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PETITIONER: ROSHAN LAL MEHRA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: ISHWAR DAS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/08/1961

BENCH: DAS, S.K. BENCH: DAS, S.K. SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) SARKAR, A.K. AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA MUDHOLKAR, J.R.

CITATION:  1962 AIR  646            1962 SCR  Supl. (2) 947  CITATOR INFO :  F          1963 SC1060  (4,5)

ACT: Standard  rent,  (fixation  of-Newly  Constructed  and   old buildings-Classification, if violative of fundamental  right and  principles  of natural justice-Constitution  of  India, Art. 14-Delhi and Ajmer-Marwara Rent Control Act, 1947  (Act XIX of 1947), ss. 7, 7A, Sch.  IV.

HEADNOTE: The  appellants applied to the Rent Controller for  fixation of  fair  and  standard  rent of  certain  shops  and  other premises alleging that the rent charged by the landlords was exorbitant.   The questions arising for  determination  were (1)  whether the Delhi and Ajmer-Marwara Rent  Control  Act, 1947  in so far as it provided for the fixation of  standard rent  in respect of premises the construction of  which  was completed  after  March  24, 1947  by  the  Rent  Controller violated  the fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 14  of the  Constitution;  and  (2) whether  the  procedure  to  be followed  by the Rent Controller’violated the principles  of natural justice. Held, that s. 7A and the relevant provision-, of Sch.  IV of the  Act laying down the procedure for fixing standard  rent by  the Rent Controller are not unconstitutional and do  not violate  Art.  14 of the Constitution.   The  classification between  premises  the construction of which  was  completed before March 24, 1947 when the Act came into force and those which  were  completed thereafter, is  reasonable,  and  the criteria for the fixation of standard rent for both old  and new   buildings  under  the  Act  were   not   substantially different. The  procedure  laid down under those  provisions  does  not violate the principles of natural justice.  The power  given to  the  Rent  Controller is not arbitraly  and  he  has  to exercise   it  on  a  judicial  consideration  of  all   the circumstances of the case. 948 G.D.  Soni  v..  S.  N. Bhalla,  A.I.R.  1959  Punj.  381

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approved. New Prakash Transport, Co. Ltd. v. New Suwarna Transport Co. Ltd., (1957) S.C.R. 98, Union of India v. T.R. Verma  (1958) S.C.R. 499 followed. In  the  instant  case ample opportunity was  given  to  the landlord  for  producing all relevant evidence in  the  case which  he  did not avail himself of.  It was  not  necessary under  para  2,  Sch.  TV, to have  two  enquiries  one  for ascertaining  whether there were good reasons for  believing that the rent charged was exorbitant and another for  fixing the standard rent. The proceedings before the Rent Controller were not vitiated merely  because  standard rent of certain vacant  shops  was also., fixed in the process of fixing the standard rent  for the entire building in which those shops were situated; that would  not affect the legality of the fixation of  the  rent for the shops which had been let out to tenants.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL- APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 171 of 1958. Appeal  by special leave from the Judgment and  order  dated March ’7, 1956, of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench)  at Delhi in Civil Misc.  No. 249-D of 1956.                     WITH    Civil Appeals Nos. 172 to 186 of 1958. Appeals  from the judgment and order dated August 26,  1954, of  the Punjab High Court in Civil Revisions Nos. 243,  274, 276, 277, 281 to 286, 288, 290 and 293 and 295 of 1951. Anoop  Singh, for the appellant in Civil Appeal No.  171  of 1958. Basant  Kumar Jaggi, for the respondent. (In  Civil  Appeals Nos. 172 to 186 of 1958). A.V.   Viswanatha  Sastri,  R.  Ganapathy  Iyer  and   O. Gopalakrishnan,  for  the appellants in Civil  Appeals  Nos. 1722 to 186 of 1958. C.K. Daphtaru Solicitor General of India, C.B.  Aggarwala and K.P. Gupta, for the respondent$ Nos: 1 to 4. 949 1961.   August 2. The Judgment of the Court ,",as  delivered by S.K.  DAS, T.-These are 16 appeals which have been  heard together.   For facility of considering them on  merits,  it would be convenient to classify them into three  categories. In the first category fall Civil Appeals Nos. 172 to 184  of 1958.  In the second category are two appeals, Civil Appeals Nos. 185 and 186 of 1958.  In the third category falls Civil appeal  No.  171  of 1958.  The appeals  in  the  first  two categories  arise out of a judgment in revision rendered  by the High Court of Punjab at Simla on August 26, 1954.   That decision  was  reported  in British  Medical  Stores  v.  L. Bhagirath Mal (1).  The appeal in the third category  arises out  of a short order of the said High Court dated March  7, 1956,  by  which  it dismissed an application  made  by  the appellant-tenant  under  Art. 227 of the  Constitution.   It appears  that the order war, based on the decision given  by the  High Court in the first two categories of  cases.   The appeals  in  the first two categories have been  brought  to this Court on a certificate granted by High Court, and  have been consolidated by an order made by the said Court.  Civil Appeal  No.  171 of 1958 has been brought to this  Court  in pursuance  of  special  leave  granted  by.  this  Court  on November 19, 1956. The  reason  why  these  appeals  have  been  put  in  three

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categories is this.  The judgement of the High Court against which  appeals are really directed is the judgment  rendered in  the first two categories of eases (reported  in  Messrs. British Medical Stores v. L. Bhagirath Mal (1).  That  judg- ment related to four sets of’ buildings of Chandini Chowk in Delhi.   In Civil Appeals Nos. 172 to 186, we are  concerned with two of these buildings owned by the landlord  Bhagirath Mal, who has since died ,(1) (1955) I. L. R. 8 Punjab 639. 950 and  is  now represented by some of  the  respondents.   For convenience, however, we shall refer to him as the landlord. The  two  buildings  we are concerned with  are  called  (1) "Chemists’ Market", also known as "Medicine Market", and (2) "Prem Building".  Both these buildings are part of a  colony called  "’Bhagirath Colony".  Several tenants took  on  rent flats or rooms in the said buildings and the question  which fell  for  determination  was the  fair  and  standard  rent payable for the said flats or rooms under s. 7A of the Delhi and Ajmer Marwara Rent Control Act, 1947, (Act XIX of 1947), hereinafter  referred to as the Control Act, 1947.   In  the first  two  categories  of  appeals,  the  main  point   for consideration before us is whether the judgment rendered  by the  High  Court on August 26, 1954, was correct,  the  High Court  having held that the whole proceedings  taken  before the   Rent   Controller  were  ultra   vires   and   without jurisdiction.   ’The reasons given for this finding  by  the High  Court  were not quite the same in respect of  the  two buildings;  somewhat  different reasons were  given  in  the cases  of the two tenants in the Prem Building.   Therefore, it would be convenient to deal with the main judgment of the High  Court in Civil Appeals Nos. 172 to 184 of 1958 of  the tenants  in  the building known as "Chemists’  Market".   We shall  then deal with the special considerations arising  in the  two  appeals  preferred by the  tenants  of  the  "Prem Building".  Lastly, we shall deal with Civil Appeal No.  111 of  1958  which relates to a different  building  altogether belonging to a different proprietor, namely two ground-floor flats  of  a house on plot No 20, Block No.  13  in  Western Extension Area, Karolbagh, New Delhi.  We. shall later state the facts of that appeal, but it is sufficient to state here that  the application for fixation of standard rent for  the flats  in  the Karolbagh house was dismissed on  the  ground that  the  High  Court had held earlier  in  the  first  two categories of cases, that s. 7A of the Control Act, 1947 was unconstitutional and 951 void  after  the coming into force of  the  Constitution  of India on January 26, 1950. Civil Appeals Nos. 172 to 184 of 1958 Having  made  these preliminary remarks with regard  to  the classification  of the appeals, we proceed now to state  the facts with regard to the first category of appeals  relating to the "Chemists’ Market" in Bhagirath Colony.  On July  30, 1948,  nine  tenants made an application to  the  Rent  Con- troller,  Delhi,  asking  for a determination  of  fair  and standard rent of the tenements (shops) rented to them by the landlord,   on   the  ground  that  under  the   stress   of circumstances  which  resulted  from the  partition  of  the country and scarcity of business premises available in Delhi after partition, they were forced to take on rent the  shops in  question  on an excessive and exorbitant  rate  of  rent charged  by  the landlord.  They alleged that  the  premises were completed after March 24, 1947, and they were  entitled to have the fair and standard rent determined for the  shops in question by the rent Controller.  On August 1, 1948,  the

