http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 9  

PETITIONER: RICHPAL SINGH & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DESH RAJ SINGH & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT25/08/1981

BENCH: TULZAPURKAR, V.D. BENCH: TULZAPURKAR, V.D. VARADARAJAN, A. (J)

CITATION:  1981 AIR 1960            1982 SCR  (1) 368  1981 SCC  (4) 194        1981 SCALE  (3)1269

ACT:      Uttar Pradesh  Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act section 21(1)(h) construction of-Whether the lessor/landlord should not  only be  "disabled person" on the relevant dates but that  he should continue to live on the date immediately preceding  the  date  of  vesting-Section  21(1)(h)  section 157(1) and 240B, scope of.

HEADNOTE:      One Smt.  Ram Kali, widow of Tikam Singh, was the land- holder of  the agricultural  lands in  dispute  situated  in villages Agaota  and Khaiya  Khera in  District  Bulandshahr (U.P.). On June 14, 1915 Smt. Ram Kali, who was a Sirdar and a "disabled  person" falling  within section  157(1) of  the U.P.  Zamindari   Abolition  and  Land  Reforms  Act,  1950, executed a  registered deed  of lease  fora period  of  five years  in  favour  of  Uttam  Singh  and  Murli  Singh  (the predecessors-in-title of  the respondents)  but  before  the expiry of  the period of five years she died in August, 1945 and Dan  Sahai, who  was also "disabled person" - within the meaning of  section 157(1)  of the  Act, (her husband’s real brother  and   predecessors-in-title  of   the   appellants) inherited her  interest. After  the expiry  of the period of registered lease  Uttam Singh  and Murli  Singh continued to hold the lands as tenants from year to year under Dan Sahai.      In consolidation  proceedings a question arose, whether Uttam Singh  and Murli  Singh, who  were lessees (adhivasis) under Smt.  Ram Kali  and Dan  Sahai acquired  the status of Sirdars, being  entitled to be treated so under section 240B of the  Act or they remained Asamis of the plots in dispute. The Division  Bench of  the Allahabad High Court, relying on the earlier  view taken  by its  Full Bench  in Smt. Maya v. Raja Dulaji  and  others  (1970)  A.L.J.  476,  decided  the appeals in  favour of  the respondents  by holding that they were not Asamis but had become Sirdars. Hence the appeals by certificate by  successors-in-title  of  Ram  Kali  and  Dan Sahai.      Allowing the appeals, the Court ^      HELD: 1.  On true  construction of  section 21(1)(h) of the U.P.  Zamindari  Abolition  and  Land  Reforms  Act  the benefit thereof would be available to the land-holder on the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 9  

