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PETITIONER: REHMAN SHAGOO AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/09/1959

BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. DAS, SUDHI RANJAN (CJ) DAS, S.K. SARKAR, A.K. HIDAYATULLAH, M.

CITATION:  1960 AIR    1            1960 SCR  (1) 680

ACT:        Constitution-Legislative  competence of Ruler of  Jammu  and        Kashmir-ordinance Promulgated creating new offence of aiding        the enemy and prescribing trial by special Judges  following        special  procedure--If discriminatory-Whether Ordinance  was        legislation  with  respect to defence-Defence,  meaning  of-        Repeal   of  law  empowering  Ruler   to   legislate-Whether        Ordinance  survives--Cessation  of  emergency-If   Ordinance        occasioned  by  emergency  also  lapses  Jammu  and  Kashmir        Constitution Act, S. 1996, s. 5-- Enemy Agents Ordinance, S.        2005  (J.  K. Ordinance VIII Of S. 2005) Jammu  and  Kashmir        Constitution  (Amendment)  Act, S. 2005 (J.  K. XVII  Of  S.        2005)--jammu  and Kashmir General Clauses Act, s.  1977  (J.        K. XX Of S. 1977), S. 16(b)-Constitution of India, Art.   14        Part XVIII.

HEADNOTE: Under  the  Jammu and Kashmir Constitution Act  all  powers, legislative, executive and judicial vested in the Ruler.  On the accession of the State to India on October 22, 1947, the powers   in  respect  of  defence,  external   affairs   and communications  were  ceded  to India.  Under S.  5  Of  the Constitution  Act,  the Ruler promulgated the  Enemy  Agents Ordinance,  S.  2005,  which  provided  for  the  trial  and punishment  of  enemy agents and other  persons  siding  the enemy.   The  Ordinance provided for trial  of  offences  by Special   judges  and  prescribed  a  procedure   materially different  from  that  followed  in  the  criminal   Courts. Section  5 of the Constitution Act was repealed on  November 17,   1951.   The  appellants  were  prosecuted  under   the Ordinance  for  offences alleged to have been  committed  on June 27 and 28, 1957.  They contended (1) that the Ordinance violated Art. 14 of the Constitution of India, (ii) that the Ruler  had no legislative competence to issue the  Ordinance as it dealt with defence, (iii) that S- 5 of the 681 J.   K. Constitution Act having been repealed the  Ordinance came to   an end, (iv) that the Ordinance had lapsed as  the emergency on   account  of which it was issued  had  ceased,

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and  (v) that the Ordinance was void as it was  inconsistent with   the  Emergency  Provisions  in  Part  XVIII  of   the Constitution of India. Held,  that  the  Ordinance  was  intra  vires,  valid   and subsisting. The  Ordinance was riot discriminative and did  not  violate Art.  14 Of the Constitution.  In view of the  circumstances existing  in the State, " enemy agents " and  other  persons aiding the I, enemy " to whom the Ordinance applied formed a reasonable   classification   which  was   founded   on   an intelligible  differentia which distinguished  such  persons from  others and the differentia had a rational relation  to the object of the Ordinance which was to check subversion of the Government.  Besides, if the Ordinance did not make  any classification  of persons but only created an  offence  and provided  stringent procedure and punishment then there  was no  discrimination  at all as everybody  who  committed  the offence was subjected to the same procedure. Ram  Krishna Dalmia v. Shri justice S. R. Tendolkar,  [1959] S.C.R. 279 followed. The  Ordinance was not legislation with respect  to  defence and was within the legislative competence of the Ruler.  The entry  " defence " dealt only with the armed forces  whether on land or sea or in the air and the raising or  maintenance of such forces and their operations.  The Ordinance dealt in the  main with certain acts done with the intent to aid  the enemy though indirectly it was concerned with the operations of  the armed forces.  In pith and substance  the  Ordinance was  a  law  relating  to public  order,  criminal  law  and procedure and not defence. Though  s.  5  Of  the Constitution  Act  was  repealed  the Ordinance  was  saved by s. 6(b) of the  Jammu  and  Kashmir General  Clauses  Act.  Section 6(b) saved,  inter  alia,  " anything  duly  don(, " under a repealed enactment  and  the Ordinance  was  a  thing  duly done "  under  s.  5  of  the Constitution Act. The Ordinance was a permanent piece of legislation.  It came into existence because of an emergency but that was only the occasion  for  passing it.  Being a permanent law  it  could only  be brought to an end by means of repeal  by  competent authority. The  Emergency Provisions in Ch.  XVIII of the  Constitution of India had nothing to do with the validity or otherwise of the Ordinance and the question of any inconsistency  between the Ordinance and these provisions did not arise.