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Rent  Controller  recorded an order to the  effect  that  in order to fix the rent of the shops in question in accordance with  s.  7A read with Sch.  TV of the Control Act,  1947  a summary enquiry would be held on August 18, 1948.  A  notice was issued to that effect to the landlord, directing him  to attend and bring all relevant authenticated records such  as plans,  account  books, vouchers etc., showing the  cost  of construction of the building; the landlord was also asked to bring   documentary  evidence  relating  to  the   date   of completion of construction of the building.  It is necessary to  explain here why-the date of completion of  construction of  the building was important.  The Control Act, 1947  came into  force  on March 24, 1947.  By s. 1(2) thereof,  as  it originally stood, it was not applicable to any premises  the construction 952 of which was not completed by March 24, 1947, and which  was not  let  to  a tenant before the enforcement  of  the  Act. Later, there was an Ordinance (Ordinance No. XVIII of  1947) followed  by all Act (Act L of 1947)by which enactment  only constructed buildings were brought within the purview of the Control Act, 1947 by repealing s. 1(2) of the Act in so  far as it affected buildings iii.  Delhi and by introducing  s,7 A and Sell.  IV to the Act.  We shall presently read s. 7  A and the relevant provisions of Sch.  IV.  We may just  state here  that  s.7A  laid  down  that  the  fair  rent  of  the constructed  buildings  shall  be  fixed  according  to  the provisions  set  forth in Sch.  TV.   Buildings  which  were completed earlier than March 24, 1947, had to be dealt  with by  the Civil Court under s.7 of the Act.  Under  s.7A  read with.  Sch.  IV, the Rent Controlled had jurisdiction to fix the,  fair and standard rent in respect of  buildings  which were  not  completed  before the commencement  of  the  Act. Therefore, the Rent Controller had to determine the date  of completion  of the building, in order to  have  jurisdiction under s.7A of the Control Act, 1947. We have referred to the notice which the Rent Controller had directed  to be issued to the landlord on August  12,  1948; fixing  August, 18 1948, as the date for the hearing of  the case.   On  August 18, the landlord made an  application  by means  of a letter sent to the Rent Controller in which  he, asked  for  postponement  of  the  case  to  some  date   in September.   The case was postponed to August 26, 1948,  but on  that date the landlord again asked for  an  adjournment. Then on September 1, 1948, an application was made on behalf of  the  landlord,  in which there was  a  reference  to  14 tenants  who had applied for fixation of standard  rent  for the shops in the Chemists’ Market.  In this application  the landlord stated that he himself had applied for fixation of 953 standard  rent under s. 7 of the Control Act, 1-947  in  the Court   of  the  Subordinate  Judge,  Delhi  and  as   those applications  were pending, he prayed that  the  proceedings for  determining  the  identical  question  of  fixation  of standard  rent by the Rent Controller tinder s.7A should  be stayed.   The printed record does not clearly show  how  and when  tenants  other than the 9 tenants who  had  originally applied for fixation of standard rent on July 30, 1948,  had also applied for fixation of standard rent for the shops  in their   occupation.    It  is  clear,  however,   from   the application of, the landlord dated September 1, 1948 that 14 tenants including some of those who had applied on July  30, 1948 had applied for fixation of standard rent for the shops occupied by them.  On November 9, 1948, the Rent  Controller wrote a letter to the landlord in which he referred to  some

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enquiry held in his officer on September 1, 1949 and said:.       "On  that  day you promised  to  produce  some       papers to show that these shops were completed       before  March  24,  1947.   As  the  case   is       unnecessarily being delayed, you are requested       to appear in my office with all the  necessary       document  at  3  P.m. on  Wednesday  the  17th       November,  1948.  It may please be noted  that       no further adjournment will be possible.  Your       failing  to comply with this notice,  ex-parte       decision will be given". On November 15, 1948 the Rent Controller again wrote to  the landlord   that  on  a  representation  by  the   landlord’s representative,  the date had been extended to November  19, 1948 and the landlord should produce all necessary documents relating to the building in quest-ion.  The Rent  Controller again  reminded  the landlord that there would  be  a  final hearing on November 19.  On that date, however, the landlord again made an application saying that as there were  regular suits for the determination 954 of the standard rent pending in the Court of the Subordinate Judge,  Delhi,  the proceedings before the  Rent  Controller should be stayed.  On November 26, 1948 the Rent  Controller wrote to the landlord to the following effect:       "’As  you  have  failed to  attend  my  office       personally on the fixed date and your attorney       did  not possess any information or  documents       regarding  the  newly  constructed  "Chemists’       Market",  you are now directed to submit  your       written statement on oath, duly  countersigned       by   your   advocate,  giving   full   details       regarding the date of construction of the said       building.   Please  note that  your  statement       must reach this office before the 3rd December       1948". Then  on December 3, 1948 the Rent Controller wrote  to  the landlord  saying that he would be visiting the  premises  on December  5,  1948.  On December 3, a telegram was  sent  on behalf  of the landlord saying that lie was out of  station. On  that  date the Rent Controller  recorded  the  following order:       "These  shops  were  first let  out  from  1st       April,   1948.  Note.-The  Advocate  for   the       landlord  was requested to tell  the  landlord       that  he must submit his statement in  writing                     (countersigned  by the.  Advocate)  within  the       next  15 days whether he contends or does  not       contend that this building was completed after       24th March, 1947.       The   Advocate  for  the  landlord   gave   an       application asking for staying the proceedings       as  he had applied to the Sub-Judge for  fixa-       tion of standard rent of the premises.  He was       told that I was not prepared to stay the  pro-       ceedings unless he or his client were prepared       to say on oath that the building was completed       before the 24th March, 1947." 955 On  December 9, 1948 the Rent Controller again wrote to  the landlord to the following effect:       "  I am in receipt of your telegram dated  the       3rd December, 1948.       On  19th  November,  1948, the  last  date  of       hearing, your Advocate Shri Jugal Kishore  and

