was the status of the accused at the time  of  the commission of the offence which was relevant rather than his status  at  the time a court was asked to  take  cognizance. This sub-section was inserted into the Act by the Prevention of Corruption (Second Amendment) Act, 1952, and it purported to  finally  settle any doubts which may arise as  to  which authority should grant the sanction in the case of a  public servant  who had committed an offence mentioned in  s.  6(1) and  who at the time the court was asked to take  cognizance is still a public servant.  For example, it is not difficult

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to imagine cases where a public servant employed by a  State Government   is   subsequently  employed  by   the   Central Government  and  a question arises as to which  of  the  two Governments  is to grant the sanction for  his  prosecution. This  sub-section resolves the difficulty by directing  that where  a doubt arises, the authority which was to grant  the sanction was the one which was competent to remove him  from his office at the time of the commission of the offence.  If the provisions of sub-s. (1) bear the construction which  we place upon them, there is nothing in sub-s. (2) which is  in conflict with that construction.  Besides, there is  nothing in  the  language of sub-s. (2) which  carries  the  meaning suggested on behalf of the appellants or which assists us in construing the provisions of sub-s. (1).  We cannot construe the  words " is employed " and " is not removable"  in  cls. (a) and (b) and "competent to remove him from his office" in cl.  (c) as "was employed" and " was not removable "  and  " would have been I33 1048 competent to remove him from his office ". To do so would be to substitute our own words for the words of the statute  as contained in these clauses.    In Criminal Appeal No. 122 of 1954, dealt with by another judgment,  where  a similar question bad  been  raised,  the appellant had suggested that two defects appearing in s. 197 of  the  Code  of Criminal Procedure  were  intended  to  be remedied  by  the Act: (1) that s. 197 did not  apply  to  a public servant who had ceased to be a public servant at  the time of the taking of cognizance of an offence and (2)  that an  offence under s. 161 of the Indian Penal Code  committed by  a public servant was not covered by s. 197 of the  Code, as such offence could not be said to have been committed  by him  while acting or purporting to act in the  discharge  of his  official  duty, having regard to the decisions  of  the courts in India and of the Privy Council. We cannot see  how this assists us in construing s.6 of the Act.  Whatever  the phraseology of s.197 of the Code may have been in the  past, the  decisions  of the courts in India that s.  197  of  the Codedoes not   apply  to  a person who had ceased  to  be  a public  servant  at  the  time a court  was  asked  to  take cognizance were based upon the words used in that section at the  time  the judgments were pronounced.   These  decisions laid emphasis on the words " when any person who is a  judge within   the   meaning  of  s.  19  of  the   Indian   Penal Code........................ or when any public servant  who is  not removable from his office ............... "  It  was held  in  these decisions that these words  meant  that  the person  must  be a public servant at the time  a  court  was asked to take cognizance, although be may have been a public servant at the time of the commission of the offence.  It is true  that unlike s. 197 of the Code, s. 6 of the  Act  does not contain the words " while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty ". We have to construe s. 6  of the Act as we find it and the absence of  these  words from   the   section  renders  us  no  assistance   in   its construction.   In  our opinion, in giving effect to the ordinary  meaning of the words used in s. 6 of the Act, the conclusion                             1049 is  inevitable  that at the time a court is  asked  to  take cognizance not only the offence must have been committed  by a  public servant but the person accused is still  a  public servant  removable from his office by a competent  authority before  the  provisions of s. 6 can apply.  In  the  present

