REPORTABLE

                  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA  CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3146 OF 2009 @ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.116 of  2008

Roy Estate      ……Appellant

Versus

State of Jharkhand & Ors.   …… Respondents

J U D G M E N T

HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.      

1. Leave Granted.

2. The facts  leading to  the  appeal  are  as  under: The  

property in dispute known as ‘Katras House’   built  over an  

area  of  1.7  acres  of  land  on  Circular  Road,  Ranchi  was  

purchased by Late Shri Ganesh Chandra Dey vide registered  

sale deed dated 26th January 1933.  World War-II broke out on  

3rd September  1939  on  which  the  Viceroy  promulgated  the

Defence of India Ordinance 1939 under which the Defence of  

India Rules  were issued.  On 25th April 1942, Rule 75 A was  

inserted in the Defence of India Rules empowering the Central  

Government to requisition any property necessary or expedient  

for  securing  the  defence  of  British  India  and  other  related  

matters.   Japan  entered  World  War-II  on  the  side  of  Nazi  

Germany on the 7th December 1941,  after  its  attack on the  

United States Seventh Fleet in Pearl Harbour, Hawai and soon  

after a string of victories over the Allies in South East Asia and  

upto Burma brought the Imperial  Japanese Army to India’s  

Eastern doorstep. It  was thereafter thought prudent to shift  

the headquarters of the Indian Army’s Eastern Command from  

Kolkata to Ranchi.  Vast areas of  land and other residential  

property were accordingly requisitioned under Rule 75 (A) ibid.  

Katras  House  too  was  requisitioned  for  this  purpose.   The  

World War ended in 1945 but the property continued to be  

remain  under  requisition.   The  Requisitioning  and  

Acquisitioning of  Immovable Property Act 1952 (  hereinafter  

called  ‘the  Act’)  was thereafter  promulgated and Section 23  

thereof provided that all the old requisitions were now deemed  

to have been made under Section 3 of the Act but by virtue of  

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an  amendment  made  in  1970  Section  6  (1-A),  the  Central  

Government was not authorized to retain any property under  

requisition  for  a  period  beyond  17  years.   The  Deputy  

Commissioner, Ranchi however, on a misconception of the law  

transferred  Katras  House,  undoubtedly  a  requisitioned  

property, to the Civil Surgeon, Ranchi without the consent of  

its  owner and on vacation of  the said property by the Civil  

Surgeon, vide by Order dated 30th April 1958, transferred the  

property  to  the  Principal,  Ranchi  Women’s  College  

(Respondent no.3 herein) under Section 11 (2) (b) of the Bihar  

Building  Lease  Rent  and  Eviction  Control  Act  1947  

(hereinafter  called  the  ‘Rent  Act’  )  subject  to  a  monthly  

payment of rent directly to the owner.  In July 1995, the then  

owner of the property through his attorney, filed an Eviction  

Title suit no.8 of 1995 under the provisions of the Rent Act for  

eviction  of  Respondent  no.3  alleging  that  the  college  was  a  

tenant in the demised premises.  Respondent No. 3 as well as  

the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi appeared in the said Suit  

as Defendants and filed their written statements.  Respondent  

no.3  took  a  categorical  stand  that  Katras  House  had  been  

requisitioned for  purposes of  the Army during World War-II  

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and had been allotted to it by the Deputy Commissioner under  

the Act, and an application for its vacation would lie before the  

Deputy Commissioner,  and as such the  Court  Civil  had no  

jurisdiction to entertain the Suit.   This  Suit  was eventually  

dismissed  in  default  for  non-prosecution  in  the  year  1998.  

The compensation payable under Section 8 (2) of the Act was,  

however,  regularly  paid  by   Respondent  no.3 to  the  owner.  