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     your  General  Attorney Shri Kundal  Lal  were       given  definite instruction to see  that  your       written statement, as to when the construction       of’  the  "Chemists’ Market" was  started  and       when completed, was sent to me within 15 days.       These  instructions  were later  confirmed  in       writing  vide this office No. R. C. 42/  Camp.       dated    the   26th   November,   1948.     My       instructions, however, have not been  complied       with  so far and it is presumed that  you  are       try g to evade the issue.       I, however, give you another final opportunity       and   direct  you  to  submit   your   written       ,statement  on oath within one week  from  the       receipt hereof, showing the date of completion       of  construction  of’ your building  known  as       "Chemists’   Market"  in  Bhagiratli   Colony,       Chandni Chowk, Delhi.       Please take notice that your failure to comply       with (torn) within the stipulated period  will       amount to disobeying the orders of this  Court       and  the case will be referred to  appropriate       authorities   for  necessary  action  in   the       matter." The landlord took no steps whatsoever to furnish any written statement.   In  these circumstances,  the  Rent  Controller passed  his final order on January 10, 1949.  In that  order he  recited  the facts stated above and ended up  by  saying that  though the landlord had been given  sufficient  oppor- tunity, he had not made any statement in writing or 956 otherwise  and that the landlord was clearly trying to avoid the trial of the issue.The Rent Controller had inspected the building on December 12. 194S and made local enquiries.   He came  to  the  finding  that  the  shops  in  question  were completed only in the beginning of 1948.  He said:       "I  inspected this building on 12th  December,       1948   and  made  local  enquiries   when   it       transpired that the building (shops) was  com-       pleted  only  in the beginning of  1948.   The       very  look of the building also confirms  this       information. On the other hand, no data has       been placedbefore me by the landlord, his       attorney  or  the advocate to  show  that  the       construction  of the building  was  completed.       before  24th  March, 1947.  According  to  the       admitted  statement of the attorney the  shops       have  been let out for the first time in  1948       and otherwise too his statement of 19th Novem-       ber,  1948  shows that the  building  had  not       been.completed  before 24th March,  1947.   No       completion  certificate or house-tax  receipts       have been produced in support of this  conten-       tion.   It is, therefore,  not  understandable       how it is claimed that the shops were  comple-       ted  before  24th March, 1947.  The  owner  is       knowingly avoiding to give a statement himself       that  the  shops were  completed  before  24th       March,  1947.  Evidently because  he  realises       that  this is not true.  It has also not  been       stated  what use was made of these shops  till       January, 1948, when they were first let out if       they  had  been completed before  24th  March,       1947 as alleged.       It is unbelievable that shops like these could

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     remain  unoccupied for nearly 9 to 1.0  months       after completion.  I am, therefore,  convinced       beyond a shadow of doubt that the construction       of  there shops was completed long after  24th       March, 1947, and the fixation        957       of their standard rent definitely falls within       the  scope of s. 7 A of the Delhi  and  Ajmer-       Marwara  Rent Control Act,  1947(as  amended).       I,therefore,   proceed   to   fix   the   rent       accordingly." After   taking   into  consideration  the  nature   of   the construction  and  the fittings, etc.,  and  other  relevant considerations  the Rent Controller fixed the  valuation  at Rs.  9-7-0  per sq. ft. of plinth area for working  out  the probable cost of the construction of the building.  The cost of  the land, he estimated at Rs.  ’275 per sq. yd.; but  he allowed  only  one-third  of the estimate  inasmuch  as  the building  was  one  storeyed and all the  buildings  in  the vicinity were mostly three-storeyed.  On these calculations, lie  held  that the standard rent for all the shops  in  the building  work  out at Rs. 335 per month including  10%  for repairs but excluding house tax and charges for  consumption of water and electricity.  A calculation sheet was  prepared fixing  the  standard rent for each of the  shops  including some shops which were vacant, oil the aforesaid’ basis.  The calculation sheet showed that the standard rent of 18 ,shops in  the building varied from Rs. 10 per month to Rs. 50  per month. Against  the order of the Rent Controller dated January  10, 1949,  nineteen  appeals were taken to the  District  Judge. One  of the points taken before the District Judge was  that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to fix the  standard rent  inasmuch  as the building had  been  completed  before March 24, 1947.  The learned District Judge dealt with  this point at length, and held that the Rent Controllers  finding on  the  question of jurisdiction was correct.  As  to  fair rent, he held that though the building was  single-storeyed, there  was no reason why the landlord should not be  allowed the  full  value of the land on which the  building.  stood. Allowing  full value for the land and having regard  to  the rent of premises in the neighbouring area the learned 958 District  Judge modified the order of’ the  Rent  Controller and  fixed the standard rent of the building at Rs. 670  per month,  viz.,  double.  of  what  was  fixed  by  the   Rent Controller.  The learned District Judge passed his order  on January 15, 1951. It appears that from the order of the District Judge,  Delhi dated  January  15, 1951, certain applications  in  revision were.   made  to  the  Punjab  High  Court.   Most  of   the applications were by the landlord, but one of them was by  a tenant.  These applications were heard together by the  High Court.   The  High  Court allowed the  applications  of  the landlord and held in effect that the proceedings before  the Rent  Controller violated the principles of natural  justice and were, therefore, bad and without jurisdiction.  The High Court,  it  appears, travelled over a wide field  and  dealt with a number of questions, though its decision was based on the finding stated above.  The first question which the High Court considered was whether s.7A read with Sch.  IV of  the Control  Act,  1947 prescribed  a  discriminatory  procedure without  a reasonable classification in respect of  premises completed  after  March  24,  1947  and  thus  violated  the guarantee   of  equal  protection  under  Art.  14  of   the

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Constitution.   Along  with  this  question  was   canvassed another  connected question viz., whether these cases  would be governed by the law in force at the time of the  decision given  by the Rent Controller or by the law existing at  the time  when the District Judge heard the appeals.  It may  be here noted that the Constitution of India came into force on January  26,  1950 and at the date of decision of  the  Rent Controller  Art.  14 of the Constitution was not  in  force. The High Court expressed the view that the law to be applied was the law in existence at the time when the District Judge decided  the appeals. It further held that s. 7A  read  with Sch.   IV  of  the Control Act, 1947 was  violative  of  the guarantee of equal protection 959 of  laws under Art. 14 of the Constitution, there  being  no rational  nexus  between the classification  made  regarding premises old and new and the objects of the statute.  Having given these two findings, the High Court said, however, that it would prefer not to base its judgment on these  findings, because to do so might be giving retrospective effect to the Constitution.  The High Court then went, on to consider  the further  contention urged before it that in the  proceedings before  the  Rent Controller there was a  violation  of  the principles  of  natural justice inasmuch as  all  recognised principles governing tribunals which exercise quasi-judicial powers   or  follow  a  procedure  subserving  the   orderly administration  of justice had been. disregarded.   On  this point  the  learned Judge, delivering the  judgment  of  the Court, expressed himself as follows       "In  the present case no ’evidence as to  rent       was  called  from the parties or  recorded  by       the’   Controller  nor  was  any   opportunity       afforded to the parties to adduce such or  any       evidence  which they considered  necessary  to       submit.  The Controller made private enquiries       and  his  order shows that he  has  based  his       decision on the cost of the building which  he       himself   calculated  without   allowing   the       petitioner  an opportunity to show  that  such       calculation was wrong or its basis  erroneous.       Of course, there is no procedure prescribed by       the   Schedule  and  whatever  procedure   was       followed   does  not  subserve   the   orderly       administration  of  justice.   So  that   the,       determination is based oil private  enquiries,       unchecked calculations and no evidence of  the       parties  who were afforded no  opportunity  of       proving their respective cases." With regard to the flats in ’Prem Building’a farther  ground given by the High Court was that they were,                     960 not  now  construction as held by the  District  Judge,  and therefore s.7A was not applicable for determination of  fair and standard rent in respect thereof. We may first dispose of the constitutional point that s.7  A read  with  Sch.  IV of the Control Act, 1947  violated  the fundamental   right   guaranteed  under.Art.   14   of   the Constitution.   We  may  ’here read s.7A  and  some  of  the provisions of Sch.  IV.       "7A.   The  provisions set out in  the  Fourth       Schedule  shall apply to the fixation of  rent       and other matters relating to the premises  in       Delhi  (hereinafter referred to as  the  newly       constructed  premises)  the  construction   of                     which was not completed before the commencement

