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PETITIONER: ROYAL TALKIES, HYDERABAD & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: EMPLOYEES STATE INSURANCE CORP.

DATE OF JUDGMENT09/08/1978

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. DESAI, D.A.

CITATION:  1978 AIR 1478            1979 SCR  (1)  80  1978 SCC  (4) 204  CITATOR INFO :  R          1980 SC2038  (3)  R          1984 SC1916  (8)  RF         1986 SC1687  (14)  RF         1992 SC 573  (11,38)

ACT:      Employes  Stale   Insurance   ACT,   1948,   S.   2(9), definitional  amplitude   and  consequential   fall-out   of statutory obligations-Whether  a cinema  theatre manager who has no  statutory obligation  TO run  a canteen  or  Private cycle-stand   but for  the better amenities of his customers and improvement  of his  business enters into an arrangement with another  lo maintain  a canteen  and a  cycle-stand and that other  employs, on  his own, workers in connection with The canteen  and The  cycle stand,  can be  held liable  for contribution as  the "principal  employer’  of  The  workmen although they  are engaged independently by the owner of the canteen or the cycle-stand.

HEADNOTE:      The appellants  are owners  of  theaters  in  the  twin cities  of  Hyderabad  and  Secunderabad,  where  fulls  are exhibited. Within  the same  premises as  the  theaters,  in every case, there is a canteen and a cycle stand, leased out to contractors  under instruments  of lease. The contractors employ their  own servants  to run the canteen and the cycle stand. In  regard to  persons so employed by the contractors the owners  of  the  theaters  were  treated  as  ’principal employers’ and  notices  of  demands  were  issued  to  them calling upon  them to  pay contribution  under the Employees State  Insurance  Act.  Thereupon  the  appellant  filed  an application under  s. 75  of the  Act before  the  Employees Insurance Court for a declaration that the provisions of the Act were  not application  to their  theaters and  that they were not  liable to  any  contribution  in  respect  of  the persons  employed  in  the  canteen  and  the  cycle  stands attached to  their theaters. The Insurance Court found "that the canteens  are meant  primarily for  the convenience  and comfort for  those visiting  the cinema theaters though in a few cases  the persons  in-charge of the canteens seem to be allowing the  general public  also to  have  access  to  the canteens" and  that the  cycle stands "are meant exclusively

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for the  convenience of  the persons visiting the theaters". The Insurance  Court held  that the  owners of  the theaters were, therefore,  principal employers  with reference to the persons employed  by the contractors in the canteens and the cycle stands  attached to  the  theaters  and  rejected  the application filed by the contractors under s. 75 of the Act. In appeal  the High  Court confirmed  the said  findings and hence the appeal by special leave.      Dismissing the appeal, the court ^      HELD: (1)  Law is  essentially the formal expression of the regulation of. economic relations in society. In view of the complexities  of  modern  business  organisations,  ’the principal employer’  is made primarily liable for payment of contribution "in respect of every employee, whether directly employed by  him or  by or  through an  immediate employer," under the  Insurance Act,  the main  purpose of  which is to insure all  employees in factories or establishments against sickness  and  allied  disabilities,  but  the  funding.  to implement the  policy of  insurance is  by contribution from the employers  and the employees. The benefits belong to the employees and are intended to embrace as extensive a circle 81 as is  feasible. In short the social orientation, protective purpose and  human A  coverage  of  the  Act  are  important considerations in  the statutory  construction, more weighty than mere logomachy or grammatical nicety. [83A, 85G-H, 86A- B]      (2)  In the  field  of  labour  jurisprudence,  welfare legislation and  statutory construction  which must have due regard to  Part  IV  of  the  Constitution,  a  teleological approach  and   social  perspective   must  play   upon  the interpretative  process.   ’The  reach   and  range  of  the definition of  ’employee’ in  s. 2(9)  of the  E.S.I. Act is apparently wide and deliberately transcends pure contractual relationships. [88C]      (3)  Clause (9) of s. 2 contains two substantive parts. Unless the person employed qualifies under both he is not an employee. Firstly  he must  be employed "in or in connection with" the  work of  an establishment.  The expres-  sion "in connection with  the work  of an  establishment’’ ropes in a wide variety  of workmen  who may  not be  employed  in  the establishment.   Some   nexus   must   exist   between   the establishment and  the work  of the employee but it may be a loose  connection.  "In  connection  with  the  work  of  an establishment" only  postulates some connection between what the employee  does and the work of the establishment. He may not do anything directly for the establishment concerned; he may  not   clo  anything   statutorily  obligatory   in  the establishment; he  may not  do anything  which is primary or necessary  for   the  survival  or  smooth  running  of  the establishment or  integral to the adventure. It is enough if the employee  does some  work which is ancillary, incidental or  has  relevance  to  or  link  with  the  object  of  the establishment. Surely,  the  amenity  or  facility  for  the customers who frequent the establishment has connection with the work  of the  establishment. the question is not whether without theat  amenity or  facility the establishment cannot be carried  on but  whether such  amenity or  facility  even peripheral may  be, has  not a  link with the establishment. Nor indeed  is it  legal ingredient that such adjunct should be exclusively  for the  establishment if  it is  mainly its ancillary. [88 D.G, 89 C]      The primary  test in  the substantive clause being thus wide, the  employees of  the canteen and the cycle stand may

