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PETITIONER: ROJASARA RAMJIBHAI DAHYABHAI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: JANI NAROTTAMDAS LALLUBHAI (DEAD)BY LRS. & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT10/04/1986

BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) RAY, B.C. (J)

CITATION:  1986 AIR 1912            1986 SCR  (2) 447  1986 SCC  (3) 300        1986 SCALE  (1)566

ACT:      A. Suit  for specific  performance -  Agreement to sell contains an implied covenant on the part of the vendor to do all things  necessary  to  give  effect  to  the  Agreement, including the  obtaining of  the permission for the transfer of property  - Vendor  who has become the statutory occupant and owner  of  the  land  and  who  has  obtained  necessary permission subsequently  as such occupant refuses to execute the sale-deed on the plea that the agreement to sell entered into by  him was  interdependent on his earlier Agreement to purchase the  lands from  the Girasdar and contingent on his obtaining the  permission and since he failed, the Agreement to sell  is incapable  of performance  - Contract Act, 1872, sections 31  & 32  - Whether  the Court  can order  specific performance of transfer - Specific Relief Act, 1877, section 13 - Doctrine of "feeding the estoppel", applicability.      B. Limitation  Act, 1963, Article 113, applicability of - Computation of period of time from what date, explained.

HEADNOTE:      The appellant-defendant  who was the owner of two plots of land  admeasuring 491  and 1599  square yards  situate in village Dudheraj  recorded as  Girasdari  agricultural  land entered into an agreement in writing (Ex.26), on October 19, 1949, with  the Girasdar, Rana Mohabat Singh to purchase the said lands  at Rs.2.50  per square  yard and paid an earnest money of  Rs.1,001. The agreement stipulated that the vendor was to  apply for  permission from  the Collector to convert the agricultural land into village site for non-agricultural use and  that  the  sale  deed  was  to  be  executed  after obtaining the requisite permission. On November 14, 1949 the appellant  entered  into  another  agreement  to  sell  some property to  the respondents  Jani Narottamdas Lallubhai and Thakur Dhirajlal  Dhaneshvar at  Rs. 3.75  per  square  yard agreeing to  contend that  the appellant was to get the land converted  into   village  site   at  his  own  expense  and thereafter executed the sale-deed. 448      In 1950-51  Rana Mohabat Singh applied to the Collector for grant  of permission  to convert  the land  into village site but  since his application was rejected he refunded the earnest money  to the  appellant. However, after coming into

