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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6286  OF 2008

[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 11298/2004]

RUDRA PRATAP SINGH ... APPELLANT(S)

:VERSUS:

DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION AND ORS. ... RESPONDENT(S)

O R D E R

Leave granted.

Appellant  is  aggrieved  by  and  dissatisfied  with  the  judgment  and  order

dated  5.4.2004  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Allahabad  in  Civil

Miscellaneous  Writ  Petition  No.  12329/1000  whereby  and  whereunder  the  writ

petition  filed  by  him challenging  an  order  dated  12.4.1990 passed  by  the  Deputy

Director  of  Education,  U.P.,  modifying  the  order  dated  16.7.1987  passed  by  the

District Inspector of Schools (“DIOS”), was dismissed.

Appellant  was  appointed  as  a  Clerk  in  the  Janta  Uchhatar  Madhyamik

Vidyalaya,  Madanpur,  situated  at  Gola  in  the  District  of  Deoria.  It  is  a  private

institution. It is managed by a Committee of Management. However, it is governed by

the provisions of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act and the Regulations framed

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thereunder.  

Appellant  is  said  to  have  embezzled some amount  out  of  GPF deduction

cheques  which  were  issued  in  the  name  of  ex-Principal  of  the  said  school.

Indisputably, a departmental proceedings was initiated against him. A charge-sheet

containing 5 charges was drawn up. He was asked to show cause, pursuant whereto

cause was shown by him, inter alia,  contending that he had no role to play in the

matter. He denied and disputed the charges leveled against him. However, despite the

opportunities granted, he did not take part in the disciplinary proceedings.  

The Inquiry Officer submitted a report in the year 1986 finding him guilty of

the charges levelled. The Committee of Management - Respondent No.3, relying on or

on the basis the said report passed an order of dismissal.   

Admittedly,  in view of  the provisions  of  the said Act and the regulations

framed thereunder, approval of the District Inspector of Schools was necessary for

passing an order of dismissal. The order of punishment together with the records was,

therefore, forwarded to DIOS. Before the said authority also the appellant did not

appear.   

By reason of its Judgment dated 16.7.1987, the DIOS while holding that the

charges levelled against the appellant  were totally proved, was of the opinion that

from humanitarian point of view, in stead and in place of imposing a punishment of

termination of the services of the appellant, he should be reverted back to the initial

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scale of pay from the date of his suspension and the purported amount of Rs. 15,901/-

should be recovered from him in easy installments.   

Aggrieved  by  and  dissatisfied  with  the  said  decision  of  the  DIOS,  both

appellant  as  also  respondent  No.3  preferred  appeals.  The  Deputy  Director  of

Education, U.P., by reason of its order dated 12.4.1990, while allowing the appeal of

respondent No.3, dismissed the one preferred by appellant.  

Respondent No.1 – Deputy Director of Education also in his order opined

that all the five charges were serious ones.  It was directed:

“Therefore,  the  appeal  of  Manager  Janta  Uchhtatar  Madhyamik

Vidyalaya,  Madan  Pur  (Gola)  is  allowed  by  using  the  rights

enshrined under the rules made under Section 16G of Intermediate

Education Act and the Order of District Inspector of School dated

16.7.87 is set aside. The proposal for the dismissal of Shri Rudra

Pratap Singh from service is approved and the order is passed for

initiating the proceedings for immediate recovery of the amount of

embezzled  by  Shri  Singh.  Along  with  it,  appeal  of  Shri  Rudra

Pratap Sigh dated 25.7.87 is rejected.”   

Aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith, appellant filed a writ petition before

the High Court of Allahabad.  The High Court by reason of the impugned judgment

held that even if charge No.5 is excluded from consideration, the remaining charges

being serious ones, the quantum of punishment cannot be said to be disproportionate

thereto.  The writ petition was allowed in part, directing:

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“The writ petition is partly allowed. The orders of District Inspector

of Schools and Deputy Director of Education directing recovery of

Rs. 14,180/- from the  petitioner's salary is set aside. The rest of the

punishment are maintained.”

Appellant is, thus, before us.

Mr. Shiva Pujan Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant

would  contend  that  although  the  Inquiry  Officer  proceeded  ex-parte  against  the

appellant,  the  same would  not mean that  the Inquiry  Officer was  not required to

either record reasons in support of his finding or to arrive at the conclusion that the

charges have been proved on the basis of the materials on record.  It was contended

that keeping in view the fact that appellant denied and disputed all the charges and,

particularly, in view of the fact that a plea was raised that he was not responsible for

the acts of embezzlement and other purported misconduct, the Inquiry Officer in his

report  at  least  should  have  referred  to  the  materials  which  had  been brought  on

record by the Managing Committee of the said school,  to show as to how the said

charges were said to have been proved.  

In the facts and circumstances of this case, we are not persuaded to accept

the aforementioned submission of Mr. Singh. Charge Nos. 1 to 4 could be proved by

documents  maintained  in  the  school.  An  Audit  Report  was  also  available.  The

institution was a private institution. The terms and conditions of the services of the

appellant  were  governed  only  in  terms  of  the  regulations  framed under  the  U.P.

Intermediate  Education  Act  in  terms  whereof  certain  requirements  were  to  be

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fulfilled, before an order of dismissal could be given effect to. One of them, as noticed

hereinbefore, was to obtain the approval from the DIOS.   

The  DIOS  exercises  a  wide  jurisdiction.   He  must  have  considered  the

materials brought on record in the disciplinary proceedings. Even the said authority,

as noticed hereinbefore, has arrived at the conclusion that all the five charges framed

against appellant were serious ones and they have been proved. Appellant preferred

an appeal against the said order before respondent No.1. The said respondent also

arrived at a similar finding.

In the writ petition, the High Court was, therefore, concerned inter alia with

the question as to whether the respondent Nos. 1 & 2 acted within their jurisdiction in

terms of the provisions of the said Act and the Regulations framed thereunder.  

The fact that respondent Nos. 1 & 2 had jurisdiction to consider the entire

matter  is  not  in  dispute.   We  have  been  taken  through  the  orders  passed  by

respondent No. 2 and respondent No.1, respectively, and we find that the same contain

very detailed reasons.   

The principal contention raised by appellant before the High Court related

to the quantum of punishment. It was from that point of view, a further contention

was  raised  by  appellant  as  to  whether  charge  No.5  was  beyond  the  scope  of  the

inquiry.  The High Court proceeded on the premise that charge No.5 may be excluded

but  even  if  it  is  so,  having  regard  to  the  nature  of  charges  leveled  against  the

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appellant, imposition of punishment of dismissal of the services of the appellant was

held to be justified.   

In the aforementioned premise, we are of the opinion that no case has been

made out  for  interference  with  the impugned judgment.  This  appeal  is,  therefore,

dismissed.

...........................J (S.B. SINHA)

...........................J   (CYRIAC JOSEPH)    NEW DELHI, OCTOBER 17, 2008.