REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7431 OF 2008 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 14429 of 2007)

ROOP SINGH NEGI       … APPELLANT

Versus

PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK & ORS.                  … RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

S.B. SINHA, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Appellant was working as a peon in the respondent – Bank.  

On or about 24.11.1993, a complaint was lodged by the Manager of

the Bank alleging that some drafts which were presented for encashment

by M/s Anil Trader and some other persons and purported to have been

issued from the Mall Road Branch of the Bank had in fact not been issued

therefrom.   

A  First  Information  Report  (for  short,  “FIR”)  under  Section

380/120B of the Indian Penal Code was registered.  The investigation of

the said case was assigned to one Shri Janardhan Singh, Senior Inspector.

He submitted a report on 11.12.1993, inter alia, opining that the integrity

of  the  appellant  who  had  been  transferred  to  Rampur,  Shimla  was

doubtful.  It was concluded:

“In view of the facts stated above we are of the view that both the joint custodian i.e. Shri H.C. Grover  –  Manager,  presently  posted  at  BO Chandni  Chowk, Delhi  and Shri  P.C. Gupta – AM are responsible for the loss of the drawing book since either of the two have remained one of the custodians from 1.6.93 to 24.8.93.  The loss of drawing book could have been avoided had they taken due care and precaution.   

Further, Shri Sharad Narain, Sr. Manager is also responsible  as  he  has  failed  to  ensure compliance of laid down instructions in respect of monthly checking of security forms and also for non-submission of M.C. after 31.5.93.”

In the said report,  various procedural lapses on the part  of some

officers of the Bank were also pointed out.   

3. After  five  years  of  the  said  incidence,  a disciplinary proceeding

was  initiated  against  the  appellant  stating  that  during  the  period

18.11.1991 and 9.10.1993, he had taken away one blank draft issue book

bearing No. 626401 to 626425.  A show-cause notice was issued.  Cause

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was shown by him.  He was found guilty by the Enquiry Officer. In the

said proceeding, reliance was placed on the purported confession of the

appellant before the police authorities in the year 1993.  It was marked as

Exhibit PE-3.   

4. Indisputably, the forms and other important books and documents

belonging  to  a  Bank  never  remain  in  the  custody  of  a  peon.   It  was

accepted  that  documentary  evidences  were  collected  by  the  police

officers.  Those documents were simply produced; they were not proved.

The  purported  confession  by the  appellant  was  also  not  proved.  Only

because the said confession was made before the police authorities, the

enquiry  officer  inferred  on  the  basis  thereof  that  the  appellant  had

connection with those persons who had used those bank drafts, stating:

“….Therefore, the undersigned is of the opinion that PE-4 proves that Shri  Roop Singh Negi has connections  with  the  said  culprits.   On examination of witness MDW-1 on 20/7/99, he has said that according to the statement of Shri Roop Singh Negi, he has confessed that on the instructions/saying  of  Rajbir,  Devinder  alias Mental,  Asif  and  Brahmpal,  who  are  the residents of trans-Yamuna area he had stolen the draft book…..”

It was, inter alia, concluded:

“In view of the above details/proceedings  it  is proved  that  the  delinquent  employee  has admitted that drafts being no. QWA-626401 to 626425  have  been  stolen  from  Branch  office

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Mall  Road Delhi  Branch vide page no.  25057 and has caused financial loss to the bank but he has  not  admitted  that  he  has  stolen  the  said drafts.  

As the main charge on the delinquent employee is  of  stealing  the  draft  books  and  other documents,  therefore,  in  such  matters  direct proof/evidence  are  not  available  generally  and the conclusion has been arrived at on the basis of assumptions….”

Assumption of certain factual foundation was drawn on the basis of

the documents supplied by the police as would appear from the following

findings of the Enquiry Officer.    

“1. Efforts were made to through Lost Draft book no. 626404 dated 6.9.93 for Rs. 6,90,000/- was  prepared  the  fake  draft  and  encashed through OBC Farukabad prepared through PNB Branch  Farukabad  and  again  draft  drawn  on OBC Delhi  and encashed through CBI Narain branch.

