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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  1704 of 2007

PETITIONER: Ravi Khullar and another

RESPONDENT: Union of India and others

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 30/03/2007

BENCH: B.P. SINGH & ALTAMAS KABIR

JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT (Arising out of SLP) No.6093 of 2003)  WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO 1707 2007 (Arising out of SLP) No.6095 of 2003)  M/s. Palam Potteries                                    \005.Appellant Versus Union of India and others                                       .\005Respondents         WITH  CIVIL APPEAL NO 1705 2007 (Arising out of SLP) No.6384 of 2003)  Hari Chand and another                                  \005.Appellants Versus Union of India and others                                       .\005Respondents         WITH  CIVIL APPEAL NO 1706 2007 (Arising out of SLP) No.8574 of 2003)  Punjab Potteries                                                \005.Appellant Versus Union of India and others                                       .\005Respondents         

B.P. SINGH, J.

       Special leave granted.

       In the appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 6093 of 2003;   6095 of 2003 and 6384 of 2003 the appellants have impugned the  common judgment and order of the High Court of Delhi dated  February 13, 2003 disposing of Civil Writ Petition Nos. 2672 of  1996 ; 1851 of 1986 and 2003 of 1986.   

In the appeal arising out SLP ) No. 8574 of 2003, M/s.  Punjab Potteries has assailed the judgment and order of the High  Court of Delhi in C.W.P. No.2168 of 2003 dated 26th March,  2003.   The High Court dismissed all the writ petitions preferred by  the appellants herein.  

A few broad facts may be noticed at the threshold to  appreciate the contentions urged on behalf of the parties in these  appeals.      

       A Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act  (hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’) was issued by the Lieutenant  Governor of Delhi on January 23, 1965 for acquisition of lands

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measuring 6241 bighas 12 biswas in village Mahipalpur which was  required for a public purpose, namely - Planned Development of  Delhi.  A declaration under Section 6 of the Act relating to 4759  bighas 1 biswa was made on December 12, 1966 and another  declaration  relating to 1459 bighas 18 biswas was made on December  26, 1968.  Another Notification under Section 4 of the Act was  published on December 3, 1971 for acquisition of land in Village  Nangal Dewat for a public purpose, namely - Development of Palam  Airport.  A declaration under Section 6 of the Act was made with  respect to the said lands on July 16, 1972.           

       The case of the appellants is that the matter remained pending  for a considerable period and it appears from various documents  which have been brought on record that the lands acquired were really  for the benefit of the International Airport Authority of India (IAAI).   Reliance is placed on a Resolution dated September 10, 1981 of the  Delhi Development Authority regarding change of land user from  "Green Belt and Agriculture Cultivable Land" to "Circulation  Airport".   The Resolution recites that the Delhi Development  Authority had approved the change of land user so that the land could  be utilized for the purpose of development of the Palam Airport.  This  was subject to the condition that the IAAI prepared a detailed plan  which should include the proposal for rehabilitation/resettlement of  the villagers to be affected by the proposed expansion of the Airport,  and the plan be discussed with the Municipal Corporation of Delhi  and the Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking.  It also appears from the  record that the notice issued under Section 9(1) of the Act on June 22,  1983 was challenged in several writ petitions filed before the High  Court in which an interim order was passed directing maintenance of  status quo with regard to possession of the lands but permitted the  acquisition proceeding to continue.   Reliance has been placed on the  correspondence exchanged between the various statutory authorities  to indicate that it was really for the purpose of IAAI that the lands  were being utilised.  The letter of the Land Acquisition Officer dated  July 1, 1986 indicates that IAAI had supplied details of khasra  numbers to be acquired for the expansion of the Delhi Airport which  had been discussed.  A statement enclosed with the aforesaid  communication showed that the lands to be acquired were in villages  Mahipalpur, Nangal Dewat and Nangal Dewat Village abadi  measuring 69 bighas 11 biswas, which included some of the khasra  numbers belonging to some of the appellants herein.  A  communication from the Secretary, Department of Civil Aviation,  addressed to the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi dated September 15,  1986 emphasised the need to acquire immediately the industrial  structures in the Mahipalpur and Nangal Dewat area in the overall  interest of security and development of Delhi Airport.  The IAAI was  said to be willing to accept the suggestion for provision of land for  land, provided alternative land was acquired by the Delhi  Administration/Delhi Development Authority and no further liability  was imposed on IAAI for payment of additional compensation for  acquired industrial structures.                   On September 19, 1996 an Award under Section 11 of the Act  was declared by the Land Acquisition Collector.   

       On December 23, 1986 a Notification was issued under Section  4 of the Act for acquisition of land for a public purpose, namely for  rehabilitation of the persons displaced or affected due to the  expansion/development of the Palam Airport.  The lands mentioned  therein are in village Malikpur Kohi Rangpuri.

       Since the challenge to the acquisition failed and the appellants  were not provided alternative sites under the rehabilitation package,  they approached the High Court for relief which, as noticed earlier,  has been refused by the High Court.  It will, however, be necessary to

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deal with each writ petition separately since the facts of each case are  different as also the pleas raised therein.  