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     of this Act.       The Fourth Schedule       1."Rent  Controller  or the purposes  of  this       Schedule  means  the person appointed  by  the       Central Government as the Rent Controller.       2.If  the  Rent Controller  on  a  written       complaint ’or otherwise has reason to  believe       that the rent of any newly constructed  premi-       ses  is excessive, he may, after  making  such       inquiry  as he thinks fit proceed to  fix  the       standard rent thereof.       3.The  Rent.   Controller  in  fixing  the       standard  rent  shall  state  in  writing  his       reasons therefor.       4.In  fixing  the standard rent  the  Rent       Controller  shall take into consideration  all       circumstances of the case including any amount       paid  or  to be paid by the tenant by  way  of       premium or any other like sum in addition  to-       rent.       961       5 and 6.  x         x       x        x      x       7.For  the  purposes of an  inquiry  under       paragraphs  2,  5 and 6, the  Rent  Controller       may-       (a)require the landlord to produce any book       of  account,  document  or  other  information       relating to the newly constructed premises,       (b)enter  and inspect such  premises  after       due notice, and       (e)authorise any officer subordinate to him       to enter and inspect such premises after       due notice.       8 to 10.  x     x x        x          x       11.  Any person aggrieved by an order  of  the       Rent  Controller may, within thirty days  from       the date on which the order is communicated to       him, appeal to the District Judge, Delhi." This  very  question was considered by a Full Bench  of  the same High Court in a later decision (see G. D. Soni v. S. N. Bhalla(1).   In that decision the High Court went  into  the entire history of legislation with regard to the control  of house rent in both old Delhi and New Delhi from 1939 onwards when the second world war broke out.  The High Court pointed out  that the New Delhi House Rent Control Order, 1939  made under  r.  81 of the Defence of India Rules  was  the  first Control Order seeking to control rent of houses in New Delhi and  the Civil Lines.  From 1939 till 1942 no  Rent  Control Act applied to the municipal area of Delhi.  On October  16, 1942  the  Punjab  Urban Rent  Restriction  Act,  1941  with suitable  adaptations was extended to that area. Under  that Act  a  landlord could recover only standard rent  from  the tenant and the term "standard rent-’ was defined as  meaning the, rent at (1)  A I.R. 1959 Punj. 381.      962 which  the premises were let on January 1, 1939 and  if  not so, the rent at which the were last let.    In  cases   not governed  entirely by this definition, the Court  was  given the power to fix standard rent.    In  1944  the   then Governor-General   promulgated   the  Delhi   Rent   Control Ordinance, 1944. Under     this   Ordinance   the   Chief Commissioner could apply it to any area within the  Province of  Delhi and whenever the Ordinance was made applicable  to any area, the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1941 ceased

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to  be  operative. In the Ordinance also standard  rent  was defined  substantially  in the same terms as in  the  Punjab Act.  The Central legislature then enacted the Control  Act, 1947 which repealed the Punjab Act as extended to Delhi and  also  the  Rent  Control Order of  1939  and  the  1944 Ordinance.         By s.1(2) the Act, was made  inapplicable to any premises the construction of which was not  completed by March 24, 1947 and under s.7 of the Control Act, 1947, at Court in case of dispute had to determine the standard  rent on the principles set forth in the Second Schedule.  We have already stated earlier that s.1 (2) of the Control Act, 1947 was  later  repealed (so far as, it  affected  buildings  in Delhi), and newly constructed buildings were brought  within the purview of the Control Act, 1947 by introducing s.7A and Schedule, IV to it. From  this  brief survey of the legislative history  of  the control  of  rent of premises situated in  the  Province  of Delhi, it is clear that the Control Act, 1947 brought  about uniformity  in  the law relating to rent control  by  laying down  that the standard rent of newly  constructed  premises shall  be fixed by the Rent Controller while the Court  will fix  the standard rent in respect of other premises.   There is no doubt that a classification was made between  premises the  construction of which was, completed before  March  24, 1947 and those the construction of which was completed after that  date.  The question is whether this classification  is based on                     963 intelligible  differentia having a rational nexus  with  the objects  of the statute.  Dealing with this question  Bishan Narain, J. delivering the judgment of of Full Bench said:       ’The   learned   counsel  for   the   landlord       challenged the validity of these provisions on       the  grounds (1) that there is  no  reasonable       basis  for fixing the standard rent  of  newly       constructed   premises   differently   on    a       different  principle  from  the  principle  on       which standard rent is fixed for old buildings       in the same locality and (2) that there is  no       reason   for   discriminating   against    the       landlords  of newly constructed  buildings  by       laying down that their standard rent shall  be       fixed  by  Rent Controllers appointed  by  the       Central Government while the standard rent  of       other  buildings is to he fixed by  courts  of       law  which are bound to follow procedure  laid       down  in the the Civil Procedure It  is  urged       that  the Rent Controller is not bound by  any       procedures  laid down by the  Civil  Procedure       Code or the Punjab Courts Act.       x              x               x Section 7 says that the standard rent shall be determined in accordance  with  the  principles set forth  in  the  Second Schedule.    The  Second  Schedule  fixes  basic   rent   as determined  tinder  the Control Order of 1939 or  under  the 1944 Ordinance and in other cases the contractual rent on 1- 11-1939  or  if not on that day then on the date  first  let after 1-11-1939. The  standard rent thus fixed is to be increased by  certain percentage specified in the Schedule.  If the premises  were let after 2-6-1944 then the basic rent and the standard rent were to be the same.  Obviously this principle for  fixation of standard rent could not possibly have any application  to premises constructed and let after 964

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24-3-1947.  Section 7 then proceeds. to lay down that if for any reason it is not possible to determine the standard rent of  any premises set forth in the Second Schedule  then  the courts  shall  determine it having "regard to  the  standard rent  of  similar premises in the same  locality  and  other relevant considerations".  Para 4 of Schedule IV lays down In  fixing the standard rent the Rent Controller shall  take into  consideration  all  the  circumstances  of  the   case including any amount paid or to be paid by the tenant by way of premium or any other like sum in addition to rent.’ It  was  argued on behalf of the landlord that  the  critera laid down in s.7(2) and para 4 of Schedule IV of the Act  is substantially  different and that there is no  valid  reason for  such  a  differentiation.   He  urgent  that  the  Rent Controller  (1)  may  ignore the standard  rent  of  similar premises  in  the  same  locality  while  he  is  under   an obligation  to  take into consideration any amount  Paid  or agreed  to be paid by the tenant by way of premium  etc.  in addition  to  rent and that the Rent Controller  (2)  cannot interfere with the agreed rent unless he finds it  excessive and  in that he can only reduce the rent fixed  between  the parties and cannot increase it.  It; is urged that under  s. 7(2)  it is open to the Court to increase the standard  rent and  also not to take into consideration any amount paid  by the tenant as premium in addition to rent. Now  the Rent Controller is enjoined by para 4 to take  into consideration all the circumstances of the case when  fixing standard  rent.  It is not understood how a Rent  Controller can  omit to consider the standard rent of similar  premises in  the  same  locality.   This  is  obviously  a   relevant consideration  though para 4 does not  specifically  mention it. It is true that this criteria has been 965 specifically mentioned in s.7(2)of the Act and has not  been so  mentioned in s.7A.but. this circumstance cannot lead  to the  inference  that it is open to the  Rent  Controller  to ignore it. The  words  of para 4 are in fact as.wide in effect  as  the words  used in s.7(2) of the Act.  In this context  it  must not be forgotten that if such a mistake is made by the  Rent Controller  then the aggrieved party (may he be landlord  or the  tenant) can appeal to the District Judge  whose  powers are  co-extensive with those of the Rent Controller and  who can  set right any mistake made by the Rent  Controller.   I am,  therefore, of the opinion that the criterion laid  down for  fixation  of  standard rent in s.7(2)  and  para  4  is substantially the same in scope and is not different. x x x x x       Undoubtedly   under  Schedule:  IV  the   Rent       Controller  can fix standard rent only  if  he       finds  that the rent agreed upon  between  the       parties  is excessive.  This provision  is  to       protect  the landlord from frivolous  applica-       tions  by  tenants and it is not clear  why  a       landlord should object to this provision.       The reason for this provision is intelligible.       It is. well known that rents in Delhi prior to       1-11-1939  were  very, low and in  some  cases       uneconomic.- Therefore the legislature decided       that in such cases a landlord should be. in  a       position to, got standard rent fixed at a rate       higher  than  fixed  by   agreement  of    the       parties   in   1939  or  earlier.    No   such       consideration    arises   in  the   ’case   of       buildings  constructed.  or  completed   after

