IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 909-910 OF 2003

RAVICHANDRAN …APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE BY DY. SUPERIN. OF POLICE, MADRAS …RESPONDENT

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 805-806 OF 2003

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 807-808 OF 2003

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 911-912 OF 2003

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 1515-1516 OF 2003

AND

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 1527-1528 OF 2003

O R D E R

1. All these appeals involve similar and connected facts.   Since, the  

legal  issues  that  arise  for  our  consideration  are  also  similar,  we  

proceed to dispose of  all  these appeals by this common judgment  

and order.

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2. Before we delve into the facts of the case, it would be appropriate for  

us to deal with the miscellaneous applications that have been filed in  

this  Court  and also  the statement of  the  learned counsel  for  the  

appellant in Criminal Appeal Nos. 805-806 of 2003.

3. Criminal  Miscellaneous  Petition  Nos.  6391  to  6394  of  2010  in  

Criminal  Appeal  Nos.  1515-1516  of  2003  and  Criminal  

Miscellaneous Petition Nos. 6396-6399 of 2010 in Criminal Appeal  

Nos.  1527-1528  of  2003  are  applications  filed  by  the  legal  

representatives of the accused No. 1 namely, Kumaraguru seeking  

for substitution of their names in place of the deceased appellant-

accused No. 1.   During the pendency of the appeals in this Court,  

appellant-accused  No.  1  died  on  9th April,  2007.    The  present  

applications  have  therefore  been filed  by  his  legal  representatives  

seeking  for  substitution  of  their  names  in  place  of  the  deceased  

appellant accused No. 1.   In support of the aforesaid prayer, the  

legal representatives of the deceased appellant-accused No. 1 have  

relied upon the provisions of Section 394 of the Criminal Procedure  

Code, 1973.   For the reasons stated in the said applications, the  

applications are allowed.   The names of the applicants who are the  

legal  representatives of  the deceased-appellant  accused No. 1 are,  

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thus, allowed to be brought on record.   The said applications stand  

disposed of in terms of the aforesaid order.

4. It  is  pointed out that during the pendency of  the appeals  in this  

Court, accused No. 3 namely, Tamizhselvan who was the owner of  

shop No. 18 had died.   In that view of the matter, so far as the  

appeals against accused No. 3 are concerned, i.e. Criminal Appeal  

Nos. 805-806 of 2003, they stand abated.   The same are dismissed,  

accordingly.   The owner of shop No. 30, Kandasamy, accused No. 3  

in the first appeal has not filed any appeal in this Court against the  

order of conviction and sentence passed against him.   It has been  

stated that he has served out the sentence awarded to him.

5. Brief facts, which are necessary to dispose of the present appeals,  

are that the appellants herein were charged under the provisions of  

Section 120-B, Section 420 read with Section 120B, Section 477A  

read with Section 120B IPC and under Section 5(1) (d) and 5(2) of the  

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 in SLP. C.C. No. 1 of 1985.  In  

C.C.  No.  3  of  1985,  charges  were  framed  against  the  appellants  

herein under clause 4(a) of the Pondicherry Essential Commodities  

(Display of Stocks, Price and Maintenance of Accounts) Order, 1975  

read with Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955.  

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The  case  of  the  prosecution  is  that  the  appellants  herein,  i.e.,  

accused Nos. 1 and 2 prepared the permit for issuance of palmolein  

oil and the counter foil thereof was retained in the office.    Both the  

aforesaid permits  and the counter  foil  were in the handwriting of  

accused No. 2 which are also initialed and signed by A1 and A2.  

Subsequently, however, in the permit it was detected that there was  

interpolation and forgery in respect of shop No. 30.   One of such  

permits indicates that the palmolein oil was meant to be issued in  

favour of Shop No. 38.      The counter foil retained in the office  

indicates that it was meant to be issued and was in fact issued in  

favour of shop No. 38 but in the permit, it was detected later on that  

the same was converted and interpolated as shop No. 30.   Delivery  

of the palmolein oil was also taken on behalf of shop No. 30.

6. In  view  of  the  aforesaid  interpolation  and  forgery  in  the  said  

documents, two separate cases were registered under the aforesaid  

provisions. After submission of the charge-sheet, trial was conducted  

and a number of witnesses i.e. P.W. 1 to P.W. 19 were examined and  

several documents were also placed on record which were marked as  

Exhibits P1 to P57.