APPEAL ARISING OUT OF SLP ) NO. 6093 OF 2003  

       The appellants before us are the son and daughter of Late Balraj  Khullar.  The lands in question in village Mahipalpur measuring 23  bighas and 18 biswas (approximately 5 acres) devolved upon the  appellants after the death of their father.  Late Balraj Khullar had  constructed a factory over the lands in question in the year 1955  which went into production later after obtaining registration on July  27, 1960.  He carried on the business of manufacture of ceramic goods  in the name and style of M/s. Pelican Ceramic Industries.  On January  23, 1965 the aforesaid lands of the appellants were notified for  acquisition under Section 4 of the Act for the public purpose of  planned development of Delhi. According to the appellants, when the  factory was established and became functional, there was no Master  Plan of Delhi, which came into existence only in the year 1962 in  which the lands were shown as ’green area’.  Late Balraj Khullar  objected to the acquisition but without considering his objections, a  declaration under Section 6 was made on December 26, 1968.  A  notice under Section 9(1) of the Act was issued on June 23, 1983.   Upon receipt of the notice late Balraj Khullar challenged the  acquisition by filing a writ petition before the Delhi High Court, being  Civil Writ Petition No. 1550 of 1983 primarily on the ground of  inordinate delay in completing the acquisition proceeding and other  illegalities in Section 4 Notification.  Notice was issued in the said  writ petition on July 26, 1983 and an interim order was passed for  maintenance of status quo with regard to possession.  The interim  order dated July 26, 1983 was modified on August 30, 1983 directing  maintenance of status quo with regard to possession but the  acquisition proceedings were allowed to continue.  During the  pendency of the writ petition, the award was announced on September  19, 1986 which was followed by notices under Sections 12(2) and  13(1) of the Act.  The total area acquired measured 23 bighas and 18  biswas. Ultimately the writ petition filed by late Balraj Khullar was  dismissed by the High Court by its order dated December 14, 2005.   On coming to know about the dismissal of the said writ petition, the  petitioners (appellants herein) filed a special leave petition before this  Court being SLP ) No. 7821 of 1996.  The same was, however,  withdrawn on a statement being made on behalf of the petitioners that  they would file a review petition before the High Court.  It appears  from the special leave petition filed by the petitioners that a  contention was raised before this Court that the lands having been  acquired for the planned development of Delhi, could not be given to  the IAAI since the development of the Palam Airport was not within  the contemplation of the notification under Section 4 of the Act.    Accordingly the petitioners filed the review petition being Review  Petition No.42 of 1996 before the High Court in which several fresh  grounds were also urged but the said review petition was dismissed by  the High Court by its order of May 24, 1996 observing that the new  points sought to be raised in the review petition had not been pleaded  in the original writ petition.  The High Court also rejected the  contention of the petitioners that on discovery of new facts a review  petition was maintainable.  No appeal was preferred against the order  dismissing the review petition and hence the proceeding initiated by  filing of C.W.P. No. 1550 of 1983 challenging the acquisition  proceeding got a quietus by dismissal of the review petition by the  High Court.  Apparently, therefore, the petitioners cannot be permitted  to challenge the same acquisition proceeding.   However, the petitioners filed another writ petition, being Writ  Petition No. 2672 of 1986 again questioning the acquisition  proceeding. The said writ petition was dismissed by order dated July  4, 1996.  It appears from the record that the point sought to be urged

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in the aforesaid writ petition was that the acquisition proceeding was  bad for non compliance with the provision of Chapter \026VII of the Act.   The submission proceeded on the basis that the acquisition was for the  purposes of a Company within the meaning of that term in the Act,  namely \026 the International Airport Authority of India (IAAI).  The  same submission has been urged before us as well.  

       We are of the view that the High Court was justified in  rejecting this contention.  As noticed by it, the Notification under  Section 4 was issued on January 23, 1965.  The public purpose for  which the acquisition was made was stated to be "planned  development of Delhi".  Admittedly at the relevant time when Section  4 Notification was published, the management of the airport vested  with the Department of Civil Aviation.  It cannot be denied that the  words used in the Notification, namely "the planned development of  Delhi" are wide enough to include the expansion and development of  the airport.  That is also a "public purpose."   Since the IAAI came  into existence much later only on December 8, 1971 and was vested  with the power to manage the airports, there was no question of the  acquisition being made for the purpose of the IAAI since that body  did not exist in the year 1965.  The acquisition was for the planned  development of Delhi and, as observed earlier, the expansion and  modification of the airport is a "public purpose".  It so happened that  after the constitution of the IAAI, the power of management of  airports, was vested in it and, therefore, the development work which  otherwise would have been undertaken by the concerned competent  authority in the year 1965, was to be executed by the IAAI.  The  submission that the provisions of Chapter-VII of the Act were not  complied with must, therefore, be rejected because the acquisition  purported to be for the planned development of Delhi and it is no  one’s case that the Notification had been issued mala fide.  The  procedure laid down in Chapter-VII of the Act was not attracted since  the acquisition was not for any "Company" within the meaning of   Chapter-VII of the Act.

       The High Court has also rejected the submission on the ground  that it was barred by the principle of constructive res judicata.  It is  not necessary for us to express any opinion on this issue, in view of  our earlier finding, but the appellants have themselves drawn the  attention of this Court to the fact that the land was being acquired for  the purpose of the IAAI as was evident from the Resolution of the  Delhi Development Authority dated September 10, 1981.  The  appellants, therefore, admit that they had knowledge of the fact that  the land was to be utilized by the IAAI for its own purposes, which  according to the appellants, was not a part of the planned development  of Delhi.  Such being the factual position, the father of the appellants  who filed Writ Petition No.1550 of 1983 ought to have challenged the  acquisition on the ground of non compliance with the provisions of  Chapter VII of the Act since all the relevant facts were within his  knowledge.  He not having done so, we do not find that the High  Court was in error in holding that the writ petition was barred also by  the principle of constructive res judicata.

       The question which survives consideration is whether in view  of the public purpose declared in the Notification under Section 4 of  the Act, the lands can be utilized for any other public purpose.  While  considering this question it would be useful to remember that the  Notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued in January, 1965  and the declaration made in the following year.  The IAAI came into  existence in December, 1971, six years later, whereafter the task of  developing and extending the Palam Airport was entrusted to the said  authority.  When the said authority was constituted, the acquisition  proceeding had already been initiated.  

       The learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of

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the respondents submitted that having regard to the authorities on the  subject the question is no longer res integra.  It is not as if lands  acquired for a particular public purpose cannot be utilized for another  public purpose.  He contended that as long as the acquisition is not  held to be mala fide, the acquisition cannot be invalidated merely  because the lands which at one time were proposed to be utilized for a  particular public purpose, were later either in whole or in part, utilized  for some other purpose,  though a public purpose.  He, therefore,  submitted that some change of user of the land, as long as it has a  public purpose, would not invalidate the acquisition proceeding which  is otherwise valid and legal.   

       In Gulam Mustafa and others  vs.  The State of Maharashtra  and others : (1976) 1 SCC 800, this Court noticing the submission of  learned counsel for the petitioner that the excess land out of the lands  which were acquired for a country fair was utilized for carving out  plots for the housing colony, held that it did not invalidate the  acquisition.  This Court observed :-

"\005..Apart from the fact that a housing colony is a public  necessity, once the original acquisition is valid and title has  vested in the Municipality, how it uses the excess land is no  concern of the original owner and cannot be the basis for           invalidating the acquisition. There is no principle of law by  which a valid compulsory acquisition stands voided because  long later the requiring authority diverts it to a public purpose  other than the one stated in the Section 6(3) declaration."

