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PETITIONER: RATHOD BHIMJIBHAI MASRUBHAI RAJPUT AND ANOTHER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF BOMBAY AND OTHERS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/12/1959

BENCH: DAS, S.K. BENCH: DAS, S.K. KAPUR, J.L. SARKAR, A.K.

CITATION:  1960 AIR  438            1960 SCR  (2) 393

ACT: Taluqdari  Tenure-Abolition of-" Lal-liti "  lands-Liability for  land revenue-Taluqdari  lands--Taluqdari  Estate-Bombay Land  Revenue Code, 1879 (Bom. V of 1879), s.  136(1)-Gujrat Taluqdars’  Act, 1888 (Bom.  VI of 1888), ss. 4, 5, 22,  31- Bombay  Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949 (Bom.  LXII  of 1949), ss.2(3), (4), 3, 5(1)(a),(b), 5(2)(a) 17(c).

HEADNOTE: The  appellants who were holders of certain lands  known  as Lal-liti  "  lands were assessed to land revenue  under  the provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, after  the Bombay  Taluqdari  Tenure Abolition Act, 3 1949,  came  into force.   "Lal-liti  "  lands  were  granted  originally   by Taluqdars  in  Gujrat to cadets, widows of  the  family  and relations  for  maintenance  and  to  village  servants  and others,   either   in  reward  for  past  services   or   as remuneration  for  services  to be  performed.   Before  the establishment of British rule, Taluqdars had the position of semi-independent chiefs, but subsequent to the establishment of  British  rule  they became mere  owners  of  proprietary estates  holding  lands  directly from  Government,  and  in respect  of such estates the Gujrat Taluq dars’  Act,  1888, was passed providing for their revenue administration.   The appellants claimed that these lands had been enjoyed without payment of any " jama " since pre-British times and that the exemption  from payment of land revenue was not affected  by the  Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949.  The  High Court  took  the  view  that the lands  were  liable  to  be assessed  under s. 5 of that Act.  It was contended for  the appellants,  inter  alia, that no liability for  payment  of land  revenue in respect of " Lal-liti " lands  could  arise under s. 5 of the Act, because (1) the Taluqdar retained  no interest  in such lands after the grant  and,  consequently, such lands were not taluqdari lands within the meaning of s. 2(3)  of the Act, (2) clause (a) of S. 5(1) of the  Act  was merely declaratory, 394 while  cl.  (b) was the operative clause by which  the  only persons  liable  for  payment of land  revenue  were  (i)  a taluqdar holding    any taluqdari land and (ii) a cadet of a

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taluqdari   family  holding      any  taluqdari   land   for maintenance,   and  (3)  even  assuming  thatcl.  (a)   made taluqdari lands liable to the payment of land revenue Code, a  " Lal-liti " holder could not be made liable, because  he was  not an occupant of unalienated land within the  meaning of s.     136(1) of the Code. Held:(1)  that having regard to the history of  "  Lal- liti lands and the provisions of the Gujrat Taluqdar’s  Act, 1888,  such lands are lands which form part of  a  taluqdari estate,  even  though no " jama " was actually paid  to  the taluqdar  or  to Government, and are,  therefore,  taluqdari lands within the meaning of s. 2(3) of the Bombay  Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949; (2)that  cl.  (a)  of  S. 5(1)  of  the  Bombay  Taluqdari Abolition Act was a general provision and applied the Bombay Land Revenue Code to all taluqdari lands, while cl. (b)  was a  particular deeming Provision with regard to the  taluqdar and his cadet and (3)that whatever might have been the position of a "  Lal- liti  "  holder earlier, on the abolition of  the  Taluqdari tenure  by the Bombay Taluqdari Abolition Act, he  became  a holder in actual possession of land in respect of which  the Government had not transferred its rights to the payment  of revenue, wholly or partially,to the ownership of any person.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.327 of 1955. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated January 31,1955, of the Bombay High Court, in Special  Civil Application No. 1100 of 1954. V.   M. Limaye, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellants. N.   P.  Nathwani,  K. L. Hathi and R. H.  Dhebar,  for  the respondent. 1959.-  December 7. The Judgment of the Court was  delivered by S. E. Das J.       S. K. DAS J.-This is an appeal by special leave  from  a decision of the High Court of  Bombay,  dated January  31, 1955, by which it dismissed with costs  a  writ application  (No.  1100  of 1954) made  by  the  petitioners therein,  who are now appellants before us.  It  raises  for consideration and decision a land revenue                             395 problem   of  some  complexity,  which  resulted  from   the enactment  of  the Bombay Taluqdari  Tenure  Abolition  Act, 1949, (Bombay Act LXII of 1949), hereinafter referred to  as the  Abolition  Act.   The problem  is  if  the  appellants, holders  of  certain lands known as "Lalliti  "  lands,  are liable to the State Government concerned for payment of land revenue  under  the provisions of the  Bombay  Land  Revenue Code,  1879 (Bombay Act V of 1879), hereinafter referred  to as the Revenue Code’ after the enforcement of the provisions of the Abolition Act. The  problem has to be considered in the light.  of  certain incidents of taluqdari tenures in the Ahmedabad district  of Gujrat, with special reference to the changes through  which those  tenures  had  gone  in the  past  by  legislation  or otherwise.   For  the  purposes of this  appeal  it  is  not necessary  to  give a full history of taluqdari  estates  in Gujrat;  but it is necessary to explain what is meant  by  " Lal-liti  lands.  We get from such books  as  Baden-Powell’s Land-systems of British India " and Dandekar’s " The law  of Land  Tenure in the Bombay Presidency ", from both of  which