Katras House was purchased by Shri L.N. Dey from its owner  

by  a  registered  sale  deed  dated  9th January  2001  and  

pursuant thereto the necessary mutations were made in the  

revenue  record  and  it  is  the  admitted  position  that  the  

rent/compensation is now being received by the new owner.  It  

is the case of the Appellant that a letter dated 23rd November  

2002 was received from the Administrator, Ranchi Municipal  

Corporation that on inspection it had been found that Katras  

House  was  in  a  dangerous  and  uninhabitable  state  and  a  

direction  was  issued  under  Section  247  (1)  of  the  Ranchi  

Municipal Corporation Act 2001 that the building which had  

been declared as  dangerous, should either be demolished or  

subjected  to  extensive  repairs  to  make  it  habitable.   The  

Appellant  thereupon  served  a  copy  of  this  notice  on  the  

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Deputy Commissioner on 8th July 2003 requesting him to de-

requisition  the  building  so  that  it  could  be  demolished  or  

repaired,  as  the  case  may  be,  failing  which  there  was  a  

possibility  that the girls  residing in the building which was  

being used as a hostel,  may suffer some injury.  The request  

of the Appellant was accepted and an order was made by the  

Deputy Commissioner on 8th July 2003, de-requisitioning the  

property  and  directing  its  return  to  its  owner.   Vide  order  

dated 25th August 2003,  however, the Deputy Commissioner,  

in partial supersession of the order of 8th July 2003,  referred  

the matter  to the Secretary,  Human Resource Development,  

Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi and the Vice Chancellor,  

Ranchi University to take a final decision with respect to the  

ownership  and title  of  the  said  property.   On receiving  the  

revised  order,  the  Appellant  approached  the  Secretary,  

Department of Education on 14th October 2003 giving evidence  

as to his ownership of the property.  The Joint Secretary of the  

Ministry,  however,  wrote  a  letter  of  1st March  2004  to  the  

Secretary, Building & Construction Department to arrange for  

an inspection of the property and to ascertain as to whether it  

was unsafe and unfit for habitation.  The inspection was held  

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over  several  days  in  May  &  June  2004  and  a  report  was  

tendered that as the building had been constructed before the  

year  1919  and  as  the  quality  of  the  construction  had  

deteriorated,  the  building  was  no  longer  fit  for  habitation.  

This report was forwarded to the Secretary, Human Resource  

Development  Department  by  the  Chief  Engineer,  Building  

Construction Department on 21st June 2004 but it  appears  

that  no  result  followed  on  which  the  Appellant  filed   Writ  

Petition (Civil)  No.4955 of 2004 in the High Court seeking a  

direction to the Respondents, specifically to Respondent No.3  

to relinquish the possession of the property forthwith to the  

owner so that the building could be demolished or repaired to  

make  it  safe.   Respondent  No.3  filed  its  counter  affidavit  

admitting that Katras House had been originally requisitioned  

for  Army purposes during World War-II and had later been  

allotted to the Civil Surgeon and on its vacation by the Civil  

Surgeon,  had been allotted  to  the  respondent  on 30th April  

1958 under Section 11(2)(b) of the Rent Act and that it had  

been in use as a hostel for girls for more than 45 years.  The  

matter  was  heard  by  a  learned  Single  Judge,  who  in  his  

Judgment dated 20th September 2005 observed that it was not  

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possible  to  determine  the  question  of  right,  title  and  

possession  over  the  land  and  building  in  writ  proceedings  

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and that this  

matter  could  not  be  decided  by  the  Secretary,  Human  

Resource Development Department or the Vice Chancellor of  

the  Ranchi  University  and  therefore,  the  Order  dated  25th  

August 2003 was bad to extent.  It was, however, left to the  

Competent Authority under the ‘Act’ to determine whether the  

building in question should be de-requisitioned or retained by  

the Government.   

