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PETITIONER: ROSHAN LAL & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF PUNJAB

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/12/1964

BENCH: SARKAR, A.K. BENCH: SARKAR, A.K. AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA BACHAWAT, R.S.

CITATION:  1965 AIR 1413            1965 SCR  (2) 316

ACT: Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860), s. 201-Removal  of evidence  of  crime to  screen  offender-Maximum  punishment under section whether to be with reference to offence  found to  have been committed or offence ’believed’ to  have  been committed.

HEADNOTE: The  three appellants were prosecuted for  various  offences under  the  Indian  Penal Code and acquitted  by  the  trial court.  On appeal, the High Court of Punjab convicted one of the appellants under ss. 330 and 348 of the Code and all the appellants under s. 201 of the Code while acquitting them in respect  of  the charge under s. 304.  The  sentence  passed under s. 201 was three years rigorous imprisonment each, the court  holding that the appellants had removed  evidence  of the  offence  culpable homicide.  In appeal to  the  Supreme Court  by special leave, the appellants contended  that  the only  offences proved to have been committed were under  ss. 330  and  348 and therefore the fourth paragraph of  s.  201 applied  and  under it the sentence could  not  exceed  one- fourth  of the longest term of imprisonment of the  offences under ss. 330 and 348 which worked out at one year and  nine months.  The contention of the respondent State on the other hand was that the term of imprisonment that could be imposed under s. 201 did not depend on the actual offence  committed the  evidence  of which had been destroyed but on  what  the accused believed that offence to have been and therefore the sentence  imposed in the present case was fully  within  its terms.   It  was  stressed  that  the  words  in  the  first paragraph  of  s.  201 were "knowing  or  having  reason  to believe  that  an offence had been committed,"  but  in  the second  paragraph the words were "knows or believes to  have been committed." HELD  (Per  Rajagopala Ayyangar and Bachawat, JJ.)  (i)  The expression  "knowing  or having reason to  believe"  in  the first  paragraph and the expression "knows or  believes"  in the  second paragraph are used in the same sense.  If it  be supposed  that  the  word "believes" was  used  in  a  sense different from the expression "having reason to believe", it would be necessary for the purpose of inflicting  punishment

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upon the accused to prove that he "believes" in addition  to "having  reason  to  believe".   We  cannot  impute  to  the legislature an intention that an accused who is found guilty of  the  offence  under the  first  paragraph  would  escape punishment  under  the  succeeding  paragraphs  unless  some additional fact or state of mind is proved. [324 A-D] (ii) If the contention of the State were to be accepted, the erroneous  belief or delusion of the accused  would  furnish the  measure of punishment 2nd he would be punishable  under the  second paragraph with imprisonment extending  to  seven years.  On this interpretation it is possible that a  person who  removes the evidence of an offence may be liable  to  a heavier  punishment than the person who committed  the  main offence as when the actual offence committed is under s. 323 but the accused under s. 201 removes the blood-marks  caused by  the  offence  in the belief that  they  were  caused  by murder.   It does not stand to reason that s.  201  provides for  punishing  a  minor  offence  more  severely  than  the principal offence. [325 B-D] 317 Chinna  Gangappa,  In  re  :  I.L.R.  (1931)  54  Mad.   68, considered and interpreted. (iii)The  word  "offence" wherever used in  the  first, second,  third  and fourth paragraphs of s. 201  means  some real  offence which in fact has been committed and not  some offence  which the accused imagines to have been  committed. In  the  present case it had not been established  that  the offence  under s. 304 was committed by the appellants or  by anybody  else.  Only offences under ss. 330 and  348  I.P.C. has been proved to have been committed. [324 G-H] (iv)By  the same act, namely, burning of the dead  body  of Raja Ram, the appellants caused the evidence of two offences namely s. 330 and 348 to disappear.  Taking a strict view of the  matter  it  must  be held that  by  the  same  act  the appellants  committed  two  offences  under  s.  201.    But normally, no court should award two separate punishment& for the same act constituting two offences under s. 2o1.   Under s.  330 the maximum punishment is seven years’  imprisonment and  therefore the accused are liable to a maximum  of  one- fourth  of seven years’ imprisonment i.e. one year and  nine months. [327 A-C] Per  Sarkar,  J.-(i)  There  is no  reason  to  dispute  the proposition  that there must first be an actual  offence  in order  that there may be evidence of it which is  destroyed. But  this does not furnish an answer to the  contention  for the State.  Suppose an offence is committed but is  believed to be of a graver nature than it actually is.  There can  be no  objection  in principle in such a case to  a  law  which makes the punishment of the person who destroys the evidence of  that  offence to depend on what he believed it  to  have been. [320 C-F] (ii)But even if the interpretation suggested for the  state were accepted the sentence imposed in the present case could not  be  upheld.  In order that  that  interpretation  might assist  the  State it has to be shown  that  the  appellants believed that an offence under s. 304 had been committed  so that  the case could he brought under paragraph 3. The  High Court had not come to a finding that an offence under S. 304 had  been  committed by the appellants, in  fact  they  were acquitted of that charge.  The most that can on the facts be reasonably said against the appellants is that they knew  or believed that an offence of grievous hurt had been committed under  s.  325.  The longest term of imprisonment  for  that offence being seven years, the appellants could at the  most given under    the fourth paragraph of s. 201 one-fourth  of