date of  vesting, if the same land-holder or his predecessor existing on  the material  dates was  a  person  or  persons belonging to one or more clauses mentioned in section 157(1) of the Act. [378 C-D]      Since, in  the instant  case, which  falls  under  sub- clause (a)  of clause (h) on the date of actual letting Smt. Ram Kali  was a  "disabled person"  and since  on  the  next material date, namely, April 9,1946 Dan Sahai (successor-in- interest of  Smt. Ram  Kali) was also a disabled person, the land-holder on the date of vesting who incidentally happened to be  Dan Sahai would be entitled to the benefit of section 21(1)(h) and the respondents (successors of Uttam Singh and 369 Murli Singh)  would remain Asamis and cannot be said to have become Sirdars  within the  meaning of  section 240B  of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. [378 E- F]      2. Section 21(1)(h) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms  Act, 1950 provides that every person occupying or holding  land in  any one  of the capacities mentioned in clause (h)  on the date immediately preceding 1-7-1952 shall be deemed  to be  an Asami  thereof notwithstanding anything contained in  the Act,  if the  land-holder or  if there are more than one all of them were "disabled persons" within the meaning of  section 157(1)  both on  the date  of letting as well as  on April  9, 1946 where the letting has taken place prior to  April 9, 1946 or were disabled persons on the date of letting  if the letting has occurred after April 9, 1946. [373 A-B]      3:1. It  is true  that clause  (h) contains  the phrase "where the  land-holder or  if there are more than one land- holder all  of them were person or persons belonging" to any one or  more than  one of  the clauses  mentioned in section 157(1) of  the Act.  Under section  3(26) of  the  Act,  the definition of "landholder" as given in the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 has been adopted since the expression is not defined in the Act.  The expression  "land-holder" who  obviously is  a possessor of  interest in  land under  section 3(11)  of the U.P. Tenancy  Act, 1939  means a  person  to  whom  rent  is payable, and  under section  3(1), ibid. by legal fiction it shall include his predecessor-in-interest as also successor- in-interest to  whom the  rent was or is payable. It is such definition that  will have  to be read in the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and  Land Reforms  Act  wherever  that  expression occurs. Therefore  the expression "land-holder" occurring in section 21(1)(h)  of the Act must mean a person to whom rent is payable  and by fiction would include his predecessor-in- interest. Read  in this  light there would be no question of adding the  words predecessor-in-interest of the land-holder in section  21(1)(h) as  that would  be implicit in the term "land-holder" on  account of  deeming provision  of  section 3(1) read  with section 3(11) of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939. [375 G-H, 376 A, D-F]      3:2. Section 157(1) of the U P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms  Act permits  leases by  disabled  persons  and provides that a Bhumidar or on an Asami holding land in lieu of maintenance allowance under section 11, who is a disabled person falling  under any of the clauses (a) to (g), may let the whole  or any part of his holding, "provided that in the case of a holding held jointly by more persons than one, but one or  more  of  them  but  not  all  are  subject  to  the disabilities mentioned  in clauses (a) to (g), the person or persons may  let out  his or  their share  in the  holding". Having regard to the proviso under which even in the case of a joint  holding a  lease of  his share  by a disabled land-

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 9  

holder is permissible and the same is liable to be separated by a  partition, the  expression "all of them" must refer to all such  land holders who were disabled land-holders on the material dates.  When under  the proviso to section 157(1) a lease of  his share  by  a  disabled  land-holder  in  joint holding (held along with a non-disabled person) is expressly permitted  and   under  section  157(2)  the  Court  has  to determine such  share of  the disabled  lessor and partition the same  on an  application being  made in  that behalf, it cannot be  said that the Legislature intended to deprive the protection of  section 21(1)(h) to such disabled land-holder simply because on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting such land-holder comes to hold the 370 land jointly  with some  other non-disabled  land-holder. On true construction  of the crucial phrase occurring in clause (h) it  is not  possible to  read  into  the  provision  the additional requirement,  namely, that  the identity  of  the land-holder or  land-holders must remain unchanged up to the date of vesting. [376 G-H, 377 A, B-D, G-H]      Further the  scheme of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms  Act is  different from  the Agra  Tenancy Act, 1926 and  U.P.  Tenancy  Act,  1939.  In  each  of  the  two provisions of  these two  Acts express  words have been used conferring personal  rights  on  the  individuals  concerned which is not the case with section 21(1)(h) of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. [378 B-C]      Smt. Maya  v. Raja  Dulaji and  Ors. [1 970] A.L.J. 476 over ruled.      Dwarika Singh v. Dy. Director of Consolidation All W.C. 213-1981 All. L.J. 484 approved.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1725-26 of 1973.      From the judgment and order dated 27th October, 1972 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeals Nos. 424 and 425 of 1971.      P.  N.  Lekhi,  M.K.  Garg  and  V.  K.  Jain  for  the Appellants.      A.  P.   S.  Chauhan   and  C.K.  Ratnaparkhi  for  the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      TULZAPURKAR, J. These appeals by certificate granted by the Allahabad  High Court  raise the  following  substantial question of  law of  general importance  which needs  to  be decided by this Court:      "Whether the  view taken by the Full Bench in Smt. Maya v. Raja  Dulaji and  others  (1)  that  the  lessor/landlord should not  only be  disabled person  on the relevant dates, but that  he should continue to live on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting, within the meaning of clauses (h) of  section 21  (1) of  the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms  Act,  represents  a  correct  construction  of clause (h) of section 21(1) of the Act ?"      The facts  giving rise to the aforesaid question may be stated. One  Smt Ram  Kali, widow  of Tikam  Singh, was  the land-holder of  the plots  (agricultural  land)  in  dispute situated in villages Agaota 371 and Khaiya Khera in District Bulandshahr (U.P.). On June 14, 1945 Smt.  Ram Kali who was a Sirdar and a ’disabled person’ falling within  s. 157  (1) of  the U.P. Zamindari Abolition