3. Aggrieved  by  the  aforesaid  Judgment,  the  Appellant  

preferred a Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench on  

6th January  2006,  but  simultaneously  pursued  the  liberty  

granted  by  the  Single  Bench  in  the  judgment  dated  

20th December  2005  and  filed  a  representation  before  the  

Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi (being the Competent Authority  

under  the  Act)  seeking an order  of  de-requisition  of  Katras  

House.   The  Deputy  Commissioner  by  his  Order  dated  

4th April  2006 ordered that the property should be released  

and  handed  over  to  the  Appellant  with  effect  from  

4th April 2006. Faced with this situation Respondent No.3, the  

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Principal, Women’s College, Ranchi filed Title Suit No.134 of  

2006 in the Court of the Munsif, Ranchi challenging the Order  

dated 4th April  2006 pleading  that  the  aforesaid  Order  was  

without  jurisdiction  and  also  seeking  on  interim injunction  

during  the  pendency  of  the  Suit.   The  Appellant  filed  its  

written statement on 2nd August 2006 pleading inter alia that  

the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred under Section 19  

of the Act, and also an application under Order VII, Rule 11 of  

the  CPC  that  the  question  of  jurisdiction  be  treated  as  a  

preliminary issue. This prayer was rejected by the Munsif vide  

Order dated 14th November 2006.  The Appellant thereupon  

preferred Writ  Petition (Civil)  No.7497 of 2006 pleading that  

the proceeding before the Civil Court were barred by Sections  

18 and 19 of the Act.  The High Court disposed off the writ  

petition with the direction that the Munsif should re-consider  

the  pleas  raised  in  the  application  aforesaid  without  being  

prejudiced  by  his  earlier  Order  dated  14th November  2006.  

This order of the High Court was challenged by way of a Letter  

Patent Appeal.  The Appellant also moved an application for  

review of the Order dated 14th November 2006 which too was  

rejected.  These facts were brought to the notice of the Division  

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Bench  of  the  High  Court  in  the  Letters  Patent  Appeal  

proceedings vide an affidavit dated 7th September 2007.  The  

High  Court,  however,  by  its  Judgment  and  Order  dated  

1st October 2007, dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal in spite  

of the changed circumstances holding that the remedy of the  

Appellant lay elsewhere and that it was for the Civil Court to  

decide  the  question  of  jurisdiction  raised  in  the  application  

under  Order  7  Rule  11  of  the  CPC.   It  is  in  these  

circumstances that the matter is before us by way of Special  

Leave Petition.   

4. Several arguments have been addressed before us by Mr.  

K. Venugopal, the learned Senior Advocate for the appellant.  

He  has  emphasized  that  it  was  the  admitted  position  that  

Katras House had been requisitioned under Rule 75 A of the  

Defence of India Rules in the year 1942 and by operation of  

law,  the  said  requisition  would  now  deemed  to  have  been  

made under the Act.  He has pointed out that the Order of the  

Division Bench observing that only the Civil Court could  to go  

into  the  matter  was  not  in  accordance  with  law  as  the  

provisions of the Act were applicable and Section 19 thereof  

specifically barred any proceedings before the Civil Court.  He  

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has further pointed out that  Respondent No.3 in its written  

statement filed in 1995 in the eviction suit filed by the power  

of attorney holder of the earlier owner had admitted that the  

property had been requisitioned for the army and had pleaded  

that proceedings before the Civil Court were barred.  He has  

pointed out that this volte face  had been made in order to  

frustrate the Order of the Deputy Commissioner dated 4th April  

2006 which had been validly made under Section 6 (1A) of the  

Act.  He  has  further  pointed  out  that  the  requisition  of  a  

property  could  not  continue  indefinitely  as  the  original  

purpose  of  the  requisition  had  ceased  to  exist  and  more  

particularly as the requisition could not continue beyond the  

year  1987 i.e.  a  period  of  17 years  from the  year  1970 as  

provided by Section 6 (1A) ibidem.  For these two submissions  

Mr. Venugopal has placed reliance on H.D. Vora vs. State of  

Maharashtra  and  Ors.  (1984)  2  SCC  337,  and  Grahak  

Sanstha Manch and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra (1994) 4  