2. From this draft no. 626402 dated 24.8.93 for Rs. 5,40,000/- made in the name of M/s Ajay Sales and encashed from Farukabad Branch.  

3. From the  pages,  draft  no.  626415  dated 27.9.93  for  Rs.  7,35,000/-  and  draft  no. 626423dated  1.10.95  for  Rs.  8,65,000/-  drawn on branch Saharanpur and encashed on branch Khalsi Lines Saharanpur.  

4. Arresting of culprits namely K.K. Gupta, Rajbir,  Ashok  Kumar,  Ravinder  Pal  Singh, Kante Gupta and Harvinder alias Billa with the remaining pages of the draft book by the Thane Mysori (Ghaziabad) police.

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5. Stealing of draft book bearing no. 626401 to  626425  and  other  documents  from  branch Mall Road Delhi.  

6. First draft was issued on 24.8.93 from the stolen  draft  book  which  fact  came  to  the knowledge of Mall Road Delhi Branch from the Central Bank of India Branch Officer.

7. Before 9.10.1993 Shri Roop Singh Negi was posted in the Mall Road Delhi Branch.

8. Bank Security Form Department is out of reach of non-bank employees/outsiders.”

It was purported to have been found:

“1. Stealing  of  drawing  book  and  specimen signatures of officers happened before 24.8.93.

2. The factum of stealing the drafts came to the knowledge on 24.11.93 while the same was done on 24.8.93.   Draft  book  has  been stolen from  Security  Form  Department  in  such  a manner which fact has come to the knowledge very  late.   Possibly  this  draft  book  has  been taken away available at the last serial nos. of the draft books.

3. From the whole embezzlement it is clear that the gang had full knowledge of the banking working or any employee was involved in this embezzlement/fraud.

4. That  fraud  has  been  committed  so cleverly  so  that  there  is  no  direct  proof  or evidence available.”

Conclusion was drawn up on the basis of the above facts by the

Enquiry Officer as under:

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“That  Shri  Roop  Singh  has  direct  or  indirect links with the culprits who were arrested by the Thane Mysori (Ghaziabad) along with pages of drafts and on the basis of whose statement Shri Roop  Singh  Negi  was  arrested  by  the  Delhi Police  on  9.12.93  from  Rampur  Bushahar Himachal Pradesh and taken to Delhi.  Having links  with  the  aforesaid  accused,  it  is  proved that Shri Roop Singh Negi has stolen the draft book no.  626401 to 626425 from the Security Form Department.”

5. Before the disciplinary authority, the appellant contended that there

was no evidence against him. The attention of the disciplinary authority

was furthermore drawn to the fact that by an order dated 9.5.2000, the

Criminal  Court  passed  an order of  his  discharge.   Only charges under

Section 411 of the Indian Penal Code were framed against one Rajbir.   

Neither  the  State  nor  the  Bank  preferred  any  revision  petition

thereagainst.  The same attained finality.   The Regional Manager acting

as a disciplinary authority by an order dated 24.1.2001 without assigning

any  reason  and  without  considering  the  contentions  raised  by  the

appellant including the fact that he had been discharged by the criminal

court, directed the appellant to be dismissed from services, stating:

“That  I  have  again  gone  through  the  facts carefully  and I hold  you responsible  for  gross misconduct  in  terms  of  Bipartite  Settlement clause  19.5  (amended  from time  to  time)  and there is no justification to reduce the proposed punishment.  Therefore, in terms of the Bipartite

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Settlement clause 19.6, I confirm the proposed punishment “Dismissal from Bank Service”. As you are under suspension, therefore, I order that in terms of Bipartite Settlement Provisions you will be eligible for subsistence allowance only till your dismissal from bank service.”  

6. Appellant made a representation against the said order before the

appellate authority.  The appellate authority noticing his contentions in

details.  Inter  alia,  on  the  premise  that  appellant  had  been  given  an

opportunity of personal hearing, the appeal was dismissed, opining:

“In view of the above, the submissions made by the appellant in his appeal dated 23.02.2001 and his  verbal  submissions  made  during  personal hearing are devoid of merits.  As such I find no reasons  to  interfere  or  alter  the  order  of Disciplinary Authority.  