JUDGMENT:        CRIMINAL  APPELATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.  60  of        1958.        Appeal from the judgment and order dated the, 19th  February        1958, of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court, in Writ  Petition        No. 53 of 1957.        682        R. V. S. Mani, for the appellants.        Jaswant  Singh, Advocate-General for the State of Jammu  and        Kashmir, G. S. Pathak and T. M. Sen for the respondent.        1959.   September  10.   The  Judgment  of  the  Court   was        delivered by        WANCHOO J.-This appeal, on a certificate granted under  Art.        132  of  the Constitution of India (hereinafter  called  the        Constitution) by the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir, raises        the  constitutionality of the Enemy Agents  Ordinance),  No.        VIII   of  S.  2005  hereinafter  called   the   Ordinance),

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      promulgated  by  His Highness under s. 5 of  the  Jammu  and        Kashmir  Constitution Act, S. 1996, (hereinafter called  the        Constitution-Act).  The appellants also made an  application        under  Art.  132 (3) of the Constitution to this  Court  for        permission  to urge other grounds taken by them in the  High        Court  besides those relating to the interpretation  of  the        Constitution.   We intimated at the outset of the  arguments        that this application was being allowed and learned  counsel        for the appellants was permitted to make his submissions  on        all points raised in the High Court.        The  appellants are being prosecuted before a Special  Court        constituted  under the Ordinance for offences under s. 3  of        the  Ordinance, ss. 3, 4 and 5 of the  Explosive  Substances        Act,  (VI of 1908), s. 120-B of the Penal Code and s. 29  of        the Public Security Act read with rr. 28 and 32 of the Rules        thereunder.   The  incidents out of which  this  prosecution        arose took place on June 27 and 28, 1957.        The  circumstances in which the Ordinance came to be  passed        were  these:  Outside  raiders began  attacking  Kashmir  on        October 22, 1947.  The State acceded to India on October 26,        1947.   It appears that the Enemy Agents Ordinance, No.  XIX        of  S. 2004 was enacted soon after in January  1948.   There        was " cease-fire " on January 1, 1949 and the raids came  to        an  end.  This was followed by the present  Ordinance  which        became law an January 24, 1949.  The preamble to the  Ordin-        ance says that an emergency had arisen as a result of        683        wanton  attacks by outside raiders and enemies of the  State        which  made  it  necessary  to provide  for  the  trial  and        punishment  of enemy agents and persons  committing  certain        offences  with  intent  to  aid the  enemy  and  as  it  was        necessary to amend Ordinance XIX of S. 2004, therefore,  the        Ordinance was passed consolidating the law and repealing the        earlier Ordinance.        The  main  contentions of the appellants in the  High  Court        were  that  the Ordinance was unconstitutional and  void  by        reason  of the violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution  and        that His Highness had no legislative competence to enact  it        and  that  in any case it came to an end when s.  5  of  the        Constitution-Act was repealed in 1951.        The  High Court was of the view that there was a  reasonable        classification and that the classification was founded on an        intelligible  differentia  which  distinguished  persons  or        things that were grouped together from those left out of the        group  and the differentia had a rational relation with  the        object sought to be achieved by the Ordinance.  It therefore        held  that  the Ordinance was not hit by Art.  14.   It  was        further  of  the  view that  His  Highness  had  legislative        competence  to promulgate the Ordinance when he did  so  and        that when certain subjects were made over to the  Government        of India by the Instrument of Accession, the State  retained        its  powers to legislate even on these subjects so  long  as        the  State  law  was not repugnant to any law  made  by  the        Central Legislature, thus holding that there was  concurrent        power  in  the  State  to legislate  even  on  the  subjects        transferred to the Government of India.  Finally., the  High        Court  held that the repeal of s. 5 of the  Constitution-Act        did not result in the Ordinance coming to an end, as s. 6 of        the  Jammu  and Kashmir General Clauses Act saved  it.   It,        therefore,   dismissed  the  writ  petition  filed  by   the        appellants.        The  main contentions of the appellants before us are  these        :-        (1)The  Ordinance is unconstitutional as it violates  Art.        14 of the Constitution.