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that  term, namely, one year and nine months. [321 G-H;  322 A-B]

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 197 of 1964. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated May  21, 1964, of the Punjab High Court in  Criminal  Appeal No.   598 of 1963. .lm15 N.   S. Krishna Rao and Girish Chandra, for the appellants. R.   N. Sachthey, for the respondent. SARKAR,  J.  delivered  a separate  Opinion.   The  Judgment of  Rajagopale  Ayyangar and Bachawat JJ. was  delivered  by Bachawat J. Sarkar J. There are three appellants in this case.  They had been prosecuted for various offences under the Indian  Penal Code 318 and acquitted by the trial Court.  On appeal, the High Court of  Punjab  convicted  the  appellant  Roshan  Lal,  a  Sub- Inspector of Police, under ss. 330 and 348 of the Code.  The High Court also convicted all the three appellants under  s. 201 of the Code.  This appeal is against the judgment of the High  Court  with  special leave.  That  leave  was  however confined only to the question as to the legality of the term of imprisonment imposed under s. 201. The  High Court found that Roshan Lal, with a  police  party which  included the two other appellants one of whom was  an Assistant  Sub-Inspector and the other a  police  constable, arrested  a  man  called  Raja Ram on  a  public  street  on suspicion  that  he was an opium smuggler, took him  to  his house  and  when no contraband opium was  found  there,  the appellant Roshan Lal got very angry and hit him on the  head with  his baton which injured his eye.  In respect  of  this injury  the appellant Roshan Lal was convicted on one  count under  s. 330 of the Code.  After this beating Raja Ram  was taken  by  the police party to the police station  and  kept confined in a room there for the night and was there  beaten by  Roshan Lal assisted by some policemen.  It  was  however not  found that the other two appellants had taken any  part in  administering this beating to Raja Ram.  In  respect  of this  beating the appellant Roshan Lal was convicted by  the High Court on a second count under S. 330 read with s. 34 of the  Code and also under s. 348 for wrongful confinement  of Raja  Ram with a view to extort a confession.  Next  morning Raja Ram was found dead in the room in a pool of blood.  The three  appellants  thereafter  carried his dead  body  to  a jungle, burnt it up and collected the bones and ground  them in  a pestle and mortar and threw the remnants in  a  canal. In  respect  of  the  disposal  of  the  body  and   thereby destroying the evidence of the offences committed upon  Raja Ram the appellants were convicted under s. 201 of the  Code. Each  of the appellants was sentenced for the offence  under s. 201 to rigorous imprisonment for three years. The only question in this appeal is whether the appellants could havebeen awarded a sentence of imprisonment for three years underS. 201.  That section is in these terms               S.    201.  Whoever, knowing or having  reason               to believe that an offence has been committed,               causes any evidence of the commission of  that               offence  to disappear, with the  intention  of               screening the offender from legal  punishment,