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force of  the Saurashtra Land Reforms Act, 1951, with effect from September  1, 1951, the right and title of Rana Mohabat Singh as the ex-Girasdar were extinguished and the appellant was  recognised   to  be   an  occupant  thereof  under  the provisions of  the Bombay  Land Revenue  Code, 1898.  On  13 August, 1957,  the appellant  made  an  application  to  the revenue authorities  for the grant of occupancy certificate, which was  granted on 6.2.58 by the Mamlatdar. The occupancy certificate was  to come into effect from August 1, 1958. On two applications  of the  appellant dated  June 23, 1958 and September 10,  1959 revenue  authorities granted  permission for converting  the lands  under his possession into village site, that  is, for non-agricultural use. On 5 October, 1959 the respondents  called upon  the  appellant  to  execute  a conveyance of  the property in accordance with the agreement of sale  between the  parties dated  14.11.1949 and  on  the appellant’s  failure  to  comply,  they  filed  a  suit  for specific performance.  The Trial  Court upheld  the pleas of the  appellant,   namely,  (i)   the  suit   was  barred  by limitation; and (ii) the agreement between the parties was a contingent contract  depending upon the contingency referred to in the agreement (Ex.26) dated 19 October, 1949 and since that contract  became incapable  of execution  by virtue  of Rana Mohabat  Singh failing  to obtain  a permission  of the Collector the  agreement dated  14 November,  1949, and non- suited the  respondents. On  appeal the  High Court reversed the decree  and held  that the  second agreement between the parties had  not been  cancelled by  mutual consent and that the suit  was within time and that the time started, running only from  10th  September,  1959,  as  the  date  on  which requisite permission was obtained from the Collector for the use of the land as a village site.      Dismissing the appeal, on certificate, the Court, ^      HELD: 1.1  The agreement  embodied in the suit Banakhat (Ex.25)  dated  November  14,  1949  was  not  a  contingent contract; the  contract was  an absolute  and  unconditional one, and  there was  no question  of its  performance  being dependent on  the fulfilment  of  the  condition  under  the earlier agreement 449 (Ex.26) by  which the  appellant’s vendor Rana Mohabat Singh had undertaken  upon himself the obligation of procuring the necessary sanction  from the  Collector. Under  the terms of the suit  Banakhat (Ex.25), the appellant had undertaken the obligation of  getting the  agricultural land converted into village site.  Under the  Saurashtra Land  Reforms Act, 1951 there was  an extinguishment  of the right and title of Rana Mohabat Singh  as a  girasdar  of  the  suit  land  and  the appellant was recognised to be an occupant thereof under the provisions of  the Bombay  Land Revenue Code. The contention that the  appellant had  an  imperfect  title  is  therefore without  any   basis  whatever.  As  such  occupant,  it  is undisputed that  the appellant  applied for and obtained the requisite  permission   from  the  revenue  authorities  for conversion of the disputed land into village site. There was therefore no legal impediment to the specific performance of the contract between the parties. [454 C; 454 H; 455 A; E-F]      1.2 There  is always  in  such  contracts,  an  implied covenant on  the  part  of  the  vendor  to  do  all  things necessary to  give effect  to the  agreement, including  the obtaining  of   the  permission  for  the  transfer  of  the property. Ex.25,  the  suit  Banakhat  embodies  an  express covenant to that effect. [457 C-D]      Dalsukh M.  Pancholi v. The Guarantee Life & Employment

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Insurance  Company  Ltd.  &  Ors.,  A.I.R.  1947  P.C.  182, distinguished.      F. Ranchhodas  v. Nattmal  Hirachand & Co., [1951] Bom. L.R. 491;  Motilal v.  Nanhelal  Ghasiram,  L.R.  [1930]  57 Indian Appeals  333; Mrs.  Chandnee Widya Wati Madden v. Dr. C.L. Katial, [1964] 2 S.C.R. 495; and Ramesh Chandiok & Anr. v. Chuni  Lal Sabharwal  (Dead) by his Lrs. & Ors., [1971] 2 S.C.R. 573, referred to.      1.3 In  the facts  and circumstances  of the  case,  it could not  be said  that the  respondents’ suit for specific performance  filed  on  September  6,  1960  was  barred  by limitation inasmuch  as permission  to convert  a portion of the disputed  land was  obtained on  August 26, 1958 and for the remaining  portion on  September 10,  1959, and the suit was therefore  brought within three years from the date when the cause  of action arose. The cause of action for the suit arose 450 after the  appellant had  obtained the  requisite permission from the  revenue authorities upon conferral of rights of an occupant on him. [459 F-H]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 315 of 1971.      From the  Judgment and  Decree dated 3/4 December, 1969 of the Gujarat High Court in Appeal No. 160 of 1961.      S.H. Sheth,  Vandana Sharma  and M.V.  Goswami for  the Appellant.      S.T. Desai and B.B. Singh for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      SEN, J.  This appeal on certificate is directed against the judgment  and decree  of the  Gujarat High  Court  dated February 1,  1971 reversing those of the Civil Judge, Senior Division,  Surendranagar   dated  January   31,  1961,   and decreeing the plaintiffs’ suit for specific performance.      Put very  shortly, the essential facts are these. By an agreement in  writing (Exh.26)  dated October  19, 1949, the appellant who was the defendant entered into an agreement to purchase two  plots of  land admeasuring 491 and 1599 square yards situate  in Village  Dudheraj  recorded  as  Girasdari agricultural land  of which he was the tenant @ Rs. 2.50 per square yard  from the  Girasdar, Rana Mohabat Singh and paid Rs.1,001 by  way of  earnest  money  in  lieu  thereof.  The agreement stipulated  that the vendor Rana Mohabat Singh was to apply  for permission  from the Collector to convert this agricultural  land   into  village   site  i.e.   for   non- agricultural use.  The sale-deed  was to be executed by Rana Mohabat Singh after he had obtained the requisite permission from the  Collector. Within  about a month therefrom i.e. on November 14,  1949, the  appellant by  a  contract  (Exh.25) covenanted to sell the same property to the respondents Jani Narottamdas Lallubhai  and Thakur  Dhirajlal Dhaneshvar  who were  the  plaintiffs  @  Rs.  3.75  per  square  yard.  The agreement provided that the vendor i.e. the appellant was to get the land converted into village site at his own expense. 451      IN 1950-51, Rana Mohabat Singh applied to the Collector for grant  of permission  to convert  the land  into village site but  his application  was rejected  and  thereafter  he refunded the earnest amount to the appellant. The Saurashtra Land Reforms  Act, 1951  came into force w.e.f. September 1, 1951.  Under  the  provisions  of  the  Act,  there  was  an

