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PETITIONER: RUKMANI BAI GUPTA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE GOVERNMENT OF MADHYA PRADESH BHOPAL& ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT20/12/1974

BENCH: BHAGWATI, P.N. BENCH: BHAGWATI, P.N. MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN UNTWALIA, N.L.

CITATION:  1975 AIR  991            1975 SCR  (3)  72  1975 SCC  (1) 627  CITATOR INFO :  D          1976 SC 424  (2)  R          1976 SC1125  (7,11)

ACT: Madhya  Pradesh  Minor Minerals Rules, 1961  and  Mines  and Minerals  (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957,  S.  3(e)- Notification  by Central Government of minor  minerals-Scope of-Rules of business. Practice-Contention  not raised before authorities and  High Court-Whether   Supreme  Court  would  interfere   on   such contention.

HEADNOTE: The respondent-Government in exercise of the power conferred under  s.  15  of the Mines  and  Minerals  (Regulation  and Development) Act, 1957 made the Madhya Pradesh Minor Mineral Rules,-  1961 for grant of prospecting licences  and  mining leases  in respect of minor minerals.  ’Minor minerals’  are defined  in s. 3(c) of the Act, The Central  Government,  in exercise  of  the  power conferred under s.  3(e)  issued  a notification in 1958 declaring, inter alia, "limestone  used for  lime burning" to be a minor numeral.  The  notification was  amended in 1961 and the words "limestone used in  kilns for  manufacture  of lime used as  building  material"  were substituted. The  appellant  was a lessee under a quarrying lease  from 1961 to 1966 and it was renewed in 1966 for the period  1966 to 1971 for quarrying "limestone for burning".  Though there was no option for renewal in the later lease, the  appellant applied for renewal of the lease for "limestone for  burning as a minor mineral." As the application was not disposed  of in time it was deemed to have been refused and the appellant applied for review. Meanwhile, the 5th respondent applied for a quarrying  lease for  the same area and as this application was not  disposed of in time, it was also deemed to have been refused and  the 5th respondent also applied for review.      The   Deputy   Secretary   rejected   the   appellant’s application  on  the grounds,(a) that  the  quarrying  lease granted for "limestone for burning’s was null and void, because, after the 1961 notification the lease was not for a

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"minor  mineral" and hence no renewal could be granted of  a null and void lease, and (b) the application was not proper, because, the application was for "limestone for burning" and hence was not for a minor mineral.  The Deputy Secretary, by the  same  order, allowed the 5th  respondent’s  application observing that ’there was no other valid application,’  but, by  that  time,  an  application  by  the  appellant  for  a quarrying  lease  of.  "limestone used-in  kilns  for  manu- facture of lime for use as building material," filed by  the appellant abundanti cautela, was in fact pending before  the authorities. As  the  lease  deed  in favour of  the  5th  respondent  in pursuance of the grant of the quarrying lease by the  Deputy Secretary,   was  not  executed  in  time,  the   Additional Collector,  in exercise of his powers as a delegate  of  the State  Government.  extended the time for execution  of  the lease-deed and thereafter, a lease was executed in favour of the 5th respondent. The appellant’s application for a fresh lease was again  not disposed of in time and it was deemed to have been  refused. She  filed a review application and also a revision  against the  order  of the Addl.  Collector extending  the  time  in favour  of the 5th respondent.  The Deputy Secretary  agreed with  the  contention that the Additional Collector  had  no power  to  extend time but himself extended the  period  for execution  of  the lease deed and rejected  the  Appellant’s application for grant of a fresh lease in her favour.                              73 The appellant challenged the orders of the Deputy  Secretary but the High Court negatived the challenge, In  appeal  to  this Court it was contended,  (i)  that  the quarrying lease for 1966 to 1971 in favour of the  appellant was  not  void;  (ii)  the application  of  renewal  by  the appellant  was proper; (iii) no Power was delegated  to  the Deputy Secretary by the State Government to extend the  time for execution of the lease deed; and (iv) the sanctioning of the  lease in favour of the 5th respondent proceeded on  the wrong  basis that it was the only valid application for  the quarrying lease. Dismissing the appeal, HELD:(1) Both under the original notification of the Central Government  of  1958 and the amended  notification  of  1961 ’limestone’  was  contemplated to be used  for  burning  for manufacture  of  lime.   The only difference  was  that  for classification as a minor mineral under the former,  burning could  be by any means or process and the lime  manufactured could  be for any purpose including building material  while under  the latter, the burning should only be in  kilns  for the  manufacture of lime used only as building material  and for  no  other purpose.  Hence, the use  of  the  expression "limestone  for  burning" would not  indicate  whether  ’the limestone  referred to is a minor mineral or not,  for  that would  depend on how the limestone is to be burnt  and  for what purpose.  Moreover the proposition that the  expression "limestone  for  burning" could cover limestone as  a  minor mineral  is  borne  out by Schedule 3  of  the  Rules  which prescribes  a minimum output for "limestone  (for-burning)". Therefore,  it  could not be said that  merely  because  the mineral  for which the, quarrying lease was granted  to  the appellant was described therein as "limestone for  burning," it  was quarrying lease for a mineral which was not a  minor mineral. [78C-G] In  the present case, the application of the appellant.  the order  granting the lease, the rule (r. 29) under which  the power  was  exercised,  the  Form in  which  the  lease  was