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 9  

and Land  Reforms Act,  1950 (hereinafter  called "the Act") executed a  registered deed of lease for a period of S years in favour  of Uttam  Singh (the predecessors-in-title of the respondents) but  before the expiry of the period of S years she died  in August,  1945 and Dan Sahai (her husband’s real brother  and   predecessors-in-title  of   the   appellants) inherited her  interest. Dan  Sahai  was  also  a  ’disabled person’ within the meaning of s. 157(1) of the Act. It seems that after  the expiry of the period of the registered lease Uttam Singh  and Murli  Singh continued  to hold the land as tenants from  year to year under Dan Sahai. In consolidation proceedings a  question arose  whether Uttam Singh and Murli Singh, who  were lessees  under Smt.  Ram Kali and Dan Sahai acquired the  status of  Sirdars or  they remained Asamis of the plots  in dispute.  The case  of Dan Sahai was that they were Asamis  and not  adhivasis entitled  to be  treated  as Sirdars under  s. 240  of the  Act and  that  depended  upon whether as  tenants or  occupants of  the plots  in  dispute their case fell within the provisions of s. 21(1) (h) of the Act. The  contention of  Dan Sahai  was that  since Smt. Ram Kali was  a disabled person on the date of letting and since he who  succeeded her was also a disabled person on April 2, 1946, the  lease in  favour of  Uttam Singh  and Murli Singh would fall  within section 21(1) (h) and as such Uttam Singh and Murli  Singh shall  be deemed to be Asamis. On the other hand the contention on behalf of Uttam Singh and Murli Singh was that  the land-holder  should not  only  be  a  disabled person on both the dates mentioned in sub-cl. (a) of cl. (h) of s.  21(1? (being  the date  of letting  as also  April 9, 1946) but  the same  landlord should continue to live on the date immediately  preceding the date of vesting (which is 1- 7-1952 under the Act) and since in the instant case the same landlord who  had let  out the  plots and  who was  disabled person on  the date  of letting had not continued to live on the date  immediately preceding the date of vesting s. 21(1) (b) was  totally  inapplicable  and,  therefore,  they  were entitled to be treated as Sirdars. The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeals Nos. 424-425 of 1971 accepted the contention raised by counsel on behalf of Uttam Singh  and   Murli  Singh  (the  respondents’  predecessors) relying on the view taken by the Full Bench in Smt. Maya v. Raja Dulaji  and others (1) and decided the appeals in their favour by  holding that  they were not Asamis but had become Sirdars. 372      At the outset it may be stated that it was not disputed either in  the lower  courts or before us that both Smt. Ram Kali as well as Shri Dan Sahai who succeeded to her interest in the  plots after her death were disabled persons under s. 157((1) of  the Act.  In fact  it was  accepted by  both the sides that  on the  date of  letting (being 14th June, 1945) Smt. Ram  Kali, the  then land  holder was a disabled person and on  9th April, 1946 (being the other relevant date under sub-clause (a) of clause (h) of section 21(1) Dan Sahai, the then land-holder,  was a disabled person who continued to be the land  holder upto  the date of vesting, and the question is whether  in such  8 case  the occupation  of the plots by Uttam Singh  and Murli  Singh under  the lease  from both of them would fall within the provisions of s. 21(1) (h) of the Act.      The relevant provision runs thus:           "21(1) Notwithstanding  anything contained in this      Act,  every   person  who,   on  the  date  immediately      preceding the  date of  vesting, occupied  or held land      as-

