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PETITIONER: RAVAL & CO.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: K. C. RAMACHANDRAN & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT11/12/1973

BENCH: ALAGIRISWAMI, A. BENCH: ALAGIRISWAMI, A. RAY, A.N. (CJ) KHANNA, HANS RAJ MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN BHAGWATI, P.N.

CITATION:  1974 AIR  818            1974 SCR  (2) 629  1974 SCC  (1) 424  CITATOR INFO :  F          1974 SC2331  (4)  RF         1975 SC1750  (8)  APR        1976 SC 869  (5)  RF         1978 SC1518  (9,11)  E          1979 SC1745  (7,15,17)  D          1986 SC1444  (4)  R          1987 SC2117  (21)  D          1988 SC 458  (8)  D          1989 SC1110  (15)  E&D        1991 SC 884  (14)

ACT: Tamil  Nadu  Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act  (18  of 1960).   S.  4(1), 7-Definition of "landlord"  and  "tenant" under Applicability to contractual tenancies and  statutory tenancies-Fixation of fair rent-Landlord whether entitled to apply  for  fixation  of fair  rent  during  subsistence  of contractual tenancy-Interpretation of statutes. Constitution  of  India, Art.  141 And  precedents-General observations in Supreme Court decision-Binding nature of Evidence  Act,  1972,  Sec. 92-Variation  in  permission  of registered  lease  deed Oral  evidence  regarding  variation barred.

HEADNOTE: On  the tenants’ appeal, the Full Bench of the  Madras  High Court  held  that  the Act  controls  both  contractual  and statutory  tenancies  and  it  enables  both  landlords  and tenants  to  seek  the benefit of  fixation  of  fair  rent. Thereafter, the matter came up before a Single Judge of  the High  Court who applying the provisions of the’ Act  to  the facts  of the-case, held that the Act did not apply  to  the premises  in  question.  The Division  Bench  reversed  this decision, In the appeal by special leave the tenants  mainly contended  that  a landlord has no right to  apply  for  the fixation  of  a  fair  rent at  a  figure  higher  than  the contractual  rent, where there was a subsisting contract  of tenancy. Dismissing the appeal,

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HELD : (per majority and Bhagwati, JJ.  Contra) The  present  Act  which  replaces the  1949  Act  adopts  a completely new scheme    of  its own and provides for  every contingency,  i.e.  in  ’the relationship  of  landlord  and tenant.   The  provisions of the Act show  that  the  Madras Legislature  deliberately proceeded on, the basis that  fair rent  was  to  be fixed which was to be  fair  both  to  the landlords  as  ’well as to the tenants, and  that  only  the poorer class of tenants needed protection.  ’the  assumption that  the Act like ill rent acts, is intended only for  the to  on of tenants is not warranted by the provisions of  the Act.       It is clear therefore, that the fair  rent  under the  present  Act is payable during the contract  period  as well as after the expiry of the contract period. [636C-F] The  analysis. of the Act shows that it has a scheme of  its own and it is intended to provide a complete code in respect of. both contractual tanancees. the definitions of the  term "landlord"  and  "tenant"  show  that  the  Act  applies  to contractual  tenancies,as  well as to.  cases  of  statutory tenants  and  their  landlords.  On  some  supposed  general principles governing all Rent Acts it cannot be argued  that such  fixation  can only be for the benefit of  the  tenants when  the  Act  clearly lays down that  both  landlords  and tenants  can  apply  for fixation of fair.  rent.   A  close reading of the Act shows that the fair rent is fixed for the building and it is payable by whoever is the-tenant  whether a contractual tenant or statutory tenant.  What is fixed  is not the fair rent payable by the tenant or to, the  landlord who applies for fixation of fair rent but fair rent for the- building   somethings  like  an  incident  of  the   tenure, regarding; the building. [637F] 630 The general observations to the contrary in Bhaiya  Punjalal Bhagwanddin v. Dave Bhagwat Prabhuprasad [1963] 3 S.C.R. 312 and  Manujendra v. Purendu Prasad [1967] 1 S.C.R. 475,  held obiter. Sri  Brij Raj Krishna v. S. K. Shaw and Bros. [1951]  S.C.R. 145,  Hem  Chand V. Sham Devi, I.L.R. [1955]  Punj,  36,  R. Krishnamurthy   v.  Parthasarathy  A.I.R.  1949  Mad.   780, distinguished. Abbashails  case  [1964]  5  S.C.R.  157  and  Mangilal   v. Sugarchand Rathi [1964] 5 S.C.R. 239, referred to. Per Mathew and Bhagwati, JJ : Two basic considerations  must guide  our approach to the question whether a landlord  can, during the subsistence of the contractual tenancy, apply for fixation  of fair rent under section 4(1) of the  Act.   The first  is  that  the rent which is the  result  of  contract between  the parties must continue to bind them so  long  as the  contract  subsists,  unless there is  anything  in  the statute  which expressly or by necessary  implication  over- rides  the  contract.  It is to counter act the  in  justice resulting from in equality in bargaining power and to  bring about social or distributive justice that social legislation interferes  with sanity of contract.  Ordinarily, we do  not find  and  in  deed  it  would  be  a  strange  and   rather incomprehensible  phenomenon,that legislation intervenes  to disturb  the  sanctity  of contract for  the  benefit  of  a stronger party who does not need the protective bind of  the legislature.  Secondly the Act has been enacted inter  alia, with the object of controlling rents of residential and non- residential buildings and preventing unreasonable a  diction of  tenants.  Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960 is in its  essential character as also in its object and purpose similar to  what may  conveniently be described rent control legislation,  in other States, such as Maharashtra, Gujarat, West Bengal  and

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Madhya Pradesh.  The general purpose and intendment of  rent control legislation and its positive thrust and emphasis  on the protection of the tenant cannot be lost sight of when we are construing a similar legislation like the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960 [642C] Bhaiya   Punjalal   Bhagwanddin  v.  Dave   Bhagwat   prasad Prabhuprasad  [1963] 3 S.C.R. 312, Mangi Lal  v.  sugarchand Rathi [1964] 5  S.C.R.  and Manujendra v.    Pwendu   prasad [1967] 1 S.C.R. 475 referred to. Having  regard  to the basic character of the statute  as  a rent  control legislation and the scheme of  its  provisions and  reading sec. 4(1) in its contextual setting and in  the light of the other provisions of the statute, the conclusion is inescapable that the ward "landlord" in sec. 4(1) is used in  a  limited  sense and it does  not  include  contractual landlord.  The landlord does not have the right to apply for fixation  of  fair  rent  during  the  subsistence  of   the contractual  tenancy.   It  is only  when  the  contract  of tenancy  is lawfully determined that he becomes entitled  to apply for fixation of fair rent, for it is only then that he can  recover fair rent higher than the agreed rent from  the statutory tenant, there being no contract of tenancy to bind him down to the agreed rent. [646G] (2)  Per   majority  :  General  observations   in   earlier decisions  of this Court should be confined to the facts  of those  case.   Any  general  observation  cannot  apply   in interpreting the provisions of an Act unless this Court  has applied  its  mind to and analysed the  provisions  of  that particular  Act.   Therefore, the observations in  (1967)  1 S.C.R.  475, that rent acts are not ordinarily  intended  to interfere  with  contractual  leases and are  Acts  for  the protection  of tenants and are consequently restrictive  and not  enabling  conferring no now right but  restricting  the existing  rights  either  under the contract  or  under  the general  law, should not be held to apply to all  rent  Acts irrespective   of  the  scheme  of  those  acts  and   their provisions.   The present Act did not proceed on  the  basis that the legislation regarding rent control was only for the benefit  of  the tenants.  It wanted the legislation  to  be fair both to the landlord and the tenant. [834B] (per  Mathew  and  Bhagwati,JJ).  The meaning  of  the  term landlord’    must   not   be   confined   to   that    given in  the definition or to its ordinary  etymological  meaning but  must  be understood in the context of  the  setting  in which it occurs, and the scheme and object of the Act.   The Provisions  of the Act, particularly of sec. 7, are  clearly restrictive   in  character  and  not  enabling   provisions empowering the landlord to recover the fairrent where it  is higher than the agreed rent.  This is the only rational 631 construction which can be placed on the relevant  provisions of  the  Act  relating  to  control  of  rent  and  such   a construction  is not only compelled by grammar and  language but  also accords with the broad general  considerations  in interpreting the rent control legislation.[646B] Cog  v.Hakes(1890) A.C. 15, and Whethered v.  Calcutta(842)5 Scctt.N.R. 409,referred to. (3)Any  variation of rent reserved by registered lease  deed must   be  made  by  another  registered  instrument.    The agreement  between the landlord and the tenant by which  the rent   was  increased  being  in  variation  of  a   written contract,evidence of that was barred under section 92 of the Evidence Act.