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be correctly  described as  employed in  connection with the work of  the establishment.  A narrower  constriction may be possible but a larger ambit is clearly imported by a purpose oriented interpretation. The whole goal of the statute is to make  the   principal  employer  primarily  liable  for  the insurance of  kindred kinds  of employees  on the  premises, whether they  are  there  in  the  work  or  are  merely  in connection with  the work of the establishment. Merely being employed in  connection with  the work  of establishment, in itself, does  not entitle  a person  to be an "employee". He must not only be employed in connection with the work of the establishment but  also be  shown to  be employed  in one or other of  the three  categories mentioned  in s.  2(9)  (1). [89D-F]      (4) S.  2(9) (i) covers only employees who are directly employed by  the ’principal employer’. It is imperative that any employee  who is  not directly employed by the principal employer cannot  be eligible  under  s.  2(9)  (i).  In  the present case  the employees  concerned  are  admittedly  not directly employed by the cinema proprietors. [89F-G] 82      (5)  The language  of s.  2(9) (ii)  is  extensive  and diffusive imaginatively  embracing all possible alternatives of employment by or through an independent employer. In such cases  the  principal  employer  has  no  direct  employment relationship since  the immediate  employer of  the employee concerned is  someone else.  Even so  such an employee if he works (a) on the premises of the establishment, or (b) under the supervision  of the  principal employer  or his agent on work  which   is  ordinarily   part  of   the  work  of  the establishment or which is preliminary to the work carried on in or  incidental to  the  purpose  of  the  establishment", qualifies under  s. 2(9)  (ii).  The  plurality  of  persons engaged in  various activities  who  are  brought  into  the definitional net  is wide  and considerable  and all that is necessary is  that the  employee be  on the  premises or  be under the  supervision of  the  principal  employer  or  his agent. [89G-H, 90A-B]      (6)  A thing  is incidental  to another  if  it  merely appertains to  something else  as primary.  Surely such work should not  be extraneous  or contrary to the purpose of the establishment but  need not  be integral  to it either. such depends upon  time and place, habits and appetites, ordinary expectations and social circumstances. Keeping a cycle stand and running  a canteen  are incidental  or adjuncts  to  the primary purpose of the theatre. [90D-E]      (7)  May be  punctilious sense  of grammar  and  minute precision of  language may  sometimes lend unwitting support to narrow  interpretation. But language is the handmaid, not mistress. Maxwell  and Fowler  move along different streets, sometimes. It  will defeat  the objects  of the  statute  to truncate its semantic sweep and throw out of its ambit those who obviously  are within  the benign  contemplation of  the Act, when,  as in  s. 2(9)  the  definition  has  been  cast deliberately in  the widest  terms  and  the  draftsman  has endeavoured to  cover every  possibility so  as not  exclude even distant  categories  of  men  employed  either  in  the primary work  or cognate  activities.  Salvationary  effort, when the  welfare of  the weaker  sections of society is the statutory object  and is  faced with  stultifying effect, is permissible judicial  exercise. The findings, in the instant case, arc  correct and the conclusion reached deserves to be affirmed. [90G-H, 91A-B]      [In  view   of  the  fact  that  the  contribution  was determined without hearing under s. 45-A of the ESI Act, the