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 9  

          ...           ...           ...           ...           (h)   a tenant  of sir of land referred to in sub-                clause (a)  of clause  (i) of the explanation                under section 16, a sub-tenant referred to in                sub-clause (ii)  of clause  (a) of section 20                or an  occupant referred to in sub-clause (i)                of the  said section where the land holder or                if there  are more than one land-holders, all                of them were person or persons belonging-                (a)   if the  land was  let out  or  occupied                     prior to  the ninth  day of April, 1946,                     both  on   the  date   of   letting   or                     occupation, as  the case  may be, and on                     the ninth day of April, 1946, and                (b)   if the  land was let out or occupied on                     or after  the ninth  day of April, 1946,                     on the date of letting or occupation,                to any  one or  more of the classes mentioned                in sub-section (I) of Section 157.      shall be deemed to be an asami thereof " 373 In other  words, s.  21 (1)  (h) provides  that every person occupying or  A holding  land in  any one  of the capacities mentioned in  cl. (h) on the date immediately preceding 1-7- 1952 shall  be deemed to be an Asami thereof notwithstanding anything contained in the Act, if the landholder or if there are more  than one  all of them were disabled persons within the meaning  of s.  157(1), both  on the  date of letting as well as  on April  9, 1946 where the letting has taken place prior to  April, 9,  1946, or  were disabled  persons on the date of  letting if  the letting has occurred after April 9, 1946. In  the instant  case it  is not  disputed that  Uttam Singh and Murli Singh were on the date immediately preceding the date  of vesting  holding  or  occupying  the  plots  in question in  one or the other capacity mentioned in cl. (h); secondly, since  the letting was prior to April 9, 1946 sub- cl. (a)  of cl. (h) is attracted and it is also not disputed that on  the date  of letting the then land-holder (Smt. Ram Kali) was  a disabled  person and  on April 9, 1946 the then land-holder  Dan  Sahai,  who  succeeded  her,  was  also  a disabled person under s. 157(1) of the Act. Incidentally Dan Sahai  continued   to  be   the  land-holder   on  the  date immediately preceding  1.7 1952.  On these facts it seems to us clear  that all the requirements of s. 21(1) (h) could be said to  have been  satisfied but the Division Bench relying upon the Full Bench decision in Smt. Maya v. Raja Dulaji and others (supra)  held that  Uttam Singh  and Murli Singh were not Asamis  and had  become Sirdars because s. 21(1) (h) was not attracted inasmuch as in their view it was a requirement of that provision that not merely should the land- holder be a disabled person on both the dates mentioned in sub-cl. (a) of cl.  (h) but  the same  land-holder should continue to be landholder on  the date  immediately preceding  the date  of vesting (i.e.  the identity  of the  disabled land-holder or landholders on  both the  dates and the land-holder or land- holders seeking  the benefit  or protection of the provision on the  date immediately  preceding  1.7.1952  must,  remain unchanged) and  this requirement  was not  satisfied in this case. The  question is  whether on  true construction of the provision such  a requirement  can be  read  into  the  said provision ?      In Smt.  Maya v.  Raja Dulaji  and others  (supra)  the facts were  that the  disputed plots  belonged to one Bijain and were  inherited on  his death  by his widow Smt. Lakshmi and when  Smt. Lakshmi  died her  minor  unmarried  daughter