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learned  counsel  for the parties  have  extensively  quoted before us, a short history of the Taluqdars of Gujrat and of their  estates.   Shortly  stated,  the  history  is   this: Taluqdars of Gujrat (they were not known as Taluqdars  then, because  the name was given much later) originally  occupied the  position  of  Chiefs or Rulers.  This  was  before  the Mahomedan  rule  in  Gujrat.  When  the  Mahomedans  invaded Gujrat, they found the country partitioned out into  estates of large or small Chiefs, whom they forcibly deprived of all but  one-fourth of their possess ions, and the portion  thus left took the name of ’wanta’ (divided).  Some ’wantas’ were free  of payment of pent or revenue; other  ’wanta’  estates paid  a  tribute in the shape of an " udhad  jama  "  (fixed sum).   After the Moguls came the Marathas.   The  accession and   domination  of  the  Marathas  made   no   substantial difference to the position of these semi-independent chiefs, except  that  the annual payments varied under  the  Maratha rule.  Then came the British, who for sometime continued 396 to   realise  annual  payments  according  to  past   years; but  very  soon  a significant change  took  place  and  the nature   of  the  payment  was   altered,  and  instead   of tribute, the Government assumed it to be rent or  revenue. The rent or revenue was also increased by about 50 per cent. and the result was that the holders     of these lands  fell into pecuniary embarrassment and   became  impoverished  and needy.  A system of annual leases was then introduced:  this remedy,  however, proved worse than the disease, and it  was sought   to  improve  the’position  of  the   Taluqdars   by legislation it is not necessary for our purpose to refer  to the  details of that legislation till we come to the  Gujrat Taluqdars’  Act, 1888 (Bombay Act VI of f888), -which was  a landmark in the history of Taluqdari tenures. We shall  have occasion  later to refer to some of the provisions  of  this Act.   It is sufficient to state here that by the  time  the aforesaid Act was passed the Taluqdars of certain  districts of Gujrat including Ahmedabad had really become mere  owners of  proprietary  estates,  who  held  lands  directly   from Government,and the Act provided, inter alia, for the revenue administration  of their estates.  Under the  provisions  of the  Act,  the Settlement Registers were prepared  for  each village, which served the purpose of the Record of Rights in those estates.  In these estates, large areas of lands  were granted presumably by the Taluqdars to cadets, widows of the family,  and  relations  for  maintenance,  and  to  village servants  and others, either in reward for past services  or as  remuneration for services to be performed.  The  holders of  these  transferred lands paid no revenue either  to  the Taluqdar or to Government generally.  These grants fell into  three  categories: (i) those made prior to British  rule  ; (ii)  those made between 1818 and 1888, that is,  after  the introduction  of British rule and before the passing of  the Gujrat  Taluqdars’  Act, 1888 ; and (iii) those  made  after 1888.   The lands thus transferred were called " Lal-liti  " lands  because  they  were recorded inred  ink  in  the  old ’faisal patrakas’ and in the Settlement Registers also, they were recorded in red ink but were shown as subject to " jama (land revenue) 397 liabilities of varying character.  The pre-British transfers were recognised by Mr. Peile (later Sir James Peile) who was the  Taluqdari Settlement Officer  1866, and the  holders of these  lands  generally  paid no "  jama  ".  The  1818-1888 transfers  were  those  which  were  not  so  recognised  by prescription, and when these lands reverted to the Taluqdar,