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JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 50 of  1968 and 1201 of 1970. From  the  judgment and Order dated the 20th  January  1966, and’  26th  November 1968 of the Madras High Court  in  Writ Appeals Nos. 1124 of 1963 and 153 of 1966. K.S. Ramamurthy and S. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant (in both the appeals). S.V.  Gupte  and A.S. Nambiar, for respondent Nos.  1-3  (in both-., the appeals). S.   Govindaswaminathan,  A.V..Rangam,  N.S.  Sivam  and  A. Subshashini, for respondent No. 5 (in both the appeals). B.R. Agrawala, for intervener (in C.A. 50/68). The Judgment of A.N. Ray, C.J., H.R. Khanna and A. Alagiri-- swami, JJ. was delivered by Alagiriswami, J. The  dissenting Opinion of’ K.K. Mathew and P.N. Bhagwati JJ. was  delivered by Bhagwati, J. ALAGIRISWAMI,  J.  The  appellants  are  the  tenants  of  a property bearing door Nos. 16 and 17 on the Poonamallee High Road  in  the city of Madras.  They became tenants  of  this building in May 1929, when the property was with one of  the predecessors in title of the present landlords, who are  the respondents in these appeals.  Though, the appellants became tenants in 1929 a registered lease deed came into  existence only in 1935 under which the lease was to run upto 1-5-1969. The  lessee was entitled to renewal on the same  terms,  and conditions for another period of fifteen years.  The monthly rent  agreed upon was Rs. 225/- and a sum of Rs.  225/-  was payable  as an annual contribution towards repairs  and  Rs. 220/- towards public charges and taxes.  In 1949 the parties mutually  agreed that the tenants were to pay a 25 per  cent increase in rent and also certain other amounts, The present landlords  purchased  the property in 1962  and  soon  after filed  an  application under Section 4 of  the  Madras  (now Tamil Nadu) Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 for fixation  of  fair rent.  Thereupon the tenants  filed  writ Petition No. 1124 of 1963 seeking, to restrain the landlords from  proceeding  with that petition.   The  learned  Single Judge  who heard the petition felt that in view of  a  long, series  of decisions of Madras High Court under the  various Rent Control Acts in force in Madras that they applied  also to contractual 632 tenancies  in  the  matter of payment of  rent  as  well  as eviction,  the matter should be considered by a Full  Bench in  view  of the decisions of this Court  in  Rent  Control cases from certain other States. The Full Bench after an elaborate consideration came to  the conclusion that the Act controls both contractual as well as statutory tenancies, that it is a complete Code, and enables both  landlords and tenants to seek the benefit of  fixation of  fair rent, whether a contractual tenancy prevails or  it has  been determined.  Thereafter the matter again  came  up before  the  same  learned Single Judge  who,  applying  the provisions of the Act to the facts of the case held that the Act did not apply to the premises in question.  On appeal by the  landlords a Division Bench of the High Court held  that the  premises were not exempted from the provisions  of  the Act  and the Rent Controller has therefore  jurisdiction  to entertain  and  dispose  of on merits  the  application  for fixation  of  fair rent filed by the landlords.   These  two appeals  ;are  against  the  judgments  of  the  Full  Bench (reported  in  1966  2  MLJ  68)  and  the  Division   Bench respectively.

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Before we go further into a discussion of the questions that arise  :it  is  necessary  to  look  into  certain  relevant provisions of the Act. Clause (6) of section 2 of the Act defines landlord thus :               "Landlord"   includes   the  person   who   is               receiving  or is entitled to receive the  rent               of a building, whether on his own account  .or               on  behalf of another or on behalf of  himself               and others or as an agent, trustee,  executor,               administrator, receiver or’ .,guardian or  who               would  so receive the rent or be  entitled  to               receive the rent, if the building were let  to               a tenant;"               Clause 8, in so far as it is relevant, defines               tenant as follows               "tenant" means any person by whom or on  whose               account rent is payable for a  building  and               includes the surviving spouse, or any son,  or               daughter,  or  the legal representative  of  a               deceased  tenant who had been living with  the               tenant  in  the building as a  member  of  the               tenant’s family up to the death of the  tenant               and  a person continuing in  possession  after               the   termination  of  the  tenancy   in   his               favour...... Section 4 provides for an application for fixation of a fair rent by the tenant as well as the landlord.  The fair  rent for  any  residential building is to be six per  cent  gross return per annum on the total cost of the building if it  is residential  and nine percent if it is nonresidential.   The total  cost  has  to be calculated by  taking  the  cost  of const ruction  at  prescribed  rates  less  depreciation  at prescribed rates as well as the market value of the site  on which the building stands.  It is to include allowances  for such  considerations as locality, features of  architectural interest,  accessibility to market, dispensary or  hospital, nearness  to the railway station or educational  institution and such ,other amenities as may be prescribed. 633 Section 5 provides that when the fair rent of a building has been  fixed no further increase shall be permissible  except in cases where some addition, improvement or alteration  has been  carried  out  at the landlord’s  expense  and  at  the tenant’s  request.   Similarly,. if there is a  decrease  or diminution in the accommodation or amenities provided,,  the tenant may claim a reduction in the fair rent. Section  6 provides for payment of additional sums in  cases where the taxes and cesses payable to local authorities  are increased. Section 7 prohibits the landlord from claiming or  receiving or stipulating for the payment of any premium or anything in excess  of’ fair rent.  It also provides that where  a  fair rent  has  not  been  fixed the  landlord  shall  not  claim anything in excess of the agreed rent. Section 10 deals with the eviction of tenants and lays  down the  conditions under which an eviction could be asked  for. One of those conditions mentioned in sub-section (3) is when the  Landlord requires. a residential building for  his  own occupation or a non-residential building for the purpose  of his  business.  Clause (d) of sub-section (3) provides  that where  the  tenancy is for a specified  period  agreed  upon between the landlord and the tenant, the landlord shall  not be  entitled  to  apply under that  sub-section  before  the expiry of such period. Sections  12  and 14 provide for recovery of  possession  by