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 9  

Kumari Maya  became the  land-holder. Her elder sister Saheb Kunwar acting as her guardian executed a registered lease of the plots  in favour  of  the  plaintiffs  (Ram  Charan  and others) on  15.10.1947 for  a period  of five  years (a case falling under  sub-cl. (b)  of cl.  (h)). Later  on Maya was also married to her 374 sister’s husband  Thakurdas who  was admitted to the holding as co-tenant  with Maya, with the consent of the Zamindar in the year  1948. Thus  on the date of vesting (1.7.1952) both Maya (who  was still  minor and  disabled person) as well as her husband  Thakurdas were the land-holders of the plots in question. The  lessee plaintiffs  filed a  suit in  the year 1954 for a declaration that they had become Adhivasis of the land on  the coming  into force of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act and had  subsequently acquired Sirdari rights on the passing of the  U.P. Act XX of 1954 The suit was decreed by both the Courts below  and hence  Maya defendant  preferred a  second appeal  to   the  High   Court.  The   question  raised  for determination was whether for the purposes of s. 21 ( 1) (h) the disability  of the  landholders who were in existence on the date  of vesting  was material  or the disability of the land-holders who let out the land was a deciding factor? The Court noticed  that s.  21(1) (h) had been introduced in the Act for  the first  time  by  U.P.  Act  XVI  of  1953  with retrospective effect  from July  1, 1952  and was  later  on amended by  U.P. Act XX of 1954 and has thereafter continued in its  present  form.  Section  21(1)  (h),  as  originally enacted, in  express terms required that "the land-holder or if there  are more  than one  landholder all  of  them  were person or persons belonging, both on the date of letting and on the  date immediately  preceding the  date of vesting, to any one or more of the classes mentioned in sub-s. (2) of s. 10 or  cl. (viii)  of sub-s.  (I) of s. 157". As a result of the amendment  made by Act XX of 1954 the words "both on the date of  letting and  on the  date immediately preceding the date of  vesting" were  omitted.  In  other  words,  by  the amendment the requirement that disability of the land-holder should subsist on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting was  deleted. The  Full Bench  accepted the position that for  purposes of s. 21(1) (h), in its present form, the disability of  the land-holder  need not continue or subsist on the  date immediately  preceding the  date of vesting and might cease  on or  before the  date of vesting but took the view that  in the case before it there were two land-holders on the  date immediately  preceding  the  date  of  vesting, namely, Smt. Maya and her husband Thakurdas, that a new body of ’land-holders’  had come into existence subsequent to the date of  letting and  that all of them were not land-holders who had  let out the land as disabled person and, therefore, the plaintiffs  became Adhivasis and the defendants were not entitled to the benefit of s. 21(1) (h) of the Act. In other words, the Full Bench has been of the view that for purposes of s. 21(1) (h) it is necessary that the land-holders on the date immediately  preceding the  date of vesting must be the same persons as those who let out the 375 land and  suffered from  disability on  the date of letting, and also  on A  April 9, 1946 in case the letting was before that date.  In other  words, the identity of the land-holder or land-holders  must remain  unchanged up  to the  date  of vesting.      For reading  such a  requirement into the provision the Full  Bench   has  given   two  reasons:  (a)  that  such  a requirement arises  on construction of certain words used in