SCC 192. Mr.  Venugopal  has  further  pointed  out  that  the  

Deputy Commissioner was not authorized to transfer Katras  

House to Respondent No.3 vide Order dated 30th April 1958  

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purportedly under Section 11 (2) of the Act as the conditions  

for the applicability of this provision did not exist.  He has also  

pleaded that as  RespondentNo.3 in the Suit filed  in the year  

1995 had claimed that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction in  

the  matter,  it  was  now  estopped  from  the  claiming  to  the  

contrary and saying that the Civil Court had the jurisdiction in  

proceedings which were now pending in the Civil Court.   

5. Mr. Dholakia,  the learned senior counsel  appearing for  

Respondent No.3 has, at the very outset, very fairly conceded,  

that the question of title was not disputed but as the question  

as to whether the relationship of landlord and tenant existed  

inter  se the parties was a matter  which could be examined  

only by the Civil Court and that this procedure that had been  

adopted by the respondent by filing a civil suit challenging the  

order  dated  4th April,  2006  of  de-requisition  made  by  the  

Deputy Commissioner.

6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and  

gone through the record.  Although, a feeble attempt has been  

made by the learned counsel for the Respondent doubting the  

factum  of  the  requisition  made  in  the  year  1942  for  the  

purpose  of  the  Army,  it  stands virtually  admitted  now that  

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such an order had indeed been made under Rule 75 A of the  

Defence of India Rules.  It is also the conceded position that by  

virtue of various provisions made in subsequent laws, the said  

order would now be deemed to be one made under Section 3 of  

the Act.  In this view of the matter, the question would arise as  

to  whether  the  Civil  Court  would  have  jurisdiction  in  the  

matter  or  that  the  remedy  of  the  parties  elsewhere.  It  is  

significant that in the civil suit filed in the year 1995 by the  

previous  owner  of  the  property,  a  comprehensive  written  

statement had been filed by the Principal of Respondent No.3,  

and the positive stand taken was that the building in question  

had  been  requisitioned  by  the  Deputy  Commissioner-cum-

District  Magistrate,  Ranchi  for  military  purposes  under  the  

Defence of India Rules in the year 1942 and that the Deputy  

Commissioner  had allotted the  said premises to the Ranchi  

Women’s College by order dated 4th April 1958  under Section  

11 (2) of the Rent Act and as such the civil suit was barred  

and  the  remedy  for  de-requisition  lay  only  before  the  

Competent Authority, that is the Deputy Commissioner-cum-

District  Magistrate,  Ranchi.   Concededly,  this  suit  was  

dismissed in default and was not pursued any further.  It is  

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equally  true  that  the  appellant  herein  too  has  taken  a  

vacillating  stand with regard to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Civil  

Court  or  otherwise  in  other  legal  proceedings  inter  se  the  

parties.  However, as per findings of all the Courts and as per  

written statement filed, the fact that the property had indeed  

been requisitioned in the year1942 under  Rule  75 A of  the  

Defence of India Rules stands virtually admitted.  In this view  

of the matter the controversy would be covered by Sections 3,  

6 & 19 of the Act.  

7.   Section  3  of  this  Act  gives  power  to  the  Competent  

Authority to requisition any immovable property for any public  

purpose, being a purpose of the Union and Section 4 thereof  

gives the power to the Competent Authority to take over the  

possession of the requisitioned property.  Section 6 deals with  

release  from  requisition  and  insofar  as  is  relevant,  is  

reproduced below:

       6.  Release  from  requisitioning.  (1)  The  Central  Government  may  at  any  time  release  from  requisition  any  property requisitioned under this Act and  shall,  as  far  as  possible,  restore  the  property in as good a condition as it was  when  possession  thereof  was  taken  subject  only  to  the  changes  caused  by  

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reasonable wear and tear and irresistible  force:  

      Provided that where the purposes for  which  any  requisitioned  property  was  being  used  cease  to  exist,  the  Central  Government shall, unless the property is  acquired  under  section  7,  release  that  property,  as  soon  as  may  be,  from  requisition.   