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landlord for repairs or for reconstruction. Section  17 provides that the landlord is not  to  interfere with the amenities enjoyed by the tenant. Section  30 exempts from the provisions of the Act  (1)  any building  the construction of which was completed after  the commencement of the Act, and (2) any residential building in respect  of  which  the monthly  rent  payable  exceeds  two hundred and, fifty rupees.  We shall refer to other  details as and when they become relevant. The above short analysis of the Act would show that the  Act provides  for every contingency that is likely to  arise  in the relationship ,of landlord and tenant. On  behalf  of the appellants reliance is  placed  upon  two decisions of this Court, Bhaiya Punjalal Bhagwanddin v. Dave Bhagwat prasad Prabhuprasad (1963 3 SCR 312) and  Manujendra v. Purendu Prasad (1967 1 SCR 475).  They are cases  dealing with  eviction.   In those two cases it  was  held,  broadly speaking,  that  the  provisions of  the  Acts  there  under consideration  were in addition to and not in derogation  of the  provisions of the Transfer of Property Act.  There  are certain  general  observations in those two  decisions  upon which  reliance  was placed to contend that  they  apply  to cases of fixation of rent also.  The argument was that as it was  held in those cases that the Acts did not  provide  the landlord  with  additional rights which he did  not  possess under  his contract of tenancy, similarly where there was  a subsisting 634 contract of tenancy it is not open . to the landlord to take advantage of the provisions of the Act to apply for fixation of  a fair rent at a figure higher than the  contract  rent. We  are  not called upon in this case  to  consider  whether those  two cases were correctly decided.  But we must  point out that the general observations therein should be confined to  the  facts  of those  cases.   Any  general  observation ,cannot  apply  in  interpreting the provisions  of  an  Act unless  this Court has applied its mind to and analysed  the provisions  of that particular Act.  We may also  point  out that  in both those cases the contract of ’tenancy  was  not subsisting.  In a sense, therefore, the observations therein were not really necessary for deciding those cases.  We  may also  point  out that in Rai Brii Raj Krishna v.  S.K.  Shaw Bros.  (1951  SCR  145) dealing  with  the  Bihar  Buildings (Lease,   Rent   and  Eviction)  Control   Act,   1947   and interpreting section 11 of that Act this Court observed  as follows :               ’.’Section   11   begins   with   the    words               ’Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  any               agreement  or law to the,contrary’, and  hence               any attempt to import the provisions  relating               to  the  law of transfer of property  for  the               interpretation of the section would seem to be               out of place.  Section II is a  self-contained               section,  and it is wholly unnecessary  to  go               outside  the  Act for  determining  whether  a               tenant  is  liable to be evicted or  not,  and               under  what conditions he can be evicted.   It               clearly  provides that a tenant is not  liable               to  be evicted except on  certain  conditions,               and  one of the conditions laid down  for  the               eviction  of a month to month tenant  is  non-               payment of rent." ’Similarly in Shri Hem Chand v. Shrimati Sham Devi (ILR 1955 Punj  36) which dealt with the Delhi and Ajmer Merwara  Rent Control Act, section 13(i) of which provided that no  decree

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or  order  for the recovery of possession  of  any  premises shall  be  passed  by any court in favour  of  the  landlord against  a tenant, notwithstanding anything to the  contrary contained  in  any other law or any contract, it  was  h.-Id that the Act provided the procedure for obtaining the relief of  ejectment and that being so the provisions of s. 106  of the  Transfer or Property Act had no relevance.  Both  these cases  were referred to in the decision in  Bhaiya  Punjalal Bhagwanddin v. Dave Bhagwatprasad Prabhuprasad.   Therefore, the following observations in Manujendra ,v.  Purendu Prosad that               "Rent  Acts  are not  ordinarily  intended  to               interfere with contractual leases and are Acts               for   the  protection  of  tenants   and   are               consequently  restrictive  and  not  enabling,               conferring   no  new  rights  of  action   but               restricting  the existing rights either  under               the contract or under the general law." should not be held to apply to all Rent Acts irrespective of the scheme of those Acts and their provisions.  The decision of   the   Madras  High  ’Court  in  R.   Krishnamurthy   v. Parthasarathy  (AIR 1949 Mad. 780-1 949 1 MLJ 412) where  it was  held that section 7 of the Madras Buildings (Lease  and Rent Control) Act of 1946 had its own scheme 635 of  procedure  and  therefore there was no  question  of  an attempt to reconcile that Act with the Transfer of  Property Act  and that an application for eviction could be  made  to the Rent Controller even before the contractual tenancy  was terminated  by  a  notice  to quit,  should  not  have  been summarily  dismissed on the grounds that it was contrary  to the decisions of this Court in Abbasbhai’s Case (1964 5  SCR 157) and Mangilal’s Case (1964 5 SCR 239) and therefore  was not a correct law, without examining the provisions of  that Act. Be that as it may, we are now concerned with the question of fixation of a fair rent.  The legislation regarding  control of  rents  started during the Second World War.   In  Madras first  two  orders  under the Defence of  India  Rules  were issued as the Madras House Rent Control Orders, 1941 and the Madras Godown Rent Control Order, 1942.  In1945 these orders were reissued with slight changes, as the    Madras    House Rent Control Order, 1945 and the Madras Non-Residential Buildings Rent Control Order, 1945.  These were replaced  by the  Madras  Buildings (Lease and Rent Control)  Act,  1946. Under that Act for the first time both the tenant as well as the landlord were given the right to apply for fixation of a fair  rent.   This  Act was later  replaced  by  the  Madras Buildings  (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949,  which  again had  a similar provision.  But the important thing  to  note about  the fixation of a fair rent under both these Acts  is that  the fair rent was related to the rents  prevailing  in April  1940 and only a fixed percentage of increase  from  8 11/3  to  50 per cent depending upon the  rent  payable  was allowed. The 1960 Act which replaced the 1949 Act adopted  a completely  new  scheme  of its own.  It  provided  for  the fixation  of  a  fair  rent on the  basis  of  the  cost  of construction  and  the cost of land and after  allowing  for depreciation provided for a return of 6 per cent in the case of residential buildings and 9 per cent in the case of  non- residential  buildings.   It also provided for  increase  in rent  for  such  factors as locality,  nearness  to  railway station, market, hospital, school etc.  Another  significant fact  is that all new buildings constructed after 1960  were exempt  from the scope of the Act.  Still another  departure

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was  that  the  Act  applies, in  the  case  of  residential buildings, only if the monthly rent does not exceed Rs. 250. The  Act also provides for fixation of fair rent  under  the new provisions even though fair rent for the building  might have been fixed under the earlier repealed enactments.   All these show that the Madras Legislature had applied its  mind to the problem of housing and control of rents and  provided a  scheme of its own.  It did not proceed on the basis  that the  legislation  regarding rent control was  only  for  the benefit of the tenants.  It wanted it to be fair both to the landlord as well as the tenant.  Apparently it realised that the  pegging of the rents at the 1940 rates had  discouraged building construction activity which ultimately is likely to affect  every body and therefore in order to  encourage  new constructions  exempted them altogether from the  provisions of  the  Act.   It did not proceed on  the  basis  that  all tenants belonged to the weaker section of the community  and needed protection and that all landlords 636 belonged  to  the  better  off  classes.   It  confined  the protection  of  the Act to the weaker section  paying  rents below  Rs.  250.  It is. clear, therefore, that  the  Madras Legislature  deliberately proceeded on the basis  that  fair rent  was  to  be fixed which was to be  fair  both  to  the landlords as well as to the tenants and that only the poorer classes of tenants needed protection.  The facile assumption on  the basis of which an argument was advanced before  this Court that all Rent Acts are intended for the protection of tenants  and, therefore, this Act also should be held to  be intended only for the protection of tenants breaks     down when the provisions of the Act are examined in detail.   The provision  that  both the           tenant as  well  as  the landlord can apply for fixation of a fair rent would  become meaningless  if fixation of fair rent can only be  downwards from the contracted rent and the contract rent was not to be increased.   Of  course, it has happened over the  last  few years  that rents have increased enormously and that is  why it  is  argued on behalf of the tenants  that  the  contract rents  should  not be changed.  If we  could  contemplate  a situation  where  rents  and prices  are  coming  down  this argument  will break down.  It is a realisation of the  fact that  prices and rents have enormously increased and  there- fore if the rents are pegged at 1940 rates there would be no new  construction and the community as a whole would  suffer that led the Madras Legislature to exempt new buildings from the  scope of the Act, it realised apparently how  dangerous was  the feeling that only "fools build houses for wise  men to live in".  At the time the 1960 Act was passed the Madras Legislature  had  before  it the  precedent  of  the  Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Act, 1956.   That Act  provides for fixation of fair rent.  It  also  provides that the contract rent, if lower, will be payable during the contract  period.  Even if the contract rent is higher  only the fair rent will be payable.  After the contract period is over only the fair rent is payable.  The Madras  Legislature having  this  Act  in mind still made  only  the  fair  rent payable and not the contract rent if it happens to be lower. It is clear, therefore, that the fair rent under the present Act  is payable during the contract period as well as  after the expiry of the contract period. It  was argued that the basis of the decisions in  Rai  Brij Raj  Krishan’s Case and Shri Hem Chand’s Case was  the  non- obstante  clause in those two Acts.  But it is well  settled that  the intention that a legislation should,  take  effect notwithstanding  any earlier legislation on the subject  can