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             or  with that intention gives  any  infomation               respecting  the  offence  which  he  knows  or               believes to be false, 319               shall,  if  the  offence  which  he  knows  or               believes to have been committed is  punishable               with  death, be punished with imprisonment  of               either description for a term which may extend               to  seven years, and shall also be  liable  to               fine;               and   if  the  offence  is   punishable   with               imprisonment  for life, or  with  imprisonment               which  may  extend  to  ten  years,  shall  be               punished    with   imprisonment   of    either               description  for  a term which may  extend  to               three years, and shall also be liable to fine;               and   if  the  offence  is   punishable   with               imprisonment for any term not extending to ten               years, shall be punished with imprisonment  of               the description provided for the offence,  for               a term which may extend to one-fourth part  of               the longest term of the imprisonment  provided               for the offence, or with fine, or with both. The appellants contend-Id that the sentence imposed was  not justified  by  the section, for the offences found  to  have been  committed were under ss. 330 and 348  and,  therefore, the fourth paragraph of the section applied and under it the sentence could not exceed one-fourth of the longest term  of imprisonment for the offences under ss. 330 and 348.  It was said  that on this basis, the longest term  of  imprisonment that could be imposed in the present case would be one  year and vine months and not three years as was done. The contention of the respondent State was that the term  of imprisonment  that  could be imposed under S.  201  did  not depend  on  the actual offences committed  the  evidence  of which  had been destroyed but on what the  accused  believed that offence to have been and therefore the sentence imposed in  the  present  case was fully within its  terms  and  the matter  had  to be governed by the third  paragraph  of  the section.  Learned advocate for the State contended that  the words "the offence" in the third and fourth paragraphs meant the  offence mentioned in the second paragraph.  The  second paragraph speaks of "the offence which he knows or  believes to have been committed" and therefore the word "offence"  in the last two paragraphs must refer to the offence which  the person accused under S. 201 either knew or believed to  have been  committed.  It seems to me that so far the  contention of  the  State  is unassailable.  It  is  not  necessary  to consider a case where it is known what the offence committed is, for it is not disputed that the punishment has there  to depend on that offence.  The argument on behalf of the State was that if S. 201 did not intend that 320 punishment under it could be made to depend on the belief as to  the  offence committed, then the words " which  he  .... believes   to  have  been  committed"  would   be   rendered completely  otiose.   It  was said  that  an  interpretation cannot  be  accepted  which would result in a  part  of  the language  used  being rendered ineffective.  As  at  present advised,  I am inclined to agree with this reasoning  though for  reasons  later  discussed, I  find  it  unnecessary  to express a final opinion on it on the present occasion. On behalf of the appellants it was contended first, that  in order that an offence under s. 201 might be committed  there must  be another offence actually committed.  It was  indeed