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executed and the royalty stipulated, all indicated that  the quarrying leasewas in respect of a minor mineral;  that is it was really a quarry lease for"limestone  used  in kilns for manufacture of lime used as building material."It could  not,  in the circumstances. be  condemned  and  void. [78G-79C] 2(a)  When  column  6  of paragraph  4  of  the  application requires an applicant to state the mineral which he  intends to  mine, it is for the purpose of intimating to  the  State Government  the  mineral for which the  quarrying  lease  is applied  for.   So  long as the  description  given  by  the applicant  in  the column ’,is sufficient  to  identify  the mineral,  the object of requiring the applicant to give  the information would be satisfied and the application would not suffer from the fault of being vague or indefinite.  In  the present  case, the appellant Described the mineral  intended to  be  mined by her as "limestone for burning  as  a  minor mineral" that is.  "limestone for burning" which was a minor mineral  or  in  other words "limestone used  in  kilns  for manufacture of lime used as building material".   Therefore. the  application  for  renewal was in  respect  of  a  minor mineral  and the State Government was wrong in rejecting  it on the ground that it was not an application in respect of a minor mineral. [79D-G] (b)But  the  application  for  renewal  was   misconceived because there was no optionof renewal and hence the State Government was right in rejecting it. [80C] (3)The  Deputy  Secretary,  in  extending  the  time   for execution of the lease in favour of the 5th respondent,  did not act as delegate of the State Government, but in exercise of  the  power of the State Government under  the  Rules  of Business.   His order extending time was  therefore,  valid. [81B-C] (4)The State Government was in error in sanctioning  grant of  lease  in  favour of the  5th  respondent  ignoring  the application  of  the,  appellant; but  the  appellant  never raised this contention at any time before the State  Govern- ment  or the High Court and hence, this Court would  not  be justified  in  interfering  with  the  order  of  the  State Government on this ground. [80 E-G] 74

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil ’Appeal Nos. 612 &  613 of 1974. Appeals  by special leave from the judgment and order  dated the  5th  May, 1973 and 27th February, 1974  of  the  Madhya Pradesh  High Court in Misc.  Petns.  Nos. 552/72 and  Misc. Petn.  No. 675 of 1973 respectively. T.   S.  Krishnamurthy,  P. V. Lale and S. S.  Khanduja  and Sushil Kumar,for the appellant (In C.A. No. 612-13/74). I.   N.  Shroff,  for  respondents Nos.  1-3  (In  C.A.  No. 612/74) and respondents Nos. 1-4 & 6 (In C.A. No. 613/74). R.S.  Dabir  ,  V.  S.  Dabir,  N.  M.  Ghatate  and   S. Balakrishnan, for respondent No. 5 (In both the appeals). R. N. Sachthey, for respondent No. 4 (in C.A. No. 612/74.). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHAGWATI, J.-The Mines & Minerals (Regulation & Development) Act,  1957  (hereinafter  referred to as  the  Act)  divides minerals  into  two  classes,  namely,  minor  minerals  and minerals other than minor minerals, which may, for the  sake of  brevity,  be  referred to as major  minerals.   The  Act itself  makes provisions in sections 4 to 13 for  regulating