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be  both explicit and implicit and that is the  Position  in the present case.  We do not also feel called upon to  refer to  the  decisions in Glossop v. Ashley (1921 2 KB  450),  a Newell v. Crayford Cottage Society (1922 1 KB 656), and Kerr v.  Bryde  (1923  Act 16), nor  to  the  various  statements regarding the law in Megarry’s work on the Rent Acts  relied upon  by Sri K. S. Ramamurthy on behalf of  the  appellants. They  are  based on the relevant provisions  of  the  Act,in force  in England particularly section 3(1) of the  Increase of Rent & Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920  which- reads. 637               "Nothing  in  this  Act  shall  be  taken   to               authorise  any  increase  of  rent  except  in               respect of a period during which but for  this               Act  the landlord would be entitled to  obtain               possession." The provisions of the Act under considerations show that the are to take effect notwithstanding any contract even  during the  subsistence of the contract.  We have already  referred to the definition of the terms ’landlord’ and ’tenant’ which applies  both to subsisting tenancies as well  as  tenancies which  might have come to an end.  We may also refer to  the provision  in  section 7(2) which lays down that  where  the fair  rent  of a building has not been  fixed  the  landlord shall  not  claim anything in addition to the  agreed  rent, thus  showing  that the fair rent can be  fixed  even  where there  is  an  agreed rent.  That is  why  we  have  earlier pointed out that the various English decisions which provide for fixation of rent only where the contractual tenancy  has come to an end do not apply here.  We may also refer to sub- section  (3)  of section 16 which deals with cases  where  a landlord requires a residential or non-residential  building for  his own use.  Clause (d) of that sub-section  provides that where the tenancy is for a term the landlord cannot get possession before the expiry of the term, thus showing  that in other cases of eviction covered by section 10 eviction is permissible  even during the continuance of the  contractual tenancy  if  the  conditions laid down  in  section  10  are satisfied. The  Madras  High Court reviewed all the decisions  of  this Court’  except  the  latest one  in  Manujendra  v.  Purendu Prosad.  We have already pointed out that the criticism made in  that  decision regarding Krishnamurthy’s  Case  was  not justified.   We are in agreement with the view of  the  Full Bench of the Madras High Court that the various decisions of this  Court  were based upon particular  provisions  of  the Acts. which were under consideration, mainly the Bombay  Act which  is  vitally different from the Madras Act.   A  close analysis of the Madras Act shows that it has a scheme of its own and it is intended to provide a complete code in respect of both contractual tenancies as well as what are  popularly called   statutory  tenancies.   As  noticed   earlier   the definition  of  the  term ’landlord’ as  well  as  the  term ’tenant’ shows that the Act applies to contractual tenancies as   well  as  cases  of  "statutory  tenants"  and   their. landlords.   On some supposed general  principles  governing all  Rent  Acts it cannot be argued that such  fixation  can only be for the benefit of the tenants when the Act  clearly lays  down  that both landlords and tenants  can  apply  for fixation  of  fair rent.  A close reading of the  Act  shows that  the  fair  rent is fixed for the building  and  it  is payable  by  whoever  is the tenant  whether  a  contractual tenant. or statutory tenant.  What is fixed is not the  fair rent  payable by the tenant or to the landlord  who  applies

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for  fixation of fair rent act fair rent for  the  building, something  like  an  incident  of  the  fair  regarding  the building. We have then to deal with Civil Appeal No. 1201 of  1970.The learned  Single Judge considering that as the  total  amount annually in respect of these premises was Rs. 5032/-,  which lakhs  the  rent payable to exceed Rs. 400/-  a  month,  the building was outside 15-M602Sup.  CI 74 638 the scope of the Act and therefore the petition for fixation of fair rent does not lie. (This provision was removed by an Amending  Act of 1964).  The learned Judges of the  Division Bench on the other hand held that the agreement of the  year 1949  between the landlord and the tenant by which the  rent was increased was one in variation of a written contract and therefore  evidence of it is barred under section 92 of  the Evidence  Act.  Clearly any variation of rent reserved by  a registered  lease  deed must be made by  another  registered instrument.   We are not able to accept the argument of  Sri K. S. Ramamurthy on behalf of the tenants that the agreement of  1949  was one by the landlord to give up  his  right  to apply  for  fixation of fair rent in  consideration  of  the additional  rent  agreed to be paid by the  tenant  and  is, therefore,  not covered by section 92 of the  Evidence  Act. The correspondence between the parties makes it clear beyond doubt that the agreement was to pay increased rent.  If this agreement  is left out of account the rent payable is  below Rs.  400/-  a  month, and, therefore, the  decision  of  the Division Bench is correct. Before  concluding  we must refer to one other  argument  on behalf  of the appellants.  Under section 30 of the Act,  as originally  enacted,  any residential building the  rent  of which exceeded Rs. 250 /- per month and any  non-residential building whose rent exceeded Rs. 400/- a month were  outside the scope of the Act.  In 1964 the Act was amended so as  to provide  that all non-residential buildings would be  within the  scope of the Act.  This amendment was attacked  on  the ground  that it contravened the provisions of Art. 19(1)  of the Constitution.  In view of our finding earlier that  this case  should  be decided on the basis of  the  monthly  rent being  below  Rs. 400/- this argument does not  fall  to  be considered. In  the  result the appeals are dismissed.   The  appellants will pay the respondents’ costs. BHAGWATI  J.  We  have  had the  advantage  of  reading  the judgment  prepared  by  our brother  Alagiriswami,  J.,  and though we, agree with him in regard to the decision in Civil Appeal  No. 1201 of 1970, we find it difficult to assent  to the view taken by him in Civil Appeal No.  50 of 1968.  The facts  giving  rise  to the two  appeals  have  been  stated clearly and succinctly in the judgment given by our  learned brother  and  we  think it would be  a  futile  exercise  to reiterate them.  We may straight away proceed to examine the question  which arises for consideration in.   Civil  Appeal No.  50  of 1968.  The question is whether  a  landlord  can during the subsistence of the contractual tenancy, apply for fixation of fair rent under s. 4 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred  to as  the  Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960).  The  determination  of this question depends on the true interpretation of  certain provisions  of  the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960  and  we  may, therefore,  refer to those provisions and see what is  their proper meaning and effect. The long title and the preamble of the Tamil Nadu Act 18  of 1960  show that it is enacted "to amend and consolidate  the