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Court directed  the Corporation authorities to give a, fresh hearing to  the principal  employers i.e.  the employers  in tune with the ruling of this Court in the Central Press case [19771] 3 SCR 351.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal  Nos.  122 1244 of 1978.      Appeal by  special leave  from the  Judgment and  order dated 23-11-77  of the  Andhra Pradesh High Court in appeals against orders  Nos. 236,  237, 241 to 243, 246, 253 to 260, 287, 288, 293, and 294 of 1977.      Y. S.  Chitale, A.  A. Khan, J. B. Dadachanji and D. N. Mishra for the appellants.      S.V.  Gupte,  Attorney  General  of  India  and  Girish Chandra for the Respondent. 83      The order of the Court was delivered by      KRISHNA  IYER,   J.  Law   is  essentially  the  formal expression  of  the  regulation  of  economic  relations  in society. That  is the  key note  thought in this case" where the core  question is:  who is  an employee  ? Secondly,  to decide the  meaning of  a welfare  measure a feeling for the soul of  the  measure  is  a  surer  guide  than  meticulous dissection  with   lexical  tools  alone.  The  definitional amplitude of  ’employee’ in  section 2(9)  of the Employees’ State Insurance  Act, 1948,  (hereinafter referred to as the Act), is  the sole contentious issue canvassed by counsel at the bar. We have heard Sri Chitale for the appellant and the learned Attorney  General for  the respondent-Corporation at some length,  because a  decision by  this Court  as to  the width  of  the  definition  and  consequential  fall-out  of statutory obligations  may cover  a considerable  number  of establishments. We  have granted  leave to  appeal  on  that basis and  now proceed to study the anatomy of ’employee’ as defined in section 2(9) of the Act.      A brief  factual narration  may help  get a hang of the case. The  High Court,  before which  the present appellants had  filed   fruitless  appeals  has  summarised  the  facts succinctly thus:           "The appellants are owners of theatres in the twin      cities of  Hyderabad and  Secunderabad, where films are      exhibited. Within  the same premises as the theatre, in      every case,  there in  a canteen and a cycle stand. The      canteen  and   the  cycle   stand  are  leased  out  to      contractors under instruments of lease. The contractors      employ their  own servants  to run the can teen and the      cycle stand.  In regard  to persons  so employed by the      contractors, the  owners of  the theatres  were treated      ’Principal Employers’ and notices of demand were issued      to them calling upon them to pay contribution under the      employees’ State Insurance Act. Thereupon the owners of      theaters filed  application under  Section  75  of  the      Employees State  Insurance  Act  before  the  Employees      Insurance Court  for a  declaration that the provisions      of the  Act were  not applicable  to their theaters and      that they  were  not  liable  to  any  contribution  in      respect of  the persons  employed in  the can teens and      cycle stands attached to the theaters.      The Insurance Court, on a consideration of the relevant lease  deeds  and  other  evidence,  noticed  the  following features in regard to the running of the canteens:-           "(1) All these  canteens are  within the premisses