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extinguishment of  the right and title of Rana Mohabat Singh as the  ex-Girasdar  of  the  land  and  the  appellant  was recognised to be an occupant thereof under the provisions of the Bombay  Land Revenue Code, 1898. On August 13, 1957, the appellant made an application to the revenue authorities for the grant  of an occupancy certificate. The Mamlatdar by his order dated  February 6,  1958  directed  the  issue  of  an occupancy  certificate   in  favour   of  the  appellant  on condition of  his paying  occupancy price in accordance with the provisions  of the  Saurashtra Land Reforms Act. On that very day i.e. on February 6, 1958, the occupancy certificate was issued  to the  appellant on such payment being made but it was  to come into effect from August 1, 1958. On June 23, 1958, the appellant applied for converting 1000 square yards out of  the two  plots which prior to 1958 were agricultural land into  village site,  and on August 26, 1958 the revenue authorities  granted   such   permission.   Thereafter,   on September  10,   1959  the   revenue   authorities   granted permission for  converting the  remaining area  of land into village site.  Thus, by  September 10,  1959  the  appellant obtained permission  for converting  both the plots for non- agricultural use.  On October 5, 1959 the respondents called upon the  appellant to  execute a conveyance of the property in accordance with the agreement of sale between the parties and on  his failing to comply, commenced the present suit on September 6, 1960.      The material terms of the agreement between the parties are to  be found  in the suit Banakhat (Exh.25) and they are to the effect :           "You can  construct  a  house  or  building  or  a           factory or put up a park, garden etc. on this land           after getting it converted into village site land.           The sale-deed  in respect  of this  land is  to be           executed after  the land  has been  converted into           such use  . .  . . . The title of the land is free           from any  doubt. No  one has  any right,  title or           interest 452           therein. If any amount is to be paid either to the           Government or  to the  Darbar in  respect  of  the           land, then  you are  not liable  for the same, but           this agreement  has been  entered into with you on           the footing  that the  land is to be considered as           village site land. We have to give you a certified           copy  of   the  permission  whereby  the  land  is           converted into  village site land and all expenses           in connection  with the  grant of  such conversion           are to be borne by us." It is  common ground that the word "we" refers to the vendor i.e. the  appellant and "you" refers to the respondents i.e. the purchasers.      The appellant contested the suit on various grounds. He pleaded inter  alia  that  (1)  the  agreement  between  the parties as  per Banakhat  (Exh.26) was a contingent contract and not an absolute contract and that the appellant’s vendor Rana Mohabat Singh having failed to obtain permission of the Collector in terms of the agreement (Exh.25) entered into by him with  the appellant for converting the land into village site, and  execute a  sale-deed in his favour, the agreement between the parties was incapable of performance and (2) the suit  was  barred  by  limitation.  The  Courts  below  have differed in  their conclusion.  The learned  Civil Judge who tried  the  suit  upheld  these  pleas  and  non-suited  the respondents. He  held that the suit was barred by limitation and further  that the  contract between  the parties being a