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law relating to the regulation of the letting of residential and  non-residential buildings and the control of  rents  of such buildings and the preven- 639 tion  of unreasonable eviction of tenants therefrom  in  the State  of Tamil .Nadu".  See, 2, cl. (6) gives an  inclusive definition  of ’landlord’ and according to this  definition, ’landlord’  includes  "the  person who is  receiving  or  is entitled  to receive rent of a building, whether on his  own account or on behalf of another or on behalf of himself  and others  or  as an agent, trustee,  executor,  administrator, receiver or guardian or who would so receive the rent or  be entitled to receive the rent, if the building were let to  a tenant".  Thus the owner of a building which becomes  vacant would be ’landlord’ within the meaning of that expression as defined  in s. 2, cl. (6) and so also would be the  landlord during  the subsistence of the contractual tenancy  as  also after  the termination of the contractual tenancy where  the tenant  continues to remain in possession of  the  building. ’Tenant’ is defined in s. 2, cl. (8) to mean "any person  by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building  and includes  the surviving spouse, or any son, or daughter,  or the  legal representative of a deceased tenant who had  been living  with  to tenant in the building as a member  of  the tenant’s  family up to the death of the tenant and a  person continuing  in  possession  after  the  termination  of  the tenancy  in his favour".  This definition is wide enough  to include  not  only a contractual tenant but  also  a  tenant remaining  in possession of the building affect  the  termi- nation  of  the  contractual  tenancy.   Section  3   enacts detailed  provisions regulating the letting  of  residential and  non-residential  buildings.  The broad scheme  of  this section is that when a building becomes vacant, the landlord is required to give notice of the vacancy to the  authorised officer and if the building is required "for the purposes of the State or Central Government or of any local authority or of  any  public institution under the control  of  any  such Government  or  for the occupation of any  officer  of  such Government",  the  authorised  officer  may  give  necessary intimation in that behalf to the landlord and on receipt  of such  intimation,  the landlord would be  bound  to  deliver possession  of the building to the authorised officer or  to the  allottee named by the authorised officer, as  the  case may be, and the Government would be deemed to be the  tenant of the landlord on such terms as may be agreed upon  between the landlord and the Government, or in default of agreement, determined  by  the  Controller.  The rent  payable  by  the Government to the landlord would be the "fair rent, if  any, fixed for the. building under the provisions of this Act and if  no fair rent has been so fixed, such reasonable rent  as the  authorised officer may determine", but "the  reasonable rent  fixed  by the authorised officer-shall be  subject  to such fair rent as may be fixed by the Controller".   Section 4  provides for fixation of fair rent of a building  on  the application  of the tenant or the landlord.  Sub-s.  (1)  of the  section  is material and it says that  "The  Controller shall,  on, application by the tenant or the landlord  of  a building  and .after holding such inquiry as the  Controller thinks  fit,  fix  the  fair  rent  for  such  building   in accordance with the principles set out in subsection (2)  or in  sub-section  (3)  as the case may  be,  and  such  other principles as may be prescribed".  Sub-s. (2) lays down  the principles for fixation of fair rent of residential building and sub-s. (3), for fixation of fair rent of non-residential building.  The fiar rent is to be such as would provide 6  %

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gross_return per annum on 640 the  total cost of the building, if it is residential and  9 gross return per annum on the total cost of the building, if it is non-residential.  The total cost of the building is to be computed by taking the cost of construction as calculated according to the prescribed rates less depreciation also  at the  prescribed rates and adding to it the market  value  of that   portion  of  the  site  on  which  the  building   is constructed and making allowances for such considerations as locality  in  which the building is  situated,  features  of architectural interest, accessibility to market,  dispensary or hospital, nearness to the railway station or  educational institution  and such other amenities as may be  prescribed. It may be pointed out that under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1946 and the Madras Buildings  (Lease and  Rent Control) Act, 1949, which preceded the Tamil  Nadu Act  18  of 1960, the scheme of fixation of  fair  rent  was different,  in  that  the  fair rent  was  related  "to  the prevailing  rate  of rent in the locality for  the  same  or similar  accommodation in similar circumstances  during  the twelve  months period to 1st April, 1940" and only  a  fixed percentage  of  increase varying from 8 1/3 % to  50  %  was allowed  on  such rate of rent, depending  upon  whether  it exceeded  or  did  not  exceed  a  certain  limit’  But  the Legislature  while  enacting the Tamil Nadu Act 18  of  1960 made a departure from that scheme presumably because it felt that in view of the staggering and disproportionately  heavy fall in, the purchasing power of the rupee over the last  30 years, it was most, unrealistic to peg the fair rent to  the level  of  rents prevailing during the period of  12  months prior to 1st April, 1940 and allow only an ad hoc percentage of increase, and therefore, in s. 4, sub-ss. (2) and (3), it adopted  a different basis for fixation of fair  rent  which would  not  unduly depreciate the yield permissible  to  the landlord  and  at  the same time,  be  not  extortionate  or exploitative  of  the tenant.  Now once the fair rent  of  a building  is  fixed  under  s. 4,  sub-s.  (1),  no  further increase  in such fair rent is ’permissible except in  cases where  some  addition, improvement or  alteration  has  been carried  out  at  the expense of the  landlord  and  if  the building  is  then  in the occupation of a  tenant,  at  his request and similarly, if there is a decrease or  diminution in  the  accommodation or amenities, the  tenant  may  claim reduction in such fair rent.  Vide s. 5. Section 6  provides that  where  the amount of the taxes and cesses  payable  in respect of a building to a local authority for any half year commencing  on 1st April, 1950 or on any later date  exceeds the  amount  of taxes and cesses payable for the  half  year commencing on 30th September, 1946 or for the first complete half year after the date on which the building was first let out,  whichever is later, the landlord shall be entitled  to claim  such excess from the tenant in addition to  the  rent payable for the building. The consequences  of  fixation  of fair rent are set out in s. 7, sub-s (1)     and (3).   Sub- section (1) says that where the Controller has fixed the  fair rent of a building-               "(a) the landlord shall not claim, receive  or               stipulate  for the payment of (i) any  premium               or  other  like sum in addition to  such  fair               rent, or (ii) save as provided in section 5 or               section  6, anything. in, excess of such  fair               rent               641               (b)......  any premium or other like.  sum  or

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             any rent paid in addition to, or in excess of,               such  fair  rent whether before or  after  the               date  of  the  commencement of  this  Act,  in               consideration of the grant, continuance or re-               newal of the tenancy of the building after the               date  of such commencement, shall be  refunded               by  the landlord to the person by whom it  was               paid or at the option of such person, shall be               otherwise adjusted by the landlord;               Provided that where before the fixation of the               fair  rent, has been paid in  excess  thereof,               the  refund or adjustment shall be limited  to               the  amount  paid  in excess  for  the  period               commencing  on the date of application by  the               tenant  or landlord under sub-section  (1)  of               section  4  and ending with the date  of  such               fixation." Sub-sec. (3) declares that any stipulation in  contravention of  sub-s. (1) shall be null and void.  These are  the  only provisions  of  the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960 which  have  a direct  bearing on the determination of the question  before us, but reference was also made to certain other  provisions of that Act dealing with eviction of tenants for the purpose of drawing support by way of an a logical reasoning from the decisions of this Court interpreting those provisions and we must, therefore, briefly advert to them.  Section 10 confers protection on the tenant against eviction "in execution of a decree  or  otherwise"  by providing that he  shall  not  be evicted  except  in accordance with the provisions  of  that section or sections 14 to 16.  Sub-ss. (2) and (3) of s.  10 set out the grounds on which the tenant my be evicted by the landlord.   One  of the grounds-that set out in cl.  (a)  of sub-s.  (3)-is that the landlord requires the  building,  if residential,  for his ,own occupation or for the  occupation of his son, and if non-residential, for a business which  he or  his son is carrying on, but in respect of  this  ground, there is a limitation imposed by cl. (d) of sub-s. (3)  that when  the  tenancy  is for a specified  period  agreed  upon between  the landlord and the tenant, the landlord shall not be entitled to apply for possession under sub-s. (3)  before the  expiry of such period.  Sections 12 to 14  provide  for recovery  of possession of the building by the landlord  for repairs   or  reconstruction.   These  provisions  are   not material  and we need not refer to them in detail.  Then  we go  straight to s. 30 which exempts certain  buildings  from the   operation  of  the  Act.   Every  new   building   the construction of which is completed after the commencement of the Act is exempted under cl. (i).  The reason obviously  is that the legislature wanted to encourage construction of new buildings  so  that  more and more  buildings  would  become available   for  residential  as  well  as   non-residential purposes   and   that  would  help   relieve   shortage   of accommodation.  Cl. (ii) exempts any residential building or part  thereof  occupied by any tenant, if the  monthly  rent paid  by  him  exceeds  Rs.  250/Here  the  object  of   the Legislature  clearly  was  that the the  protection  of  the beneficent provisions of the Act should be available only to ,small  tenants  paying  rent not exceeding  Rs.  250/-  per mouth, as they 642 belong  to the weaker sections of the community  and  really need protection against exploitation by rapacious landlords. Those who can afford to pay higher rent would ordinarily  be well-to-do people and they would not be so- much in need  of protection  and  can, with,out much difficulty,  look  after