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so  held  by  this  Court in  Palvinder  Kuer  v.  State  of Punjab(1) and by a full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Empress  of  India  v. Abdul Kadir(2) I find  no  reason  to dispute  that  proposition.  There must first be  an  actual offence  in order that there may be evidence of it which  is destroyed.   Further  it cannot be the intention  of  a  law creating criminal offences that a person may be guilty  only because  he believed that what he was doing  constituted  an offence though it was not in fact so.  Both these aspects of the question were mentioned in the judgment of the Allahabad High  Court.  But I am unable to see that the fact  that  an actual  offence has to be committed furnishes an  answer  to the  contention  for  the  State.   Suppose  an  offence  is committed  but is believed to be of a graver nature than  it actually is.  There can be no objection in principle in such a case to a law which makes the punishment of the person who destroys  the evidence of that offence to depend on what  he believed it to have been.  The person is not being convicted under that law because he believed what he was doing was  an offence  while it was in fact not; he did commit  an  actual offence by destroying the evidence of another actual offence and  all that the law does is to permit the imposition of  a term of imprisonment according to his belief. Learned  advocate for the appellants then said that in  view of  the words "having reason to believe that an offence  has been  committed" in the first paragraph of the  section  the contention on behalf of the State could not be accepted.  It was  said that if the contention of the State was  accepted, it  would be necessary to prove two states of mind,  namely, first that he had reason to believe that an offence had been committed  and secondly, what his belief as to the  kind  of that offence was.  It was said that that would be anomalous. But  this  argument  is  to  my  mind  unavailing,  for  the acceptance of the State’s interpretation of the section does not (1)  [1953] S.C.R. 94,102. (2) [1880] I.L.R. 3 All. 279. 321 lead  to  the  conclusion that two states  of  mind  of  the offender  have  to  be proved before an  offence  under  the section  can  be  punished.   It seems to  me  that  it  may legitimately  be  said  that the  words  "having  reason  to believe" had been used in the first paragraph which set  out the  elements  constituting  the  offence,  to  provide  the requisite guilty mind.  Without such provision, if  evidence of  an actual offence was destroyed by a person without  his having reason to believe that an offence had been  committed and,  therefore,  without believing that he  was  destroying evidence  of  that offence, he would have been  made  liable though he had no guilty mind.  That would be contrary to the principles  of  criminal law.  Then I find it  difficult  to conceive  that  if a person has reason to  believe  that  an offence  had been committed, he would not at the  same  time have  formed a belief as to the kind of that offence.  If  a person  has  reason  to believe that  an  offence  has  been committed, he necessarily would have reason to believe  what the  offence committed was.  "Having reason to believe  that an offence has been committed" only means that a person must be  taken  to  have  believed  that  an  offence  has   been committed.   The latter is no different from the  expression "the offence .... which he believes to have been  committed" which  occurs  in paragraph 2 of the section.   Therefore  I think  that the expressions "having reason to  believe"  and "he believes" refer to the same state of mind; proof of  one is  proof  of the other.  It does not seem to  me  that  any

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anomaly can arise from the acceptance of the  interpretation of the section suggested by learned advocate for the State. I  have  said  that  I am inclined  to  agree  with  learned advocate for the State but I think it right also to  observe that  I  find it difficult to imagine that it  can  ever  be found  that  a  person guilty of an offence  under  s.  201, believed the offence of which he had destroyed the evidence, to have been of a higher degree than it actually was.  That, however, is only a matter of proof.  But even if we were  to accept the interpretation suggested for the State, I  think, we  cannot in the present case uphold the sentence  imposed. In order that that interpretation might assist the State, it has to be shown that the appellants believed that an offence under  s. 304 had been committed so that the case  could  be brought under paragraph 3. The High Court had not come to  a finding  that an offence under s. 304 had been committed  by the  appellants; in fact they were acquitted of  the  charge under  that section for causing the death of Raja Ram.   The High  Court did not even find that the  appellants  believed that  an offence under s. 304 had been committed.  All  that the  High  Court said was that "Raja Ram met  his  death  by violence", without indicating who had committed 322 that  violence.  It may be that the violence only  caused  a grievous hurt.  The most that can on the facts be reasonably said  against the appellants is that they knew  or  believed that an offence of grievous hurt had been committed on  Raja Ram under s. 325.  The longest term of imprisonment that can be   imposed  under  that  section  is  seven  years.    The appellants  could  not  most  be  given  under  the   fourth paragraph  of  s. 201 one-fourth of that term,  namely,  one year and nine months.  A similar view was taken, it seems to me rightly, In re Chinna Gangappa(1). I would, therefore, reduce the sentence passed under s.  201 to one year, nine months. Bachawat,  J.  Appellants, Roshan Lal,  Lachhman  Singh  and Kulwant  Rai  were police officers attached  to  the  police station,  Jaito  in District Bhatinda.  Roshan Lal  was  the Sub-Inspector and Station House Officer, Lachhman Singh  was the  Assistant  Sub-Inspector  and Kulwant Rai  was  a  foot constable.    The  appellants  were  charged  with   diverse offences  under  ss. 330, 348, 330/ 34, 304,  342,  201  and 342/34 of the Indian Penal Code.  The Trial Judge  acquitted all the appellants.  On appeal, the High Court found that on December  24, 1961 at Raja Ram’s house, Roshan Lal  for  the purpose  of  extorting information from Raja Ram as  to  the illegal  possession of opium, gave a danda blow to Raja  Ram and  injured his eye, and had thereby committed  an  offence under  s. 330, and that Roshan Lal was responsible  for  the illegal confinement of Raja Ram at the Jaito police station, and together with other police officers for the be labouring of  Raja  Ram during- the night between the  24th  and  25th December, 1961, and thereby committed offences under ss. 348 and  330/34.  Accordingly, the High Court  convicted  Roshan Lal of the offences under ss. 330, 330/34 and 348 and passed appropriate  sentences on him for those offences.  The  High Court also found that all the appellants "knowing or  having reason  to  believe that an offence has been  committed  and with  the  intention of screening the  offender  from  legal punishment  caused  the evidence of an offence  of  culpable homicide and of offences under ss. 330 and 348 of the Indian Penal Code to disappear by burning clandestinely Raja’ Ram’s dead  body." On this finding, the High Court  convicted  all the  appellants  of the offence under s. 201  and  sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years.   The