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      (2)There was no legislative competence in His Highness  to        issue the Ordinance under s. 5 of the        684        Constitution   Act,  as  His  Highness  had   executed   the        Instrument of Accession on October 26, 1947 surrendering his        powers   regarding  Defence,  Communications  and   External        Affairs  to the Government of India and the  Ordinance  came        under the head Defence ".        (3)Section  5 of the Constitution-Act was repealed  by  an        amending  Act, No. XVII of S. 2005, passed on  November  17,        1951, and therefore the Ordinance also came to an end on the        day s. 5 was repealed.        (4)The Ordinance has in any case lapsed as the  conditions        under  which it was enacted had become obsolete and did  not        exist any more.        (5)The Ordinance was void as it was inconsistent with Art.        352 of the Constitution and the Articles following.        Re. (1)        The  Ordinance defines " enemy " and " enemy agent in s.  2.        Section  3 provides that whoever is an enemy agent or,  with        intent to aid the enemy, does or attempts or conspires  with        any  other person to do any act which is designed or  likely        to give assistance to the military or air operations of  the        enemy or to impede the military or air operations of  Indian        forces  or His Highness’ forces or the forces of any  Indian        State or to endanger life or is guilty of incendiarism shall        be  liable to various punishments.  Section 4 provides  that        any  offence  punishable under s. 3 shall be  triable  under        this Ordinance and that where any other offence is committed        along with an offence under s. 3 which may be jointly  tried        under the Code of Criminal Procedure, a special Judge trying        the  offence under s. 3 shall also try the other offence  in        accordance  with the procedure laid down by  the  Ordinance.        Section  5  provides  for appointment  and  jurisdiction  of        Special Judges.  Section 6 gives power to the government  of        the State to transfer proceedings from one Special Judge  to        another and provides for the procedure to be followed by the        Special Judge to whom a case is transferred.  Section 7 lays        down that the procedure for trial of warrant cases shall  be        followed by Special                         685        Judges  and  no commitment proceedings would  be  necessary.        This  action%  also gives powers to Special  Judges  in  the        matter  of  recording  evidence,  summoning  witnesses   and        adjournments  and the Special Judge is deemed to be a  Court        of  Session.  Section 8 provides for sentences to be  passed        by  the  Special  Judge.  Section 9 provides  for  power  of        review  by  a  Judge of the High Court,  designated  by  the        Government  and  the decision of such Judge is  made  final.        Section  10  gives  power  to  the  Special  Judge  and  the        Reviewing  Judge  to  hear proceedings in camera  if  it  is        expedient in the interest of public safety or the defence of        the  State so to do.  Section 11 days down that  an  accused        person  triable  under the Ordinance may be defended  by  a’        pleader  if the Special Judge or the Reviewing Judge  grants        permission  in  this  behalf and also  gives  power  to  the        Special  Judge or the Reviewing Judge to appoint  a  pleader        for  an  accused  who has not  engaged  a  pleader  himself.        Section   12  provides  for  a  special  rule  of   evidence        empowering  the  Special Judge to admit  certain  statements        recorded  by a magistrate, when the person who made them  is        dead or cannot be found or is incapable of giving  evidence.        Section  13  provides for powers to deal  with  a  situation        arising  out  of  intransigent conduct  of  accused  persons        during the course of trial.  Section 14 takes away the power