       The same principle has been reiterated in Mangal Oram and  others vs. State of Orissa :  (1977) 2 SCC 46.   

       In Union of India and others  vs.  Jaswant Rai Kochhar and  others : (1996) 3SCC 491, lands which had been acquired for public  purpose of housing scheme were sought to be utilized for a  commercial purpose, namely for locating a district center.  It was  contended before this Court that since the acquisition was for a  housing scheme, the land cannot be used for commercial purposes.   The submission was rejected in the following words:-  "\005.We find no force in the contention. It is conceded by the  learned Counsel that the construction of the District Centre for  commercial purpose itself is a public purpose. No doubt it was  sought to be contended in the High Court that in a housing  scheme, providing facilities for commercial purpose is also one  of the composite purpose and that, therefore, acquisition was  valid in law. However, the contention was rejected by the High  Court. We need not go to that part. Suffice it to state that it is a  well-settled law that land sought to be acquired for public  purpose may be used for another public purpose. Therefore,  when the notification has mentioned that the land is sought to  be acquired for housing scheme but it is sought to be used for  District Centre, the public purpose does not cease to be public  purpose and the nomenclature mentioned in the notification  under Section 4(1) as housing scheme cannot be construed to be  a colourable one. The notification under Section 4(1) could not  have been quashed on the ground that the land is sought to be  used for District Centre, namely, for commercial purpose. It is  obvious that the lands acquired for a public purpose should  serve only the public purpose of providing facilities of  commercial purpose, namely, District Centre as conceded by  the learned Counsel in fairness to be a public purpose. The  notification under Section 4(1) cannot be quashed on the  ground of change of user. The High Court was wholly wrong in  quashing the notification on the ground of change of user."  

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       Though not directly in point, the observations of this Court in  State of Maharashtra  vs.  Mahadeo Deoman Rai alias Kalal and  others : (1990) 3 SCC 579 are significant to determine the approach of  courts in such matters.  In that case a Notification under Section 4 of  the Land Acquisition Act was issued for the purpose of establishing a  ’tonga’ stand.  The respondent applied for permission to raise a  construction which was denied on the ground that the land was  reserved for road widening under a Town Planning Scheme which  was being implemented.  Since the respondent was prevented from  continuing with the construction work undertaken by him, he initially  field a writ petition before the High Court which was withdrawn and  subsequently filed a suit claiming damages etc.  The Municipal  Council took a decision to accord permission to the respondent as  asked for, and the suit was withdrawn.  When the State Government  came to know about it, it asked the Municipal Council to explain the  circumstances under which such permission had been granted.  A  High Powered Committee was appointed to examine the entire matter.   The resolution of the Municipal Council granting permission to the  respondent was rescinded.  Another application filed by the  respondent was kept in abeyance which compelled the respondent to    file another writ petition which was allowed by the High Court.  The  plea of the Municipal Council was that it had passed a fresh resolution  inter alia deciding to re-plan the scheme with respect to the area in  question in the light of the recommendations made by the Committee.   Consequently the matter was re-opened and the objections from the  affected persons were invited.  Even the respondent filed his  objections.  This fact was not brought to the notice of the High Court  which allowed the writ petition.  This Court,  set aside the judgment  and order of the High Court and observed :-  "Besides, the question as to whether a particular Scheme  framed in exercise of statutory provisions is in the public  interest or not has to be determined according to the need of the  time and a final decision for all times to come cannot be taken.  A particular scheme may serve the public purpose at a given  point of time but due to change of circumstances it may become  essential to modify or substitute it by another scheme. The  requirements of the community do not remain static; they  indeed, go on varying with the evolving process of social life.  Accordingly, there must be creative response from the public  authority, and the public scheme must be varied to meet the  changing needs of the public. At the best for the respondent, it  can be assumed that in 1967 when the resolution in his favour  was passed, the acquisition of the land was not so urgently  essential so as to call for his dispossession. But for that reason it  cannot be held that the plots became immune from being  utilised for any other public purpose for ever. The State or a  body like the Municipal Council entrusted with a public duty to  look after the requirements of the community has to assess the  situation from time to time and take necessary decision  periodically.  We, therefore, hold that the Resolution dated 13- 2-1967 was not binding on the Municipal Council so as to  disable it to take a different decision later."

       In Bhagat Singh  vs.  State of Uttar Pradesh and others : (1999)  2 SCC 384 this court upheld an acquisition even when the public  purpose to which the land was put was contrary to the permitted user  under the Master Plan.  This Court  held that the acquisition was valid  but it was for the beneficiary of the acquisition to move the competent  authority and obtain the sanction of the said authority for change of  user.  That it could do only after it got possession of the land in  question.

       The learned Additional Solicitor General also relied upon the  decision of this Court in Northern Indian Glass Industries  vs.   Jaswant Singh and others : (2003) 1 SCC 335 wherein this Court has

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held that the High Court was not right in ordering restoration of land  to the respondents on the ground that the land acquired was not used  for the purpose for which it was acquired.  It was held that after  passing of the Award and possession  taken under Section 16 of the  Act the acquired land vests with the Government free from all  encumbrances.  Even if the land is not used for the purpose for which  it is acquired, the landowner does not get any right to ask for  restoration of possession.              Referring to the facts of the instant case, it cannot be disputed  that the planned development of Delhi for which purpose the land was  acquired under Section 4 of the Act is wide enough to include the  development and expansion of an airport within the city of Delhi.   Thus it cannot be said that the land is actually being utilized for any  purpose other than that for which it was acquired.  The only difference  is that whereas initially the development work would have been  undertaken by the D.D.A. or any other agency employed by it, after  the constitution of the IAAI, the said development work had to be  undertaken by the newly constituted authority.  Thus there has been  no change of purpose of the acquisition.  All that has happened is that  the development work is undertaken by another agency since  constituted, which is entrusted with the special task of maintenance of  airports.  Since the said authority was constituted several years after  the issuance of the Notification under Sections 4, the acquisition  cannot be invalidated only on the ground that the public purpose is  sought to be achieved through another agency.  This, as we have  noticed earlier, was necessitated by change of circumstances in view  of the creation of the authority i.e. IAAI.  Moreover since there is no  change of public purpose for which the acquired land is being utilized,  the acquisition cannot be invalidated on that ground.  The purpose for  which the lands are being utilized by a governmental agency is also a  public purpose and as we have noticed earlier, would come within the  ambit of the public purpose declared in Section 4 Notification.   Therefore, the acquisition cannot be challenged on the ground that the  acquired lands are not being utilized for the declared public purpose.   Having regard to the facts of the case it cannot be contended, nor has  it been contended, that the Notification under Section 4 of the Act was  issued mala fide.  