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     1947.       In  1947  there existed an acute  shortaae  of       accommodation in Delhi and the landlords  were       in,  a position to dictate terms  and,  there-       fore, presumably the fixed between the parties       were not so low as to require, in-       966       considered unnecessary to provide for increase       of  rent in Schedule IV.  I am, therefore,  of       the  opnion that it is not possible  on  these       grounds to hold that s.7-A and Schedule IV are       unconstitutional.       The learned counsel then brought to our notice       two   other   matters  in  which   the   newly       constructed   buildings  have   been   treated       differently   from  the  old  buildings.    He       pointed out that under para 10(2) of  Schedule       IIV the standard rent fixed by Rent Controller       must  necessarily be retrospective  in  effect       while under s.7(5) the Court can fix the  date       from which the payment of Estandard rent would       become effective.  He further pointed out that       under   s.   4(2)   a   landlord   on   making       improvements can increase the standard rent by       an  amount  not exceeding 61 per cent  of  the       cost of improvement, while under para 6 of the       Schedule  IV the Rent Controller can  increase       the standard rent in such circumstances to  an       amount  not  exceeding 7-1/2 per cent  of  the       cost of improvement.       These  are, however, no grounds for hold.  ing       the  impugned  provisions  to  be  unconstitu-       tional.’  The  Delhi  and  Ajmer-Marwara  Rent       Control  Act, 1947, came into force  on  24-3-       1947  originally for two years only and  s.7-A       with Schedule IV were introduced in  September       1947.   Therefore  the standard rent  for  new       buildings   could  well  be  fixed  from   the       beginning  of  the lease.  The  old  buildings       were  let long before 1947 and, therefore,  it       was considered advisable to leave it to courts       to  fix  the date from which  the  payment  of       standard rent would become effective.       This  is  a rational difference.   So  is  the       Matter of differenace of return on the cost of                            967       improvements.  There is no reason for equating       the  return  on cost of  improvements  of  old       buildings-  with the return oil’ the  cost  of       improvements  of  new buildings.   This  is  a       matter  for  the legislature to  consider  and       this  possible slight difference,  in  returns       cannot  be  said  to  be  discriminatory   and       violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.       For these reasons I am of the opinion that the       criteria for the fixation of standard rent for       new  and  old buildings is  substantially  the       same  and does not violate Article 14  of  the       Constitution and there is no valid reason  for                     coming to the conclusion that the standard rent       of old and new buildings of the same type  and       in  the,  same locality would  necessarily  be       different.  The first ground, therefore, fails       and rejected.       The  second ground also has no force.   It  is

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     urged   that  in  Schedule  TV  there  is   no       provision  for recording the evidence  of  the       parties  nor is it laid down whether the  evi-       dence  is to be on oath.  It is  futher  urged       that  the principles of natural  justice  have       been disregarded by Schedule IV and it is open       to  the Rent Controller to fix  standard  rent       arbitrarily  without recording  any  evidence.       Now  para  2 Schedule IV says  that  the  Rent       Controller  shall  make  such  enquiry  as  he       considers fit to fix the standard rent.       x       x        x       x        x       In  fixing standard rent the Rent;  Controller       decides  a  dispute between a landlord  and  a       tenant.  To do this effectively he has to take       evidence  and  to  hold  a  judicial   inquiry       particularly  when he has to give reasons  for       his  decision.  Para 7 is also  indicative  of       such a judicial. inquiry.  There is no  reason       for Presuming and assuming that the       968       Rent  Controller  would  not hold s  a  oh  an       inquiry. If he does"not   do  go  then   the       aggrieved party can always     appeal  to  the       District Judge, Delhi who invariably is a very       senior and experienced judicial officer.       x     x       In this context it must not be forgotten  that       considering  the’  recent rise  in  prices  of       land,  building material and labour  costs  in       Delhi  the standard rent should be  correlated       to  these  costs.  In  the  circumstances  the       legislature in its wisdom has thought fit that       the  enquiry,  into  standard.  rent.  of  new       building  should continue to remain  with  the       Rent Controllers who can expeditiously  decide       the matter.       In this context it can be reasonably  expected       that the Central Government will appoint  only       those persons as Rent Controllers who can use:       their   own   knowledge  and   experience   to       calculate these costs.  In these circumstances       it cannot be said that the differentiation  in       the  procedure adopted in the statute  has  no       rational  relation to the, object  sought  ’by       the legislature. We  agree with these observations of the Full Bench, and  we further  accept the view expressed by it that  the  criteria for  the  fixation of standard rent for both  new  and.  old buildings under the Control Act, 1947 are not  substantially different.  The minor differences that exist in the  matter, which  have  been adverted to in the judgment of  the  High_ Court, can be justified on the grounds of (a) difference  in the.  cost  of construction of old and  new  buildings,  (b) difference   in  the rate of return on investments  made  in building  houses  before  and  after  1947(c)  the  need  to encourage the, building of houses to meet the acute shortage of 969 accommodation  in Delhi after 1947, and (d) the  opportunity presented  of charging excessive tent after 1947.   Perhaps, it is also necessary to emphasise again that the  provisions in  Schedule  IV of the Control Act, 1947, do  not  give  an arbitrary power to the Rent Controller.  Paragraph 3 of the. Schedule  requires the Rent Controller to state ’in  writing

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his  reasons  for  fixing the standard  rent.   Paragraph  4 states that in fixing the standard rent, the Rent Controller shall  take into consideration all the circumstances of  the case  including any amount paid or to be paid by the  tenant by way of premium or any other like sum in addition to rent. Paragraph  7 gives the Rent Controller power to require  the landlord  to produce any book of account, document or  other information  relating to the newly constructed premises,  to enter  and  inspect such premises after due notice,  and  to authorise  any  officer  subordinate to  him  to  enter  and inspect any such premises after due notice.  Paragraph.   II provides  for an appeal to the District Judge by any  person aggrieved  by  an  order  of  the  Rent  Controller.   These provisions clearly indicate that the power given to the Rent Controller  is not an arbitrary power.  The power has to  be exercised by the Rent Controller on a judicial consideration of  all  the circumstances of the case.  We think  that  the High  Court  was in error in the view it expressed  that  no reasonable  procedure  is prescribed by  the  provisions  of Schedule  IV  and the Rent Controller is at  liberty  to  do whatever he likes. This  brings us to the main question for decision  in  these appeals-was  there a violation of the principles of  natural justice in the procedure which the Rent Controller  actually followed  in  fixing the standard rent ?’We  are  unable  to agree  with  the  High  Court  that  there,  was  any.  such violation.  On behalf of the landlord, it has been contended before us that in respect of both the matters 970 completion  of construction of the building and fixation  of standard rent, the Rent Controller proceeded on (i)  private enquiries,  (ii) local inspection without notice, and  (iii) inadmissible  evidence.  Before we deal with this  argument, it  is necessary to say a few words about the principles  of natural justice.  This Court considered the question in  New Prakash  Transport Co., Ltd. v. New Suwarna  Transport  Co., Ltd. (1).  After a review of the case law on the subject, it pointed  out  that the rules of natural justice have  to  be inferred  from the nature of the tribunal, the scope of  its enquiry  and the statutory rules of procedure laid  down  by the law for carrying out the objectives of the statute.  The mere  circumstance  that  the procedure  prescribed  by  the statute does not require that evidence should be recorded in the  manner  laid down for ordinary courts of law  does  not necessarily mean that there is a violation of the principles of  natural justice.  In Union of India v. T. R.  Varma  (2) this Court said       "Stating  it broadly and without intending  it       to  be  exhaustive, it may  be  observed  that       rules of natural justice require that a  party       should  have the opportunity of  adducing  all       relevant.  evidence on which he  relies,  that       the  evidence of the opponent should be  taken       in  his presence, and that he should be  given       the   opportunity   of   cross-examining   the       witnesses examined by that party, and that  no       materials  should  be relied  on  against  him       without  his  being given  an  opportunity  of       explaining   them.    If   these   rules   are       satisfied,  the enquiry is not open to  attack       on the ground that the procedure laid down  in       the  Evidence Act for taking evidence was  not       strictly followed." Judged in the light of the observations referred (1)  (1957) S. C. R. 98.