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 9  

cl. (h)  (vide: para  17 of  the Judgment)  and (b) that the protection given to a disabled landholder was intended to be a personal protection granted to the very individual who let out the  land as a disabled person and this was warranted by a historical  survey of parallel provisions contained in the preceding Tenancy Laws in U.P. (vide: Para 19). According to the Full  Bench the crucial words used in cl. (h) are "where the landholder or if there are more than one land-holder all of them were person or persons belonging" to any one or more of the  classes of  disabled persons under s. 157(1) and the Full Bench  has reasoned "the word ’are’ and the word ’them’ together with  the word  ’were’ in the aforementioned phrase clearly show  that the intention of the Legislature was that on the  date of vesting the ’land-holder’ should be the very person who  was the  land-holder on  the relevant  dates, to earn the benefit of cl. (h) of s. 21(1)". The Court observed that s. 21(1) (b) could bear the interpretation suggested by counsel  for   Smt.  Maya   only  if  the  words  ’or  their predecessor-in-interest’ were added before the words "all of them". The  Court has  further stated that historical survey of  the  parallel  provisions  contained  in  the  preceding Tenancy Laws  showed that the protection given to a disabled person  had   always  been  in  the  nature  of  a  personal protection granted  to the  very individual  who let out the land as  a disabled land-holder and the protection ceased to be available  when the identity or personality of that land- holder is  changed and in that behalf reliance was placed on certain provisions  of the  Agra Tenancy  Act, 1926 and U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939. In our view neither reason holds good for sustaining  the   literal  construction   placed  upon   the provision by the Full Bench.      It is  true that cl. (h) contains the phrase "where the land- holder  or if  there are more than one landholder, all of them  were persons  belonging" to  any one or more of the classes mentioned  in s.  157(1), but  for arriving  at  the correct  interpretation   of  this   crucial  phrase  it  is necessary to  have regard  to the definition of ’landholder’ and the  provisions of s. 157 of the Act with which s. 21(1) (h) is inter-connected. 376      Under  s.   3(26)  of   the  Act,   the  definition  of ’landholder’ as  given in the U.P. Tenancy Act 1939 has been adopted since the expression is not defined in the Act. That expression has  been defined in s. 3(11) of the U.P. Tenancy Act 1939 thus:           "Landholder" means  the person to whom rent is or,      but  for  a  contract  express  or  implied  would  be,      payable." This definition must be read in light of s. 3(1) of that Act which runs thus:           "All words  and expressions  used  to  denote  the      possessor of  any right,  title or  interest  in  land,      whether the  same be proprietary or otherwise, shall be      deemed to  include the  predecessors and  successors in      right, title or interest of such Person." In other words, the expression ’landholder’ who obviously is a possessor  of interest  in land  under s.  3(11)  means  a person to  whom rent  is payable, and under s. 3(1) by legal fiction it shall include his predecessor-in-interest as also successor-in-interest to whom the rent was or is payable. It is such definition that will have to be read in the U.P.Z.A. and L.R.  Act wherever  that expression  occurs. It  is thus obvious that  the expression  ’landholder’ occurring  in  s. 21(1) (h)  must mean a person to whom rent is payable and by fiction would  include his  predecessor-in-interest. Read in

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 9  

this light  there would  be no  question of  adding the word predecessor-in-interest of  the land-holder  in s. 21(1) (h) as that  would be  implicit  in  the  term  ’landholder’  on account of  the deeming  provision of  s. 3(1)  read with s. 3(11) of  the Tenancy  Act, 1939.  It does  appear that this aspect of  the matter  was not  brought to the notice of the Full Bench  when it  construed the concerned crucial phrase. Moreover after  the amendment effected by Act XX of 1954 the thrust of  cl. (h) is on the landholder or landholders being disabled persons on the material dates only.      Further s.  157(1) permits  leases by  disabled persons and says  that a  Bhumidhar or an Asami holding land in lieu of maintenance  allowance under  s. 11,  who is  a  disabled person falling  under any of the clauses (a) to (g), may let the whole  or any  part of  his  holding;  and  the  proviso thereto is very important which runs thus:           "Provided that  in the  case  of  a  holding  held      jointly by  more persons  than one,  but one or more of      them but not 377      all are subject to the disabilities mentioned in clause      (a) to  (g), the  person or  persons may let out his or      their share in the holding." And sub-s.  (2) provides  that where  any share of a holding has been  let out  under the aforesaid proviso the Court may on  an   application  of  the  Asami  or  the  tenure-holder determine the  share  of  the  lessor  in  the  holding  and partition the  same. Having  regard to the aforesaid proviso under which  even in  the case of a joint holding a lease of his share  by a  disabled land-holder is permissible and the same is  liable to be separated by a partition it is obvious that the  expression "all  of them"  must refer  to all such land-holders who  were disabled land-holders on the material dates. When  under the  proviso to  s 157(1)  a lease of his share by  a disabled  land-holder  in  joint  holding  (held alongwith a  non-disabled person) is expressly permitted and under s. 157(2) the Court has to determine such share of the disabled lessor  and partition  the same  on an  application being made  in that  behalf, it  is difficult to accept that the Legislature  intended to  deprive the  protection of  s. 21(1) (h) to such disabled land-holder simply because on the date immediately  preceding the  date of  vesting such land- holder comes  to hold  the land jointly with some other non- disabled land-holder.  In other  words on the facts found in the Full  Bench case  when on the date of letting the entire holding belonged  to Smt. Maya who was a disabled person and on the  date of  vesting she alongwith her husband Thakurdas (a non-disabled person) became joint holder, could Smt. Maya at any  rate to the extent of her share in the joint holding be denied  the benefit  of s.  21(1) (h) notwithstanding the proviso to  s. 157(1)  and s.  157(2) being in the Statute ? The answer  is obviously in the negative. In fact in view of the fact  that on  the material  date  (being  the  date  of letting)  the  entire  holding  belonged  to  Smt  Maya  the disabled person,  and having regard to the deeming provision which has  to be  read in the definition of ’landholder’ and having regard  to the  thrust of  amended cl. (h) which does not require  that the  successor-in-interest be  a  disabled person on  the date of vesting, the benefit of s. 21 (1) (h) should have  been extended  or made  available in respect of the entire  holding. In other words, on true construction of the crucial  phrase occurring  in cl. (h) it is not possible to read  into  the  provision  the  additional  requirement, namely, that the identity of the land-holder or land-holders must remain unchanged up to the date of vesting.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 9  