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they  became his ordinary lands liable to payment of  full." jama  ".  The post Act grants were covered by s. 31  of  the Gujrat  Taluqdars’ Act, 1888 (see in this connection  "  The Land  Problems  of Re-organised Bombay State by  Dr.  G.  D. Patel, pp. 174-175). Such,  in brief, is the history of Taluqdari estates  and  " Lal-liti  " lands, so far as that history has a  bearing  on the  problem  before us.  It is necessary now to  state  the facts which have given rise to the present appeal.  In their writ  petition to the High Court, the appellants  said  that they  were holders of " Lal-liti " lands in villages  Kharad and  Rajka of the Dhanduka taluq of Ahmedabad  district  and were  enjoying  the lands without payment of any  "  jama  " (land  revenue)  since  the  pre-British  rule,  though  the circumstances in which their predecessors originally got the lands are lost in antiquity.  They said inter alia that  the exemption  from payment of land revenue which they  had  all along  enjoyed was not affected by the Abolition Act  or  by any  later  legislation  like  the  Bombay  Personal   Inams Abolition Act, 1952 (Bombay Act LXII of 1953), and that  the demand  for  payment  of  land revenue  made  by  the  State Government  of  Bombay for 1950-1953 was not  authorised  by law.  In the alternative, they also said that they were  not liable to any assessment of land revenue till August,  1953. Accordingly, they prayed for appropriate writs (a)  quashing the  demands for payment of land revenue and  (b)  directing the  State  of Bombay, the Collector of  Ahmedabad  and  the Revenue Officer of Dhanduka (who are now respondents  before us), to forbear from taking any steps to enforce payment  of land  revenue  for the " Lal-liti " lands held by  them.   A number  of similar applications, presumably filed  by  other holders  of "Lal-liti" lands, were also pending in the  High Court, 51 398 So far as we can gather from the record before us,     there were   three   sets   of  such   applications.    The   High court delivered its leading judgment on writ application No. 1098  of 1954 and the application of the  appellants  herein (No.  1100 of 1954) was dismissed with costs on the  grounds given  in  the  leading judgment.  The High  Court  held  in effect that the holders of  " Lal-liti " lands were  liable to payment of land revenue under s. 5 of the Abolition  Act, read  with  the  provisions of the  Revenue  Code,  and  the objections raised thereto, on their behalf were not  legally valid.  Having been unsuccessful in their application for  a certificate under Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution, the appellants applied for and obtained special leave from  this Court  on  June 29, 1955.  They then preferred  the  present appeal. Learned  counsel  for  the  appellants  has  challenged  the correctness  of  the decision of the High Court  on  various grounds.  It will be convenient to take these one by one. The first point urged is that the relevant provisions of the Abolition Act do not apply to " Lal-liti " lands, which  are not " taluqdari lands " within the meaning of the  Abolition Act,  and,  therefore,  no liability  for  payment  of  land revenue in respect of " Lal-liti " lands can arise under  s. 5  thereof.   At  this  stage, we  must  read  the  relevant provisions   of  the  Abolition  Act.   The  expressions   " Taluqdari land " and " Taluqdari tenure " are defined in  s. 2, clauses (3) and (4): Section 2 :............................... "  (1 ).......................... (lA)........................