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(2) (1958) S. C. R. 499) 507. 971 to above, was there a violation of the principles of natural justice  in  the  cases under our  consideration?   We  have pointed  out earlier that the landlord was repeatedly  given an  opportunity of producing such evidence as he  wished  to produce.   On  August  12, 1948 be was asked  to  bring  all relevant records including account books, vouchers etc.   He did  not,  choose to do so.  He asked  for  an.  adjournment which was granted to him.  On September 1, 1948 the landlord again  asked for time.  This was also granted to him and  he was  told that the cases would be finally heard on  November 17,1948,  He was also informed that no  further  adjournment would  be  given.   It  appears  from  the  record  that  on September  1,  1948  some statements were  recorded  in  the presence  of  the  representative  of’  the  landlord.    On November  19,  1948  which ",as the  date  fixed  for  final hearing,  the  landlord again asked for time  and  time  was again granted to him.  On December 3, 1948 the landlord  was told  that  the  Rent Controller  would  inspect  the  house on..Sunday December 5, 1948 between 9 A. m. and 1 P. m.  The landlord  was  asked  to  be present.   On  December  3  the Advocate  of the landlord was present and was informed  that the  landlord must submit his written statement  in  writing within 15 days.  The Advocate, however, gave an  application for  postponement  of the cases on the ground  that  certain proceedings  were  pending  before  the  Subordinate  Judge, Delhi.  On December 9, 1948 the landlord was again given one A week’s time to file his written statement and produce such other   evidence  as  he  wished  to  produce.    In   these circumstances it is difficult to understand how the landlord can  complain  that  there  has  been  a  violation  of  the principles of natural justice and that he had no opportunity of  producing evidence or of cross-examining  the  witnesses whose statements were recorded by the Rent Controller.   It, is  indeed  true that the Rent Controller  made  some  local enquiries  when  he inspected the building on  December  12, 1948.  If, however, 972 the  landlord  chose  to  be absent  in  spite  of  repeated intimation  to  him,  he cannot be heard  to  say  that  the enquiries were made in his absence and are, therefore,  bad. To  bold  in  such  circumstances  that  there  has  been  a violation  of the principles of natural justice would be  to put a premium on the recalcitrance of a party.  Even in  the ordinary  courts of law, if a party chooses to be absent  in spite of notice, evidence is recorded ex-parte and the party who chooses to be absent cannot be heard to say that he  had no  opportunity of being present or of  cross-examining  the persons whose statements were recorded by the court.   After all,  what natural justice requires is that a  party  should have  the opportunity of adducing all relevant evidence  and that  he should have an opportunity of the evidence  of  his opponent  being taken in his presence.  Such an  opportunity was clearly given to the landlord in the present cases.   If anybody  is  to  blame for the ex-parte order  of  the  Rent Controller, it is the landlord himself.  It appears from the order  of Rent Controller that the attorney or  advocate  of the  landlord  did appear on several dates and even  made  a statement as. to the letting out of the building in question but.  took  no other ’part in the proceeding  except  asking repeatedly for adjournment.  The Rent Controller was not far wrong when he said that the landlord was bent upon  avoiding a  trial  of  the issue before the Rent  Controller  on  the ground  that  be  had made applications under s.  7  to  the

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Subordinate  Judge, Delhi, for fixation of’  standard  rent. In  view  of the recalcitrant attitude  which  the  landlord adopted   the   Rent  Controller  did  his   best   in   the circumstances.   He  took into consideration  such  relevant circumstances   as   the  cost  of  the,   land,   cost   of construction,  cost of fittings, the open. area in front  of the shops, cost of repairs etc.. The learned District  Judge also took in to consideration the return- which the landlord could:.-reasonably  expection his outlay and also. the  rent of other premises in the. area.  Taking these 973 additional  circumstances into consideration,  the  District Judge  doubled the standard rent which the  Rent  Controller had  fixed.   ’It  does, not appear from the  order  of  the learned District Judge that any objection was pressed before him on the ground that in the actual proceedings. before the Rent Controller there was a violation of’ the principles  of natural  justice,  though in paragraph 7 of the  grounds  of appeal it was stated that the procedure adopted by the  Rent Controller  was  contrary. to the provisions  of  law  etc.A ground appears to have been seriously pressed for the  first time I in the revision applications to the High Court.  Some grievance has been made before us of the  circumstance that  in  his  letter  dated  December  3,  1948  the   Rent Controller  said  that  be would  inspect  the  building  on December   5,1948.   He  however,  actually  inspected   the building  oh  December  12, 1948 as his  order  shows.   Our attention has been drawn to para 7 (b) of So ’IV and it  has been  contended that the inspection was made without  notice to  the  landlord’.  This, it is stated, has.  vitiated  the entire  proceedings.   This  argument might  have  had  some force,   but  for  the  attitude  adopted   throughout   the proceedings by the landlord.  On the very date on which the, Rent  Controller  intimated to the landlord  that  he  would visit the building on December 5, 1948, the landlord sent  a telegram purporting to be on his behalf stating that he  was out of, station.  The Rent Controller then noted an order on that  very date stating that the advocate for  the  landlord gave  an  application  for  staving  the  proceedings.   The application was rightly refused by the Rent Controller.   In these  circumstances we do not think that the  landlord  can make any complaint that the inspection was without notice or that he had, no opportunity of being present at the time  of the inspection.  It is obvious that from the very  beginning the landlord had taken up an attitude of non-co-operation in the proceedings before the 974 Rent  Controller.   It  is  worthy  of  note  that  even  in statement  of the case in this Court, the landlord has  made no. grievance that the inspection was held without notice to him;  nor  did  he take any such plea  before  the  District Judge. A further contention urged on behalf of the landlord  arises out  of para 2 of Sch.  IV That paragraph says that  if  the Rent Controller "has reason to believe that the rent of  any newly constructed premises is excessive, he may after making such  enquiry  as he thinks fit, proceed to fix  a  standard rent  thereof".   The  argument before  us  is  that  before proceeding to fix the standard rent the Rent Controller  did not  bold a preliminary enquiry nor did be record a  finding to  the  effect that the rent charged by  the  landlord  was excessive  ;  therefore.,  the provisions  of  para  2  were violated.   We do not think that there is any  substance  in this  contention.  In the, application which 9 tenants  made on  July  30,  1948 they definitely stated  that  under  the