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appeals, admittedly, the appellants had ceased to be  public servants  at  the  time the court  took  cognizance  of  the offences  alleged to have been committed by them  as  public servants.  Accordingly the provisions of s. 6 of the Act did not apply and the prosecution against them was not  vitiated by the lack of a previous sanction by a competent authority.                      Criminal Appeal 25 of 1956.    In  this  appeal apart from the question that  the  court could not take cognizance of the offence alleged against the appellant  without  a  previous  sanction  of  a   competent authority, additional points had been taken for quashing the prosecution   pending  against  him.   The   appellant   was appointed  Deputy  Assistant  Director  Enforcement  in  the Ministry of Industry and Commerce on March 25, 1949 and  was promoted  to  the office of Assistant Director on  July  14, 1949.   It  was alleged that he accepted  on  September  11, 1951,  a sum Rs. 10,000 as bribe in part payment out  of  an agreed amount of Rs. 30,000.  An enquiry under r. 55 of  the Civil  Service  Rules  took  place  and  thereafter  he  was dismissed  from  service  on September  25,  1953.   In  the meantime, it appears that correspondence bad ensued  between the appellant and the Government.  On September 18, 1952,  a final report was submitted to the court under s. 173 of  the Code  of  Criminal  Procedure wherein  it  was  stated  that although  a  prosecution was recommended, the order  of  the Ministry  of  Commerce and Industry was that  the  appellant would be dealt with departmentally.  On September 19,  1952, the Magistrate, by his order, approved of the closing of the investigation,  discharged the appellant from his  bail  and directed that the sum of Rs. 10,000 seized from him, was  to be  returned  to the complainant.  The  prosecution  of  the appellant was, 1050 however,  recommenced  on February II,, 1954,  on  the  same materials and same allegations but on a fresh complaint.    It, was contended on behalf of the appellant, that once a sanction  had  been  refused then that was the  end  of  the prosecution for all times.  If once the sanction was refused it  could not ever be granted later on. If  the  prosecution had  been  dropped, then it could not be revived in  a  case where a. sanction was necessary prior to a prosecution,  and a  promise not to prosecute prevented a  reconsideration  of the matter.  Lastly, it was urged that in the  circumstances of  the case it was an abuse of the process of the court  to allow  a  prosecution to be recommenced after  it  had  been withdrawn.    We  have  examined  the  correspondence  which  has  been referred  to in the petition for special leave and which  is to be found on the record of this case.  There is nothing in them  to  establish the allegation that a sanction  for  the prosecution  of the appellant was positively  refused.   All that  is indicated is that the Government chose  to  proceed against the appellant departmentally.  It can hardly be said that  in doing so the Government had positively  refused  to grant  sanction  for  the  prosecution  of  the   appellant. Indeed,  it  may be legitimately said  that  the  Government preferred to &wait the result of a departmental enquiry.  If that  enquiry  exonerated  the appellant  the  occasion  for granting  a sanction may not arise.  If, on the other  band, the departmental enquiry established the allegation  against the   appellant,  the  Government  might  find   itself   in possession  of  more  material than that  disclosed  by  the police  investigation on which to decide whether a  sanction should  or should not be granted.  We cannot read  into  the correspondence, as was suggested on behalf of the appellant,

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that  there was a promise on the part of the Government  not to prosecute the appellant.    It is true that there was a final report and a withdrawal of  the  case before a Magistrate.  At the  stage  when  the withdrawal  took  place  the appellant was  still  a  public servant and the court could not take                             1051 cognizance  of the offence under s, 161 of the Indian  Penal Code  and  under  s.  5(2) of the  Act  without  a  previous sanction.  The withdrawal of the case at that stage meant no more  than  this  that  the  appellant  was  discharged.   A withdrawal  of a case resulting merely in a  discharge  does not  prevent  the prosecution being recommenced on  a  fresh complaint.   On February 11, 1954, when the fresh  complaint was  filed  the  appellant  was not  a  public  servant  and therefore the court could take cognizance without a previous sanction.    It  is unnecessary for us to say whether once a  sanction is  positively refused a fresh sanction cannot  be  granted, because we are satisfied, on the materials before us,  that, in  fact,  there  was no positive refusal  to  sanction  the prosecution of the appellant.    We  are  also  satisfied that the  circumstances  do  not establish  that there had been any abuse of the  process  of the  court  and  the provisions of s. 561A of  the  Code  of Criminal Procedure do not apply.    As  the  points urged in these appeals have  failed,  the appeals must, accordingly, be dismissed.                               Appeals dismissed. 134 1052