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(2)....................................... (3)    ’  Taluqdari  land’  means land  forming  part  of  a taluqdari  estate  and includes land forming  part  of  such estate  and held by a cadet of a taluqdar’s family  for  the purpose of maintenance; (4)  ’  Taluqdari  tenure’ means land tenure  on  which  the taluqdari land is held Section 3 states: "  With  effect from the date on which this Act  comes  into force                             399 (i)the taluqdari tenure shall wherever it prevails be deemed to have been abolished; (ii)save as expressly provided by or under the provisions of this Act, all the incidents of the said tenure attaching  to any land comprised in a taluqidari estate shall be deemed to have been extinguished " Section  5, which is of great importance for the purpose  of this appeal, read as follows before it was amended in 1953. Section 5 (1) " Subject to the provisions of subsection (2), (a)all  taluqdari  lands  are and shall  be  liable  to  the payment of land revenue in accordance with the provisions of the Code and the rules made there- under,    and (b)a taluqdar holding any taluqdari land or a cadet    of  a taluqdari  family  any taluqdari land hereditarily  for  the purpose  of maintenance immediately before the  coming  into force of this Act, shall be deemed to be an occupant  within the meaning of the Code or any other law for the time  being in force. (2)Nothing in sub-section (1) shall be deemed to affect- (a)the right of any person to hold any taluqdari land wholly or  partially  exempt  from payment of  land  revenue  under special contract or any law for the time being in force; (b)the  right of any person to pay Jama under any  agreement or  settlement  recognised  under  section  23  or  under  a declaration  made under section 22 of the Taluqdars’ Act  so long as such agreement, settlement or declaration remains in force under the provisions of this Act." Now, the argument on behalf of the appellants has  proceeded on  the  following  lines;  learned  counsel  for  them  has submitted that the expression " Taluqdari land " is  defined as  land  forming  part  of  a  taluqdari  estate;  but  the expression  " taluqdari estate" is not defined,  though  the expression  "  Taluqdari  tenure "  is  defined;  therefore, taluqdari estate can only mean, 400 such  land  or  estate  in  which  the  taluqdar  has   some subsisting interest; but in " Lal-liti " lands, at least  of the  taluqdar  retains  no interest after  the  grant,  and, therefore,  " Lal-liti " land is not taluqdari  land  within the  meaning of s. 5 of the Abolition Act.  We have  now  to consider the soundness of this line of argument. In the High Court as also before us an attempt was  made  on behalf  of  the respondents to establish that  the  taluqdar retained  a reversionary right to " Lalliti " lands in  case the  holder  died  without any heir.  The  High  Court  said rightly in our opinion, that on the materials placed  before it,   it  could  not  be  said  that  the  respondents   had established  that position.  The High Court then  considered the  meaning of the expression ’ taluqdari estate’ and  said that  it  was  used  in a  descriptive  sense  and  was  not equivalent  to the expression ’Taluqdar’sestate’.  Said  the High Court: "  Therefore,  the  expression " Taluqdari  estate  "  is  a comprehensive  expression including all lands which  at  one

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time  belonged  to  the Taluqdar.  In the eye  of  the  law, although  the  lands  might  have  been  alienated  by   the Taluqdar,  they still form part of the  estate.   Therefore, the expression is more an expression indicating a particular tenure  rather  than a particular interest  enjoyed  by  the Taluqdar . .................................................  ...........................................................  ...........................................................  ............... Therefore, if the lands, the subject matter of the petition did at any time belong to the Taluqdar which he  subsequently  alienated, they would be  covered  by  the definition  in  the Act of 1949, not withstanding  the  fact that when the Act was passed the Taluqdar had no interst  in those lands." We are in agreement with the view thus expressed by the High Court.   Having regard to the history of the gig Lal-liti  " lands  to which we have earlier adverted and the  provisions of  the Gujrat Taluqdars’ Act, 1888, it is manifestly  clear that  "  Lal-liti  " lands are lands which form  part  of  a taluqdari  estate, even though no ’ jama’ was actually  paid for  such  lands to the taluqdar or to  Government.   It  is necessary to refer here 401 to  ss.  4,  5 and 22 of the Gujrat  Taluqdars’  Act,  1888. Section 4 empowers the Government to direct a revenue survey of   any  Taluqdari  estate;  section  5    lays   down what particulars the Settlement Registers prepared by the  Survey Officer in respect of a taluqdari estate shall contain.  One of  such particulars is " the name and description  and  the nature and extent of interest of every alienee and of  every incumbrancer  of the estate or any portion thereof  together with  a specification of (i) the aggregate area  over  which such interest extends; (ii) the amount and nature of rent or land revenue, if any, payable or receivable by such  alienee and incumbrancer, etc.".  It is not disputed before us,  and the  High Court has referred to it, that in  the  Settlement Registers  prepared  in  respect  of  the  two  villages  in question under s. 5 of the Gujrat Taluqdars’ Act, 1888,  the interest of the appellants in the " Lal-liti " lands held by them  was shown as comprised within the  Dhanduka  Taluqdari estate.   This clearly showed that these " Lal-liti "  lands formed part of a taluqdari estate, apart altogether from the question  what  interest, if any, the taluqdar  retained  in them  after  the  alienation.   Section  22  of  the  Gujrat Taluqdars’  Act,  1888, also points the same way.   It  lays down  how  the  " jama " of a taluqdar’s  estate  is  to  be calculated:  it  says  that  the  aggregate  of  the  survey assessments  of the lands composing such estate, minus  such deduction,  if  any, as the Government shall  in  each  case direct,  shall be the " jama ". Along with  their  petition, the  appellants filed an annexure marked A": that  annexure, besides  showing  the  lands  of  the  appellants  within  a taluqdari  estate, also showed the "Jama " payable for  each plot of land.  This again showed that whether the "jama " be actually  paid  or not, the " Lal-liti " lands held  by  the appellants   formed   part  of  a  taluqdari   estate.    We accordingly hold that learned counsel for the appellants  is not right in his contention that " Lal-liti " lands are  not part   of  a  taluqdari  estate  and,  therefore,  are   not ’taluqdari lands’ within the meaning of the Abolition Act. Learned  counsel for the appellants referred us  to  certain decisions of the Bombay High Court as to the 402       meaning of the expression " Taluqdar’s estate "  in s. 31 of the Gujrat Taluqdars’ Act, 1888, and contended that it