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      of all courts to interfere with the proceedings or orders of        the Special Judge or to transfer any case pending before him        or  to make any order under s. 491 of the Code  of  Criminal        Procedure.   Section  15 prohibits the giving of  copies  of        records of any case before a Special Judge to any one except        to  an  accused or his pleader and makes it  punishable  for        such accused or pleader to show the copy to any other person        or  to divulge its contents to anybody except in the  course        of proceedings for the purpose of which it was obtained.  It        further  provides  for the return of the copies  within  ten        days  after  the conclusion of the  proceedings  before  the        Special  Judge.  Section 16 provides for the application  of        the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law for the time        being in force to proceedings under the Ordinance in so  far        as they are not inconsistent with its        87        686        provisions.   Section  17 makes  disclosure  of  information        prohibited  under s. 15 punishable.  Section 18 gives  power        to  the  Government to make rules necessary  to  carry  into        effect the purposes of the Ordinance.  Section 19.     repeals        the Enemy Agents Ordinance, XlX of S.   2004,  but  provides        that  all rules made, orders issued, prosecution and  action        taken  and punishment awarded under the  repealed  Ordinance        shall be deemed to have been made, issued, taken and awarded        under the Ordinance.        It will be clear from this analysis of the provisions of the        Ordinance  that  the  procedure under the  Ordinance  is  in        material  respects different from the ordinary procedure  of        Criminal  Courts dealing with offences.  The  contention  of        the  appellants is that this amounts to  discrimination  and        therefore  the Ordinance is void and unconstitutional as  it        violates Art. 14 of the Constitution.        The  provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution have come  up        for  discussion before this Court in a number of cases.   It        is  now well established that " while Art. 14 forbids  class        legislation,  it does not forbid  reasonable  classification        for the purposes of legislation.  In order, however, to pass        the  test of permissible classification two conditions  must        be  fulfilled,  namely (i) that the classification  must  be        founded  on an intelligible differentia which  distinguishes        persons or things that are grouped together from others left        out  of  the group and, (ii) that differentia  must  have  a        rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the        statute  in question.  The classification may be founded  on        different  bases,  namely,  geographical,  or  according  to        objects  or occupations or the like.  What is  necessary  is        that   there   must  be  a  nexus  between  the   basis   of        classification  and  the object of the Act  under  consider-        ation.  It is also well established by the decisions of this        Court  that  Art. 14 condemns discrimination not only  by  a        substantive  law but also by a law of procedure."  (see  Sri        Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar (1)).  We        have,   therefore,  to  see  whether  there  is   reasonable        classification for the purposes of the        (1) [1959] S.C.R. 279.        687        Ordinance.   Now  the Ordinance was passed in  January  1949        soon  after  the cease-fire.  But though the attack  by  the        outside raiders and enemies of the State had come to an  end        it  was  felt that conditions were such that  the  emergency        continued  and  it was necessary to provide  for  trial  and        punishment  of enemy agents and persons  committing  certain        offences with intent to aid the enemy by a special procedure        which was enacted in the Ordinance.  With that end in  view,