378      Coming to the second reason the Full Bench has observed that a  historical survey of parallel provisions of the Agra Tenancy Act  1926 and  U.P. Tenancy  Act, 1939 supported the conclusion that  protection was  granted only  to  the  very individual who  let out  the land  as a disabled land-holder and  the   protection  ceased   when  the  identity  of  the personality of  that land-holder  changed and in that behalf reference was made to s. 29(6) and (7) of the former Act and s. 41  (2) of  the latter  Act. Now apart from the fact that the scheme  of the  U.P.Z.A. and  L.R. Act is different from these two  earlier enactments, a careful analysis of the two provisions in  the earlier enactments will clearly show that in each  of the  provisions  express  words  had  been  used conferring personal  rights  on  the  individuals  concerned which is not the case with s. 21(1) (h) of the Act.      Having regard  to the  above discussion  we are  of the opinion that  the view  taken by the Full Bench of Allahabad High Court  in Smt.  Maya v.  Raja Dulaji and others (supra) does not  represent the correct construction of s. 21(1) (h) of the  Act. On  true construction  of the said provision in our view,  the benefit  thereof would  be available  to  the land-holder on  the date  of vesting, if the same landholder or his  predecessor existing  on the  material dates  was  a person or  persons belonging  to one  or more of the classes mentioned in s. 157(1) of the Act.      Since in  the instant  case, which  falls under sub-cl. (a) of  cl. (h), on the date of actual letting Smt. Ram Kali was disabled  person and  since on  the next  material date, namely, April,  9 1946  Dan Sahai  (successor-in-interest of Smt. Ram  Kali) was  also a disabled person, the land-holder on the  date of vesting, who incidentally happened to be Dan Sahai, would  be entitled to the benefit of s. 21(1) (h) and the respondents  (successors of Uttam Singh and Murli Singh) would remain  Asamis and  cannot  be  said  to  have  become Sirdars.      We might  mention that  after the  arguments  in  these appeals were  concluded  and  our  Judgment  was  ready  for pronouncement we  were informed that in a later case Dwarika Singh v. Dy. Director of Consolidation (l) a larger Bench of S-Judges of  the Allahabad  High  Court  has,  by  majority, overruled the view taken in Smt. Maya’s case. 379      In the  result the  appeals are  allowed, the orders of the Division  Bench in  Special Appeals Nos. 424-425 of 1971 are set  aside and  for  reasons  given  by  us  above,  the decision of  the learned  Single Judge dated May 10, 1971 is restored.      We direct that each party will bear its own costs. S. R.                                       Appeals allowed. 380