       We, therefore, find no merit in the appeal arising out of SLP  (C) No.6093 of 2003 and the same is accordingly dismissed.    

APPEAL ARISING OUT OF SLP ) No. 6384/2003  

       In this appeal the lands belonging to the appellant in village  Mahipalpur were notified for acquisition under Section 4 of the Act  on January 23, 1965   A declaration under Section 6 followed on  December 7, 1966.  Ultimately an Award was pronounced under  Section 11 of the Act on September 19, 1986.  Thereafter the  appellant filed Civil Writ Petition No.2003 of 1986 before the High  Court challenging the acquisition proceeding.  The High Court by the  impugned judgment and order dismissed the appeal on the ground of  delay and latches

       It will be noticed that the appellants filed the writ petition  challenging the acquisition proceeding which was initiated in 1965 as  late as on September 25, 1986, after the Award had been declared  under Section 11 of the Act.  The High Court, in our view, has rightly  noticed that the acquisition was challenged almost 21 years after the  issuance of the Notification under Section 4 of the Act.  Indeed the  writ proceeding was initiated after the Award was declared.  The High  Court has relied upon the decisions of this Court in Aflatoon  vs.  Lt.  Governor of Delhi : AIR 1974 SC 2077 ; Tilockchand Motichan  vs.  H.B. Munshi : AIR 1970 SC 898 ; Indrapuri Griha Nirman Sahakari

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Samiti Ltd.   vs.  The State of Rajasthan and others  : AIR 1974 SC  2085 ; Pt. Girharan Prasad Missir and another  vs.  State of Bihar  and another : (1980) 2 SCC 83 and H.D. Vora  vs.  State of  Maharashtra and others : AIR 1984 SC 866.  Following the  principles laid down therein the High Court dismissed the writ petition  on the ground of delay and latches.  In the facts and circumstances of  the case no exception can be taken to the order of the High Court  dismissing the writ petition.  There was no good reason explaining the  delay in moving the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction.  It  is not necessary to refer to the large number of authorities on the  subject since the law is so well settled that there is no need for a  further reiteration.   

We, therefore, find no merit in this appeal and the same is  accordingly dismissed.   

CIVIL APPEAL ARISING OUT OF SLP ) NO. 8574 OF 2001

The appellant in this appeal is M/s. Punjab Potteries whose  lands were notified for acquisition under Section 4 of the Act on  December 3, 1971 and the declaration under Section 6 was published  on July 10, 1972.  The petitioner had earlier filed a writ petition being  C.W.P. No. 432 of 1987.  It appears from the order passed in the said  writ petition dated February 18, 1987 that a prayer was made for leave  to withdraw the petition.  The order notices the fact that in the  aforesaid writ petition there was no prayer for mandamus directing the  respondents to allot any alternative site.  It merely questioned the  acquisition and validity of the Notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of  the Act.  The High Court recorded a finding that it found nothing  wrong with the acquisition so far as the validity of the Notifications  under Sections 4 and 6 was concerned.  It accordingly dismissed the  writ petition as withdrawn but with liberty to file a fresh petition for  claiming any alternative site, if it had any such right.  Whereafter the  petitioner filed the instant writ petition on March 7, 2003.  In the  instant petition as well the acquisition proceedings were challenged  but the same was dismissed by the High Court on March 26, 2003.   The High Court noticed the order passed by the Court earlier on  February 18, 1987 and also the fact that the writ petition was being  filed after a lapse of 16 years.  It did not entertain the challenge to the  Notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act since challenge  to the aforesaid Notifications stood rejected by order of February 18,  1987.  It noticed the earlier common judgment delivered in the writ  petitions preferred by other appellants in this batch of writ petitions  and held that the inordinate delay in filing the writ petition  challenging the validity of the Notifications was not condonable.   

It then proceeded to consider the submission urged on behalf of  the appellant that in any event it was entitled to the allotment of  alternative land in lieu of the lands acquired.   The High Court after  noticing the Full Bench decision of the High Court in Ramanand  vs.   Union of India : AIR 1994 Delhi 29 and the judgment of this Court in  New Reviera Cooperative Housing Society  vs.  Special Land  Acquisition Officer & others  :  (1996) 1 SCC 731 observed that if  there was a scheme promulgated by the State to provide alternative  sites to persons whose lands had been acquired, the Court could give  effect to the Scheme.  However, it could not be argued as a matter of  principle that in each and every case of acquisition the land owners  must be given an alternative site because such a principle, if adopted,  would result in the State being unable to acquire any land for public  purpose.   In the instant case the High Court dismissed the writ  petition in view of the fact that there was nothing on record to indicate  that any application was made to the competent authority for allotting  an alternative site within a reasonable period.  Reliance placed on the  decision of the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in  Daryao Singh and others  vs.  Union of India and others (Civil Writ

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Petition No. 481/1982) dated 2nd August, 2001 was rightly rejected.    That case related to a different award and the land owners concerned  in that case gave up the challenge to the acquisition proceedings in  view of the assurance given that an alternative plot under the Scheme  to be formulated shall be given to them.  Those facts do not exist in  the  instant case.  Moreover the Government had agreed to allot the  plots to the land owners and there was no question of recognizing any  right of the land owners to an allotment of alternative plots.  In view  of these findings the writ petition preferred by the appellant was  rejected.  

The appellants in the other appeals as well have contended that  an alternative site should be allotted to them in view of the lands  acquired.   We may at the threshold notice that the Notification under  Section 4 of the Act was issued in the cases of the other appellants on  January 23, 1965.  The lands were located in village Mahipalpur  which were required for the public purpose of planned development of  Delhi.