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the  grant  of  prospecting licenses and  mining  leases  in respect  of major minerals but so far as minor minerals  are concerned,  grant of prospecting licenses and mining  leases is  left  to be governed by rules to be made  by  the  State Government under section 15.  The Madhya Pradesh Government, in  exercise of the power conferred under section  15,  made the Madhya Pradesh Minor Minerals Rules, 1961 for regulating the-grant  of quarry lease in respect of minor minerals  and for  purposes  connected  therewith.   These  rules  are  ex hypothesi  applicable  only in relation to grant  of  quarry lease  in respect of minor minerals.  "Minor  minerals"  are defined  in section 3 (e) to. mean building stores,  gravel, ordinary  clay,  ordinary  sand other  than  sand  used  for prescribed purposes, and any other mineral which the Central Government  may,  by notification in the  official  Gazette, declare  to be a minor mineral.  The Central Government,  in exercise of the power conferred under section 3(e), issued a notification  dated  1st  June, 1958  declaring  inter  alia "limestones  used for lime burning" to be a  minor  mineral. This  notification was subsequently amended by  the  Central Government  by a further notification dated 20th  September, 1961 and the words "limestone used in kilns for  manufacture of lime used as building material" were substituted for  the words   "limestone used for lime burning".  The  result  was that  with effect from 20th September, 1961  only  limestone used  in  kiln  for manufacture of lime  used  for  building material  remained a minor mineral while limestone used  for burning for manufacture of lime for other purposes ceased to be  a  minor  mineral  and  became  a  major  mineral.   The appellant  was a lessee under a quarry lease of 25.32  acres of land situate in village Badari, Tehsil Kurwara,  District Jabalpur  granted  to  her  by  the  State  Government   for quarrying "limestone for burning" for a period of five years from 21st 75 June,  1961  to  20th June, 1966.   This  quarry  lease  was granted under the Madhya Pradesh Minor Minerals Rules,  1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) and it was in Form  V annexed  to  the Rules and contained clause (15)  giving  an option  of  renewal to the appellant for a further  term  of five  years.  Before the period of the quarry lease was  due to  expire, the appellant applied for renewal in  accordance with the provisions of the Rules and in the application  for renewal  against  column  6 of  paragraph  3  the  appellant described  the  mineral  which  she  intended  to  mine   as "limestone  for burning".  This application for renewal  was not disposed of by the State Government before the expiry of the quarry lease and it was, therefore, deemed to have  been refused  under rule 8(3).  The appellant thereupon  made  an application   for  review  under  rule  28  and  the   State Government,  by an order dated 24th December, 1966  made  in exercise  of the power conferred under rule  29,  sanctioned renewal  of the quarry lease to the appellant.  Pursuant  to this  order  a  quarry  lease  was  granted  by  the   State Government  in,  favour  of  the  appellant  for   quarrying "’limestone  for  burning" for a period of five  years  from 21st  June, 1966 to 20th June, 1971.  This quarry lease  was also in Form V annexed to the Rules but it did riot  contain clause (15) giving an option of renewal to the appellant. Even  though the last mentioned quarry lease granted to  the appellant  did  not  contain  an  option  of  renewal,   the appellant made an application dated 19th June, 1970 to  the State  Government for renewal of.the quarry lease which  was due to expire on 20th June, 1971.  This application was  in Form  I  annexed  to  the Rules  and  against  column  5  of