Thus keeping in view the nature and gravity of the  proven  charges,  punishment  of  “Dismissal from Bank Service”, imposed upon Shri Negi by Disciplinary  Authority  vide  its  order  dated 24.01.2001 is  hereby confirmed and appeal  of Shri Negi is rejected.”

7. The  appellate  authority  also  did  not  apply  his  mind  to  the

contentions raised by the appellant; no reason was assigned in support of

his conclusion.

On what evidence, the appellant was found guilty was not stated.   

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8. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said orders,  the appellant

filed a Writ Petition.  The same by reason of the impugned judgment has

been dismissed, stating:

“…The writ jurisdiction can be exercised by this court  only in  exceptional  circumstances  which have not been mentioned by the petitioner in the petition.   However,  once  the  petition  was admitted  for  hearing  in  exercise  of  the  writ jurisdiction after a lapse of so many years since the writ petition was admitted in the year 2001, it may not be appropriate for this Court to pass an order now that the petitioner should make out a  case  for   reference to  the industrial  tribunal and therefore the petition filed by the petitioner is being considered.”

9. The  High  Court  noticed  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  Kuldeep

Singh  vs.  Commissioner of Police & ors.  [(1999) 2 SCC 10],  Narinder

Mohan Arya vs.  United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & ors. [(2006) 4 SCC

713] and Bhagwati Prasad Dubey vs. The Food Corporation of India [AIR

1988 SC 434] whereupon reliance has been placed by the learned counsel

appearing on behalf of the appellant, and held:

“ All  the  aforesaid  decisions  are  not directly attracted to the present facts though the law laid down applies to the present facts. But in  the  facts  of  the  case  it  is  not  a case  of  no evidence but only in regard to the conclusions drawn  based  upon  the  evidence  which reappraisal cannot be done by this Court.

Coming to  the  arguments  that  there  can be no reappraisal of the evidence by this Court once  the  findings  have  been  given  by  the Enquiry Officer  considering the evidence, it  is

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not the case of the petitioner that there was no evidence  at  all  as  against  him led  before  the Enquiry Officer, but the dispute is in regard to the  conclusion  drawn  by  the  enquiry  Officer based upon evidence.  According to law even if two views are possible to be drawn against the petitioner  on  the  basis  of  the  Enquiry  Report one  which  has  been  drawn  by  the  Enquiry Officer cannot be held to be wrong taking the plea that the second view was also possible to be drawn based upon evidence.  

The  decision  of  Hon’ble  Apex Court  in Narinder Mohan Arya’s case (supra) clearly lays down  that  the  proceedings  of  departmental enquiry  report  are  quasi  criminal  in  nature. Therefore the guilt of the delinquent official is not  required  to  be  proved  beyond  any reasonable doubt as in a criminal case.

We  have  considered  the  report  of  the Enquiry Officer and the penalty imposed by the Bank is  based upon evidence as such it  is  not open to this Court to consider that some other view was also possible  and since it  was not  a case  of  no  evidence  therefore  there  cannot  be reappraisal  of  evidence  or  draw  its  own conclusion by this Court based upon evidence. The  findings  recorded  by the  Enquiry  Officer and the punishment imposed by the respondent Bank or its officers call for no interference by this court and as such there is  no merit  in the petition which is dismissed accordingly.”

10. Indisputably,  a  departmental  proceeding  is  a  quasi  judicial

proceeding.  The Enquiry Officer performs a quasi judicial function. The

charges leveled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been

proved.  The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking

into consideration the materials  brought on record by the parties.   The

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purported  evidence  collected  during  investigation  by  the  Investigating

Officer  against  all  the  accused  by  itself  could  not  be  treated  to  be

evidence in  the disciplinary proceeding.   No witness  was examined to

prove the said documents.  The management witnesses merely tendered

the documents  and did  not  prove the  contents  thereof.   Reliance,  inter

alia, was placed by the Enquiry Officer on the FIR which could not have

been  treated  as  evidence.  We have  noticed  hereinbefore  that  the  only

basic  evidence  whereupon  reliance  has  been  placed  by  the  Enquiry

Officer was the purported confession made by the appellant before the

police.   According to the appellant,  he was forced to sign on the said

confession, as he was tortured in the police station.  Appellant being an

employee  of  the  bank,  the  said  confession  should  have  been  proved.