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contingent contract,  the agreement  in view  of the  events that had happened made it unenforceable.      On appeal,  the High Court reversed the decree and held that  the   agreement  between  the  parties  had  not  been cancelled by  mutual consent  and that  finding has not been challenged before  us. On  the question  as to  whether  the agreement was  a contingent  contract or a contract creating absolute  liabilities   as  between   the  parties   without contemplating any contingency, the High Court reproduced the material portion of the agreement (Exh.25) set out above and held that  the agreement clearly contemplated that the sale- deed was  to be  executed after the requisite permission was obtained from the Collector for use of the land as a village site and  that the  land was  not to be sold as agricultural land but as village 453 site. In  coming to that conclusion the High Court took into consideration the  agreement between  the appellant and Rana Mohabat Singh (Exh.26) which contained the recital :           "I will  execute the  registered sale-deed in your           favour immediately  after  permission  to  convert           these  plots  into  village  site  land  has  been           obtained." In the  light of  that recital,  it held  that the agreement between the parties (Exh.25) contemplated that the sale-deed was to  be executed  after permission  was obtained from the revenue authorities  for use  of the  land as a village site and it was not being sold as agricultural land.      Following the  decision of Chagla, CJ. in F. Ranchhodas v. Natmal Hirachand & Co., [1951] Bom. LR 491 the High Court held that  the words  "after the  permission is obtained" in Exh. 26  and the words "after the land is converted" in Exh. 25 both  indicate the  point of  time at which the sale-deed within the  contemplation of  the parties had to be executed in accordance  with  the  terms  of  the  document.  In  the circumstances, the  High court  held that the contract could not be  interpreted as  a contingnent  contract.  Upon  that view, it  held that  there was no contingency whatsoever and even though  Rana Mohabat  Singh had  failed to  obtain  the requisite permission  to convert the land into village site, as and  when such  permission was obtained by the appellant, the rights  of the  respondents for  the performance  of the agreement  came  into  existence.  It  also  held  that  the respondents  were  entitled  to  rely  on  the  doctrine  of ’feeding the  estoppel’ embodied  in s.13  of  the  Specific Relief Act,  1963.  It  held  that  at  the  time  when  the agreement was  entered into between the parties in 1949, the appellant had  only a right to get the land in suit conveyed to him  by Rana  Mohabat Singh in pursuance of the agreement (Exh.26). However,  by  virtue  of  the  provisions  of  the Saurashtra Land Reforms Act, his title as an occupant became complete and  he had  obtained the permission to convert the land into  village site  and the  respondents were therefore entitled to  get specific  performance of  the agreement  in respect of  the rights which he had at the date of the suit. It further  held that the permission to convert the disputed land into  village site  having been  obtained on August 26, 1958, 454 insofar as a part of the land was concerned and on September 10, 1959,  as regards  the balance  thereof it  could not be said that  the respondents  suit was  barred by  limitation. Upon these  findings, the  High court reversed the decree of the learned Civil Judge and decreed the respondents suit for specific performance.