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High Court directed that the substantive sentences of Roshan Law under ss. 340, 348 and 201 would run consecutively.  All the appellants (1)  [1931] I.L.R 54 Mad. 68. 323 now  appeal to this Court by special leave, limited  to  the question  of the legality of the sentence imposed  under  s. 201. The High Court found that Raja Ram met his death by violence on the afternoon of December 25, 1961.  The appellants  were charged under s. 304 for the offence of culpable homicide of Raja Ram not amounting to murder, but were acquitted on that charge.   It was not established that the offence  under  s. 304  was  committed by the appellants or  by  anybody  else. Section  201  presupposes a real offence,  the  evidence  of which is made to disappear.  As the appellants could not  be convicted  for causing the evidence of an imaginary  offence under  s. 304 to disappear, they must be taken to have  been convicted under s. 201 for causing the evidence of  offences under  ss.  330  and 348 to disappear.  That  they  knew  or believed  those  offences  to have  been  committed  is  not disputed by Mr. Girish Chandra  Now, the longest term of im- prisonment for an offence under s. 330 is seven years.   Mr. Girish Chandra, therefore, argued that the appellants  could be  punished  under  the fourth paragraph  of  s.  201  with imprisonment  for  a term extending to  one-fourth  part  of seven years and no more. Mr. Sachthey, learned counsel for the State, contended  that though  by the first paragraph of s. 201, the conviction  of the accused is dependent upon his "knowing or having  reason to  believe that an offence has been committed", the  second paragraph indicated that his punishment is according to "the offence which he knows or believes to have been  committed", that the second paragraph uses the somewhat different phrase to indicate that the punishment depends not so much on  what offence,  in  fact, was committed, but on what  the  accused knew or believed to have been committed, that the appellants believed  that not only the offences under ss. 330  and  348 but  also the offence under s. 304 had been  committed,  and they  are, therefore, liable to be punished under the  third paragraph  of  s. 201 with imprisonment extending  to  three years.  In support of his contention, Mr. Sachthey relied on Chinna Gangappa, In re(1).  He rightly pointed out that  the High  Court proceeded on the assumption that the  appellants had reason to believe that an offence under s. 304 also  had been  committed.  The correctness of this assumption is  not challenged by Mr. Girish Chandra.  We, therefore, proceed on the footing that this assumption is correct.   Nevertheless, we cannot accept the construction of s. 201 suggested by Mr. Sachthey   and  his  contention  that  the  appellants   are punishable  under  the  third  paragraph  of  s.  201   with imprisonment extending to three years. (1)  [1931] I.L.R. 54 Mad. 68. 324 Section 201 is somewhat clumsily drafted, but we think  that the expression "knowing or having reason to believe" in  the first  paragraph and the expression "knows or  believes"  in the  second paragraph are used in the same sense.  Take  the case of an accused who has reason to believe that an offence has  been  committed. If the other conditions of  the  first paragraph are satisfied, he is guilty of an offence under s. 20 1. If it be supposed that the word "believes" was used in a  sense  different from the expression  "having  reason  to believe",   it  would  be  necessary  for  the  purpose   of inflicting  punishment  upon the accused to  prove  that  he