So far as the case of Punjab Potteries is concerned the Section 4  Notification was issued on December 3, 1971.  It related to lands  located in Nangal Dewat acquired for public purpose, namely the  development of Palam Airport.   

It was submitted by Mr. Andhyarujina, leaned senior counsel  appearing for the appellant Ravi Khullar in appeal arising out of SLP  No. 6093 of 2003 that in view of the Notification of December 23,  1986 the appellants are entitled to the benefit of rehabilitation in view  of the acquisition of their lands for the expansion/development of the  Palam airport.   According to him the lands which were subject matter  of Notification under Section 4 dated January 23, 1965 for the planned  development of Delhi were owned by the appellants over which they  had been carrying on business of ceramic industries for over 15 years.   It is his contention that a Notification under Section 4 of the Act was  issued on December 23, 1986 for acquisition of lands in village  Malikpur Kohi Rangpuri measuring 713 bigha and 0.2 biswa for the  rehabilitation of those displaced or affected due to the  expansion/development of Palam airport.  He, therefore, submitted  that regardless of the fact that their lands were acquired under a  different Notification than the lands of Ravi Khullar, in view of the  issuance of the Notification dated December 23, 1986, it made no  difference since all of them were displaced or affected due to the  expansion/development of the Palam airport.  The generality of the  aforesaid notification could not be limited by administrative decision  to only certain beneficiaries as a matter of policy.

Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand  contended that though the matter relating to rehabilitation package  was considered,  no decision was taken nor any scheme formulated for  the rehabilitation of industries.  Only those displaced from village  Nangal Dewat, pursuant to the Notification under Section 4 dated  December 3, 1971 for acquisition of land for development of the  Palam airport, were to be allotted lands in village Rangpuri and that  too for residential purposes.  Succinctly stated the State contended  that the acquisition of land in village Rangpuri was meant for  rehabilitation of persons from village Nangal Dewat and that too for  residential purpose, and that the other land owners, whose lands were  acquired for the planned development of Delhi could not claim such  benefit.   The State has relied upon three decisions taken in this  regard.

We shall, therefore, consider the material placed on record by  the parties on the question of rehabilitation.  

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The first document to be considered is a letter dated December  5, 1986 written by the Joint Director of Industries to the Deputy  Commissioner, Delhi, informing him that the position regarding  acquisition of land occupied by the industrial units in Mahipalpur- Nangal Dewat area and providing of alternate plots to the land owners  was to be reviewed by the Chief Secretary shortly.  An enquiry was  made as to whether awards had been announced in respect of affected  industrial units in that area.  The Deputy Commissioner was also  requested to intimate regarding the steps taken to provide alternative  lands to the affected units so that the whole position was brought to  the notice of the Chief Secretary.  This letter does not refer to any  decision taken by the Government to provide alternate site.  At best  the matter was to be reviewed by the Chief Secretary.

It appears that earlier a Joint Survey Report had been submitted  sometime in August, 1983 with a view to assess the needs of the  different ceramic industries located on the Mehrauli-Mahipalpur Road  which had to be shifted in view of the expansion of Palam airport.  On  the basis of the survey conducted by the Committee the industries  were classified in three groups.  The appellants fell in the first  category, namely \026 those who had a turnover of Rs. 15 lakhs and  above with an area of 5 acres in their possession on ownership basis.   The Committee recommended that they be allowed 25000 sq. yards  each.  The Committee also made its recommendations with regard to  other two categories of industries and assessed that the total  requirement of land would be about 20.86 acres if such allotments  were to be made.  It also noticed the fact that the aforesaid factories  were located over an area of 25.70 acres.   

No document has been produced to show that the  recommendations contained in the said survey report were at any time  accepted by the Government.  The appellants also relied upon the  letter written by the Secretary, Civil Aviation, to the Lieutenant  Governor of Delhi on September 15, 1986 wherein a view was firmly  expressed that in the over all interest of security and development of  Delhi Airport, the industrial structures in Mahipalpur and Nangal  Dewat area need to be acquired immediately.  The letter also stated  that the IAAI will be willing to accept the suggestion for provision of  land for land, provided alternative land is acquired by the Delhi  Administration/D.D.A. and no further liability is imposed on them for  payment of additional compensation for the acquired industrial  structures.  Though this letter records the willingness of the IAAI to  provide land for land subject to the condition that it shall incur no  additional liability for payment of compensation for the acquired  industrial structures, it does not refer to any firm decision taken in this  regard.

Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned senior counsel appearing for the  appellant in Punjab Potteries also placed reliance on a decision of the  High Court of Delhi dated August 2, 2001 in CWP No. 481 /1982 :  Daryao Singh (supra) and submitted that the aforesaid judgment  supports the case of the appellants that the lands acquired in village  Rangpuri were meant for rehabilitation of the persons displaced from  village Nangal Dewat, such as the appellants.  As noticed earlier, the  High Court has considered this decision and distinguished the same on  the ground that it related to another award.  Moreover a mere perusal  of the judgment discloses that the plea of the petitioners before the  High Court was that they were not interested in challenging the  acquisition but they were only interested in allotment of an alternative  piece of land for the purpose of their residence.  In reply counsel  appearing for the respondents stated that for allotment of land to the  persons whose lands had been acquired a scheme was being  formulated.  Such  persons whose names appear in the Award shall be  allotted land in terms of the Scheme within 6 months.  In this view of  the matter the writ petition was dismissed.  

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It will be seen that in the aforesaid writ petition the question of  rehabilitating an industrial unit did not come up for consideration.  So  far as the allotment of residential site is concerned, counsel appearing  for the respondents submitted before us that if the appellant was  eligible for allotment in terms of the scheme formulated for the  purpose, it could as well have asked for allotment of alternative site,  but the appellant was not interested in allotment of alternative plot for  residence.  Its demand was that a site should be given to it for  establishing an industry, which was not contemplated under the  scheme.  There is substance in the contention of the respondents that  so far as the aforesaid decision goes it only related to allotment of  alternative sites for residence of the displaced persons and not for  relocation of an industry.  The respondents on the other hand relied on  atleast 3 documents and contended that at no time any decision was  taken to allot alternative sites with a view to relocate the displaced  industrial units.   