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meant  an  estate  held  by  the  Taluqdar  as  a   Taluqdar and on the same analogy, he urged that land forming  part of a taluqdari estate must also mean land in which the taluqdar has  some interest as a taluqdar (Khoda  Bhai  v.  Chaganlal (1),  Bichesbha  Mansangji  v. Vela  Dhanji  Patel  (2)  and Taluqdari Settlement Officer v. Chhagan Lal Dwarkadas (3) ). We do not think that those decisions are of any help to  the appellants  for the simple reason that the analogy does  not apply;  we  are concerned here not with the meaning  of  the expression  " taluqdar’s estate " occurring in s. 31 of  the Gujrat  Taluqdars’  Act,  1888, but with the  meaning  of  a different expression, viz.  " taluqdari estate " in s.  2(3) of  the Abolition Act.  Moreover, in some of  the  decisions relied  on  by the learned counsel, it was  recognised  that there  was  a  distinction between  taluqdar’s  estate’  and ’taluqdari estate.   We were also addressed at some length on the effect of the relinquishment of his land by the taluqdar in favour of  the Collector (Nathuram Hiraram Thakur v. The Secretary of State for India(4)) or the effect of an attachment of the  village under s. 144 of the Revenue Code on failure of the  taluqdar to  pay  the  assessment  (Tulla  Sobharam  Pandya  v.   The Collector  of  Kaira  (5)).  We do  not  think  that  it  is necessary in the present case to consider those questions. We  now  go  to  the second point urged  on  behalf  of  the appellants.  This point was not urged before, nor considered by, the High Court in the writ application in which it  gave its  leading  judgment.  The appellants wished to  urge  the point  in the High Court on their own application, but  were told  that  if  the  decision of  the  High  Court  in  Writ Application  No.  1098  of  1954  was  wrong,  it  could  be corrected only by this Court.  The argument on this point is based on s. 5(1) of the Abolition Act, which we have  quoted earlier, and is in two parts: firstly, it is contended  that if clauses (a) (1)  (1907) 9 Bom.  L.R. 1122. (2)  (1909) 11 Bom.  L.R. 736. (3)  (191O) 12 Bom.  L.R. 903. (4)  (1929) 32 Bom.  L.R. 907. (5) (1918) 20 Bom.  L.R. 748. 403 and (b) of sub-section (1) of s. 5 are read together, the only  reasonable  conclusion is that clause  (a)  is  merely declaratory  and  clause  (b) is the  operative  clause  and according  to that operative clause, the persons who  become liable  for payment of land revenue are only two in  number, namely, (1) a taluqdar holding any taluqdari land and (2)  a cadet of a taluqdari family holding any taluqdari land  with hereditary rights for the purpose of maintenance immediately before  the  coming into force of the  Abolition  Act,  and, therefore,  the holder of " Lal-liti " lands, assuming  them to  be  taluqdari  lands, has no liability  under  s.  5(1); secondly,  it is contended that even if clauses (a) and  (b) of subsection (1) of s. 5 are read distributively the holder of Lal-liti " lands has still no liability, because cl.  (a) makes taluqdari lands liable to the payment of land  revenue in  accordance with the provisions of the Revenue  Code  and there is no provision in that Code under which a "  Lal-liti " holder can be made liable to the payment of land revenue. We take the first part of the argument first.  How should we read  clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of s. 5 of  the Abolition  Act ? Learned counsel for the  appellants  states that  if clause (a) is also read as a clause which  operates to charge all taluqdari lands with liability for payment  of land  revenue, then clause (b) becomes a wholly  unnecessary