“(1-A)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained in sub-section (1), the Central  Government  shall  release  from  requisition, -   (a) any  property  requisitioned  or  

deemed  to  be  requisitioned  under  this  Act  before  the  commencement  of  Requisitioning and Acquisition  of  Immovable  Property  (Amendment) Act, 1970, on or  before the expiry of a period of  [seventeen  years]  from  such  commencement;

(b) any  property  requisitioned  under  this  Act  after  such  commencement,  on  or  before  the  expiry  of  a  period  of  [seventeen years] from the date  on  which  possession  of  such  property  was  surrendered  or  delivered  to,  or  taken  by,  the  competent  authority  under  section 4,unless such property  is  acquired  under  section  7  

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within the period of” [seventeen  years] aforesaid.]

(2) Where any property is to be released  from requisition, [under sub-section (1) or  under  sub-section  (1-A)]  the  competent  authority may, after such inquiry, if any,  as it may in any case consider necessary  to make or cause to be made, specify by  order  in  writing  the  person  to  whom  possession of the property shall be given  and  such  possession  shall,  as  far  as  practicable, be given to the person from  whom possession was taken at the time  of the requisition or to the successors-in- interest of such person.

[3] The  delivery  of  possession  of  the  property  to  the  person  specified  in  an  order under sub-section (2) shall be full  discharge  of  the  Central  Government  from  all  liability  in  respect  of  the  property,  but  shall  not  prejudice  any  rights  in  respect  of  the  property  which  any other person may be entitled by due  process  of  law  to  enforce  against  the  person  to  whom  possession  of  the  property is given.   

8.        A bare perusal of Section 6 (1-A) and 6(2) would show  

that  the  property  cannot  be  requisitioned  permanently  and  

that the maximum period fixed by the Amendment Act of 1970  

is  17  years  from  that  date  and  that  Section  6  (2)  further  

provides  that  unless  the  requisitioned  property  is  acquired  

under  Section  7  within  the  period  of  17  years  aforesaid,  it  

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shall  be released to its  owner and as far as practicable,  be  

given to the person from whom the possession had been taken  

at the time of the requisition or to the successor in interest of  

such  person.   Concededly,  the  appellant  herein  is  the  

successor in interest of the owner from whom the property had  

been requisitioned in the year 1942.  It is, therefore, obvious  

that the requisition could not have been continued beyond the  

year 1987 unless the property had been acquired,  which is  

concededly not the case before us.   

9. Mr. Dholakia has, however, emphasized that the status  

inter  se  the  parties  was  that  of  landlord  and  tenant,  the  

appellant being the landlord, and as the appellant had been  

accepting  rent  and  had  also  sought  and  received  an  

enhancement thereof on several occasions , the suit could not  

be dismissed on the ground that the civil court’s jurisdiction  

was barred.  We are of the opinion, however, that the payment  

of rent in such matters would not change the legal position  

with regard to the rights and obligations of the requisitioning  

authority and the person from whom the property had been  

requisitioned.  It is impossible to accept the plea that if the  

appellant  whose  property  has  been  requisitioned  in  

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desperation  seeks  an  enhancement  of  the  rent,  that  would  

ipso-facto create a tenancy so as to preclude the obligations  

imposed  on  the  Central  Government  under  the  Act.   While  

repelling a similar submission in H.D. Vora’s case this is what  

this Court had to say:   