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"believes"  in addition to "having reason to  believe".   We cannot  impute  to  the legislature  an  intention  that  an accused  who is found guilty of the offence under the  first paragraph  would  escape  punishment  under  the  succeeding paragraphs  unless some additional fact or state of mind  if proved.   In the instant case, the High Court  recorded  the finding  that the appellants knew or had reason  to  believe that  an  offence had been committed.  It did not  record  a separate  finding that the appellants knew or believed  that an  offence was committed.  If Mr. Sachthey’s argument  were accepted, the appellants would escape punishment altogether. But,  in our opinion, it was not necessary to record such  a separate finding. The  first  paragraph  of s. 201  lays  down  the  essential ingredients of the offence under s. 201.  It must be  proved first  that  an offence has been committed.   See  Palvinder Kaur  v.  State of Punjab(1) and Empress of India  v.  Abdul Kadir(2).  Secondly, the accused must know or have reason to believe  that the offence has been committed.  Thirdly,  the accused must either cause any evidence of the commission  of that offence to disappear or give any information respecting the  offence  which  he  knows  or  believes  to  be  false. Fourthly  the accused must have acted with the intention  of screening  the  offender  from  legal  punishment.   By  the second,  third  and fourth paragraphs, the  measure  of  the punishment  is  made  to  depend upon  the  gravity  of  the offence.   The word " offence" wherever used in  the  first, second, third and fourth paragraphs means some real offence, which,  in  fact, has been committed and  not  some  offence which   the  accused  imagines  has  been  committed.    The punishment depends upon the gravity of the offence which was committed  and  which  the accused knew  or  had  reason  to believe  to  have been committed.  If an accused  on  seeing blood  marks  on the ground-made as a result of  an  offence punishable  under  s. 323, erases the blood marks  with  the intention (1) [1953] S.C.R. 94, 102. (2) [1880] I.L.R. 3 All. 281. 325 of  screening the offender whom he erroneously  believes  to have committed the offence of murder, he could be  convicted only  on  the  footing  that an offence  under  S.  323  was committed and that he acted with the intention of  screening such  an  offender  believing  that  such  an  offence   was committed,  and  he may be punished  accordingly  under  the fourth  paragraph  with  imprisonment  extending  to   three months;  but he could not be convicted on the basis  of  his having screened a murderer merely because he wrongly imagin- ed  that  an offence of murder had been committed.   If  the contention  of the State were to be accepted, the  erroneous belief or, delusion of the accused would furnish the measure of  punishment, and he would be punishable under the  second paragraph with imprisonment extending to seven years.  It is difficult  to impute such an intention to  the  legislature, and to hold that the minor offence of screening an  offender under  s.  201  is punishable more severely  than  the  main offence committed by the main offender.  It does not, in our opinion, stand to reason that s. 201 provides for  punishing a minor offence more severely than the principal offence. In  the case of Chinna Gangappa, In re(1), the  accused  was charged also with the murder of his wife, but was  acquitted on that.  The death of the woman was due to blows by  sticks or  stones  on her head.  The accused knew  the  person  who inflicted the injuries; nevertheless, with the intention  of screening  the real offender he gave false information  that