The first document is the Minutes of the Meeting held by the  Lieutenant Governor of Delhi on June 16, 1982 to consider issues  connected with acquisition of lands in village Nangal Dewat etc. for  the International Airport Authority of India (IAAI).  At the meeting  were present the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and officers of the  concerned department; the Vice Chairman of the Delhi Development  Authority and its officers as also the representatives of the Municipal  Corporation of Delhi; Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation and  IAAI.  The relevant part of the Minutes reads as under :-           "After further discussions, Lt. Governor directed  that in the special circumstances obtaining in Delhi, there  was no alternative to IAAI undertaking t he responsibility  for the rehabilitation of the village abadi.  The cost of  rehabilitation would have to be borne by IAAI over  and  above the compensation to be paid by them for the land  and structures.  International Airport Authority of India  would also bear the cost of acquiring, if necessary, the  alternative area where the abadi would be shifted.  The  cost of rehabilitation would include provision of  developed and serviced plots to the residents and also  provision for community facilities such as schools, tube  wells, electricity, community hall and dispensaries etc.   However, the cost of construction of houses would be  borne by the villagers themselves.  Lt. Governor felt that  early selection of the alternative plots where the village  abadi would be shifted and announcement of the facilities  to be offered, would be helpful in inducing people to shift  to the new site.  This would be the responsibility of Delhi  Administration.

It was pointed out that there were other villages in  the neighbourhood where there were certain other  industrial structures.  The owners of these industrial  structures would not be provided any assistance beyond  what they may be entitled to by way of the usual  compensation under the Land Acquisition Act."

It would thus appear that after considering all aspects of the  matter, the IAAI was burdened with the cost of rehabilitation of the  displaced persons from the village abadi, meaning thereby to provide  them land for residence over which the villagers could construct  houses at their own cost. So far as industrial structures are concerned,  it was clearly decided that the owners of industrial structures would

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not be provided any assistance beyond what they may be entitled to as  compensation under the Act.   

The second document is the letter of April 16, 1986 written to  the Chief Secretary, Delhi Administration which refers to a meeting  held on April 4, 1986 wherein it was decided that a site may be  selected for shifting the residents of village Nangal Dewat.  The letter  discloses that the site had been selected in village Rangpuri and the  same may be acquired on priority basis so that the village abadi may  be shifted to this alternative site.  This letters also refers to the  rehabilitation of villagers displaced from village Nangal Dewat and  for the purpose of providing them an alternative plot for residence.  

The last document on which reliance has been placed by the  respondents is of August 21, 1991 which is the Minutes of the  Meeting held in the room of the Chief Secretary, Delhi Administration  on July 30, 1991 regarding acquisition of land for IAAI.  The Minutes  disclose that the representatives of the various departments put  forwards their points of view and though the Delhi Administration  suggested that the agency for which the land was being acquired  should pay not only for the land but also for meeting cost of  rehabilitation of the concerned industrial units, the Ministry of Civil  Aviation, Government of India, was not agreeable to pay any amount  over and above the cost  of land and super-structures.  Paragraph 3.1  of the Minutes is relevant which reads as follows :-

"Reverting to the specific question of acquiring  land under the above said five industrial units the Chief  Secretary remarked that linking obligation of re-location  with the acquisition of their land would not be advisable  as neither DDA nor Delhi Administration could  undertake such an obligation especially as units were  now required to shift out of UT of Delhi.  The Delhi  Administration could at best assist in the allotment of the  land by the concerned states.  The affected units should  therefore be discouraged from expecting any special  concession.  At the same time it would be necessary for  the IAAI to pay rehabilitation cost to these units and not  merely the cost of acquisition of land and super  structures.  He advised the Land Acquisition Collector to  keep this in view while determining award for  acquisition.  The LAC said that award in 4  of the cases  had already been announced.  The Chief Secretary  advised the LAC that in case it was not possible to revise  the award the LAC should determine the additional  compensation on above lines and intimate t he same to  IAAI.  He also advised the IAAI representatives that in  case they wanted this land urgently they should be  prepared to pay the said additional cost."

       The documents relied upon by the respondents do establish that  though at different stages the question of rehabilitation of the affected  persons as a result of the acquisition was considered, no firm decision  was ever taken to rehabilitate the industries affected thereby.  The  decision taken was only to provide alternative sites for residentce of  the oustees from village Nangal Dewat in village Rangpuri.  The  proposal to allot lands for setting up the displaced industrial units was  always turned down and it was decided that owners of such industries  would only be entitled to compensation under the Land Acquisition  Act.  Having regard to the material on record we are satisfied that no  scheme was ever framed for rehabilitation of industrial units.  The  scheme was framed only for the affected villagers of village Nangal  Dewat and that too for residential purpose alone.

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Learned counsel for the appellants strenuously urged before us  that the land in village Rangpuri is still available and even if the three  industries with which we are concerned in the instant batch of appeals  are allotted land to the extent of 25,000 sq.  yards each, as  recommended in the Joint Survey Report, their purpose will be served.    We are afraid we cannot accede to the request because that is a matter  of policy and it is for the government to take appropriate decision in  that regard.  In law we find no justification for the claim that even in  the absence of a scheme for rehabilitation of displaced industries  alternative sites should be allotted to them for relocating the industrial  units.  It is no doubt true that the acquisition of land in village  Rangpuri by issuance of Notification under Section 4 of the Act on  December 23, 1986 was for the public purpose, namely \026 for  rehabilitation of the persons displaced or affected due to the  expansion/development of the Palam airport.  Learned counsel  appearing for the State contended that this public purpose has been  achieved and the persons who were displaced from village Nangal  Dewat in view of the acquisition of their lands for the development of  Palam airport have been allotted plots in village Rangpuri for their  residence.  There is nothing in the Notification which obliges the State  to provide equal alternative site to the industries for their  rehabilitation.   We find substance in the stand of respondents.    CIVIL APPEAL ARISING OUT OF SLP ) NO. 6095 of 2003

       In this appeal apart from other questions which have been  raised in this batch of appeals, a question of limitation has been raised.   It is submitted on behalf of the appellant that the award made by the  Collector in the instant case was barred by limitation under Section  11A of the Act inasmuch as it was not made within a period of 2 years  from the date of the publication of the declaration after excluding the  period during which an order of stay granted by the High Court  operated.  The facts are not in dispute and since this plea became  available to the appellant only after the dismissal of the writ petition  by the High Court, we permitted the appellant to raise this plea after  giving an opportunity to the respondents to reply to the same.   Since  the facts are not in dispute, we proceed to decide the question of  limitation in this appeal.