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      an  "enemy"  was  defined to mean and  include  "any  person        directly  or indirectly, participating or assisting  in  the        campaign recently undertaken by raiders from outside in sub-        verting the Government established by law in the State." ’An        "  enemy  agent  " was defined as meaning "  a  person,  not        operating as a member of enemy armed force, who is  employed        by,  or works for or acts on instructions received from  the        enemy."  It is clear, therefore, that " enemy " and "  enemy        agent  "  are a clearly defined class of persons  and  would        give rise to a reasonable classification for the purpose  of        the  Ordinance.   Section  3 provides for  punishment  of  a        person who is an enemy agent or who does certain things with        intent  to  aid  the enemy.  There can be no  doubt  in  the        circumstances  existing in the State then and now  that  the        classification   is   reasonable  and  is  founded   on   an        intelligible differentia which distinguished persons brought        under  the  Ordinance from others.  There is also  no  doubt        that  the differentia had a rational relation to the  object        sought to be achieved by the Ordinance.  There had  recently        been a campaign to subvert the government established by law        in  the  State and though the actual raids  were  over,  the        danger of subversion of the government was not over and  the        threat  from those who intended to aid the enemy  continued.        In  these  circumstances  the  Ordinance  was  enacted   and        provided  a special procedure for the trial of enemy  agents        or  those  who  did certain things with intent  to  aid  the        enemy,  the  object  of such persons being  to  subvert  the        government  established bylaw in the State.  If it  is  said        that   the   Ordinance  does  not  purport   to   make   any        classification of persons at all but only creates an offence        and        688        provides  a stringent procedure -for the punishment of  that        offence, then there is no discrimination at all, for anybody        who  commits  that  offence  is  subjected  to  the  drastic        procedure.   It has also to be remembered that in  order  to        repel   the   charge  of  discrimination   the   permissible        classification  need  not  be  of  persons  only.    Certain        offences  may  be  so heinous or serious that  they  may  in        certain  circumstances be treated as a class and tried in  a        different way.  The offence created by s. 3 of the Ordinance        is not found as such in the Penal Code but is a new  offence        of  an  aggravated  kind  which  may  in  the  circumstances        prevailing  in  the  State mentioned  above  be  treated  as        different from the ordinary offences; and may well be  dealt        with by a drastic procedure without encountering the  charge        of  violation  of  the. equal protection  clause.   We  are,        therefore,  of opinion that on the principles laid  down  by        this  Court in the large number of cases summarised  in  the        Dalmia  case  (1),  the  Ordinance  cannot  be  said  to  be        discriminatory  and, therefore, violative of Art. 14 of  the        Constitution.   The  contention  under  this  head  on   the        constitutionality   of  the  Ordinance  therefore  must   be        rejected.        Re. (2).        The  Ordinance purports to have been promulgated under s.  5        of  the  Constitution-Act, which declared that  all  powers,        legislative,  executive  and judicial, in  relation  to  the        State  and  its  government, were  always  inherent  in  and        possessed  and retained by His Highness and nothing  in  the        Act  was to affect or deemed to have affected the right  and        prerogative  of  His  Highness  to  make  laws,  and   issue        proclamations,  orders  and  ordinances  by  virtue  of  his        inherent  authority.   It  is, however,  submitted  that  on        account  of the accession of the State to India  on  October