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    Two questions  are raised  upon this  appeal. First  of these is whether the agreement embodied in the suit Banakhat (Exh.25) dated  November 14,  1949 was a contingent contract and as  the contingency  failed, there was no contract which could  be   made  the   basis  for  a  decree  for  specific performance, and  the second  is that the suit as framed was barred by  limitation under  Art.113 of  the Limitation Act, 1963. As  to the first contention, it is urged that the High Court proceeded  on the  erroneous belief  that the grant of permission  by   the  Collector  was  a  certain  event  and therefore its  finding that the contract was an absolute and unconditional  one,   is  vitiated.  It  is  said  that  the appellant’s vendor  Rana  Mohabat  Singh  having  failed  to obtain permission  from the Collector in 1950-51 in terms of the  agreement   (Exh.26)  entered  into  by  him  with  the appellant for  converting the  land into  village  site  and execute a  deed of  conveyance in  his favour, the appellant had an  imperfect title  and therefore the right to specific performance of  the suit  Banakhat (Exh.25)  did  not  arise inasmuch as  the conversion  of the  Girasdari lands  at the instance of  Rana Mohabat Singh was a condition on which the mutual rights  and obligations  of the  parties would arise. The  submission   proceeds  on   the  basis   that  the  two transactions were  interdependent and  Rana Mohabat  Singh’s application   for   permission   for   conversion   of   the agricultural land  to non-agricultural  purposes having been rejected, the  appellant was  relieved of  his obligation to convey the  suit  lands  under  the  Banakhat  (Exh.25).  In support  of  the  contention,  reliance  is  placed  on  the decision of  the Privy Council in Dalsukh M. Pancholi v. The Guarantee Life  & Employment  Insurance Company Ltd. & Ors., A.I.R. 1947 P.C. 182.      We do  not see  any basis  for the  submission that the contract  between  the  parties  as  embodied  in  the  suit Banakhat (Exh.25) was a contingent contract, the performance of which  was dependent  upon fulfilment  of  the  condition under the 455      earlier agreement  (Exh.26) by  which  the  appellant’s vendor Rana  Mohabat Singh  had undertaken  upon himself the obligation of  procuring the  necessary  sanction  from  the Collector. As to the appellant having an imperfect title the question is  purely hypothetical.  May be, initially the two transactions were  not independent  of each  other but  were inter-dependent, for  the performance  of one  depended upon the fulfilment  of the  other agreement.  If  there  was  no abolition of  proprietory rights, it could well be said that the suit  Banakhat (Exh.25), being subject to the fulfilment by Rana  Mohabat Singh of the terms of the earlier agreement (Exh.26), the appellant had an imperfect title and therefore the contract  between the  parties was  contingent  on  Rana Mohabat Singh obtaining the approval of the Collector and as he could  not secure  such approval and execute a conveyance in favour of the appellant, no effective agreement came into being which  could be  ordered to  be specifically enforced. But the  contention that  unless the appellant’s vendor Rana Mohabat Singh  conveyed  title  by  execution  of  a  proper conveyance, the  contract  as  between  the  parties  became impossible of  performance and further that for want of such conveyance the  appellant had  an imperfect  title, does not take into account the subsequent events.      It  is  common  ground  that  shortly  thereafter,  the Saurashtra Land  Reforms Act,  1951 came  into force  w.e.f. September 1,  1951. Under  the provisions  of the Act, there was an extinguishment of the right and title of Rana Mohabat