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stress  of circumstances resulting from a partition  of  the country and the heavy demand for business premises in Delhi, they were forced to accept the excessive and exorbitant rent which  the landlord was charging from them.  On this  appli- cation  a note was recorded by the Rent Controller’s  office to the effect that the entire case relating to the  fixation of  standard rent for the building in question  was  already under  consideration, presumably because, other tenants  had also   made  similar  applications.   The  Rent   Controller thereupon recorded an order which said that "in order to fix the  rent  of the premises in accordance with s. 7A  of  the Control  Act, 1947 a summary enquiry would be held by  him". It  is obvious from this order that the Rent Controller  was prima  facie satisfied that the rent charged  was  excessive and action was required under s.7A of the Control Act, 1947. The  argument urged. on behalf of the landlord really  comes to  this,  viz.  that under para 2 of Sch.   IV  there  must always be’ two 975 enquiries, first an enquiry as to whether there are  reasons to believe that the rent charged is excessive and, secondly, an  enquiry for fixing the standard rent.  We do  not  think that  para  2  necessarily involves  two  enquiries  in  all circumstances.   In a case where the Rent Controller  has  a written  complaint, as in these cases, the complaint  itself may  give reasons which the Rent Controller may prima  facie accept  that the rent charged by the landlord is  excessive. In  the cases before us the tenants had stated the  reasons, which  were  common  to  all, why  they  had  to  submit  to excessive  and  exorbitant  rate  of  rent  charged  by  the landlord.  It was, we think, open to the Rent Controller  to accept  those  reasons  as  prima  facie  good  reasons  for proceeding  to make an enquiry to fix the standard  rent  in that enquiry it was open to the Rent Controller to give  the necessary finding that the rent charged by the landlord  was excessive.   The  final order of the Rent  Controller  shows with  out doubt that he was satisfied that the rent  charged by the landlord was exorbitant and excessive.  We are unable to  hold  that  in these circumstances there  has  been  any contravention  of  para 2 of Sch.  IV of  the  Control  Act, 1947. Another  objection taken by the landlord to the  proceedings before  the Rent Controller arises out of  the  circumstance that the Rent Controller in fixing the standard rent for the entire  building  had fixed the rent even for  vacant  shops i.e. shops which were not in occupation of any tenant at the time.  In the final order which the Rent Controller  passed, he  fixed the standard rent for all the shops at  RS.  335/- per  month and in the calculation sheet, which was  part  of the  final order made by the Rent Controller on January  11, 1949, three shops have been shown to be vacant.  It has been contended  before  us  that  the  Rent  Controller  had  not jurisdiction  to fix the standard rent for vacant shops  and the argument is that the way he proceeded to fix 976 the  rent for the entire building vitiated  the  proceedings before him.  It has further been argued that only 9 tenants, six  of  whom  are appellants before  us,  applied  for  the fixation of standard rent on July 30, 1948.  Therefore,  the Rent,  Controller  had no jurisdiction to fix  the  standard rent  in  respect of persons who had not  applied  for  such fixation.   It has been contended before us that in  six  of the  appeals before us (viz.  Civil Appeals Nos.  176,  178, 181,  189, 183 and 184 of 1958) the appellants had  made  no application for fixation of standard rent.

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We take up first the question of vacant shops.  It is  clear from  s.7A  and  the provisions of Sch.  IV  that  the  Rent Controller   has  to  fix,  the  standard  rent   of   newly constructed "premises" if the condition stated in para 2  of Sch.   TV is satisfied.  The word "Premises" as  defined  in s.2  of the Act means "any building or, part of  a  building which is, or is intended to be, let separately for use as  a residence  or  for commercial use or for any  other  purpose etc." Each shop let out or intended to be let out separately is  therefore "premises" within the meaning of the  Control. Act, 1947.  It may, therefore, be correct to say that it was not  necessary for the Rent Controller to fix  the  standard rent  for  vacant shops.  It is obvious, however,  that  for shops which had been let out to tenants the Rent  Controller had  to  take  into consideration the  cost  of  the  entire building,  value  of the land, the fittings etc.   In  other words he had to take the entire building into  consideration for the purpose of fixing the standard rent of the shops  in the  building  let out to various tenants.  That  being  the position, we do not consider that the proceedings before the Rent  Controller were rendered abortive merely  because  the Rent Controller also fixed the standard rent for some of the vacant  shops.   For  the  purpose  of  these  appeals,  the standard  rent  fixed  for  the vacant  shops  may  well  be ignored: that will not 977 affect  the rent fixed for the shops which had been let  out to tenants. As  to  the point that some of the appellants had  made,  no application for fixation of standard rent, we are unable  to accept the contention as correct.  It is indeed true that  9 tenants  had  made an application for fixation  of  standard rent on July 30, 1948, but it appears that there were  other applications  also from other tenants.  This is  clear  from the office note, to which we have already referred  earlier, appended  to  the application of 9  tenants.   Moreover  the application which the landlord himself had made on September 1, J948 showed that 14 tenants had made applications for the fixation of standard rent of their shops in Chemists’ Market in  Bhagirath Colony.  Unfortunately, all  the  applications have  not been printed in the paper book.  The order of  the Rent  Controller shows that he treated all the  applications as’  though they gave rise. to a single proceeding,  because they related to the same building.  This point which has now been  taken  before us does not appear to  have  been  taken before  the  District  Judge who said  that  there  were  19 appeals before him arising out of a single order of the Rent Controller fixing rent for 18 different shops of a  building belonging to the landlord.  In the calculation sheets  which the  Rent  Controller  and the learned  District  Judge  had prepared  and  which give the names of all the  tenants  the standard  rent  for whose shops was. fixed,  are  shown  the names  of all the appellants.  It is, me think, too late  in the  day  for  the  landlord to contend  that  some  of  the appellants  had  not applied for the  fixation  of  standard rent, In any view of the matter, the landlord has not placed sufficient   materials   before  us  in  support   of   that contention.   We  may  point out  here.  that  M/s.   Narang Medicine Co., appellant in Civil Appeal No. 182 of 1958, did not  join in the application made on July 30, 1948.  Yet  we find from the 978 record  that a copy of the letter which the Rent  Controller wrote  to  the landlord on November 9,    1948,  was sent to M/s.  Narang Medicine Co. As we have earlier pointed out the