“There  was  also  one  other  contention  urged  on  behalf  of  the  appellant  in  a  desperate  attempt  to  protect his possession of the flat and that  contention was, since he had paid rent of  the flat to Rukmanibai and such rent was  accepted by her, he had become a direct  tenant  of  Rukmanibai  and  the  order  of  requisition had become totally irrelevant  so  far  as  his  possession  of  the  flat  is  concerned.   This  contention  is,  in  our  opinion,  wholly  unfounded.   The  appellant  admittedly  came  into  occupation of the flat as an allottee under  the  order  of  requisition  passed  by  the  State  Government  and even if  any  rent  was paid by the appellant to Rukmanibai  and such rent was accepted by her, it did  not have the effect of putting an end to  the  order  or  requisition.   The  appellant  was an allottee of the flat under the order  of  requisition  and  he  was  liable  to  pay  compensation for the use and occupation  of the flat to the State Government and  the  State  Government  was  in  its  turn  liable  to  pay  compensation  to  Rukmanibai for the requisitioning of the  flat  and  if,  therefore,  instead  of  the  appellant  paying  compensation  to  the  State  Government  and  the  State  

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Government  making  payment  of  an  identical  amount  to  Rukmanibai,  the  appellant  paid  directly  to  Rukmanibai  with  the  express  or  any  event  implied  assent of the State Government, the order  of requisition could not cease to be valid  and  effective.   It  did  not  matter  at  all  whether  the  appellant  described  the  amount  paid  by  him  to  Rukkanibai  as  rent, because whatever was done by him  was under the order of requisition and so  long as the order of requisition stood, his  possession  of  the  flat  was  attributable  only  to  the  order  of  requisition  and  no  payment of an amount described as rent  could  possibly  alter  the  nature  of  his  occupation  of  the  flat  or  make  him  a  tenant  of  Rukmanibai  in  respect  of  the  flat”.   

Some of the observations in H.D. Vora’s case were modified on  

some other matters in  Grahak Sanstha Manch case (Supra)  

but  the  observation  in  paragraph  7  afore-quoted  were  duly  

affirmed.   

10. To our mind there exists yet another circumstance which  

militates against the case of Respondent No. 3 with regard to  

the creation of a tenancy vis-à-vis the appellant.  Admittedly,  

Respondent No.3 had been inducted into Katras House under  

the order of the Deputy Commissioner dated 30th April 1958,  

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under Section 11 (2) of the Rent Act.  This provision reads as  

under:     

“(2)  (a)  Where  a  servant  of  the  Government in possession of any building  as  a  tenant  intends  to  vacate  such  building,  he  shall  give  fifteen  day’s  previous notice in writing of his intention  to  do  so  to  the  landlord,  and  to  the  District  Magistrate  who  shall  under  intimation to the landlord, within a week  of  the  receipt  of  the  notice  either  allot  building  to  any  other  servant  of  the  Government  whom  the  District  Magistrate thinks suitable, subject to the  payment of  rent,  and the observance of  the  conditions  of  the  tenancy  by  such  servant of the Government, or direct that  the landlord shall be put in possession of  the building:  

Provided that when no such order is  passed  by  the  District  Magistrate,  the  landlord  shall  be  deemed  to  have  been  put in possession of the building.

(a] xxx xxx xxx xxx

(b) Where a building is vacated by a  servant  of  the  Government,  any  person  occupying such building other  than the  persons referred to in clause (a) shall be  liable  to  be  evicted  by  the  District  Magistrate  in  such  manner  as  may  be  prescribed:

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Provided that,  after  a landlord has  been or  is  deemed to have been put in  possession of such building, he may let it  to any person”.   

11.      It would be clear from a bare perusal of Section 11(2)  

(a)  that it postulates several conditions for the transfer of a  

building already in possession of a Servant of the Government  

to  any  other  servant  of  the  Government,  but  it  does  not  

authorize the transfer of such a building to any other person.  

It  has  been  conceded  before  us  that  respondent  No.3,  the  

Ranchi  Women’s  College,  is  not  run  or  controlled  by  the  

Government  but  is  a  private  college  under   private  

management.  To  our  mind,  therefore,  the  very  order  of  

allotment  made  on  30th April,  1958  was  completely  

unauthorized.   Concededly  also  Katras  House  was  under  

requisition with the Union of India for purpose of the Union  

and there is no provision under the Act for transfer of such a  

property to any other person.  Even assuming for a moment,  

the Act did authorize such a transfer, the condition of transfer  

visualized under section 11(2)(a) did not exist and the transfer  

was thus, bad at the very outset.  