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paragraph  3, which required an applicant to  state  whether the application was for a fresh lease or for a renewal of  a lease  previously  granted, the appellant  stated  that  the application   was  for  renewal  of’  quarry   lease.    The application   was,  there-fore,  clearly  and  avowedly   an application  for  renewal  of the  quarry  lease  which  was subsisting   in  favour  of  the appellant  and  not   ’an application for a fresh lease.  Then again, what was  stated by  the  appellant against column 6 of paragraph 3  is  very material.  The appellant stated there that the mineral which she  intended to mine was "limestone for burning as a  minor mineral".  This application was not disposed of by the State Government before the expiry of the quarry lease and it was, therefore,  deemed to have been refused on 20th June,  1971. The appellant thereupon filed an application for review  on 1st July, 1971 under rule 28. Now,  sometime  after  the application for  renewal  of  the quarry  lease  was made by the appellant, respondent  No.  5 made an application dated 11th September, 1970 for, grant of a  quarry  lease  in  respect  of’  the  same  area.    This application  was  also in Form I annexed to  the  Rules  and against  column  6 of paragraph 3 it was , stated  that  the mineral which the applicant intended to mine-was  "limestone used  in  kilns  for manufacture of lime  used  as  building material".   The State Government failed to dispose of  this application within one year from the date of its receipt and therefore under rule 8(2) it was deemed to have been refused on  10th September, 1971.  Respondent No. 5 too had, in  the circumstances,  no  choice but to file  an  application  for review,under rule 28 on 11th September, 1971. 76 It appears that after the appellant had made the application for renewal, She felt that there might be some difficulty so far  as that application was concerned, and therefore,  with a view  to  err  on  the  safe  side,  she  made  another application  for grant of a fresh lease on 21st  June,  1971 immediately  after the expiration of the  subsisting  lease. This application in column 6 of paragraph 3 gave a full des- cription  of  the mineral which the  appellant  intended  to mine,  namely, "limestone used in kilns for  manufacture  of lime  for use as building material".  The  State  Government failed  to dispose of this application also within one  year from the date of its receipt and it was, therefore,by reason of  rule  8(2), deemed to have been refused  on  20th  June, 1972.  The appellant thereupon preferred an application  for review  under.  rule 28 against the deemed  refusal  of  her application  for grant of a fresh lease.  But before  that, the  two applications for review, one made by the  appellant on 1st July, 1971 and the other made by respondent No. 5  on 11th  September  1971,  were  disposed  of  by  the   Deputy Secretary exercising the power of the State Government by an ,order dated 19th May, 1972. The  Deputy  Secretary  by the order dated  19th  May,  1972 rejected the application for review made by the appellant on the ground that "limestone for burning" for which the quarry lease was granted to the appellant was a major mineral after the  issue of the notification dated 20th  September,  1961, and  hence the quarry lease granted by the Stale  Government under  the Rules was null and void and no renewal  could  be granted  of  such a null and void lease, and  moreover,  the application  for renewal made by the appellant was also  not proper  as it was an application for mining  "limestone  for burning"  which was a major mineral.  The  Deputy  Secretary also  by the same order allowed the application  for  review made by respondent No. 5 and sanctioned grant of a lease  to

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him,  as  the  area  had become  available  for  grant  and, according to the Deputy Secretary, "there was no other valid application for this area". The  appellant  being  aggrieved by the order  made  by  the Deputy  Secretary preferred a petition in the High Court  of Madhya   Pradesh   under  articles  226  and  227   of   the Constitution  challenging  the  validity of  that  order  on certain grounds.  But none of these grounds appealed to  the High Court and affirming the view taken by the Deputy Secre- tary, the High Court upheld the impugned order and  rejected the  petition.   The  appellant  thereupon  preferred  Civil Appeal  No. 612 of 1974 ,after obtaining special leave  from this Court. Now,  the main part of rule 22 provided that where a  quarry lease  is granted, a lease deed in Form V shall be  executed within  three months of the order sanctioning the lease  and if  no such lease is executed within that period, the  order sanctioning the lease shall be deemed to have been  revoked. The  quarry  lease  in favour of respondent  No.  5  should, therefore,  have  been executed within three months  of  the order  dated  19th May, 1972 sanctioning grant of  lease  to him.  Unfortunately,, however, without any fault on the part of respondent No. 5.     the  quarry  lease  could  not   be executed within the stipulated period                              77 of three months.. The order dated 19th May, 1972 sanctioning lease  in favour or respondent No. 5 would, therefore,  have stood  revoked  under  the main part of rule  22.   But  the proviso to that rule conferred power on the State Government to  permit the execution of the lease deed after the  expiry of  the period of three months if it was satisfied that  the applicant  for the lease was not responsible for  the  delay ’in  the  execution  of  the  lease  deed.   The  Additional Collector,  purporting to exercise this power as a  delegate of the State Government, extended the time for the execution of  the lease deed and within such extended time,  a  quarry lease.  was executed by the Addl.  Collector in  favour  of respondent No. 5. The appellant, therefore, added respondent No.  5 as a party respondent in her application  for  review and also filed an application for revision under rule  32B against  the  order  of the  Additional  Collector  granting extension  of  time  and executing the  quarry  lease.   The appellant  contended  that-the Additional Collector  had  no power  to  extend the time for the execution of  the  quarry lease  as  no such power had been delegated to  him  by  the State  Government  and in any event, no  extension  of  time could be granted after the prescribed period of three months had  expired and the order dated 19th May, 1972  sanctioning grant  of  lease  in  favour  of  respondent  No.  5   must, therefore,  be  deemed to have been revoked and  the  quarry lease must be held to be null and void, and an order  should be  made sanctioning grant of quarry lease in favour of  the applicant.   The Deputy Secretary, exercising the  power  of the  State  Government, by an order dated  29th  May,  1973, agreed with the contention of the appellant that the  power of  the State Government not having been delegated  to  him, the Additional Collector had no power to extend the time for the  execution of the quarry lease or to execute the  quarry lease on behalf of the State Government, but taking the view that  respondent No. 5 was not responsible for the delay  in the execution of the lease deed within the prescribed period of  three months the Deputy Secretary extended the time  for the execution of the quarry lease upto 29th August, 1973  in exercise  of  the power of the State  Government  under  the proviso to rule, 22.  Both the application of the appellant,