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7. All the accused were examined under Section 313 of the Code  

of Criminal Procedure and on conclusion of the trial, the trial  

Court,  in Spl.  C.C. No. 1 of  1985, convicted all  the accused  

persons namely A1-A3 for an offence under Section 120B IPC  

and  sentenced  each  to  undergo  three  years  rigorous  

imprisonment and also convicted them under Section 420 read  

with Section 120B IPC and sentenced each of them to undergo  

three years rigorous imprisonment and also to pay a fine of Rs.  

500/-  each,  in  default  to  undergo  one  month  simple  

imprisonment.    The  accused  persons  were  further  also  

convicted under Section 477A read with Section 120B IPC and  

sentenced each to undergo three years rigorous imprisonment.  

Ravichandran, A2 and A1 were also convicted under Section  

5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption  

Act, 1947 read with Section 120B IPC and sentenced each to  

undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a  

fine  of  Rs.  500/-  each,  in  default  to  undergo  simple  

imprisonment  for  one  month.  Kandasamy  A3  was  convicted  

under Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of  

Corruption Act, 1947 read with Section 109 IPC and sentenced  

to undergo three years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine  

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of Rs.  500/-,  in default  to undergo simple imprisonment for  

one  month.     All  the  sentences  were  directed  to  run  

concurrently.

8. With respect to Spl. C.C. No. 3 of 1985, accused Nos. 1 and 2  

were convicted under clause 4(a) of the Pondicherry Essential  

Commodities  (Display  of  Stock,  Prices  and  Maintenance  of  

Accounts)  Order  1975  read  with  Section  7(1)(a)(ii)  of  the  

Essential  Commodities  Act,  1955  read  with  Section  109  of  

I.P.C.  and  sentenced  each  to  undergo  R.I.  for  6  months.  

Accused  No.  3  was  convicted  under  clause  4(a)  of  the  

Pondicherry Essential Commodities (Display of Stocks, Prices  

and Maintenance of Accounts) Order 1975 read with Section  

7(1)(a)(ii)  of  Essential  Commodities  Act,  1955  and  he  was  

sentenced to undergo R.I. for 6 months.  

9. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order passed by the  

trial Court, the appellants preferred four separate appeals. Two  

appeals  being C.A.  Nos.  181 and 184 of  1994 were filed by  

accused No. 1.   The other two appeals being C.A. Nos. 220 and  

222 of 1994 were filed by accused Nos. 2 and 3 jointly.   The  

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High  Court  by  its  judgment  and  order  dated  31.12.2003  

dismissed all the appeals.

10. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order  of  conviction  

and sentences, the appellants before us filed the appeals which  

were entertained.   All the appeals have been listed for hearing  

and  we  have  heard  the  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  

parties.

11. Counsel for the appellants have submitted before us that the  

judgments are required to be set aside as none of the accused  

persons  could  be  said  to  be  guilty  of  the  offences  alleged  

against them.   It is pointed out that although the aforesaid  

permit as also the counter foil were prepared by accused No. 2  

and were signed by both the accused no. 2 and accused No. 1,  

yet  there  is  no  conclusive  proof  that  the  interpolation  and  

forgery was done by both the accused persons.  It  was also  

pointed  out  during  the  course  of  arguments  by  the  learned  

counsel appearing for the appellants that so far as accused No.  

3 is  concerned,  he died during the pendency of  the present  

appeals and he did not file any appeal himself before the Court.  

So far as accused No. 4 is concerned, counsel appearing on his  

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behalf has drawn our attention to the fact that although he is  

the brother of A3 there is no evidence to show that he in fact  

knew that the aforesaid permit which was delivered by him in  

the office of the Federation was in any manner interpolated or  

forged.

12. Mr.  P.P.  Malhotra,  the  Additional  Solicitor  General  of  India  

appearing for the respondent-CBI tried to contend that it is the  

concurrent  finding  of  facts  of  the  two  Courts  below  and  

therefore,  the  findings  should  not  and  cannot  be  interfered  

with by this Court.   He also submitted that the findings on  

record fully prove and establish the guilt of the two accused  

persons and that there is enough material on record to show  

that the documents in question were forged at least with the  

knowledge and consent of the accused persons and therefore,  

the  conviction  and sentences  passed  against  them are  legal  

and valid.

13. In the light of the aforesaid submissions, we have considered  

the entire record of the case. We have carefully scrutinised the  

evidence adduced in the present cases. After going through the  

same,  we  are  of  the  considered  opinion  that  there  is  no  

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evidence on record to indicate any link to prove and establish  

that  the  interpolation  and  forgery  was  done  by  any  of  the  

accused persons namely, A1, A2 or A4.   Only because A4 is  

the brother of A3 does not in any manner prove and establish  

that he had knowledge that the permit was interpolated when  

he had presented it before the office of the Federation.