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Singh as  a Girasdar  of the suit land and the appellant was recognised to be an occupant thereof under the provisions of the Bombay  Land Revenue  Code. It  would, therefore, appear that the  contention that  the appellant  had  an  imperfect title is  without any basis whatever. With the extinction of the title  of Rana  Mohabat Singh  and the  conferral of the rights of  an occupant on the appellant, the property became transferable by him. As such occupant, it is undisputed that the appellant made an application to the revenue authorities permitting the  conversion of the disputed land into village site. Thereafter,  there was  no legal impediment in the way of the  appellant in  executing a sale-deed. Under the terms of the  suit Banakhat (Exh.25), the appellant had undertaken the obligation  of getting  the land  converted into village site. As  indicated, the  word ’we’ in the document (Exh.25) refers to  the vendor i.e. the appellant and ’you’ refers to the respondents. The 456 terms of the document are clear and explicit and admit of no ambiguity. The  appellant had  by the contract bound himself to furnish  a certified  copy of  the permission whereby the land was  converted into village site apart from bearing all expenses in connection with the grant of such permission.      In our  opinion, the  decision in Dalsukh M. Pancholi’s case is  clearly distinguishable  on facts. It is clear from the terms of the offer and acceptance in that case, that the parties  had   contemplated  that,   to  make  the  contract effective the  ’approval of  the attaching  Court’  must  be obtained. The  learned Subordinate  Judge held that the term ’subject to  the approval of the Court’ was not an essential condition, but in the High Court it was conceded that it was an essential term. The facts of the case show that there was good reason  for insisting on this condition for at the time of execution  of the  agreement it  was  well-known  to  the parties that  the property  was under  attachment by various courts. In those circumstances, the Privy Council observed :           "In their Lordships’ opinion there can be no doubt           that the  condition was  an essential  one. It was           essential not  for one  party alone,  but for both           parties. From  the point  of view of the purchaser           it is  unnecessary to  observe that he would get a           clear title to the property only if the creditors,           through the  Court, consented to take Rs. 6,50,000           in full  satisfaction of their decrees against the           vendor’s family.  The purchaser was not willing to           risk even the payment of the earnest money without           the knowledge of the attaching Court for it was to           be paid  only to the nominee of the Court named at           the  time   of  giving   the   approval   to   the           transaction. The condition was not exclusively for           the benefit  of  the  purchaser;  it  was  equally           important from the standpoint of the vendors also.           Ram Jas  would accept  the  offer  only  with  the           proviso "subject  to the  approval of  the Court".           The family  was heavily indebted. It was important           for Ram Jas that he should get effective discharge           of all  the  liabilities  of  the  family  by  the           payment of  Rs.6,50,000; thus,  it  was  necessary           from his  standpoint also, that the sale should be           subject to 457           the approval of the attaching Court." It was  accordingly held  that the contract was a contingent one and  as the  contingency failed,  there was  no contract which could  be made  the basis  for a  decree for  specific

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performance.      Although Rana Mohabat Singh having failed to fulfil the terms of his contract with the appellant and execute a sale- deed in  his favour might have rendered the contract between them incapable  of performance,  but with  the extinction of the title  of Rana  Mohabat Singh  and the  conferral of the rights of  an occupant on the appellant, the property became transferable subject,  of course, to the express covenant on the part of the appellant to do all things necessary to give effect to  the agreement.  Here, the suit Banakhat (Exh. 25) embodies an express covenant to that effect. There is always in such  contracts an  implied covenant  on the  part of the vendor to  do all  things necessary  to give  effect to  the agreement, including the obtaining of the permission for the transfer of  the property. The principles on which a term of this nature may be implied in contracts are well-settled. It is enough to refer to Halsbury’s Law of England, Vol. 8, 3rd Edn., p.  121 where the principles are summarised as follows :           "In construing a contract, a term or condition not           expressly stated  may, under certain circumstances           be implied  by the  Court, if it is clear from the           nature of the transaction or from something actual           found in the document that the contracting parties           must have  intended such a term or condition to be           part  of  the  agreement  between  them.  Such  an           implication must  in all  cases be  founded on the           presumed intention of the parties and upon reason,           and will  only be  made when  it is  necessary  in           order to  give the  transaction that efficacy that           both the  parties must  have intended  it to have,           and to  prevent such a failure of consideration as           could not  have been  within the  contemplation of           the parties." Chitty on  Contract, Vol.1,  23rd  Edn.,  paragraphs  694-95 points out  that a  term would be implied if it is necessary in the business sense, to give efficacy to the contract. 458      In this  context reference  may be made to the decision of the  Privy Council  in Motilal v. Nanhelal Ghasiram, L.R. [1930] 57  Indian Appeals  333. There, the facts were these. In that  case, the  plaintiff Mst.  Jankibai entered into an agreement to  purchase  from  Raibahadur  Seth  Jiwandas  of Jabalpur four  annas proprietary  share of  Mauja  Raisalpur together  with   the  sir  and  khudkast  lands  appurtenant thereto, with  cultivating rights  in  the  sir  lands.  The property was  subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  Central Provinces Tenancy  Act, 1920.  She filed a suit for specific performance of  the said  contract. The  Privy Council  held that the  contract was  for a  transfer  of  the  sir  lands without reservation  of the right of occupancy, and that the sanction  of   the  Revenue  Officer  to  the  transfer  was necessary under  s. 50(1)  of the  Act, which  was in  these terms :           " S.  50(1) :  If a proprietor desires to transfer           the proprietary  rights in  any portion of his sir           land without reservation of the right of occupancy           specified in  s. 49,  he may  apply to  a  revenue           officer and,  if such revenue-officer is satisfied           that the  transferor is  not wholly  or mainly  an           agriculturist,  or  that  the  property  is  self-           acquired or  has been  acquired within  the twenty           years  last   preceding,  he  shall  sanction  the           transfer." It was  contended before the Privy Council that a decree for