Some evidence should have been brought on record to show that he had

indulged in stealing the bank draft book.  Admittedly, there was no direct

evidence.  Even there was no indirect evidence.  The tenor of the report

demonstrates that the Enquiry Officer had made up his mind to find him

guilty as  otherwise he would not have proceeded on the basis that the

offence was committed in such a manner that no evidence was left.  

11. In Union of India vs. H.S. Goel [(1964) 4 SCR 718, it was held:

“….The two infirmities are separate and distinct though,  conceivably,  in  some cases,  both  may be present. There may be cases of no evidence even where the Government is acting bona fide;

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the  said  infirmity  may  also  exist  where  the Government is acting mala fide and in that case, the conclusion of the Government not supported by any evidence may be the result of mala fides, but that does not mean that if it is proved that there is no evidence to support the conclusion of the  Government,  a  writ  of  certiorari  will  not issued without further proof of mala fides. That is why we are not prepared to accept the learned Attorney-General's  argument that sine no mala fides  are  alleged  against  the  appellant  in  the present case, no writ of certiorari can be issued in favour of the respondent.

That  takes  us  to  the  merits  of  the respondent's  contention  that  the  conclusion  of the  appellant  that  the  third  charged  framed against the respondent has been proved, is based on no evidence.  The learned Attorney-General has stressed before us that in dealing with this question, we ought to bear in mind the fact that the appellant is acting with the determination to root out corruption, and so, if it  is  shown that the view taken by he appellant is a reasonably possible  view,  this  Court  should  not  sit  in appeal  over  that  decision  and  seek  to  decide whether this Court would have taken the same view  or  not.  This  contention  is  no  doubt absolutely sound. The only test  which we can legitimately  apply in  dealing  with  this  part  of the respondents case is, is there any evidence on which  a  finding  can  be  made  against  the respondent that charge No. 3 was proved against him ?  In  exercising  its  jurisdiction  under  Art. 226  on  such  a  plea,  the  High  Court  cannot consider  the  question  about  the  sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a particular conclusion. That is a matter which is within the competence  of  the  authority  which  dealt  with the question; but the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support  of  the  impugned  conclusion.  In  other words,  if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow  that  the  charges  in  question  is  proved

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against  the  respondent  ?  This  approach  will avoid  weighing  the  evidence.  It  will  take  the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on  that  evidence  legally  the  impugned conclusion  follows  or  not.  Applying  this  test, we  are  inclined  to  hold  that  the  respondent's grievance  is  well-founded  because,  in  our opinion,  the  finding  which  is  implicit  in  the appellant's order dismissing the respondent that charge number 3 is proved against him is based on no evidence.  

12. In Moni Shankar v. Union of India and Anr. [(2008) 3 SCC 484],

this Court held:

17. The  departmental  proceeding  is  a  quasi judicial  one.  Although  the  provisions  of  the Evidence  Act  are  not  applicable  in  the  said proceeding,  principles  of  natural  justice  are required  to  be  complied  with.  The  Court exercising power of judicial review are entitled to  consider  as  to  whether  while  inferring commission  of  misconduct  on  the  part  of  a delinquent officer relevant piece of evidence has been  taken  into  consideration  and  irrelevant facts  have  been  excluded  therefrom. Inference on facts must be based on evidence which meet the  requirements  of  legal  principles.  The Tribunal was, thus, entitled to arrive at its own conclusion  on  the  premise  that  the  evidence adduced by the department, even if it is taken on its face value to be correct in its entirety, meet the requirements  of burden of proof,  namely - preponderance  of  probability.  If  on  such evidences,  the  test  of  the  doctrine  of proportionality  has  not  been  satisfied,  the Tribunal was within its domain to interfere. We must  place  on  record  that  the  doctrine  of unreasonableness is giving way to the doctrine of proportionality.”

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13. In Narinder Mohan Arya vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & ors.

