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PETITIONER: RUSTON & HORNSBY LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE ZAMINDARA ENGINEERING CO.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/09/1969

BENCH: RAMASWAMI, V. BENCH: RAMASWAMI, V. SHAH, J.C.

CITATION:  1970 AIR 1649            1970 SCR  (2) 222  1969 SCC  (2) 725

ACT: Trade  Marks  Act,  1940, s.  21--Trade  mark   deceiptively similar-Whether addition of word ’India’ distinguishes.

HEADNOTE: For  the infringement of its registered trade mark  "RUSTON" by the respondent’s trade mark "RUSTAM", the appellant filed a  suit  for permanent injunction.  The  respondent  pleaded that "RUSTAM" was not an infringement of "RUSTON" and stated that  the words "RUSTAM INDIA" were used.  The  trial  court dismissed  the  suit  holding that there was  no  visual  or phonetic similarity between "RUSTON" and "RUSTAM".  The High Court  in appeal, held that there was deceptive  resemblance between  the words "RUSTON" and "RUSTAM", but held that  the use  of  "RUSTAM INDIA" did not constitute  an  infringement because  the  appellant’s  engines  were.  manufactured   in England  and  the  respondent’s in  India,  and  the  suffix ’INDIA’ was sufficient warning that the engine sold was  not the  engine  manufactured in England.  Allowing  the  appeal this Court,     HELD: In an action for infringement when the defendant’s trade mark is identical with the plaintiff’s mark, the court will  not  enquire whether the infringement is  such  as  is likely to deceive or cause confusion. But where the  alleged infringement  consists  of using not the exact mark  on  the Register   but  something  similar  to  it,  the   test   of infringement  is the same as in an action for  passing  off. In  other words, the test as to the likelihood of  confusion or  deception arising from  similarity of marks is the  same both in infringement and, passing off actions. [225 H]     In the present case the High Court found that there  was deceptive resemblance between the word "RUSTON" and the word "RUSTAM"  and  therefore the use of the bare  word  "RUSTAM" constituted  infringement  of  the  appellant’s  trade  mark "RUSTON".   The respondent did not prefer an appeal  against the  judgment  of the High Court on this point and  it  was, therefore,  not open to him to challenge that  finding.   If the respondent’s trade mark was deceptively similar to  that of the appellant the fact that the word "INDIA" was added to the  respondent’s trade mark was of no consequence  and  the appellant  was  entitled  to  succeed  in  its  action   for