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themselves. It is in the light of these provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960, that we have to consider whether a landlord can, during the subsistence of the contractual tenancy, apply for fixation  of fair rent under. s. 4, sub-s. (1).   Two  basic considerations  must  guide our approach to  this  question. The  first  is that the agreed rent which is the  result  of contract  between the parties must continue to bind them  so long  as the contract subsists, unless there is anything  in the  statute  which expressly or  by  necessary  implication overrides the contract, It is true that with the decline  of the  doctrine  of laissez faire and the  assumption  by  the State of a more dynamic and activists role, the principle of sanctity  of contract which is one of the pillars of a  free market  economy,  has in a number of cases  been  eroded  by legislation.  But if we examine such legislation it will  be apparent  that  this has happened invariably in aid  of  the weaker  party  to  the contract.   Where  there  is  unequal bargaining power between the parties, freedom of contract is bound to produce injustice and social legislation  therefore steps  in  and  overrides  the. contract,  with  a  view  to protacting the weaker party from the baneful Consequences of the  contract.   It is to contract the  injustice  resulting from  inequality  in  bargaining power and  to  bring  about social  or  distributive  justice  that  social  legislation interferes  with sanctity of contract.  It seeks to  restore the  balance in the scales which are otherwise  weighted  in favour  of  the stronger party which has  larger  bargaining power.  Ordinarily we do. not find, and indeed it would be a strange   and  rather  incomprehensible   phenomenon,   that legislation  intervenes to disturb the sanctity of  contract for  the benefit of a stronger party who does not  need  the protective  hand of the legislature.  This consideration  we must  constantly  keep.  before  us  while  construing   the relevant provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960. Secondly  the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960, as its  long  title and  preamble  show, has been enacted inter  alia  with  the object   of  controlling  rents  of  residential  and   non- residential  buildings and preventing unreasonable  eviction of tenants.  Now, there can be no doubt that in so far as it is  calculated to prevent unreasonable eviction of  tenants, the  Tamil  Nadu  Act 18 of 1960  is  a  protective  measure intended   to  safeguard  tenants   against   indiscriminate eviction by landlords.  Equally, by controlling the rents by keeping  them within fair and reasonable limits,  the  Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960 seeks to protect tenants against  greedy and  rapacious landlords who taking advantage of  the  great scarcity of housing- accommodation which prevails in  almost all  urban areas, may extract excessive  and  unconscionable rent from tenants.  The Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960 is in  its essential  character  as  also in  its  object  and  purpose similar  to  what  may conveniently  be  described  as  rent control  legislation, in other States, such as  Maharashtra, Gujarat, West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh. 643 Now it is well settled by decisions of this Court that  rent control Acts are "not ordinarily intended to interfere  with contractual  leases  and  are Acts  for  the  protection  of tenants and are consequently restrictive and not enabling or conferring any rights of action but restricting the existing rights either under the contract or under the general  law." That  is what this Court said in Manuiendra Dutt v.  Purendu Prosad  Roy  Chowdhury  & Ors.(1), while  dealing  with  the Calcutta  Thika Tenancy Act, 1949.  The same view was  taken by  this  Court  in Bhaiya  Punjalal  Bhagwanddin  v.  ’Dave

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Bhagwat Prasad Prabhuprasad(2) in relation to Bombay  Rents, Hotel  and  Lodging House Rates.  Control  Act,  1947  which prevails in Maharashtra and Gujarat and which has long title and preamble in almost the same terms as the Tamil Nadu  Act 18 of 1960.  This Court said in that case: "the Act,",  that is  the Bombay Rent Act "intended therefore to restrict  the rights  which  the landlords possessed either  for  charging excessive  rents  or  for  evicting  tenants".   The  Madhya Pradesh  Accommodation Control Act, 1955 was also  construed in  the  same way by this Court in  Mangilal  v.  Sugarchand Bathi.(3)  This  general  purpose  and  intendment  of  rent control legislation and its positive thrust and emphasis  on the protection of the tenant cannot be lost sight of when we are construing a similar legislation like the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960. We  may now turn to examine the relevant provisions  of  the Tamil  Nadu Act 18 of 1960 against the background  of  these general considerations.  Section 4, sub-s. (1)  contemplates that an application for fixation of fair rent of a  building may  be made by the tenant or the landlord.  The  definition of  "tenant",  as  we  have  pointed  out  above,   includes contractual tenant as well as tenant remaining in possession of  the  building  after determination  of  the  contractual tenancy,  that  is, statutory tenant, and  both  contractual tenant  and  statutory  tenant  can,  therefore,  apply  for fixation  of  fair  rent  under  S.  4,  sub-S.  (1).    The Government,  who is deemed to be the tenant of the  landlord under  S.  3, sub-s. (5), can also similarly  avail  of  the provision  for  fixation of fair rent in s. 4,  sub-s.  (1). The  question  is  as to who are  the  persons  comprehended within the expression ’landlord’ who can apply for  fixation of  fair rent under S. 4, sub-s. (1).  The  landlord,  where the  Government  is deemed. to be the tenant under.   S.  3, sub-s.  (5),  would  certainly  be  entitled  to  make  such application and, having regard to the wide definition of the expression  ’landlord’, which includes not only  contractual landlord  but also statutory landlord, if one may  use  that expression to describe the counterpart of statutory  tenant, it was common ground between the parties that the  statutory landlord  can also avail of this provision, but the  dispute was whether the contractual landlord is within the ambit  of this  provision.   Can he apply for fixation  of  fair  rent under S. 4, sub-s. (1)p ? Now prima facie according to  ’the definition   as   also  according  to  its   plain   natural connotation, the expression ’landlord’ includes  contractual landlord and it might, therefore, appear at first blush,  on a purely literal construction, that the contractual landlord can  make an application for fixation of fair rent under  s. 4,  sub-s.  (1).   But is  well settled  that  a  definition clause (1) [1967] 1 S.C.R. 475. (2) [1963] 3 S.C.R. 312. (3)  [1964] 5 S.C.R. 239. 644 is  not  to be taken as substituting one set  of  words  for another or as strictly defining what the meaning of a  term must  be  under all circumstances, but as  merely  declaring what   may  be  comprehended  within  the  term,  when   the circumstances require that it should be so comprehended.  It would,  therefore,  always  be a  matter  of  interpretation whether or not a particular meaning given in the  definition clause  ,applies  to  the  word as  used  in  the  statutory propriety.   That  would  depend  on  the  subject  and  the context.  Moreover, it is equally well established that  the meaning  of words used in a statute. is to be found, not  so