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    of the cinema theatres (2) A few of these canteens have      access 84      directly from  the abutting  roads  whereas  the  other      canteens can  be reached  only through  the open  space      inside the cinema theatres. (3) The persons running the      canteens are  them selves responsible for equipping the      canteens with the necessary furniture and for providing      the required utensils. (4) The Managements of all these      Cinema theaters  pay the  electricity  charges  due  in      respect of  these canteens.  (5) The persons working in      these canteens  are employed only by the contractors or      tenants  who  run  the  canteens  and  they  alone  are      responsible for  the salaries  payable to  the persons.      (6)  The   managements  of  the  cinema  theatres  have      absolutely no  supervisory  control  over  the  persons      employed in  these canteens. (7) These canteens have to      be run  only  during  the  show  hours.  This  is  made      abundantly clear  by Exhibits  P-7 to  P-10 and in the,      face of  the recitals  contained in these agreements, I      am not  prepared to  accept P.W.  1’s evidence that the      tenants of these canteens are at liberty to run them at      other times  also. In  particular Exhibit P-10 provides      that the  lessee shall run the business only during the      show hours  and that  it shall be closed as soon as the      cinema shows  are closed.  (8) A  few  of  the  persons      working  in  the  can  teens  are  allowed  inside  the      auditorium during the interval for vending eatables and      beverages. They  can enter the auditorium a few minutes      before  the   interval  and   can  remain   inside  the      auditorium for a few minutes after the interval. (9) It      is seen  Freon Ex-P.  10 that  the  management  of  the      cinema theatre  had reserved  to itself  the  right  to      specify what  types of  things should  be sold  in  the      canteen. The  canteens are  expected to maintain a high      degree of  cleanliness and  sanitation.  (10)  In  some      cases the managements of the theatres reserve the right      to enter  the canteen  premises at  all reasonable time      for purposes of check and inspection. Ex. P. 9 contains      a specific clause in that regard.      " These  features led  the Insurance Court to arrive at the following findings of fact.           "From the  several circumstance mentioned above it      is clear  that these  canteens are  meant primarily for      the convenience  and  comfort  of  those  visiting  the      cinema theatres  though in  a few  cases the persons in      charge of  canteens seem  to be  allowing  the  general      public also  to have  access  to  the  canteens  taking      advantage of  the fact that the canteens can be recalls      directly from the abutting road. But this Circum- 85      stance does  not by itself indicate that these canteens      are A  thrown open  to  the  general  public  as  other      hotels, restaurants or eating houses."      In regard to cycle stands, the Insurance Court held:           "Hence it may safely be concluded that these cycle      stands are  meant exclusively  for the  convenience  of      persons visiting B, the theaters."      The Insurance  Court found  that the owners of theaters where principal  employers with  reference  to  the  persons employed by contractors in the canteens and the cycle stands attached to the theaters and rejected the applications filed by the owners of theaters under Sec. 75 of the Act.      The disappointed theatre owners appealed under Sec. 82, without avail,  but undaunted.  moved this Court for Special

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Leave to Appeal which we have granted, as stated earlier, so that we  may discuss  the facets of the definitional dispute in some detail and lay down the law on the main question.      A conspectus of the statute, to the extent relevant, is necessary to  appreciate the  controversy at  the  Bar.  The statutory personality and the social mission of the Act once projected, the  resolution of the conflict of interpretation raised in  this case  is simple.  Although, technically, the Act is  a pre-Constitution  one, it  is a  post-Independence measure and  shares the  passion  of  the  Constitution  for social justice.  Articles 38, 39, 41, 42,,43 and 43-A of the Constitution show  concern for  workers and  their  welfare. Since Independence,  this legislative  motivation has  found expression in  many enactments.  We are  concerned with  one such law  designed to confer benefits on this weaker segment in situations  of distress as is apparent from the Preamble. The machinery  for state insurance is set up in the shape of a Corporation  and subsidiary  agencies.  All  employees  in Factories or establishments are sought to be insured against sickness  and  allied  disabilities,  but  the  funding,  to implement the  policy of insurance, is by contributions from the employer  and the  employee. In view of the complexities of modern  business organisation  the principal  employer is made  primarily  liable  for  payment  of  contribution  "in respect of  every employee, whether directly employed by him or by  or through  an immediate  employer". Of course, where the employee  is not  directly employed  by him  but through another ’immediate  employer’,  the  principal  employer  is empowered to  recoup the  contribution paid by him on behalf of the  immediate employer (s. 41). There is an Inspectorate to   supervise   the   determination   and   levy   of   the contributions. 86 There is  a  chapter  prescribing  penalties;  there  is  an adjudicating  machinery   and  there   are  other   policing processes for  the smooth  working  of  the  benign  project envisaged by  the Act.  The benefits belong to the employees and are  intended to  embrace is  extensive a  circle as  is feasible.  In  short,  the  social  orientation,  protective purpose  and   human  coverage  of  the  Act  are  important considerations in  the statutory  construction, more weighty than mere logomachy or grammatical nicety.      With this prefatory statement we may go straight to the crucial definition.  The essential  question  is  whether  a cinema theatre  manager who  has no  statutory obligation to run a  canteen or  provide a cycle stand but, for the better amenities of  his customers and improvement of his business, enters into  an  arrangement  with  another  to  maintain  a canteen and  a cycle  stand and  that other  employs, on his own, workers  in connection  with the  canteen and the cycle stand, can  be held liable for contribution as the principal employer  of   the  workmen   although  they   are   engaged independently by  the owner  of the  canteen  or  the  cycle stand. It  is common  ground  that  there  is  no  statutory obligation on  me part  of the appellants to run canteens or keep cycle  stands. It  is common  ground? again.  that  the workers with whom we are concerned are not directly employed by the  appellants and,  if we  go by the master and servant relationship  under  the  law  of  contracts,  there  is  no employer-employee nexus.  Even so,  it has  been  held  cone currently by  the Insurance  Court and  the High  Court that "canteens  are  meant  primarily  for  the  convenience  and comfort of  persons visiting  the theatres  and  the  cycle- stands are  meant exclusively  for the  convenience  of  the persons visiting theatres" and "that the persons employed in