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surplusage.   On  the other hand, learned  counsel  for  the respondents  points out that if the intention was to  fasten liability  on two categories of persons only, taluqdars  and cadets,  then clause (a) was really unnecessary.   We  think that  both the clauses have a meaning and  purpose.   Clause (a) makes all taluqdari lands liable to the payment of  land revenue  in  accordance with the provisions of  the  Revenue Code.   Section 3 of the Abolition Act  abolishes  taluqdari tenure  and  extinguishes all its incidents.  If  there  was only  abolition of taluqdari tenures without anything  more, there  would  have been a void.  Obviously  enough,  it  was necessary to say what would happen to taluqdari lands  after abolition  of the taluqdari tenure.  Therefore,  clause  (a) states that all taluqdari lands shall be liable, 404 to  the  payment  of land revenue  in  accordance  with  the provisions of the Revenue Code.  What then is the meaning of clause (b)?  It is a deeming provision by which the taluqdar and  his cadet shall be deemed to be an occupant within  the meaning  of  the Revenue  Code; and I  occupant’  under  the Revenue  Code  means  a  holder  in  actual  possession   of unalienated  land’.The word  ’alienated’ has also a  special meaning  in the Revenue Code; it means I transferred  in  so far  as the rights of Government to payment of rent or  land revenue are concerned, wholly or partially, to the ownership of any person’.  Clause (b) merely clarifies the position of the taluqdar and his cadet under the Abolition Act; it  does not  in  any way derogate from clause (a); nor does  it  cut down  the width of amplitude of clause (a).  We are  of  the view  that clauses (a) and (b) should be read together,  but not  in the sense suggested by the learned counsel  for  the appellants.   Clause (b) clarifies the position as  respects two categories of persons; but that does not mean that if  a third  category of persons properly come under  clause  (a), they  will  not be liable to payment of land  revenue  on  a specious  and unwarranted assumption that clause (b) as  the operating clause cuts down the amplitude of clause (a).  The true  view  is that clause (a) is a  general  provision  and applies  the  Revenue  Code to all  taluqdari  lands,  while clause (b) is a particular deeming provision with regard  to the taluqdar and his cadet. Now, as to the second part of the argument.  It is necessary to read here s. 136(1) of the Revenue Code: "  Section  136  (1): In the case of  unalienated  land  the occupant,  and  in the case of alienated land  or  taluqdari land, the superior holder, shall be primarily liable to  the State  Government  for  the payment of  the  land  revenue,, including all arrears of land revenue, due in respect of the land.   Joint occupants and joint holders who are  primarily liable  under  this section shall be jointly  and  severally liable." The  question  is if the holder of " Lal-liti  "  lands  is, after the Abolition Act, an occupant of unalienated 405 land  within  the meaning of s. 136; if he is,  then  he  is liable  to the payment of land revenue under s. 5(1)(a)   of the Abolition Act read with s. 136 of the Revenue Code.   In dealing  with  this  question, which  has  caused    us some anxiety,  we must remember the meaning of the expressions  ’ occupant’  and  ’alienated’ used in the Revenue  Code.   The argument on behalf of the appellants is that a " Lal-liti  " holder   is  not  an  occupant  of  unalienated  land;   the respondents contend that he is, after the enforcement of the Abolition  Act.  On a careful consideration of the  question we  have come to the conclusion that the contention  of  the