(supra), whereupon both the learned counsel relied upon, this Court held:

“26. In our opinion the learned Single Judge and consequently  the  Division  Bench  of  the  High Court did not pose unto themselves the correct question.  The  matter  can  be viewed  from two angles. Despite limited jurisdiction a civil court, it  was entitled to interfere in a case where the report  of  the  Enquiry  Officer  is  based  on  no evidence.  In  a  suit  filed  by  a  delinquent employee in a civil court as also a writ court, in the  event  the  findings  arrived  at  in  the departmental proceedings are questioned before it  should  keep  in  mind  the  following:  (1)  the enquiry officer  is  not  permitted to  collect  any material  from  outside  sources  during  the conduct of the enquiry. [See State of Assam and Anr. v.  Mahendra Kumar Das and Ors. [(1970) 1 SCC 709] (2) In a domestic enquiry fairness in the  procedure  is  a  part  of  the  principles  of natural  justice  [See  Khem Chand v.  Union  of India  and Ors. (1958 SCR 1080)  and  State of Uttar  Pradesh v.  Om Prakash  Gupta  (1969)  3 SCC 775]. (3) Exercise of discretionary power involve  two  elements  (i)  Objective  and  (ii) subjective  and existence  of  the  exercise  of  an objective  element  is  a  condition  precedent  for exercise  of  the  subjective  element.  [See  K.L. Tripathi v.  State  of  Bank  of  India  and  Ors. (1984) 1 SCC 43]. (4) It is not possible to lay down any rigid rules of the principles of natural justice  which  depends  on  the  facts  and circumstances  of  each case but  the concept  of fair play in action is the basis. [See Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1986) 3 SCC 454] (5) The enquiry officer is not permitted to travel beyond the charges and any punishment imposed on the basis  of  a  finding  which  was  not  the  subject matter  of  the  charges  is  wholly  illegal.  [See Director (Inspection & quality Control) Export Inspection Council of India and Ors. v.  Kalyan Kumar Mitra and Ors. 1987 (2) Cal. LJ 344. (6)

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Suspicion or presumption cannot take the place of proof even in  a domestic enquiry. The writ court is entitled to interfere with the findings of the fact  of  any tribunal  or  authority in  certain circumstances. [See  Central Bank of India Ltd. v.  Prakash  Chand  Jain  (1969)  1  SCR  735, Kuldeep Singh v.  Commissioner of Police and Ors. (1999) 2 SCC 10].”

The judgment and decree passed against the respondent therein had

attained finality.  

In the said suit, the enquiry report  in the disciplinary proceeding

was considered, the same was held to have been based on no evidence.

Appellant  therein  in  the  aforementioned situation  filed  a  Writ  Petition

questioning  the  validity  of  the  disciplinary  proceeding,  the  same  was

dismissed.  This Court held that when a crucial finding like forgery was

arrived at on an evidence which is non est in the eye of the law, the civil

court  would  have  jurisdiction  to  interfere  in  the  matter.    This  Court

emphasized that a finding can be arrived at by the Enquiry Officer if there

is some evidence on record.  It was furthermore found that the order of

the appellate authority suffered from non application of mind.  This Court

referred to its earlier decision in Capt. M. Paul Anthony v.  Bharat Gold

Mines Ltd. [(1999) 3 SCC 679] to opine:

“41.  We  may not  be  understood  to  have  laid down a law that  in all  such circumstances  the decision of the civil court or the criminal court

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would be binding on the disciplinary authorities as  this  Court  in  a  large  number  of  decisions points point that the same would depend upon other factors  as well.  See e.g.  Krishnakali  Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh and  Anr. (2004)  8  SCC  200  and  Manager, Reserve Bank of India Bangalore v. S. Mani and Ors. (2005) 5 SCC 100.  Each case is, therefore, required to be considered on its own facts. 42.  It  is equally well  settled that the power of judicial  review  would  not  be  refused  to  be exercised by the High Court, although despite it would be lawful to do so. In  Manager, Reserve Bank  of  India  Bangalore (supra)  this  Court observed:

‘39.  The  findings  of  the  learned Tribunal,  as  noticed  hereinbefore, are  wholly  perverse.  It  apparently posed unto itself  wrong questions. It  placed  onus  of  proof  wrongly upon the appellant.  Its  decision is based  upon  irrelevant  factors  not germane for the purpose of arriving at a correct  finding of  fact.  It  has also  failed  to  take  into consideration  the  relevant  factors. A  case  for  judicial  review,  thus, was made out.”