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the‘ canteens  and cycle stands are persons employed on work which is  ordinarily part  of the  work of  the  theatre  or incidental to  the purpose  of the  theatres. In relation to the  person  so  employed,  therefore,  the  owners  of  the theatres are principal employers.’’ The High Court proceeded further to affirm:-           "By undertaking  to run  the canteen  or the cycle      stand the  contractor has  undertaken the  execution of      the whole  or part of the work which is ordinarily part      of the work of the theatre of the principal employer or      is incidental  for the  purpose of the theatre. We have      already held that the running of canteen or cycle stand      is work  carried on  in connection with the work of the      theatre, work  which may  be considered  to  be  either      ordinarily  part   of  the   work  of  the  theatre  or      incidental to  the purpose of the theatre. If so, there      is no  reason why the contractor should not come within      the definition of ’immediate employer’ ". 87      Before  us   counsel  have   mainly  focussed   on  the definition of   "employee" since the short proposition which creates or  absolves liability  of the appellants depends on the canteen  workers and  the cycle  stand attendants  being ’employees’ vis-a-vis  the theatre owners. There is no doubt that a  cinema theatre  is an  ’establishment’ and  that the appellants, as  theatre  owners,  are  principal  employers, being persons responsible for the supervision and control of the establishment. Admittedly, the canteens and cycle stands are within  the theatre premises. Within this factual metrix let us see if the definition in S. 2(9) will fit.      We may  read the  definition of  "employee" once  again before analysing the components thereof -           2(9) "employee"  means  any  person  employed  for      wages in or in connection with the work of a factory or      establishment to which this Act applies, and           (i)  who is  directly employed  by  the  principal                employer or  any work  of, or  incidental  or                preliminary to or connected with the work, of                the factory  or establishment,  whether  such                work is  done by  the employee in the factory                or establishment or elsewhere; or           (ii) who is  employed by  or through  an immediate                employer on  the premises  of the  factory of                establishment or under the supervision of the                principal employer or his agent on work which                is ordinarily part of the work of the factory                or establishment  or which  is preliminary to                the work  carried on  in or incidental to the                purpose of the factory or establishment, or           (iii)whose services are temporarily lent or let on                hire to  the principal employer by the person                with whom  the person  whose services  are so                lent or  let  on  hire  has  entered  into  a                contract of  service; and includes any person                employed for wages on any work connected with                the  administration   of   the   factory   or                establishment  or  any  part,  department  or                branch thereof  or with  the purchase  of raw                materials for, or the distribution or sale of                the   products    of,    the    factory    or                establishment; but does not include:-                (a)  any member of the Indian naval, military                     or air forces; or 88                (b)  any  person   so  employed  whose  wages