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much in strict etymological propriety of language, nor  even in popular use, as in the subject or occasion on which  they are  used and the object which is intended to  be  achieved. The  context, the ,collocation and the object of  the  words may show that they are not intended to be used in the  sense which  they ordinarily bear, but are meant to be used  in  a narrow and limited sense.  Lord Herschell pointed out in Cox v.  Hakes (1) "It cannot, I think, be denied that,  for  the purpose  of construing any enactment, it is right  to  look, not  only at the provision immediately  under  construction, but  at  any others found in connection with  it  which  may throw  light upon it, and afford an indication that  general words employed in it were not intended to be applied without some  limitation."  However wide in  the  abstract,  general words  must  be  understood as used with  reference  to  the subject matter in the mind of the legislature and limited to it.   Thus,  in Whethered v. Calcutta(2)  a  statute  which, reciting the inconveniences arising from church wardens  and overseers  making  clandestine  rates,  enacted  that  those officers  should permit "every inhabitant" of the parish  to inspect the rates under a penalty for refusal, was held  not to apply to a refusal to one of the church wardens, who  was also  an  inhabitant.  As the object of the statute  was  to protect  those in habitants who had previously no access  to the rates (which the church wardens had, the meaning of  the term  ’inhabitants’ was limited to them.  The same  approach in interpretation must be adopted by us in the present case. We  must  not allow ourselves to be unduly obsessed  by  the meaning  of  ’landlord’ given in the definition  or  by  its ordinary etymological meaning but we must examine the scheme of  the relevant provisions of the statute,  the  contextual setting  in  which s. 4, sub-s. (1) occurs  and  the  object which  the legislation is intended to achieve, in  order  to determine what is the sense in which the word ’landlord’  is used in s. 4.  sub-s. (1)-whether it is intended to  include contractual landlord. It  is necessary for this purpose to consider what  are  the consequences  of fixation of fair rent, for  that  furnishes the key to the solution of the problem before us.  The  fair rent,  when fixed, becomes an attribute or incidence of  the building  and  there can be no change in it  except  in  the circumstances set out in s. 5. When the fair rent is  fixed, three  possibilities  may arise.  The fair rent may  be  the same as the agreed rent in which case no difficulty  arises. Or  the fair rent may be less than the agreed  rent.   Where that  happens,  s. 7, sub-s. (i), ,el. (a) operates  and  it provides  that the landlord shall not be entitled to  claim, receive  or stipulate for payment of anything in  excess  of the [1890] 15 A.C. 506. (2) [1842] 5 Scott.  N.R, 409. 645 fair  rent.   The  landlord, can, in  such  a  case,  claim, receive  or  recover only the fair rent  and  nothing  more, despite  the contract of tenancy which provides for  payment of  higher  rent.  To that extent sanctity  of  contract  is interfered  with by the legislation in order to protect  the tenant  against  exploitation by the landlord  so  that  the landlord may not take undue advantage of shortage of housing accommodation  and extract excessive rent from a  needy  and helpless tenant.  The stipulation in the contract of tenancy for  payment of higher rent would in such a case be  clearly in contravention of sub-s. (1) of s. 7 and would be null and void  under s. 7, sub-s. (3).  But what happens if the  fair rent fixed is higher than the agreed rent?  Can the landlord

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claim to recover such fair rent from the tenant,  overriding the contract of tenancy which provides for payment of lesser rent?   We do not think so.  There is nothing in s. 7 or  in any  other provision of the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960  which can  by any process of construction be read  as  authorising the  landlord to override the contract of tenancy and  claim fair  rent higher than the agreed rent from the tenant.   If the  legislative intent were that, even though the  contract of tenancy is subsisting, the landlord should be entitled to recover  fair  rent higher than the agreed rent,  we  should have expected the Legislature to say   so in so many  terms, as  it has done in s. 7, sub-s. (1), cl. (a) when it  wanted the landlord not to be able to recover the agreed rent where it  is  in excess of the fair rent.  It may  no  noted  that whenever the Legislature intended to confer on the  landlord a  right to recover any amount which he would not  otherwise have under the contract or the general law, the  Legislature has done so in clear and specific language as in s. 6 of the Act.   But here we do not find any such provision,    either express or necessarily implied.  We may also profitably com- pare  the  language of the provision in s.  3,  sub-s.  (5). There it is provided that "the reasonable rent fixed by  the authorised officer-shall be subject to such fair rent as may be fixed by the Controller".  The words "subject to" clearly take  in both kinds of cases, where the fair rent  fixed  is higher  as well as lower than the reasonable rent. in s.  7, sub-s.  (1), cl. (a), however the Legislature  has  departed from this phraseology and instead of saying that the  agreed rent  shall be subject to the fair rent or the rent  payable by  the tenant shall be the fair rent, the  Legislature  has merely laid an embargo on the landlord prohibiting him from recovering anything in excess of the fair rent.  This provi- sion is clearly, without doubt, restrictive in character. it is  not  an enabling provision empowering  the  landlord  to recover  the  fair rent where it is higher than  the  agreed rent.   But quite apart from these considerations, there  is inherent  evidence in s. 7 itself which strongly  reinforces our  interpretation and that is to be found in  sub-s.  (3). That sub-section says that any stipulation in. contravention of sub-S. .shall be null and void.  If, therefore, there  is a stipulation in the contract of tenancy for payment of rent higher  than  the fair rent, it would be invalid. ,  Such  a stipulation would not be enforceable by the landlord against the  tenant.   Only the fair rent would be  payable  by  the tenant.  If, however, there is a stipulation for payment  of rent  which is less than the fair rent, it would not  be  in contravention of sub-sec. (1) and   hence   would   not   be invalidated by sub-s. (3) but would remain 646 enforceable  and binding on the parties and if that  be  so, the landlord would not be entitled to claim the fair rent in breach  of such stipulation.  Section 7, sub-s. (3)  clearly indicates that the stipulation in the contract of tenancy as regards rent is overridden only where the fair rent is  less than  the  agreed rent and not where it is higher  than  the agreed rent.  This is the only rational construction  which, in our opinion, can be placed on the relevant provisions  of the  Act  relating  to  control of rent.   It  is  not  only compelled by grammar and language, but also accords with the broad general considerations we have already discussed.   It is  difficult  to believe that the Legislature  should  have chosen to interfere with contractual rights and  obligations in favour of the landlord who is ordinarily, in view of  the acute  shortage of housing accommodation, in a stronger  and more  dominating  position than the  tenant  qua  bargaining

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power.  The Legislature while enacting a social  legislation could  not  have intended to confer on the  landlord  a  new right of action a right to override the contract of  tenancy and  to  impose  a greater burden on the  tenant  than  that permitted  under  the contract of tenancy.  It  would  be  a startling   proposition  to  assume  that  the  Tamil   Nadu Legislature  was  so  solicitous  of  the  welfare  of   the landlord, who is admittedly, as a class, stronger party  and much more favorably situated in respect of bargaining  power than the tenant, that it enacted a provision in the Act  for relieving the landlord against the consequences of an unwise contract entered into by him with open. eyes.  To take such a  view would be to pervert the legitimate end of  a  social legislation and proselytise its true object and purpose. These  considerations  impel us to the conclusion  that  the Legislature  could  not  have. intended  that  the  landlord should  have  the right to apply for fixation of  fair  rent during  the subsistence of the contractual tenancy.   If  it was  not  the intention of the Legislature  to  benefit  the landlord  by giving him a right to override the contract  of tenancy and claim fair rent higher than the agreed rent from the  tenant  during  the  subsistence  of  the   contractual tenancy, it must follow a fortiorari that it could not  have been  intended by the Legislature that the  landlord  should have the right to apply for fixation of fair rent whilst the contract  of  tenancy is subsisting.  Having regard  to  the basic character of the statute as a rent control legislation and  the scheme of its provisions and reading s.  4,  sub-s. (1) in its contextual setting and in the light of the  other provisions  of  the statute, the conclusion  is  inescapable that  the word ’landlord’ in s. 4, sub-s. (1) is used  in  a limited sense and it does not include contractual  landlord. The landlord is not given the right to apply for fixation of fair rent during the subsistence of the contractual tenancy. It  is  only  when  the  contract  of  tenancy  is  lawfully determined  that he becomes entitled to, apply for  fixation of  fair rent, for it is only then that he can recover  fair rent higher than the agreed rent from the statutory  tenant, there  being no contract of tenancy to bind him down to  the agreed rent. We were referred to certain decisions of this Court relating to  the  interpretation of the provisions  of  various  Rent Control Acts dealing with the eviction’ of tenants.  Some of these decisions have 647 already  been  noticed by us earlier  while  discussing  the general  object and intendment of Rent Control  Acts.   They have no direct bearing on the determination of the  question before us, but they do lend some support to the view we  are taking as to the interpretation of the word ’landlord’ in s. 4, sub-s. (1).  These decisions which are given in reference to  Rent Control Acts of Maharashtra, Gujarat,  West  Bengal and Madhya Pradesh, clearly establish that the Rent  Control Acts  do  not  give  a right to  the  landlord  to  evict  a contractual tenant without first determining the contractual tenancy.   So long as the contractual tenancy subsists,  the tenant does not need protection because he cannot be-evicted in breach of the ’Contract of tenancy.  It is only after the contract  of tenancy is determined and the landlord  becomes entitled to the possession of the premises, that the  tenant requires  protection and it is there that the  Rent  Control Acts  step  in and prevent the landlord from  enforcing  his right  to possession except under certain  conditions.   The Rent Control Acts do not confer on the landlord a new  right of  eviction,  but  merely restrict his  existing  right  to