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one for review against the deemed refusal of her application for grant of a fresh lease and the other for revision of the order  of  the  Additional Collector  under  rule  32B  were accordingly rejected by the Deputy Secretary.  The appellant thereupon  preferred a petition in the High Court of  Madhya Pradesh  under  articles  226 and 227  of  the  Constitution challenging  the  validity  of  the  order  of  the   Deputy Secretary,  but the High Court negatived the  challenge  and dismissed  the  petition.  This led to the filing  of  Civil Appeal No. 613 of 1974 with special leave obtained from this Court. We  will first consider Civil Appeal No. 612 of  1974.   Two questions  arise for consideration in this  appeal.   First, whether  the quarry lease for the period 21st June, 1966  to 20th  June,  1971  granted by the State  Government  to  the appellant  was  null  and void; and  secondly,  whether  the application for renewal made by the appellant was proper  so as  to merit consideration by the State Government.  So  far as the first question is concerned, the High Court took  the view  that "limie stone for burning", for which  the  quarry lease was granted by the State Government to the  appellant, was  a major mineral at the date when the quarry  lease  was granted, and therefore, the quarry lease was null’ 78 and  void.   The  correctness of this  view  was  challenged before   us  on  behalf  of  the  appellant  and   we   find considerable   force  in  this  challenge.    The   original notification dated 1st June, 1958 described "limestone  used for  lime  burning" as a minor mineral but by  the  amending notification dated 20th September, 1961 only "limestone used in kilns for manufacture of lime used as building  material" was  regarded  as  a  minor mineral.   The  field  of  minor mineral,  in so far as it concerned limestone, was  narrowed down.   Formerly limestone used for burning for  manufacture of lime, whatever may be the uses to which such lime may  be put, whether as building material or for other purposes, was within  the  definition of ’minor mineral’,  but  after  the amendment,  it was only limestone used for burning in  kilns for  manufacture of lime used as building material that  was covered by the definition of minor mineral.  When  limestone is  used for burning for manufacture of lime for  industrial or   sophisticated  purposes  otherwise  than  as   building material, it would have to be of superior quality and  hence after  the  amendment, it was classified as  major  mineral, leaving  only  limestone  used  for  burning  in  kilns  for manufacture of lime used as building material to be regarded as  minor  mineral.  But in both cases,  whether  under  the original notification or the amended notification, limestone was  contemplated to be used for burning for manufacture  of lime.   The only difference was that in the former,  burning could  be  by any means or process  and  lime  manufactured could be for any purpose including building material,  while in  the latter, burning could be only in the kilns  and  for manufacture  of lime used only as building material and  for no  other  purpose.  It would, therefore, be seen  that  the mere use of the expression "limestone for burning" would  be ambig uous.   It  would not indicate whether  the  limestone referred  to  is a major mineral or a minor  mineral.   That would all depend on how the limestone is to be burnt whether in  kilns  or otherwise, and what is the use to  which  lime manufactured  by burning is to be put, whether  as  building material  or for other purposes.  The expression  "limestone for burning" would, therefore, equally cover limestone as a minor  mineral  and that is clearly borne out by  the  Third Schedule  to the Rules which prescribes a minimum output  of