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he suspected that the woman had been stung by a scorpion  or bitten by a snake.  The Sessions Judge, while acquitting the accused of the charge of murder, convicted him under ss. 201 and  203  of  the Indian Penal Code  and  sentenced  him  to rigorous imprisonment for five years.  On appeal, the Madras High  Court  reduced  the sentence to  one  year’s  rigorous imprisonment.  Mr. Sachthey relies strongly on the following observations of the High Court :               "It   is  clear  that  for  the   purpose   of               calculating the punishment to be awarded under               section 201, it is necessary for the Court  to               decide, not so much what offence the  evidence               of   which   has   been   concealed-has   been               committed, as what offence the accused knew or               had reason to believe had been committed." We do not think that the passage supports the contention  of Mr.  Sachthey.  It is clear that in this passage the  Judges had in their mind the first paragraph of S. 201 and not  the second  paragraph,  as suggested by Mr. Sachthey,  for  they refer  to the offence which the accused "knew or had  reason to believe had been com- (1)  [1931] I.L.R. 54 Mad. 68. 326 mitted".   Literally read, the passage may suggest that  the guilt  under  s.  201 does not depend on  what  offence  the accused knew or believed to have been committed and only the measure of punishment depends on that fact.  We cannot agree with this construction of the passage.  But we think that in the context of the entire judgment the passage really  means that both the conviction and punishment under s. 201  depend not  so much on what offence was, in fact, committed but  on what the accused knew or had reason to believe to have  been committed,  and whore a major offence was committed but  the accused knew or believed that only a minor offence had  been committed, it would be the minor offence that would  furnish the measure of punishment; for the Judges went on to say               From  that  point  of view we  cannot  on  the               evidence say that more is proved than that the               accused  knew that some one had hit  his  wife               and that she had died in consequence.  We  are               unable  to  conclude  that he  knew  that  the               person   who  struck  her  had  the   criminal               intention  of killing her.  It must have  been               clear however to the accused that his wife had               died  as a result of the blows given and  that               she at least suffered grievous hurt, and "that               is punishable under section 325, Indian  Penal               Code,  with  imprisonment  for  seven   years.               Under  section 201 the accused is then  liable               to be sentenced to a maximum of one-fourth  of               that seven years.  ’Me learned Sessions  Judge               has   sentenced   the  accused   to   rigorous               imprisonment  for five years.  At the most  he               can  be  sentenced  to  one  year  and  three-               fourths.  We think that it will be  sufficient               if he undergoes imprisonment for one year  and               we reduce the sentence accordingly." It  is  reasonable  to think, though  the  judgment  is  not explicit  on this point, that the High Court found that  the offence of grievous hurt under s. 325 had been committed  in the  presence of the accused, and the accused knew that  the offence  had been committed and was,  therefore,  punishable with  one-fourth of the maximum imprisonment of seven  years provided for  the offence under s. 325.  In this view of the matter, the ultimate conclusion of the Madras High Court may

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well be supported, though we cannot agree with the  entirety of the observations. Mr.  Sachthey  next  contended that  the  appellants  having caused  the evidence of the two offences under ss.  330  and 348  to disappear, committed two separate offences under  s. 201  and are punishable accordingly.  Now, by the same  act, namely, burning 327 of  the  dead body of Raja Ram, the  appellants  caused  the evidence of two offences to disappear.  Taking a strict view of  the  matter, it must be said that by the  same  act  the appellants committed two offences under s. 201.’ The case is not  covered either by S. 71 of the Indian Penal Code or  by S. 26 of the General Clauses Act, and the punishment for the two  offences cannot be limited under those sections.   But, normally, no Court should award two separate punishments for the  same act constituting two offences under s.  201.   The appropriate  sentence under s. 201 for causing the  evidence of  the offence under S. 330 to disappear should be  passed, and  no  separate sentence need be passed under s.  201  for causing  the  evidence  of  the  offence  under  s.  348  to disappear.   The maximum sentence for the offence  under  s. 330  is imprisonment for seven years, and under  the  fourth paragraph  to  s.  201,  the appellants  are  liable  to  be sentenced  to  a  maximum of one-fourth of  seven  years  of imprisonment.   The facts of the case call for  the  maximum sentence.    Accordingly,   the  sentence  passed   on   the appellants for the offence under S. 201 should be reduced to a sentence of one year and nine months.  Mr. Girish  Chandra attempted to argue that the entire conviction of Roshan  Lal under  s.  201 was illegal.  But it is not open  to  him  to argue  this  point, as the special leave is limited  to  the question of the legality of the sentence only.  We are  also not disposed to grant him leave to challenge the legality of the conviction at this stage. In  the  result,  the appeal is allowed  in  part,  and  the sentences passed on the appellants for the offence under  S. 201  of  the  Indian  Penal Code  are  reduced  to  rigorous imprisonment  for  one  year  and  nine  months.   In  other respects, the judgment under appeal is affirmed. Appeal partly allowed. Sup./65-5 328