       It is not in dispute that the Notification under Section 4 of the  Act was issued on January 23, 1965.  A declaration under Section 6 of  the Act was published on December 26, 1968.  The appellant filed the  writ petition before the High Court on September 12, 1986 in which  an order for maintenance of status quo was made on September 18,  1986.  It is the case of the respondents that in view of the status quo  order the award could not be pronounced.  While the awards were  pronounced in other cases on September 19, 1986, it was not  pronounced in the case of the appellant in view of the status quo  order.  The High Court by the impugned judgment dismissed the writ  petition filed by the petitioner on February 13, 2003 whereafter the  award was pronounced on March 1, 2003.

       We may notice that the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act,  1984 came into force w.e.f. September 24, 1984.   

       Keeping in view these dates it will be seen that award ought to  have been made within a period of 2 years from the date of the  publication of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act.  However, in  a case where the said declaration was published before the  commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 the  award must be made within a period of two years from such  commencement.  This is the mandate of Section 11A of the Act.  In  the instant case the declaration under Section 6 of the Act was  published on December 26, 1968 i.e. before the commencement of the  Amendment Act of 1984.  Thus the proviso to sub-section (1) of

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Section 11A applied and the award was required to be made within a  period of two years from such commencement. So calculated the  award ought to have been made on or before the 23rd September, 1986  when the period of 2 years from the commencement of the  Amendment Act, 1984 expired.  It is not disputed that an order of  status quo was made on 18th September, 1986 which prevented the  Land Acquisition Officer from pronouncing the award.  The aforesaid  order of status quo operated till February 13, 2003 which period, as  rightly submitted by the learned Additional Solicitor General, had to  be excluded in calculating the period of 2 years.  Thus after excluding  the aforesaid period the award should have been pronounced on or  before February 18, 2003.  However, the award was pronounced on  March 1, 2003.  Ex facie, therefore, the award having not been made  within the period prescribed by Section 11A of the Act, the entire  proceeding for acquisition of the land lapsed on February 18, 2003,  the last date for pronouncement of the award.   

       The learned Additional Solicitor General, however, submitted  that the judgment in the writ petition was pronounced on February 13,  2003 and an application was made for certified copy of the same on  February 14, 2003.  The certified copy was ready on February 27,  2003.  It is his contention that the period between February 14, 2003  and February 27, 2003 must be excluded and if that period is  excluded, time to make the award was available upto March 4, 2003  whereas the award was pronounced on March 1, 2003.  He submitted  that the period taken by a public authority to obtain the authentic copy  of the order, which is evidence of the contents thereof, must in all  cases be excluded and the period taken to obtain a certified copy  cannot cause any prejudice in the matter of calculation of the period of  limitation.  Since the Land Acquisition Officer, who is a public  functionary, had to look into the contents of the order passed by the  court before taking any action including the pronouncement of the  award, the said period ought to have been excluded.  In effect the  learned Additional Solicitor General contended that the rule  incorporated in Section 12 of the Limitation Act must apply in  computing the period of limitation under Section 11A of the Act.  He  also relied on judgments of this Court reported in N. Narasimbhaiah  and others   vs.  State of Karnataka and others : (1996) 3 SCC 88 ;   General Manger, Department of Communications   vs.  Jacob : (2003)  9 SCC 662 ; and Shakuntala Devi Jain  vs.  Kuntal Kumari and others  : AIR 1969 SC 575.  He submitted that since the authority had taken  immediate steps in applying for certified copy and since the  explanation to Section 11A prescribed a principle of limitation, it is  necessary that analogous principles contained in the Limitation Act  must necessarily be applied.  Applying the principle underlined under  sub-section (1) of Section 11 A of the Act read with Sections 76 and  77 of the Indian Evidence Act and also based on the principle actus  curaie neminem gravabit, the period during which the certified copy  was not obtained has to be excluded.  

Shri K.K. Venugopal, learned senior counsel appearing on  behalf of the intervener also reiterated the same submission and  contended that the Land Acquisition Officer could not have proceeded  to make the award unless he had seen the authenticated copy of the  order which had the effect of vacating the order of status quo passed  as an interim measure.  Learned counsel for the appellants on the other hand contended  that Section 11A of the Act does not provide for extension of time to  make an award or condonation of delay in making the award.  Though  it provides for exclusion of the period during which any action or  proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the declaration is stayed by an  order of the court, it does not exclude the time taken for obtaining a  certified copy of the judgment or order vacating or having the effect  of vacating the order of stay.  He further submitted that the Land  Acquisition Collector was a party in the writ petition and had,

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therefore, knowledge of the fact that the writ petition had been  dismissed which resulted in vacation of the interim order of status  quo.  In the absence of any provision in the Land Acquisition Act for  exclusion of time taken to obtain a certified copy of the judgment of  the High Court, the Land Acquisition Collector, ought to have  proceeded to make the award having come to know that the writ  petition filed by the appellant had been rejected by the High Court.   