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infringement of its trade mark.  [226 B]     Millington v. Fox, 3 MV & Cr. 338 and Savillo  Perfumery June Perfect Ltd., 58 R.P.C. 147 at 161, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: 1966. Civil Appeal No. 1274 of 1966.     Appeal  by  special leave from the judgment  and  decree dated November 23, 1965 of the Allahabad High Court in First Appeal No. 208 of 1958.     K.S.  Shavaksha,  R.A.  Shah,  1.  B.  Dadachanji   arid Bhuvanesh Kumari, for the appellant. 223 S.K. Mehta, K.L. Mehta and Sona Bhatiani  for  respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     Ramaswami,  J.--This appeal is brought by special  leave from’;  the  judgment  of the  Allahabad  High  Court  dated NOvember 23,, 1965 in First Appeal No. 208 of 1958.     The   appellant   is  a  limited    liability    company incorporated  under  the  English  Companies  Act  with  its registered   office   at Lincoln, England.   It  carries  on business  in  the  manufacture and sale of  diesel  internal combustion engines and their parts and accessories.   Ruston Hornsby  (India) Ltd., a company registered in  India  under the  Companies Act, 1956 is a subsidiary of  the  appellant. The  respondent  is  a  firm carrying  on  business  in  the manufacture  and sale of diesel internal combustion  engines and their parts.  The appellant was a registered  proprietor of   the  registered trade mark Ruston  being   registration No.   5120   in Class 7 in respect  of  internal  combustion engines.    Ruston  and’  Hornsby  (India)  Ltd.,   is   the registered  user of the said trade mark and manufactures  in India and sells in India internal combustion. engines  under the  trade  mark  "RUSTON".   Sometime  in  June,  1955  the appellant   came   to.  learn  that   the   respondent   was manufacturing-   and  selling  diesel  internal   combustion engines under the trade mark "RUSTAM".  On July 8, 1955  the appellant  wrote..  through its attorneys a  letter  to  the respondent and called upon it to desist from using the trade mark  "RUSTAM" on its. engines as it was an infringement  of the  registered trade mark "RUSTON". The  defendant  replied that  "RUSTAM"  was not an infringement of "RUSTON"  as  the words  "RUSTAM  INDIA" was used.  On February 17,  1956  the appellant   instituted  a  suit  praying  for  a   permanent injunction  restraining  the.  respondent and  its   agents’ from  infringing the trade mark  "RUSTON".  On  January   3, 1958  the Additional District Judge, Meerut, dismissed   the suit holding that there was no visual or phonetic similarity between  "RUSTON"  and  "RUSTAM".  The  appellant  took  the matter  in  appeal  in the Allahabad  High  Court.   By  its judgment   dated November 23, 1965 the High Court held  that the  use  of the word RUSTAM by the  respondent  constituted infringement   of  the appellant’s trade mark  "RUSTON"  and the  respondent should be. prohibited from using  the  trade mark  "RUSTAM".  But the High Court proceeded to. hold  that the   use  of  the  words   "RUSTAM’  INDIA"  was   not   an infringement   because   the   plaintiff’s   engines    were manufactured  in  England and the defendant’s  engines  were manufactured  in  India.   The suffix  "India"  would  be  a sufficient warning that the  engine sold was not a  "RUSTON" engine  manufactured  in England and the respondent  may  be permitted’ to use the combination "RUSTAM INDIA". 224

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Section 21 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 states               "Subject  to the provisions of section 22,  25               and  26  the registration of a person  in  the               register  as proprietor . of a trade  mark  in               respect  of  any goods shall,  give  to  .that               person the exclusive right to. the use of  the               Trade  mark  in relation to those  goods  and,               without  prejudice  to the generality  of  the               ,foregoing  provision,  that  right  shall  be               deemed to be infringed’ by any person who, not               being  the ’proprietor of the trade mark or  a               registered  user thereof using by way  of  the               permitted  use, uses a mark identical with  it               or so nearly resembling it as to be likely  to               deceive  or cause confusion, in the course  of               trade, in relation to any goods in respect  of               which it is registered, and in such manner  as               to  render  the use of the mark likely  to  be               taken either--               (a) as being used as a trade mark; or               (b)  to  import  a reference  to  some  person               having the right either as a proprietor or  as               registered  user to use the trade mark  or  to               goods   with which such a person as  aforesaid               is connected in the course of trade."     The  distinction  between an infringement action  and  a passing off action is important.  Apart from the question as to.   the  nature      of  trade  mark  the  issue   in   an infringement ,action is quite different from the issue in  a passing  off action.  In a passing off action the  issue  is as follows:     .                   "Is the defendant selling goods so  marked                             as  to  be  designed  or  calculated to   lead               purchasers  to  believe  that  they  are   the               plantiff’s goods ?"                But  in an infringement  action the issue  is               as follows:                      "Is the defendant using a mark which is               the same as or which is a colourable imitation               of the  plaintiff’s registered trade mark ?"  It  very often happens that although the defendant  is  not using   the trade mark of the plaintiff, the get up  of  the defendant’s goods  may be so much like the plaintiff’s  that a clear case of passing off  would be proved.  It is on  the contrary  conceivable  that although the  defendant  may  be using  the  plaintiff’s mark the get up of  the  defendant’s goods  may  be  so  different  from  the  get  up.  of   the plaintiff’s goods and the prices also  may be so   different that   there  "would be no probability of deception  of  the public.  Nevertheless, in an action on the trade mark,  that is to say, in an infringement 225 action,  an injunction would issue as soon as it  is  proved that  the:  defendant is improperly  using  the  plaintiff’s mark.       The action for infringement is a statutory right.   It is  dependent  upon  the validity of  the  registration  and subject  to. other restrictions laid down in ss. 30, 34  and 35  of the  Act.  On the other  hand the gist of  a  passing off action iS that A is not entitled to represent his  goods as  the  goods of B but it is not necessary for B  to  prove that A did this knowingly or with any intent to deceive.  It is   enough  that  the  get-up  of  B’s  goods  has   become distinctive  of  them and that there is.  a  probability  of