14. In order to prove that the interpolation and the forgery was  

done by A1 and A2, the prosecution has led evidence of P.W. 3  

and P.W. 6 who have stated that they knew the handwriting,  

signatures, initials and mode of writing the figures of A1 and  

A2.   Before we deal with the testimony of P.W. 3 and P.W. 6 on  

the  point  of  handwriting,  signatures,  initials  of  the  accused  

persons, we wish to refer to two judgments of this Court. In  

Rahim Khan Vs. Khurshid Ahmed and Others [(1974) 2 SCC  

660], this Court held as follows:

“39.  There  is  also  oral  evidence  identifying  the   signature  of  the  returned  candidate  on  Exhibits  P3  and PW 11/1, particularly in the deposition of Habib,   PW 23. He has not spoken to his familiarity with the   handwriting  of  the  appellant.  Opinion  evidence  is  hearsay  and  becomes  relevant  only  if  the  condition   laid  down in Section  47 of  the  Evidence Act is  first  proved.  There is  some conflict  of  judicial  opinion  on  this matter, but we need not resolve it here, because,   although  there  is  close  resemblance  between  the  signature of Rahim Khan on admitted documents and  

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that in Exhibits P3 and PW 11/1, we do not wish to   hazard a conclusion based on dubious evidence or lay  comparison  of  signatures  by  Courts.  In  these  circumstances, we have to search for other evidence, if   any, in proof of circulation of the printed handbills by  the returned candidate, or with his consent.”

In Murari Lal Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh [AIR 1980 SC 531], this  

Court held as under:-

“11. We are firmly of the opinion that there is no rule   of  law,  nor  any  rule  of  prudence  which  has  crystallised into a rule of law, that opinion-evidence of   a  handwriting  expert  must  never  be  acted  upon,  unless  substantially  corroborated.  But,  having  due  regard  to  the  imperfect  nature  of  the  science  of   identification  of  handwriting,  the  approach,  as  we   indicated  earlier,  should be one of  caution.  Reasons  for  the  opinion  must  be  carefully  probed  and  examined.  All  other  relevant  evidence  must  be  considered.  In  appropriate  cases,  corroboration  may   be sought. In cases where the reasons for the opinion  are  convincing  and  there  is  no  reliable  evidence  throwing a doubt, the uncorroborated testimony of an   handwriting expert may be accepted. There cannot be  any inflexible rule on a matter which, in the ultimate   analysis,  is  no  more  than  a  question  of  testimonial   weight.  We have said so much  because this is an  argument  frequently  met  with  in  subordinate  courts  and sentences torn out of context from the judgments   of this Court are often flaunted.”

15. P.W.  6  stated  in  his  examination-in-chief  that  he  knew the  

accused persons, viz.,  A1 to A3 and that A2 was working in  

Civil Supplies Inspector’s Office in the rank of UDC and that he  

had earlier worked with him in the Finance Department.  P.W.  

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6 has however, nowhere stated in the examination-in-chief that  

the present instance of interpolation or forgery was in the hand  

of A2.   In the cross-examination, P.W. 6 stated that although  

he had worked along with A2 in the Finance Department, but  

he was working in a different Section of the Department.  He  

has clearly stated that he was working in the Budget Section  

called F1 whereas A2 was working in the Motor Conveyance  

Section called F2 Section.   It has also been brought to our  

notice that in the cross-examination, it was said that the files  

dealt by A2 and F2 Section in the Finance Department never  

came to the F1 Section where P.W. 6 was working. Therefore,  

in our considered opinion the interpolation as also the initials  

appended thereto have not been proved and established to be  

in the hand of A2 and A1.

16. In that view of  the matter,  we are of  the considered opinion  

that  the  prosecution  has  miserably  failed  to  prove  and  

establish that the alleged interpolation and forgery was done by  

either A1, A2 or A4.   

17. As earlier noted by us, Criminal Appeal Nos. 805-806 of 2003  

stand abated. We allow all the other appeals and set aside the  

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orders of conviction and sentences passed against each of the  

accused persons.

18. The bail bonds stand discharged.

  ………...…………………………..J.    [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA]

  ……………………………………..J.    [H.L. DATTU]

NEW DELHI MARCH 25, 2010.

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