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200 tonnes per acre per annum for "limestone (for burning)". It  cannot,  therefore,  be said  that  merely  because  the mineral for which the quarry lease was granted by the  State Government  to  the appellant was described  in  the  quarry lease as "limestone for burning", it was a quarry lease  for a major mineral.  Whether it was a quarry lease for a  minor mineral  or a major mineral would have to be  gathered  from the   other   provisions  of  the  quarry  lease   and   the circumstances surrounding its execution. Now in the present case the quarry lease was granted to  the appellant  pursuant to the order dated 24th  December,  1966 made  by  the  State Government it on  the  application  for renewal made by the appellant.  The application for renewal was  in  Form  I annexed to the Rules  which  was  the  form prescribed  by the Rules for an application for grant  of  a quarry  lease  for a minor mineral.  The  order  dated  24th December, 1966 also treated the application of the appellant as  one made for a quarry lease for a minor  mineral  under the  Rules  and sanctioned renewal of the  quarry  lease  in favour of the appellant in exercise 79 of  the power under rule 29, which was a power  exerciseable in relation to grant or renewal of a quarry lease in respect of  a  minor mineral.  The quarry lease was also in  Form  V annexed  to  the Rules which is the form  prescribed  for  a quarry  lease  in respect of a minor mineral.   The  royalty stipulated  in  the quarry lease was Rs. 2/- per  tonne  and that  also  clearly indicated that the quarry lease  was  in respect of a minor mineral.  Vide the First Schedule to  the Rules.  It is, therefore, clear that though the mineral  for which  the  quarry lease was granted to  the  appellant  was described as "limestone for burning", it was a quarry  lease for "limestone for burning" as a minor mineral, that is, for "limestone  used  in kilns for manufacture of lime  used  as building material" and it could not in the circumstances  be condemned as null and void. That  takes us to the second question, namely,  whether  the application  for renewal made by the appellant was proper  ? The  only ground on which the State Government rejected  the application  for  renewal  was  that  against  column  6  in paragraph 3 the mineral which the appellant intended to mine was described as "limestone for burning as a minor mineral". The  State  Government  took the view,  and  this  view  was affirmed by the High Court, that "limestone for burning" was a  major  mineral  and  the  application  for  renewal  was, therefore,  an application for a quarry lease for  a  major mineral and the State Government was not competent to  grant it under the Rules.  We do not think this view taken by  the State Government and approved by the High Court is  correct. It rests on too strict a construction of the application for renewal ignoring the substance of the matter.  When column 6 of paragraph 3 of Form V requires an applicant to state  the mineral  which he intends to mine, it is for the purpose  of intimating to the State Government as to what is the mineral for which the quarry lease is applied for by the  applicant. So  long as the description given by the  appellant  against column  6  of  paragraph 3 is  sufficient  to  identify  the mineral,  the  object  of requiring the  applicant  to  give information  against  column  6  of  paragraph  3  would  be satisfied  and  the application would not  suffer  from  the fault  of  being vague or indefinite and the  only  question then would be whether the mineral mentioned there is a minor mineral.   Here  in the present case, against  column  6  or paragraph  3  the  mineral  intended  to  be  mined  by  the appellant was described as "limestone for burning as a minor