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specific performance  of the  agreement of sale could not be made,  because   such  performance   would  necessitate   an application by  or on  behalf of  the vendor  to the Revenue Officer for  sanction to  transfer the cultivating rights in the sir  land, and  that the  Court had  no jurisdiction  to require the vendor to make such an application. In repelling the contention,  the Privy  Council observed that in view of their construction of the agreement, namely, that the vendor agreed to transfer the cultivating rights in the sir land :           "(T)here was,  in  their  Lordships’  opinion,  an           implied covenant  on the  part of the vendor to do           all things  necessary  to  effect  such  transfer,           which would  include an application to the Revenue           Officer to sanction the transfer." 459 It was  further observed that it was not necessary for their Lordships to decide whether in that case the application for sanction to  transfer must succeed, but that it was material to mention  that no  facts were  brought to their Lordships’ notice which  would go to show that there was any reason why such sanction  should not  be granted. After making the said observations,  the   Privy  Council   held  that   in  those circumstances the  Court had  jurisdiction  to  enforce  the contract under  the Specific  Relief Act, 1877 and Order 21, r. 35  of the  Code of  Civil Procedure,  1908 by  a  decree ordering the  vendor to  apply for sanction and to execute a conveyance on  receipt of such sanction. The decision of the Privy Council  in  Motilal  v.  Nanehalal  Ghasiram,  supra, therefore is  an authority  for the  proposition that if the vendor agrees  to sell the property which can be transferred only with  the sanction  of some  Government authority,  the Court has  jurisdiction to  order the vendor to apply to the authority within  a specified period, and if the sanction is forthcoming to  convey to  the purchaser  within  a  certain time. See also : Mrs. Chandnee Widya Vati Madden v. Dr. C.L. Katial, [1964]  2 S.C.R.  495 and  Ramesh Chandra Chandiok & Anr. v.  Chuni Lal  Sabharwal (dead)  by his  Lrs.  &  Ors., [1971] 2  S.C.R. 573  where this  Court following  the Privy Council decision  in Motilal  v.  Nanehlal  Ghasiram’s  case supra, reiterated the same principle.      The next  and the last contention that the suit brought by the  appellant was  barred by limitation is wholly devoid of substance.  Under Art.  113 of  the Limitation Act, 1963, the  limitation   prescribed  for   a  suit   for   specific performance is  a period  of three years which runs from the date when  the cause  of action  accrues. In  the facts  and circumstances of  the case, the respondents were required to have a conveyance executed immediately upon the conferral of occupancy rights on the abolition and the permission granted by the  revenue authorities  to him to convert the suit land into village  site. As  already stated,  the  permission  to convert the  disputed land  into village  site  having  been obtained on  August 26,  1958 insofar  as a part of the land admeasuring 1,000  square yards and on September 10, 1959 as regards the remaining portion, it could not be said that the respondents’ suit  filed on  September 6, 1960 was barred by limitation. 460      The result  therefore is  that the appeal must fail and is dismissed.  The judgment  and decree  of the  High  Court decreeing the  plaintiff’s suit for specific performance are upheld. The  respondents shall  be entitled  to their  costs throughout. S.R.                                       Appeal dismissed. 461

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