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      26, 1947, certain matters were surrendered to the Government        of  India  and therefore His Highness had no power  left  to        legislate  on matters so surrendered.  These matters are  to        be found in the Schedule to the Instrument of Accession (2).        This Schedule consists of 20 items, grouped under        (1)  [19591 S.C.R. 279.        (2)  Appendix  VII of the White Paper on Indian  States,  p.        165.        689        four   heads:  (A)  Defence,  (B)  External   Affairs,   (C)        Communications and (D) Ancillary.  We are not here concerned        with  heads  (B) and (C) and need only  consider  the  items        under  (A) and (D).  There are four items under the  head  "        Defence ", namely-        1.The naval, military and air forces of the Dominion  and        any other armed force raised or maintained by the  Dominion,        any armed forces, including forces, raised or maintained  by        an acceding State, which are attached to, or operating with,        any of the armed forces of the Dominion.        2.Naval, military and air force works, administration  of        cantonment areas.        3.   Arms, fire-arms, ammunition.        4.   Explosives.        And there are four items under the head " Ancillary namely-        1.Elections  to the Dominion Legislature, subject to  the        provisions of the Act and of any Order made thereunder.        2.  Offences  against  laws  with  respect  to  any  of  the        aforesaid matters.        3.Inquiries and statistics for the purposes of any of the        aforesaid matters.        4.Jurisdiction and powers of all courts with respect to        any of the aforesaid matters, but except with the consent of        the  Ruler  of the acceding State, not so as to  confer  any        jurisdiction  or  powers upon any courts other  than  courts        ordinarily exercising jurisdiction in or in relation to that        State.        The  contention  on  behalf of the appellants  is  that  the        provisions  of the Ordinance were in particular  covered  by        item  (1) under the head " Defence ". It is also urged  that        the  High  Court was not correct in holding that  there  was        concurrent jurisdiction in the State as well as the  Central        Legislature  even with respect to items in the Schedule  and        that  on  a  correct interpretation  of  the  Instrument  of        Accession,  the  Central  Legislature  alone  had  power  to        legislate  with respect to the matters in the Schedule.   We        do not think it necessary to decide in this case whether the        State had concurrent        690        powers  to legislate on matters covered by the Schedule  and        shall proceed on the assumption that the Central Legislature        alone  had  the power to legislate on  these  matters.   The        question  then  which  immediately  arises  is  whether  the        Ordinance  is covered by item (1) under the head  "  Defence        The other items either under  the head " Defence  or   under        the head " Ancillary are immaterial for this purpose. If the        Ordinance is not covered by item   (1)   under   the   head"        Defence  ",  it would then be within the competence  of  the        State  Legislature or of His Highness to promulgate it,  for        all other matters besides those covered by the twenty  items        in  the Schedule in any case remained with the State.   Item        (1)  under  the  head  " Defence "  deals  with  the  naval,        military and air forces of the Dominion and any other  armed        forces raised or maintained by the Dominion and includes any        armed  forces  including those raised or maintained  by  any        acceding State, which are attached to, or operating with any

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      armed forces of the Dominion.  Howsoever wide an  interpret-        ation  is given to this entry it will be seen that it  deals        only with the armed forces whether on land or sea or in  the        air and the raising or maintenance of such forces and  their        operations.   The Ordinance has, in our opinion, nothing  to        do with the matters covered by this entry.  It is true  that        it  defines  "  enemy  " and " enemy  agent  "  and  creates        offences with reference to certain acts done with intent  to        aid the enemy including giving of assistance to the military        or -air operations of the enemy or impeding the military  or        air  operations of Indian forces or His Highness’ forces  or        the  forces of any Indian State.  But it is only  indirectly        concerned  with the operations of the armed forces  and  its        main purpose is to deal with persons who with intent to  aid        the  enemy commit certain acts including assistance  to  the        military or air operations of the enemy or impediment to the        military  or  air  operations of the  Indian  armed  forces.        Besides  this reference to military or air  operations,  the        rest of the provisions of the Act has nothing to do with the        armed  forces and if one looks at the pith and substance  of        the  Ordinance it will be found that it deals  with  persons        who are concerned with the        691        subversion of the government established by law by  becoming        enemy  agents or doing certain acts with intent to  aid  the        enemy.  In pith and substance therefore, the Ordinance deals        with  public order and criminal law and procedure; the  mere        fact that there is an indirect impact on armed forces in  s.        3 of the Ordinance will not make it in pith and substance  a        law  covered  by item (1) under the head  "Defence"  in  the        Schedule.   We  are therefore of opinion that  there  is  no        force  in the contention that the Ordinance was  beyond  the        legislative  competence  of  His  Highness  because  certain        matters  were  ceded in the Instrument  of  Accession  dated        October  26,  1947,  to  the  Government  of  India.    This        contention must also fail.        Re. (3).        The  contention is that as s. 5 of the Constitution-Act  was        repealed on November 17, 1951, the Ordinance which is stated        to have been passed under that section also came to an  end.        It is enough to say that there is no force in this argument.        Clause (b) of s. 6 of the Jammu and Kashmir General  Clauses        Act,  (J.K.XX of S. 1977), clearly saves the Ordinance.   It        is as follows:-        " Where this Act, or any Act made after the commencement  of        this  Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or  hereafter        to be made, then, unless a different intention appears,  the        repeal shall not ....        (b)  affect  the  previous  operation of  any  enactment  so        repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder;"        It will be clear that the promulgation of the Ordinance  was        a  "thing duly done" under s. 5 of the Constitution Act  and        the repeal of s. 5 of the Constitution-Act would thus  leave        the  Ordinance  which was  promulgated  thereunder  entirely        unaffected.  The repeal of s. 5 can only mean the withdrawal        of  that legislative power on and from the date  of  repeal.        Anything  done while the power subsisted cannot be  affected        by such repeal.  A law enacted under a Constitution-Act does        not  lose its vitality and would continue even though  there        may  be repeal of parts of the Constitution-Act under  which        it was enacted as long as the law        692        is not inconsistent with the Constitution-Act as it  emerges        after  the  amendment  and  repeal  of  certain   provisions        thereof.  It derives its binding force from the fact that it