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mineral".   The  words "as a minor mineral"  following  upon "limestone  for burning" clearly indicated that the  mineral which the appellant intended to mine was not "limestone  for burning"  which  was  a major  mineral  but  "limestone  for burning" which was a minor mineral, that is, "limestone used in kilns for manufacture of lime used as building material". It cannot be gain said that it would have been better if the full  description  of  the mineral had  been  given  against column  6 of paragraph 3, but absence of reiteration of  the full  description cannot be regarded as having  any  invali- dating  effect  on the application for  renewal.   What  was stated by the appellant against column 6 of paragraph 3  was sufficiently specific to identify the mineral as  "limestone used  in  kilns  for manufacture of lime  used  as  building material"  and  that showed clearly beyond  doubt  that  the application  for renewal was an application in respect of  a minor  mineral.   We are, therefore, of the  view  that  the application for 80 renewal  was  a  proper application in respect  of  a  minor mineral  and the State Government was wrong in rejecting  it on  the  ground chat it was an application in respect  of  a major mineral. But that does not mean that the application for renewal made by  the  appellant  should have been-granted  by  the  State Government.  When the quarry lease in Form V was executed by the  State  Government in favour of the,  appellant,  clause (15)  of  that form was deleted.  There was,  therefore,  no option  of  renewal in the quarry lease  and  the  appellant could  not  lay any claim to renewal on the  basis  of  such option.   It  is  apparent that an  applicant  can  ask  for renewal  of the quarry lease only if there is an  option  of renewal in his favour.  Otherwise, all that he can apply for and obtain is a fresh lease.  The application for  renewal was,  therefore, misconceived and the State  Government  was entitled to reject it.  We accordingly uphold the  rejection of  the  application  for renewal by  the  State  Government though for different reasons. The appellant then contended that the order dated 19th  May, 1972  sanctioning  lease in favour of respondent No.  5  was invalid  since it proceeded on a wrong hypothesis  that  the application   of  respondent  No.  5  was  the  only   valid application  for  a quarry lease for this  area  before  the State  Government.  There was also before the State  Govern- ment, pointed out the appellant, the application made by her for  grant of a fresh lease and though this application  was later  in point of time than the application  of  respondent No. 5, the State Government was bound to consider it as  the State  Government  it could under rule  12(2),  for  special reasons to be recorded, grant "quarry lease" to an applicant whose  application  was received later in preference  to  an applicant  whose  application was  received  earlier".  Now, there can be no doubt that on 19th May, 1972, when the State Government  sanctioned  grant of quarry lease in  favour  of respondent No. 5, the application of the appellant for grant of  a  fresh  lease  was before  the  State  Government  and therefore, it would seem that the State Government ought  to have considered that application along with the  application ’of  respondent  No. 5 for the purpose of  deciding  whether quarry   lease  should  be  granted  to  the  appellant   in preference  to respondent No. 5 even though the  application of the appellant was received later than the application  of respondent  No. 5. Prima facie, the State Government was  in error in sanctioning grant of lease in favour of  respondent No. 5 ignoring the application of the appellant.  But we do

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not  think  we would be justified in  interfering  with  the order  of the State Government on this ground because we  do not find that this contention was at any time raised by  the appellant  before  the State Government or even  before  the High   Court.   The  appellant  could  have   ’raised   this contention  in the application for review preferred  by  her against the deemed refusal of her application for grant of a fresh lease and even if it was not raised at that stage, the appellant  had another opportunity to raise it and that  was in  either  of the two petitions filed by her  in  the  High Court.   But  the appellant did not avail  herself  of  this opportunity  and it was only at the hearing of  this  appeal before us that she for the first time 81 sought  to raise this contention.  We cannot permit that  to be done and we accordingly do not propose to entertain  this contention  and  interfere  with  the  order  of  the  State Government on this ground. So  far  as Civil Appeal No. 613 of 1974 is  concerned,  the appellant  contended that the Deputy Secretary had no  power to extend the time for the execution of the quarry lease  in favour  of  respondent  No.  5 as no  such  power  had  been delegated  to  him  by  the  State  Government.   But   this contention  is  based on the erroneous assumption  that  the Deputy Secretary, in extending the time for the execution of the  quarry lease, acted in exercise of the power  purported to have been delegated to him by the St-ate Government.  The Deputy  Secretary  did  not act as  delegate  of  the  State Government.  He acted in exercise of the power of the  State Government  under the Rules of Business.  The order made  by him  extending  the time for the execution,  of  the  quarry lease  was, therefore, an order of the State Government  and no infirmity attached to it on the ground that the power  to extend the time was not delegated to him. The appellant also tried to urge the same contention in this appeal  which  she urged in Civil Appeal No.  612  of  1974, namely,  that  the order dated 19th  May,  1972  sanctioning grant  of  lease in favour of respondent No. 5  was  invalid inasmuch as it was made without considering the  application of  the appellant  for grant of a fresh  lease.   But  for reasons  which  we  have  already  given  we  cannot   allow the,appellant to raise this contention for the first time at the hearing of these appeals before us and hence we need not express any final opinion upon it. The  result is that both Civil Appeals Nos. 612 of 1974  and 613  of 1974 fail and are dismissed with costs.  There  will be only one hearing fee in one set in both appeals. V.P.S.  Appeals dismissed. 7-L379Sup.CI/75 82