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12.    In this background, the question now arises is as to  

whether  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Civil  Court  was  barred  and  

whether the appellant should undergo a trial on facts which  

are admitted.  Section 19 of the Act is reproduced hereunder:

“Save  as  otherwise  expressly  provided in this Act, no civil  court shall  have jurisdiction in respect of any matter  which  the  competent  authority  or  arbitrator is empowered by or under this  Act to determine, and no injunction shall  be  granted  by  any  court  or  other  authority in respect of any action taken  or to be taken in pursuance of any power  conferred by or under this Act”.   

13.     A bare perusal of this provision would show that it is  

only  the  Competent  Authority  (read  Deputy  Commissioner)  

who would have jurisdiction in respect of any matter under  

the Act, and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was explicitly  

barred.  We also find that in the suit filed in the year 1995,  

Respondent No.3 had taken a specific plea that it was only the  

Competent Authority under the Act who could make an order  

of  de-requisition sought by the owner and the jurisdiction of  

the Civil Court was barred.  Mr. Dholakia has, however, (and  

rightly),  pointed  out  that  Appellant  too  had  been  taken  a  

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vacillating stand in a different set of proceedings.  We find that  

both  appellant  and  the  respondent  have  been  equally  

ambivalent with respect to their relationship and rights inter-

se with the sole purpose of defeating the other party’s rights by  

whatever  means  possible.   To  our  mind,  this  ambivalence  

would not be determinative of the legal issues that have been  

raised on the basis of admitted facts.  It is the admitted fact  

that the property had been requisitioned in the year 1942 for  

Army purposes under Rule 75 A of the Defence of India Rules  

which would be deemed to be a requisition under Section 3 of  

the Act.  The maximum period for requisition in such cases is  

17 years and ought to have ended in the year 1987, but has in  

fact continued for almost 22 years thereafter.  The creation of  

the  so  called  tenancy  in  favour  of  a  respondent  of  a  

requisitioned property is not visualized under the Act and even  

otherwise the conditions for the creation of such a tenancy by  

virtue  of  Section  11  (2)  of  the  Rent  Act  do  not  exist.  The  

Competent Authority under the Act was, therefore, under an  

obligation imposed under Section 6(2) to return it to its owner.  

To our mind,  therefore,  the observations of  the Munsif  and  

High Court, that the appellant must have his remedies in the  

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Civil  Court  is  adding  insult  to  injury  in  a  situation  where  

almost none of the material facts are  in dispute.     

14.     Mr. Venugopal has also raised a plea of estoppel based  

on the conflicting stand on the question of jurisdiction taken  

by respondent no.3 from time to time.  In view of the fact that  

the appellant has been equally guilty of a similar stand and  

our findings on the other issues, we are disinclined to go into  

this aspect.   

15.     We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the Order of  

the  Division  Bench  and  direct  that  Katras  House  and  the  

entire requisitioned property shall be released in favour of the  

appellant by the end of this year.  The respondent is directed  

to pay all the arrears of rent due as of now and the rent upto  

December and also files an undertaking to vacate the premises  

as ordered within a period of two months from today.  Should  

such an undertaking not be filed, we issue a direction to the  

Competent  Authority,  that  is  the  Deputy  Commissioner,  

Ranchi to take steps to evict the respondent and hand over the  

property to the appellant forthwith.   The appellant  will  also  

have its costs from Respondent No.3 which we determine at  

Rs. One lakh.    

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……………………………..J. (DALVEER BHANDARI)

…………………………….J. (HARJIT SINGH BEDI)

New Delhi,          Dated:  May 1, 2009

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