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      was  within  the competence of the legislature when  it  was        passed  and being permanent would continue till  amended  or        repealed  under  the  amended  Constitution-Act.   We   are,        therefore, of opinion that the Ordinance did not come to  an        end  on  the  repeal of s. 5  of  the  Constitution-Act  and        remained a valid piece of legislation in view of s. 6 (b) of        the Jammu and Kashmir General Clauses Act.        Re. (4).        It  is urged that the conditions in the State  have  changed        considerably since 1949 and therefore the Ordinance must  be        held  to  have lapsed.  It is enough to say  that  there  is        nothing in this contention, even assuming that conditions in        the State are not now exactly the same as they were in 1949.        The  Ordinance was a permanent piece of legislation.  It  is        true  that it came into existence because of  an  emergency,        but  that was only the occasion for passing  the  Ordinance.        The  Ordinance,  however, tries to reach an evil  of  deeper        roots, an evil which cannot be said to have ceased to exist,        viz., subversion of the government established by law in the        State in conjunction with the enemies of the State.  Being a        permanent law, it can only be brought to an end by means  of        repeal  by competent authority.  It is not the case  of  the        appellants  that  the  Ordinance has been  repealed  by  any        competent  authority.   It must therefore be held to  be  in        force  till  such  repeal even if  the  conditions  now  are        assumed  not  to  be  exactly the same  as  in  1949.   This        contention therefore also fails.        Re. (5).        It is urged that the Ordinance was unconstitutional  because        it  is  inconsistent  with  Art.  352  and  the   subsequent        Articles.   We  must say that Art. 352  and  the  subsequent        Articles  in  Part  XVIII of the  Constitution  relating  to        Emergency Provisions have nothing whatsoever to do with  the        validity or otherwise of the Ordinance.  We have been unable        to understand how there can be any inconsistency between the        Ordinance 693 and   the  provisions  contained  in  Part  XVIII   of   the Constitution.  This contention also fails. It now remains to notice three points that were urged during the course of arguments on behalf of the appellants, namely, (i)  s. 4 (1) of the Ordinance is hit by Art. 20 (1) of  the Constitution,  (ii) s. 11 (1) is hit by Art. 22 (1)  of  the Constitution,   and   (iii)  the  Special   Judge   has   no jurisdiction   to  try  an  offence  under   the   Explosive Substances  Act.  Apart from the fact that these points  not having been raised by the appellants in their writ  petition or  urged before the High Court, we should be  reluctant  to permit them to raise these points for the first time in this Court,  we may, in passing, point out that the offences  for which  the appellants are being prosecuted are said to  have taken place in June 1957 and that they have been allowed  to engage lawyers of their choice.  They can therefore have  no grievance  so far as the first two points are concerned  and we  leave  them  to  be decided in a  case  where  there  is grievance.  There is no substance in the third point. There is no force therefore in this appeal and it is  hereby dismissed. Appeal dismissed.