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confusion  between  them and the goods of A.   No.  case  of actual  deception    nor any actual damage need  be  proved. At’ common law the  action was not maintainable unless there had  been  fraud  on  As part.   In  equity,  however,  Lord Cottenham  L.C.  in Millington v. Fox(1) held  that  it  was immaterial whether the defendant had. been fraudulent or not in  using  the  plaintiff’s  trade   mark   and  granted  an injunction  accordingly.  The common  law  courts,  however, adhered  to  their view that fraud was necessary  until  the Judicature  Acts,  by  fusing  law  and  equity,  gave   the equitable rule the victory over the common law rule.     The  two actions, however, are closely similar  in  some respects,  As  was observed by the Master of  the  Rolls  in Saville Perfumery  Ltd. v. June Perfect Ltd.(2).                     "The    Statute-   law    relating    to               infringement  of trade marks is. based on  the               same  fundamental idea as the law relating  to               passing-off.  But it differs from that law  in               two particulars, namely (I ) it is  concerned’               only  with one method of passing-off,  namely,               the use of a trade mark, and (2) the statutory               protection is absolute in the sense that  once               a  mark  is shown to offend, the  user  of  it               cannot  escape  by showing that  by  something               outside   the  actual  mark  itself   he   has               distinguished  his  goods from  those  of  the               registered   proprietor.    Accordingly,    in               considering  the question of infringement  the               Courts  have  held, and it  is  now  expressly               provided by the Trade Marks Act, 1938, section               4,  that  infringement takes place not  merely               by exact imitation but by the use of a mark so               nearly resembling the registered mark as to be               likely to deceive." In  an action for infringement where the  defendant’s  trade mark is identical with the plaintiff’s mark, the COurt  will not  enquire  whether the infringement is such as is  likely to  deceive  or  cause" confusion.  But  where  the  alleged infringement consists of using (1) 3 My & Cr. 338.             (2) 58 R.P.C. l47 at 161. 226 not  the exact mark on the Register, but  something  similar to. it, the test of infringement is the same as in an action for  passing  off        in  other words,  the  test  as  to likelihood  of  confusion  or  deception      arising   from similarity  of .marks is the same both in  infringement  and passing off actions. In the present case the High Court has found that there is a deceptive  resemblance between the word "RUSTON"   and   the ’word  "RUSTAM" and therefore the  use  of  the  bare   word ’,RUSTAM" constituted infringement of the plaintiff’s  trade mark  "RUSTON".   The respondent has not brought  an  appeal against the judgment of the High Court on this point and  it is,  therefore, not open to. him to challenge that  finding. If  the respondent’s trade mark is deceptively  similar  to. that  of  the appellant the fact that the  word  ’INDIA’  is added  to the respondent’s trade mark  is of no  consequence and the appellant is enitled to succeed in its action.n  for infringement of its trade mark.     We  are  accordingly  of the opinion  that  this  appeal should  be  allowed and the appellant should  be  granted  a decree restraining the respondents by a permanent injunction from infringing the plaintiff’s trade mark "RUSTON" and from using  it  in  connection  with the  engines  machinery  and accessories   manufactured  and sold by it under  the  trade

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mark of "RUSTAM INDIA".  The  appellant is also entitled  to an injunction restraining the respondent and its agents from selling  or  advertising for sale of engines,  machinery  or accessories  under  the-name   of   "RUSTAM"   or   "’RUSTAM INDIA".   The  appellant  ’is also.  granted  a  decree  for nominal  damages to the extent of Rs. 100/-.  The  appellant is further entitled to an order calling ’upon the respondent to  deliver     the appellant price-lists,  bills,  invoices and  other  advertising material bearing the mark  "’RUSTAM" or "RUSTAM INDIA". "The appeal is allowed with costs to  the above extent. Y.P.                                 Appeal allowed. 227