14. In that case also, the learned single judge proceeded on the basis

that the disadvantages of an employer is that such acts are committed in

secrecy  and  in  conspiracy  with  the  person  affected  by  the  accident,

stating:  

“….No such finding has been arrived at even in the disciplinary proceedings nor any charge was made out as against the appellant in that behalf. He had no occasion to have his say thereupon. Indisputably, the writ court will bear in mind the

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distinction  between  some  evidence  or  no evidence but the question which was required to be posed and necessary should have been as to whether some evidence adduced would lead to the  conclusion  as  regard  the  guilt  of  the delinquent officer or not. The evidence adduced on behalf of the management must have nexus with  the  charges.  The  Enquiry  Officer  cannot base his findings on mere hypothesis. Mere ipso dixit  on  his  part  cannot  be  a  substitute  of evidence.

45. The findings of the learned Single Judge to the  effect  that  'it  is  established  with  the conscience  (sic)  of  the  Court  reasonably formulated  by  an  Enquiry  Officer  then  in  the eventuality'  may not be fully correct  inasmuch as  the  Court  while  exercising  its  power  of judicial review should also apply its mind as to whether sufficient material had been brought on record to sustain the findings. The conscience of a court  may not  have  much role  to  play.  It  is unfortunate  that  the  learned  Single  Judge  did not at all deliberate on the contentions raised by the  appellant.  Discussion  on  the  materials available on record for the purpose of applying the  legal  principles  was  imperative.  The Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  also committed the same error.”

15. Yet again in M.V. Bijlani vs. Union of India & ors.  (2006) 5 SCC

88, this Court held:  

“….Although  the  charges  in  a  departmental proceedings are not required to be proved like a criminal trial, i.e., beyond all reasonable doubts, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the Enquiry Officer performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon analysing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis

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of  materials  on  record.  While  doing  so,  he cannot  take  into  consideration  any  irrelevant fact.  He cannot refuse to consider  the relevant facts.  He cannot  shift  the burden of  proof. He cannot  reject  the  relevant  testimony  of  the witnesses  only  on  the  basis  of  surmises  and conjectures.  He  cannot  enquire  into  the allegations  with  which  the  delinquent  officer had not been charged with.”

16. Yet again in Jasbir Singh vs. Punjab & Sind Bank & ors. [(2007) 1

SCC 566],  this  court  followed  Narinder  Mohan Arya vs.  United India

Insurance Co. Ltd. & ors. (supra), stating:

“12. In  a  case  of  this  nature,  therefore,  the High Court should have applied its mind to the fact of the matter with reference to the materials brought on records. It failed so to do.”  

17. Furthermore,  the  order  of  the  disciplinary  authority  as  also  the

appellate authority are not supported by any reason.  As the orders passed

by them have severe civil consequences, appropriate reasons should have

been assigned. If the enquiry officer had relied upon the confession made

by the appellant, there was no reason as to why the order of discharge

passed by the Criminal Court on the basis of self-same evidence should

not have been taken into consideration.  The materials brought on record

pointing  out  the  guilt  are  required to  be  proved.   A decision  must  be

arrived at on some evidence, which is legally admissible.  The provisions

of the Evidence Act may not be applicable in a departmental proceeding

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but  the principles  of  natural  justice  are.   As the report  of  the Enquiry

Officer was based on merely ipse dixit as also surmises and conjectures,

the same could not have been sustained.  The inferences drawn by the

Enquiry  Officer  apparently  were  not  supported  by  any  evidence.

Suspicion,  as  is  well  known,  however  high  may  be,  can  under  no

circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof.

18. For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the High Court is

set aside.  The appeal is allowed with costs and appellant is directed to be

reinstated with full back wages.  Counsel’s fee assessed at Rs.25,000/-.

……………….…..………….J. [S.B. Sinha]

..………………..……………J.    [Cyriac Joseph]

New Delhi; December 19, 2008

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