In the matter of computing the period of limitation three  situations may be visualized, namely \026 (a) where the Limitation Act  applies by its own force ; (b) where the provisions of the Limitation  Act with or without modifications are made applicable to a special  statute ; and (c) where the special statue itself prescribes the period of  limitation and provides for extension of time and or condonation of  delay.  The instant case is not one which is governed by the provisions  of the Limitation Act. The Land Acquisition Collector in making an  award does not act as a Court within the meaning of the Limitation  Act.  It is also clear from the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act  that the provisions of the Limitation Act have not been made  applicable to proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act in the  matter of making an award under Section 11A of the Act.  However,  Section 11A of the Act does provide a period of limitation within  which the Collector shall make his award.  The explanation thereto  also provides for exclusion of the period during which any action  or  proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the declaration is stayed by an  order of a court.  Such being the provision, there is no scope for  importing into Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act the  provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act.  The application of  Section 12 of the Limitation Act is also confined to matters  enumerated therein.  The time taken for obtaining a certified copy of  the judgment is excluded because a certified copy is required to be  filed while preferring an appeal/revision/review etc. challenging the  impugned order.  Thus a court is not permitted to read into Section  11A of the Act a provision for exclusion of time taken to obtain a  certified copy of the judgment and order.  The court has, therefore, no  option but to compute the period of limitation for making an award in  accordance with the provisions of Section 11A of the Act after  excluding such period as can be excluded under the explanation to  Section 11A of the Act.     Our conclusion finds support from the scheme of the Land  Acquisition Act itself.  Section 11A of the Act was inserted by Act 68  of 1984 with effect from 24.09.1984.  Similarly, Section 28A was also  inserted by the Amendment Act of 1984 with effect from the same  date.   In Section 28A the Act provides for a period of limitation  within which an application should be made to the Collector for        re-determination of the  amount  of  compensation  on  the basis of the  award of the Court.  The proviso to sub-section 1 of Section 28A  reads as follows:- "Provided that in computing the period of three months  within which an application to the Collector shall be  made under this sub-section, the day on which the  award was pronounced and the time requisite for  obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded."

It will thus be seen that the legislature wherever it considered  necessary incorporated by express words the rule incorporated in  Section 12 of the Limitation Act.  It has done so expressly in        Section 28A of the Act while it has consciously not incorporated this  rule in Section 11A even while providing for exclusion of time under  the explanation.   The intendment of the legislature is therefore  unambiguous and does not permit the Court to read words into  Section 11A of the Act so as to enable it to read Section 12 of the  Limitation Act into Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act.

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The judgments cited at the Bar are also of no help to the  respondents.  In Shakuntala Devi Jain (supra) this Court held that an  appeal is incompetent unless the memorandum of appeal is  accompanied by a certified copy of the decision.  It condoned the  delay in that case giving  the  benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation  Act in the facts and circumstances of the case.  The applicability of  the Limitation Act was not in dispute in that case.

In N. Narasimhaiah and others (supra) the order under Section  17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act dispensing with the enquiry under  Section 5-A was quashed by the court with liberty to the State to  proceed further in accordance with law.   In such circumstances it was  held that running of the limitation should be counted from the date of  the order of the court received by he Land Acquisition Officer.  The  limitation prescribed in clause (ii) of the first proviso to sub-section  (1) of Section 6 would apply to publication of declaration under  Section 6(1) afresh.  If it was published within one year from the date  of the receipt of the order of the court by Land Acquisition Officer,  the declaration published under Section 6(1) would be valid.  The  principle laid down therein does not help the respondents because by  an order of the court the limitation prescribed for publication of a  declaration under Section 6(1) stood extended.  That is how this Court  construed the order of the High Court giving liberty to the State to  proceed further in accordance with law.  In the instant case no such  question arises.  The situation that arises in the instant case is fully  governed by the provisions of Section 11A of the Act which does not  give any discretion to the court to exclude any period in computing  limitation other than that provided in the explanation to Section 11A  of the Act.  In General Manager, Department of Telecommunications  (supra) a question arose as to whether the High Court by directing the  passing of the award by certain date, irrespective of the provisions  contained in the Act, could prevent the Collector from passing an  award at any time beyond the specified date.  In that case the facts  were that the High Court had directed the passing of the award by  December 3, 1992 irrespective of the provisions contained in the Land  Acquisition Act.  This was done with a view to avoid further delay  and ensure expeditious conclusion of the proceedings.  This Court  found that there was nothing to indicate in the order of the High Court  stipulating or extending the time for passing the award, that beyond  the time so permitted, it cannot be done at all and the authorities are  disabled once and for all even to proceed in the matter in accordance  with law, if it is so permissible for the authorities under the law  governing the matter in issue.  This Court held that the court cannot be  imputed with such an intention to stifle the authorities from exercising  powers vested with them under statute, or to have rendered an  otherwise enforceable statutory provision, a mere dead letter.  This  Court considered the decision in N. Narasimhaiah and others (supra)  and observed :-

"This decision is of no assistance whatsoever to  the respondents in the present case. Notwithstanding the  statutory period fixed, further time came to be granted  due to intervention of Court proceedings in which a  direction came to be issued to proceed in the matter  afresh, as directed by the Court, apparently applying the  well-settled legal maxim - Actus curiae neminem  gravabit : an act of the Court shall prejudice no man. In  substance what was done therein was to necessitate  afresh calculation of the statutory period from the date of  receipt of the copy of the order of the Court. Granting of  further time than the one stipulated in law in a given case  as a sequel to the decision to carry out the dictates of the  Court afresh is not the same as curtailing the statutory

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period of time to stultify an action otherwise permissible  or allowed in law. Consequently, no inspiration can be  drawn by the respondents in this case on the analogy of  the said decision."

In our view the principle laid down in this judgment is of no  help to the respondents and if at all it supports the contention of the  appellant that the period of limitation prescribed cannot be curtailed  by order of the Court.  As a necessary corollary it cannot be extended  contrary to the statutory provisions.  We have, therefore, no doubt in  holding that so far as the acquisition of the lands belonging to Palam  Potteries is concerned, the proceedings lapsed for failure of the  Collector to make an award within the prescribed period of limitation  under Section 11A of the Act.   

       Before parting with this matter we may notice the fact that in  the award made by the Collector three khasra numbers belonging to  the appellant were not included.  It was, therefore, submitted before us  that in any view of the matter the acquisition proceedings in relation  to those 3 khasra numbers must lapse.  This was indeed not contested  by the respondents.  However, in view of the fact that we have  reached the conclusion that the acquisition proceeding as against the  lands of the appellant lapsed for failure to make an award within the  period prescribed by Section 11A of the Act, this aspect of the matter  lose its significance.   

       In the result Civil Appeals arising out of SLP ) Nos.  6093/2003;  6384/2003 and 8574 of 2003 are dismissed.  Civil Appeal  arising out of SLP ) No. 6095 of 2003 is allowed and it is declared  that the award made by the Collector on March 1, 2003 was barred by  limitation prescribed by Section 11A of the Act and as such the  acquisition proceeding in relation thereto lapsed on February 18,  2003, which was the last date for making the award.  Parties shall bear  their own costs.