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respondents is correct. In  respect  of  "  Lal-liti "  lands,  Government  made  no ,separate  settlement  with the holder of  such  lands;  the settlement   was  made  with  the  taluqdar,  within   which settlement  " Lal-liti " lands were included.  The right  of Government to payment of land revenue was never  transferred to  the holder of " Lal-liti " lands though it is true  that some  of  the taluqdars got a deduction under s. 22  of  the Gujrat Taluqdars’ Act, 1888, for the " Lal-liti " lands.  We have  been  addressed  at some length as  to  what  was  the position  of taluqdars and " Lal-liti " holders previous  to the Abolition Act.  On behalf of the respondents it has been submitted  that one characteristic of the  taluqdari  tenure was  that  the taluqdari estate was  neither  alienated  nor unalienated within the meaning of the Revenue Code;  because the  taluqdars were not grantees of the British but  enjoyed proprietary  rights in their estates even before the  advent of  British rule.  As to " Lal-liti " lands, they  were  not generally taken into account at the time of calculating  the "  jama " payable by the taluqdars to Government; and  as  a result,  they were not covered by the  Settlement  guarantee operating  in  favour of the taluqdar.   Therefore,  so  the argument on behalf of the respondents has proceeded, holders of  "Lal-liti"  lands  became  liable  to  payment  of  full assessment on the footing that they became occupants 52 406 of unalienated land, with effect from the date on which  the Abolition  Act  came into force.  Learned  counsel  for  the respondents  has  also drawn our attention to  the  list  of amendments  in  the Revenue Code made by Schedule 1  of  the Abolition  Act  in  support  of  his  contention  that   the taluqdars and all taluqdari lands have been brought into the scheme of the Revenue Code by the necessary amendments of s. 136 and other sections of the Revenue Code. The narrow question before us is, as we have stated earlier, whether   a  "  Lal-liti  "  holder  is  an  ’occupant’   of "unalienated  land’ within the meaning of the Revenue  Code. We are of the view that whatever may have been his  position earlier,  on  the abolition of the taluqdari tenure  by  the Abolition  Act  he became a holder in actual  possession  of land in respect of which the Government had not  transferred its rights to the payment of revenue, wholly or partially to the ownership of any person. Therefore,   the  second  point  urged  on  behalf  of   the appellants fails in both parts. We  need  notice very briefly three other  points  urged  on behalf  of the appellants; because we are in  such  complete agreement  with the High Court with regard to them, that  it is  unnecessary to re-state in detail the reasons which  the High Court has already given. (1)  As  to the saving clause (c) of s. 17 of the  Abolition Act,  the High Court has rightly pointed out that it is  the usual saving clause which says in effect that the repeal  of the  Gujrat ’ Taluqdars’ Act, 1888, shall not be  deemed  to effect  any declaration made or any agreement or  settlement recognised  etc. under the provisions of the  repealed  Act. The  aforesaid saving clause affords, no protection  against the liability imposed by s. 5 of the Abolition Act. (2)  Learned  counsel  also  relied on  s.  5(2)(a)  of  the Abolition  Act,  before its repeal by  the  Bombay  Personal Inams Abolition Act, 1952 (Bombay Act 42 of 1953), and based his  alternative claim thereon.  Here again, the High  Court rightly  pointed out that there was no special  contract  in favour  of  the appellants as to exemption from  payment  of

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land revenue 407 nor was there any law for the time being in force (after the Abolition  Act)  which granted the holder of  "  Lal  -liti" lands exemption, wholly or partially, from pay-ment of  land revenue;  therefore,  the  appellants were  entitled  to  no protection under s. 5(2)(a) of the Abolition Act till August 1, 1953. (3)  Lastly,  it was submitted that there was  a  settlement for  thirty years with the taluqdari estate in  question  in 1925-26 and in the absence of any fresh settlement under the provisions of the Revenue Code, a "Lal-liti" holder was  not liable  to pay land revenue within that period.  This  point is completely answered by s. 4 of the Abolition Act which in terms  says  that  all revenue surveys  or  revised  revenue surveys  of  taluqdari  estates under s.  4  of  the  Gujrat Taluqdars’  Act,  1888,  and all settlement  made  shall  be deemed  to have been made under Chapters VIII and  VIIIA  of the  Revenue  Code and the settlement  registers  and  other records  prepared  at such surveys shall be deemed  to  have been  prepared  under the corresponding  provisions  of  the Revenue  Code.   We know that the "Lal-liti" lands  of  this case  were shown in the Settlement Registers prepared  under the Gujrat Taluqdars’ Act, 1888.  In view of the  provisions of  s.  4  of the Abolition Act,  no  fresh  settlement  was necessary. For  the  reasons given above, we hold that  the  appellants have  failed to show that the decision of the High Court  is wrong.  The appeal is accordingly dimissed with costs.                                Appeal dismissed. 408