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                   (excluding  remuneration  for  overtimes                     work)  exceed   five  hundred  rupees  a                     month:-           Provided that  an employee  whose wages (excluding      remuneration for  overtime  work)  exceed  five-hundred      rupees a  month at  any time  after and not before, the      beginning of the contribution period, shall continue to      be an employee until the end of that period.      The reach  and range  of the  definition is  apparently wide   and    deliberately   transcends   pure   contractual relationships. We  are in the field of labour jurisprudence, welfare legislation  and statutory  construction which  must have  due   regard  to   Part  IV  of  the  Constitution.  A teleological approach  and social perspective must play upon the interpretative process.      Now here  is  a  break-up  of  Sec.  2(9).  The  clause contains two  substantive parts.  Unless the person employed qualifies under  both he  is not  an ’employee’.  Firstly he must be  employed "in  or in  connection with the work of an establishment. The  expression "in  connection with the work of an  establishment" ropes in a wide variety of workmen who may not  be employed in the establishment but may be engaged only in  connection with the work of the establishment. Some nexus must  exist between  the establishment and the work of the  employee   but  it  may  be  a  loose  connection.  ’in connection  with   the  work   of  an   establishment’  only postulates some  connection between  what the  employee does and the  work of  the establishment.  He may not do anything directly for  the establishment;  he  may  not  do  anything statutorily obligatory in the establishment; he may not even do any  thing which is primary or necessary for the survival or smooth  running of  the establishment  or integral to the adventure. It is enough if the employee does some work which is ancillary,  incidental or  has relevance  to or link with the object  of the  establishment.  Surely,  an  amenity  or facility for  the customers  who frequent  the establishment has connection  with the  work  of  the  establishment.  The question is not whether without that amenity or facility the establishment cannot  be carried on but whether such amenity or facility, even peripheral may be, has not a link with the establishment. Illustrations  may not  be exhaustive but may be informative.  Taking the  present case,  an establishment like a  cinema theatre is not bound to run a canteen or keep a cycle  stand (in Andhra Pradesh) but no one will deny that a can  teen service,  a toilet  service, a car park or cycle stand, a booth foresail of catchy film literature on actors, song hits  and the  like, surely  have connection  with  the cinema theatre and even further the venture. 89 On the  other hand,  a book-stall  where scientific works or tools are  A sold  or stall  where religious  propaganda  is done,  may   not  have   anything  to  do  with  the  cinema establishment and  may, therefore,  be excluded on the score that the employees do not do any work in connection with the establishment, that  is, the theatre. In the case of a five- star hotel,  for instance,  a  barber  shop  or  an  arcade, massage  parlour,   foreign  exchange   counter  or  tourist assistance counter  may be  run by  some one  other than the owner of  the establishment  but the employees so engaged do work in  connection With the establishment or the hotel even though there  is no obligation for a hotel to, maintain such an ancillary attraction. By contrast, not a lawyer’s chamber or architect’s  consultancy.  Nor  indeed,  is  it  a  legal ingredient that  such adjunct  should be exclusively for the establishment, if it is mainly its ancillary.

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    The primary  test in  the substantive clause being thus wide, the  employees of  the canteen and the cycle stand may be correctly  described as  employed in  connection with the work of  the establishment.  A narrower  construction may be possible but  a  larger  ambit  is  clearly  imported  by  a purpose-oriented  interpretation.  The  whole  goal  of  the statute is  to make  the principal employer primarily liable for the  insurance of  kindred kinds  of  employees  on  the premises, whether  they are  there in the work or are merely in connection with the work of the establishment.      Merely being employed in connection with the work of an establishment, in  itself, does  not entitle  a person to be ’employee’. He  must not only be employed in connection with the work  of the  establishment but  also  be  shown  to  be employed in  one or  other of the three categories mentioned in Sec. 2(9).      Sec. 2(9)  (i) covers  only employees  who are directly employed by  the principal  employer. Even  here, there  are expressions which  take in  a wider  group of employees than traditionally so  regarded, but  it is  imperative that  any employee who  is not  directly  employed  by  the  principal employer cannot  be eligible  under Sec.  2’(9) (i) . In the present case,  the employees  concerned are  admittedly  not directly employed by the cinema proprietors.      Therefore, we  move down to Sec. 2(9) (ii). Here again, the language  used is  extensive and diffusive imaginatively embracing all  Possible alternatives  of  employment  by  or through  all   independent  employer.  In  such  cases,  the ’principal employer’  has no  direct employment relationship since the ’immediate employer’ of the employee, concerned is some one else. Even so, such an employee, if 7-520SCI/78 90 he works  (a) on  the premises  of the establishment, or (b) under the supervision of the Principal employer or his agent ’‘on work  which is  ordinarily part  of  the  work  of  the establishment or which is preliminary to the work carried on in or  incidental to  the  purpose  of  the  establishment", qualifies under  Sec. 2(9)  (ii). The  plurality of  persons engaged in  various activities  who  are  brought  into  the definitional net  is wide  and considerable; and all that is necessary is  that the  employee be  on the  premises or  be under the  supervision of  the  principal  employer  or  his agent. Assuming  that  the  last  part  of  Sec.  2(9)  (ii) qualifies both  these categories,  all  that  is  needed  to satisfy that  requirement is  that  the  work  done  by  the employee must  be (a) such as is ordinarily (not necessarily nor statutorily)  part of  the work of the establishment, or (b) which  is merely  preliminary to  the work carried on in the establishment,  or (c) is just incidental to the purpose of the  establishment. No  one  can  seriously  say  that  a canteen or  cycle stand or cinema magazine booth is not even incidental to  the purpose  of the theatre. The cinema goers ordinarily find  such  work  an  advantage,  a  facility  an amenity and  some times  a necessity.  All that  the statute requires is  that the  work should  not be irrelevant to the purpose of  the establishment.  It is  sufficient if  it  is incidental to  it. A  thing is  incidental to  another if it merely appertains to something else as primary. Surely, such work should  not be extraneous or contrary to the purpose of the establishment  but need  not be  integral to  it either. Much depends  on  time  and  place,  habits  and  appetites, ordinary expectations and social circumstances. In our view, clearly the  two operations  in the  present  case,  namely, keeping a  cycle stand and running canteen are incidental or adjuncts to the primary purpose of the theatre.