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recover  possession under the contract or the  general  law. The   landlord  cannot,  therefore,  sue  for  recovery   of possession on any of the grounds  recognised as valid by the Rent  Control  Acts  unless  he  has  first  determined  the contractual  tenancy of the tenant.  This view.  which  has- been  taken by the decisions of this Court in regard to  the Rent Control Acts of Maharashtra, Gujarat,, West Bengal  and Madhya Pradesh, applies equally in regard to the Tamil  Nadu Act  18 of 1960.  It is true that the High Court  of  Madras took a different view in R. Krishnamurti v. Perthasarthi (1) in  regard to the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent  Control) Act’  ’1945  which  was  in  material  respects  in   almost identical  terms as the, Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960 and  held that s. 7 of that Act, corresponding to s. 10 of the present Act,  had  its  own scheme of procedure  and  there  was  no question  of  any attempt .to reconcile that  Act  with  the Transfer  of  Property Act and an application  for  eviction could, therefore, be made under that Act without terminating the  contractual tenancy of the tenant.  But  in  Manujendra Dutt.  v.  Purendu  Prosad  Roy  Choudhury  &  ors.(2)  this decision  of the Madras High Court was  expressly  overruled and held not to be correct law by this Court.  The  argument on  behalf  of the respondents was that the  observation  of this  Court disapproving the view taken by the  Madras  High Court  was a casual observation made without  examining  the scheme of the Madras Act and no validity could attach to it. We fail to see-how such an argument can possibly be advanced with any degree of plausibility.  It is clear from the  dis- cussion of the Madras decision which we find in the judgment of  Court that the attention of this Court was  specifically directed  to  the  reasoning of the  Madras  decision  which proceeded  on the basis that s. 7 of the Madras Act had  its own  self-contained  scheme which excluded the  Transfer  of Property  Act  and  it  was because  this  Court  found  the reasoning  to  be incorrect, that it held  that  the  Madras decision was not good law.  It would not be fair to  presume that  this  Court cavalierly overruled the  Madras  decision without  applying its mind and caring to examine the  scheme of the Madras Act. (1)  A.I.R. 1949 Mad. 780. (2) [1967] 1 S.C.R. 475 648 Such  a charge cannot be made merely because this Court  did not  elaborately discuss the merits of the  Madras  decision but  disposed  it  of in a few words.  The  brevity  of  the discussion  does  not signify casualness or lack  of  proper consideration.  We must, in the circumstances, hold that the observation of this Court that the Madras decision cannot be regarded  as good law was a deliberate and  considered  pro- nouncement and the view taken by this Court in regard to the Rent  Control Acts of Maharashtra, Gujarat, West Bengal  and Madhya  Pradesh must equally prevail in regard to the  Tamil Nadu Act 18 of   1960. We may point out that in any event we do not find any cogent reason  to question the validity of the observation made  by this  Court  disapproving of the Madras  decision.   We  are wholly  in agreement with that observation as we do not  see any material difference between the language and the  scheme of  s. 10 of the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960 and the  language and scheme of the corresponding provisions of the other Rent Control Acts which came to be construed by this Court.   The only  distinctive  feature  which could be  pointed  out  on behalf of the respondents was the provision in s. 10, sub-s’ (3), cl. (d).  But that provision does not make any material difference because all that it provides is that though, in a

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case  where the tenancy is for a specified period and it  is determined by forfeiture before the expiration of the  term, the  landlord would have been, but for cl. (d), entitled  to recover  possession of the building under cls. (a),  (b)  or (c),  he  shall  be  precluded  from  doing  so  until   the expiration of the period for which the tenancy was  created. If  there is any other ground available to him for  claiming possession,  for example, a ground specified in s. 10,  sub- s. (2), he can seek to recover possession on that ground and cl. (d) would not afford the tenant any protection.  But cl. (d) would stand in the way of the landlord, if possession is sought  on any of the grounds set out in cls, (a),  (b)  and (c).  The object of cl. (d) clearly is that even though  the tenancy  has come to an end by forfeiture and  the  landlord has become entitled to the possession of the building  under the  general  law.,  the  tenant  shall  be  protected  from eviction on any of the grounds set out in cls. (a), (b)  and (c) so long as the period for which the tenancy was  created in his favour has not a expired, This construction  receives considerable support from the tact that the Legislature  has used  the words "before the expiry of such period"  and  not the  words  "before  the determination of  the  tenancy"  to indicate the length of time for which protection is given to the tenant under cl. (d).  We do not therefore think that it would  be  right to infer from cl. (d) that, save  in  cases falling  within  that  provision,  the  landlord  would   be entitled to apply for possession under sub-s. (2) or sub-cl. (3) of s. 10 without determining the tenancy of the  tenant. There  can  be  no  doubt, having  regard  to  the  judicial pronouncements of this Court, that the word ’landlord’ in s. 10  of the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960 :is used in  a  limited sense  to  refer only to a landlord who has  terminated  the tenancy  of  the tenant and does not include  a  contractual landlord.  if  the’  word  ’landlord’  in  s.  10  is  found subjected to a limitation excluding a contractual  landlord, it   forms  a  strong  argument  for  subjecting  the   word ’landlord’ in s.4.,sub-s.(1) also to the like limitation. 649 It  may  also  be  noted  that,  whatever  be  the   correct interpretation of the word ’landlord’ in s. IO, it is  clear from the decisions of this Court in regard to the other Rent Control Acts. that it is not at all unusual,, having  regard to  the object and purpose of Rent Control  legislation,  to read  the  word  ’landlord’ in a limited. sense  so  as  ’to exclude contractual landlord and we are therefore not  doing anything startling or extraordinary but merely following the path eked out by the decisions of this Court when we place a limited  meaning on the word ’landlord’in s. 4,  sub-s.  (1) which  would exclude contractual landlord.  That is in  fact in conformity with the object and purpose of the Tamil  Nadu Act 18 of 1960, which, to quote the words used by this Court in  P.J.  Irani v. State of Madras (1) in reference  to  the earlier  Tamil  Nadu Act 25 of 1949 which  was  in  material respects in identical terms as the present Act, is  intended to protect "the rights of tenants in occupation of buildings from  being charged unreasonable rates of rent" and  not  to benefit landlords by conferring on them a new right  against tenants which they did not possess before. Since  we  are of the view that it is not competent  to  the landlord to apply for fixation of fair rent under s. 4, sub- s. (1) during the subsistence of the contractual tenancy, we set aside the decision of the High Court of Tamil Nadu which has  taken the view that the Controller has jurisdiction  to entertain the application of the respondents and allow Civil Appeal No. 50 of 1968.  There will be no order as,. to costs

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all throughout.                            ORDER In  accordance with the opinion of the majority, the  appeal is dismissed.  The appellant will pay the respondents costs. S.B.W. (1) [1962] 2 S.C.R. 169. 650