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PETITIONER: RUDRADHAR R. TRIVEDI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF MAHARASHTRA THROUGHTHE SECRETARY & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       15/07/1996

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. G.B. PATTANAIK (J)

CITATION:  1996 SCALE  (5)475

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R         We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner.      Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894  (for short,  the ’Act’) was published on July 11, 1953. Successive  declaration under  Section 6  came  to  be published in  the year  1955-56. Thereafter,  as many  as 40 awards have  been passed  determining the  compensation.  In this case  notice was issued by the second respondent on May 15, 1963  under Section  9 of  the Act pursuant to which the petitioner had  filed his  objections. Thereafter, the award came to  be  made  on  13.3.1985.  He  filed  writ  petition challenging the  validity of  the notification under Section 4(1)  and   the  declaration   under  Section  6.    Primary contention  raised   in  the  writ  petition  was  that  the petitioner had  not been  given  notice  under  Section  5-A whereas being a sub-lessee, he was an interested person. The High Court  was not  impressed with the argument. He further contended that  there was  inordinate delay  in passing  the award. On  that account, notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under  Section 6  were required to be set aside. That contention was also negatived. The learned single Judge by judgment  dated February  16,  1996  dismissed  the  writ petition. On  appeal, the  Division Bench  in  the  impugned order dated  June 12, 1996 in Appeal No.423/96 confirmed the same.      The learned  counsel for  the petitioner contended that since the  land in  an extent  of 567 acres was acquired for public purpose,  namely, establishment  of IIT, transfer  of 60 acres  of land to NITIE by the IIT by a resolution of the Government, viz.,  95 of  1970,  dated  June  26,  1970  was clearly  a   fraud  on   public  purpose.   Therefore,   the acquisition is  not valid  in law.  In support  thereof, the learned counsel  placed reliance  on the  judgment of Bombay High Court  in The  Industrial Development  & Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. [AIR 1989 Bom.156] and of  Delhi High  Court in Union of India vs. Nand Kishore

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[AIR 1982 Delhi 462]. We find no force in the contention. It is settled law that the land acquired for public purpose can be  transferred   to  another   public  purpose.   Paramount consideration will  be service  of the  public purpose.  The NITIE is  also one  of  the  public  institutions  imparting technical   education    in   the    region.   Under   these circumstances, the  transfer of 60.8312 acres of land handed over to  NITIE  pursuant  to  the  resolution  made  by  the Government is  not vitiated  by any  error of  law  nor  the notification under  Section 4(1)  and declaration  published under Section  6 become  bad in law. The aforesaid decisions bear no relevance.      It is  next contended  that in  view of  the inordinate delay in  passing  the  award,  the  acquisition  should  be required to  be quashed. We find no force in the contention. It is  seen that  in Maharashtra  State, as  per  the  rules prevailing, pursuant  to the  notice   under Section  5-A  a personal hearing  is required to be given to all the owners. In a  massive acquisition  like this, it would be well neigh impossible to the Land Acquisition Officer to pass the award within a  short span  of time.  Under  these  circumstances, necessarily delay  had occasioned in passing the awards. The petitioner had  evoked at  a belated  stage in  1985,  after practically 22 years. The High Court was, therefore, clearly right in refusing to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.      The SLP is accordingly dismissed.