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PETITIONER: REV.FATHER BRAIN E FERNANDES ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       12/02/1996

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. G.B. PATTANAIK (J)

CITATION:  JT 1996 (2)   641        1996 SCALE  (2)452

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                             WITH                CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3648 OF 1996                -----------------------------            (Arising out of SLP (C) 15795 of 1995)                          O R D E R      Leave granted.      We have heard the learned counsel on both  sides.      Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894  was published  in the  State Gazette  on July 26, 1965 and  the declaration was published on May 17, 1969. The Award came  to be  made on  September 22,  1986  within  the period provided  under  Section  11-A  incorporated  by  the Amendment Act  68 of  1984. Therefore,  the appellants  have approached the  High Court.  The High  Court dismissed their W.P.No.2694/89 by  order dated  June 14,  1995, Thus   these appeals by special leave.      Shri  Sorabjee,   learned  senior   counsel   for   the appellants, has  contended that in similar cases relating to the same  survey No.294,  the High  Court  had  quashed  the declaration under  Section 6  relegating the  parties for an enquiry under  Section 5-A  on the  ground that  the erratum notification was published for the first time without giving any opportunity  to  the  appellants  and  was  followed  by declaration under   Section  6. Therefore, the action of the authorities in   this case also is illegal. We find no force in the  contention. As  noted by the High Court in the order that the  only defect  as noted  was that  instead of survey numbers, guntha  numbers have  been  given  in  the  Erratum relating to specification of survey numbers. In other words, the identity of the land was not in dispute and the land was also part of the notification under Section 4(1). Therefore, there is  no illegality  in the  notification under  Section 4(1) as  originally published.  In fact,  the enquiry  under Section 5A after giving an opportunity to the appellants was held  and   thereafter  declaration   under  Section  6  was published. No  objection in  this behalf  was  taken.  Under

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those   circumstances, we  do not  find  any  force  in  the contention of  Shri Sorabjee. It is true that the High Court had quashed  the declaration under Section 6 but nonetheless an opportunity  had been  given to  all  those  persons  and thereafter Section  6 declaration  would  follow.  The  only condition precedent  is that  the   acquisition would  serve public purpose.  So long as the public purpose subsists, the enquiry  under  Section  5-A  shall  be  conducted  and  the competent authority would take a decision whether the public purpose still  subsists to  sustain the  notification  under Section 4(1).  Under those  circumstances, we  do not  think that there is any force in the contention of Shri Sorabjee.      It is  then contended  by Shri Sorabjee that this Court in Ramchand  & Ors.  vs. Union of India & Ors. [(1993) 1 SCC 44] would  have interfered and quashed the acquisition under Section  4(1)   for  a   long  delay  on  the  part  of  the authorities, but for the intervention of third party rights. In this  case, since the appellants  are still in possession and  no   third  party   rights  have   been  created,   the notification requires to be quashed. We find no force in the contention. It  is true  that   admittedly,  there  is  long inaction on  the part  of the  authorities. As noted by this Court, since  limitation has  not been  prescribed  for  the actions to  be  pursued  by    the  authorities,  after  the publication of  the   declaration under Section 6 inordinate delay is  being  caused in making the award and offering the amount.  With a view to remove the defect, the Amendment Act 1984  was  brought  on  statute  and  the  limitation  under Section 11-A  was introduced enjoining the State to make the award within  two years  from the date of the publication of the notification  required under  Section  6-A.  On  failure thereof,  the   notification  under  Section  4(1)  and  the declaration under  Section 6  shall stand  lapsed.  In  this case, immediately  after the  Amendment Act  had  come  into force, within  two years,  the award  under Section  11  was made. But  this Court  noticing the  injustice that would be meted out in determination of the compensation on account of long lapse  of time,  directed in Ramchand’s case (supra) to pay additional amount of 12% per annum from the date of  the notification under  Section 4(1).  In that  case, within two years from the date of the Aflatoon’s case, i.e., August 24, 1976. The same ratio applies to the  facts in this case. The respondents are directed to pay the additional amount of 12% per annum  to the  appellants from May 17, 1969, the date of the declaration  since after the declaration, they kept over the matter for a long time.      The appeals  are accordingly  allowed  to  the    above extent. No costs.