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    We are  not concerned with Sec. 2(9) (iii) nor with the rest of the definitional provision.      Shri Chitale  tried to  convince us  that on  a  minute dissection of  the various  clauses of  the provision it was possible  to  exclude  canteen  employees  and  cycle  stand attendants. May-be,  punctilious sense of grammar and minute precision of  language may  sometimes lend unwitting support to narrow  interpretation. But  language  is  handmaid,  not mistress. Maxwell  and Fowler  move along different streets, sometimes. When,  as in  Sec. 2(9),  the definition has been cast deliberately  in the widest terms and the draftsman has endeavoured to  cover every possibility so as not to exclude even distant  categories  of  men  employed  either  in  the primary work  or cognate  activities,  it  will  defeat  the object of  the statute  to truncate  its semantic  sweep and throw out  of its  ambit those  who obviously are within the benign 91 contemplation of  the Act.  Salvationary  effort,  when  the welfare of  the weaker  sections of society is the statutory object and  is faced with stultifying effect, is permissible judicial exercise.      In this  view  we  have  no  doubt  that  the  findings assailed before  us are  correct  and  that  the  conclusion reached deserves to be affirmed. We do so.      Learned counsel  for the  appellants finally  submitted that, in  this event of our negativing his legal contention, he should be given the benefit of natural justice. We agree. The assessment of the quantum of the employers’ contribution has now  been made  on an  ad hoc  basis because they merely pleaded non-viability  and made  no returns. on the strength of Sec. 45A the contribution was determined without hearing. In the  circumstances of the case, -and the learned Attorney General has  no obiection-we  think it  right to  direct the relevant Corporation  authorities to give a fresh hearing to the principal employers concerned, if sought within 2 months from to-day,  to prove  any errors  or  infirmities  in  the physical determination  of the  contribution. Such a hearing in tune  with the ruling, of this Court in the Central Press case(1) is fair and so we order that the assessment shall be reconsidered in  the light  of a  de  novo  hearing  to  the appellants and  the  quantum  of  contribution  affirmed  or modified by fresh orders.      Before we  formally wind  up we  think it apt to make a critical remark on the cumbersome definition in Sec. 2(9) of the  Act  when  has  promoted  considerable  argument.  This reminds us  of the  well-known dictum or Sir James Fitzjames Stephen "that  in drafting it is not enough to gain a degree of precision  which a  person  reading  in  good  faith  can understand, hut  it is  necessary to attain if possible to a degree of  precision which  a person  reading in  bad  faith cannot  misunderstand."(2)      Subject to  this direction  we dismiss the appeals with costs (one set) . S.R.                                       Appeals dismissed (1)[1977] 3 S.C.R. 35. (2)Lux Gentium Lex-Than and Now 1799-1974 p. 7. 92