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very petition of the landlord dated September 1, 1948, shows that  many more than 9 tenants had applied for  fixation  of standard rent for their shops in Chemists’ Market, Bhagirath Colony.  Therefore, we are unable to uphold the’  contention of  the  landlord  that the Rent Controller  had  fixed  the standard rent of some of the shops, tenants whereof had  not applied for the fixation of the standard rent. This  concludes the discussion with regard to the  Chemists’ Market  in Bhagirath Colony.  In these appeals we have  come to  the conclusion, for reasons given above, that  the  High Court  was  wrong  in  interfering with  the  order  of  the District  Judge in appeal.  We would, ;therefore, set  aside the  order  of  the High Court dated  August  26,  1954  and restore that of the learned District Judge in appeal, so far as the appellants herein are concerned. Civil  Appeals Nos. 185 and 186. of 1958. We  now turn to the two appeals relating to  Prem  Building. The  two  tenants  are M/s.  Dhawan & Co.,  and  Firm  Gokal Chand-Madan  Chand.   M/s.   Dhawan  &  Co.  had  made   ,in application for fixation of standard rent on June 14,  1948. A  Similar  application was made by Firm Gokal  Chand  Madan Chand on the same date.  In the applications an averment was made that the flats were completed after March 24, 1947, and that  the tenants being without any accommodation and  under the  pressure  of circumstances were forced  to  accept  the exorbitant rent of Rs. 360 per month in one case and Rs. 350 per month in the other.  Both of them asked for fixation  of standard rent under s.7A of the Control Act, 1947.  Both the landlord and the tenants appeared before the Rent Controller and 979 made statements before him.  The main question taken  before the  Rent Controller on behalf of the landlord was that  the second-floor  on  which the two flats of the  tenants-  were situated   ",as  completed  before  March  24,   1947,   and therefore, no proceeding in respect thereof was maintainable under  s.7A of the Act.  The Rent Controller %vent into  the evidence  adduced before him very carefully and came to  the conclusion that though the ground-floor and the  first-floor of  the building were old, the second-floor was  constructed some  time. in August, 1947.  He, therefore, held  that  the second-floor  was a new construction within the  meaning  of s.7A of the Control Act, 1947 and be fixed the standard rent for each flat at Rs. 96-8-0. The matter wasthen  taken  in appeal to the District Judge.      Again the main contention before the District Judge  was that the Rent Controller  bad no  jurisdiction as the premises in question were not  newly constructed.   The District Judge dealt with this  point  in the following way:       "The  premises,  are two flats on  the  second       floor  of  a large building belonging  to  the       appellant,  and the rent Controller has  found       that  these flats were constructed after  24th       March,  1947.   The  record  shows  that   the       general  attorney for the  appellant  admitted       before   the  Rent  Controller  that  only   a       temporary construction was in existence on the       second floor before 24th March 1947, and  that       temporary  construction  consisted  of  wooden       purlins with corrugated iron sheets and stone-       slabs on top of them.  Subsequently,  however,       this construction was brought down and  proper       flats  were  built  with  reinforced  concrete       roofs,  and it is in evidence that  the  first       tenant, who occupied one of the flats, did  so

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     in  September, 1947, and a second tenant  went       into  occupation in January, 1948.  It is  on.       this evidence abundantly clear that       980       the premises or the flats now in dispute  were       in every sense newly constructed premises and      the,       Rent  Controller  was  competent  to  fix  the       rent." It is clear from the orders of the Rent Controller     and of  the District Judge in appeal that the  question  whether the  second floor was newly constructed or not was really  a question  of fact, though undoubtedly a jurisdictional  fact on  which depended the power of the Rent Controller to  take action  under  s.7A.  If the  Rent  Controller  had  wrongly decided the fact and assumed jurisdiction where he had none, the  matter  would be open to reconsideration  in  revision. The  High Court did not, however, go into the evidence,  nor did  it  say  that  the finding was  not  justified  by  the evidence  on  record.   The High Court  referred  merely  to certain submissions made on behalf of the landlord and  then expressed the opinion that what was done to the second floor was  mere improvement and not a new construction.  We  think that  the  High Court was in error in interfering  with  the finding  of  fact by the Rent Controller  and  the  District Judge,  in  support  of which finding there  was  clear  and abundant  evidence which had been carefully  considered  and accepted by both the Rent Controller and the District Judge. In these two appeals we have come to the conclusion that the judgment of the High Court dated January 26, 1954, should be set  aside and that of the District Judge restored.  We  may here note that so far as the standard rent fixed by the Rent Controller  was concerned, the District Judge himself  noted that  the learned advocate for the landlord was not able  to find  any  fault  with  the  assessment  made  by  the  Rent Controller.     Civil Appeal No. 171 of 1958. We  now  come to Civil Appeal No. 171.  The  facts  of  this appeal are somewhat different.  We 981 have already stated that this appeal relates to two flats on the  ground  floor  of plot No. 20, Block  No.  13,  Western Extension Area, Karolbagh.  The tenant, who is the appellant before  us,  took the flats on a rent of Rs. 220  per  month including tax on December 15,1950.  On May 15, 1951 he  made an  application for fixation of standard rent under s.7A  of the  Control Act, 1947, on the ground that the rent  charged was excessive and exorbitant.  The application was contested by  the landlord.  On December 7, 1951, the Rent  Controller fixed  Rs. 150 per month as the standard rent  inclusive  of tax.   The  landlord filed an appeal to the  District  Judge Which  was  dismissed on May 12, 1953.   The  landlord  then filed  an application in revision to the High Court and  the High  Court  accepted the application on May 10,  1954,  and remanded the case for afresh trial.  When the case came back to the Rent Controller, the landlord made an application  to the  Rent  Controller  to the effect  that  s.7A  read  with Schedule  IV  of  the  Control  Act.’  1947,  was   rendered unconstitutional  and void on the coming into force ’of  the Constitution of India.  Apparently, this point was taken  in view of the judgement of the Punjab High Court dated  August 26,  1954, already discussed in the other appeals.   On  May 30,  1955,  the Rent Controller held, on the  basis  of  the aforesaid decision, that S. 7A read with Schedule IV of  the Control  Act, 1947, was unconstitutional and  therefore  the application  was not maintainable Accordingly, he  dismissed

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the application.  The matter was then taken to the  District Judge in appeal.The learned District Judge who was bound  by the decision of the Punjab High Court also held that s.7A of the  Control Act, 1947, was unconstitutional  and  therefore the application was not maintainable.  The  tenant-appellant then made an application under Art. 227 of the  Constitution to  the Punjab High Court.  That application  was  summarily dismissed on March 7,.1956, 982 We  have already dealt with the constitutional point  as  to whether s.7A read with Sch.  IV of the Control Act, 1947 is, void  after  the coming into force of  the  Constitution  of India  by  reason of a violation of  the  fundamental  right guaranteed  under  Art. 14 of the Constitution and  we  have come to the Conclusion that s.7A and the relevant provisions of   Sch.    IV   of  the  Control   Act,   1947   are   not unconstitutional.  That being the position, the main  ground on  which  the application of the  appellant  was  dismissed disappears  and  the application must now be dealt  with  in accordance with law.  Our attention has, however, been drawn to  the  Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act,  1952  (Act  No., XXXVIII  of 1952), which by s.46 repealed the  Control  Act, 1947.  That section, however, contains a saving clause which is as follows :            "46.  Repeals and savings.(1) x x x       (2)Notwithstanding such repeal, all suits  and       other proceedings pending at the  commencement       of  this Act, whether before any court or  the       Rent  Controller  appointed under  the  Fourth       Schedule to the said Act, shall be disposed of       in accordance with the provisions of the  said       Act as if the said Act bad continued in  force       and this Act had not been passed :       Provided that the procedure laid ’down in this                     Act shall, as far as may be, apply to suits and       other proceedings pending before an Court." We  consider it unnecessary to determine the effect  of  the aforesaid saving clause in the present appeal.  Neither  the Rent Controller, nor the District Judge, nor the High  Court considered   the   effect  of  the  saving   clause.    The, application  of  the appellant was dismissed on  the  simple ground that s.7A read with Sch.  TV of the Control Act, 1947 was unconstitutional.  We consider that that ground is not  983 correct  and  the application of the  tenant  appellant  for fixation  of  standard  rent must now be  deter-.  mined  in accordance  with  law.   It  would  be  for  the   competent authorities to consider now the effect of s.46 of the  Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 or of any other law bearing on  the  question which may have come into  existence  since then. We,  would, therefore, allow this appeal and set  aside  the orders  of the Rent Controller, the District Judge  and  the High Court dismissing the application of the appellant.  The application must now be dealt with in accordance with law by the  authority  competent  to  do so in  the  light  of  the observations made above. In  the  result  the appeals in  all  three  categories  are allowed  as  indicated  above.  The appellants  in  all  the appeals  will be entitled to their costs, but there will  be one  set of hearing fee for each of the three categories  of appeals. Appeals allowed.

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