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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 7194 2000

PETITIONER: RATANSINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: VIJAYSINGH AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       11/12/2000

BENCH: K.T.Thomas, R.P.Sethi

JUDGMENT:

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     J U D G M E N T THOMAS, J.  Leave granted.

     A  decree-holder  after  securing a decree  went  into slumber and remained as such for a pretty long period like a Rip  Van Winkle.  When he awoke he realised that his  decree became  rust  corroded  and lost its enforceability  due  to efflux  of a number of years.  In his search to find out  at least  a  straw to cling on he came across an order  of  the High  Court  by  which  a Second  Appeal  preferred  by  his opposite  party was dismissed as time barred.  The Execution Court  resuscitated  the  decree with the help of  the  said order,  but the District Court in a revision held otherwise. This  appeal  by Special Leave is against the order  of  the District  Court  as  the High Court shut its  door  for  the decree-holder when he knocked at it.  The High Court pointed out  to  him  that the revisional powers of the  High  Court under  Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short the Code) had already been exercised by the District Court on  which such powers were delegated in the State of  Madhya Pradesh.

     The  decree which the appellant succeeded in obtaining was  one  for  possession of the suit property.   The  trial court passed the decree on 14.12.1970.  The respondent filed the  First  Appeal  against  it  but  it  was  dismissed  on 1.8.1973.    The  execution  petition   was  filed  only  on 24.3.1988  which  obviously  was beyond time  fixed  by  the Limitation  act.  Then appellant thought of availing himself of  the  benefit  of an order passed by the  High  Court  on 31.3.1976 when the High Court rejected a Second Appeal filed by  the  respondent against the decree and judgment  of  the first  appellate court.  That order of rejection was  passed only  on  the  ground that the delay in  filing  the  Second Appeal  was  not properly explained.  As the  appellant  now made  an endeavour to utilize the said order we may  extract

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the material portion of it hereunder:

     In  the  light  of the foregoing  discussion,  it  is apparent  that  the cause does not appear to be genuine  and even  if it is true, it has arisen due to the negligence  or inaction  of  the appellant and his counsel.  A cause  which has  arisen  due  to  the  negligence  or  inaction  of  the appellant  and/or  his  counsel,  cannot be  said  to  be  a sufficient  cause.  In the result, I find that no sufficient cause  for condonation of delay in the filing of this appeal has  been  made out.  The application has, therefore, to  be rejected  and  is accordingly rejected.  Consequent  to  the rejection  of  this  application,  the  appeal  also  stands dismissed as barred by time.  I make no order as to costs.

     Though  the ending statement in the said order is that the  appeal also stands dismissed, a reading of the order as a  whole  makes  it  clear that the second  appeal  was  not entertained on merits at all.  The High Court considered the only  question  whether  the  second  appeal  filed  by  the judgment debtor could be treated as valid appeal to be heard on  merits.   As  the High Court found that the  appeal  was presented  after the expiry of the period of limitation  and since  there  was  no valid explanation for the  delay,  the application  for  condonation  of  delay was  liable  to  be dismissed and consequently the second appeal was rejected.

     Learned  counsel for the appellant contended before us that  dismissal of the second appeal would make the position different  as  the  time  would run from the  date  of  such dismissal.     He   adopted   a   second   contention   that interpretation  of  law of limitation should be such  as  to prevent the scuttling of the remedy.

     Article 136 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act 1963 provides  12  years for execution of any decree or order  of any  civil  court (other than a decree granting a  mandatory injunction).    The  third  column  in  the  Article   which indicates  the time from which period begins to run,  states that when the decree or order becomes enforceable.

     The  forerunner of the said Article in the  Limitation Act,  1908, (for short the old Limitation Act) was Article 182.   It worded like this:  For the execution of a  decree or  order of any civil court not provided for by Article 183 or  by  section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908   3 years  (or where a certified copy of the decree or order has been registered  6 years).  The time from which the period would  begin to run was shown as (1) the date of the  decree or  order, or (2) where there has been an appeal the date of the  final  decree or order of the appellate court,  or  the withdrawal  of the appeal.  (There are some other items also in the third column of the Article but they are not relevant for  the  purpose of this case).  Section 48 of the old  CPC prescribed a period of 12 years before the expiry of which a fresh  application could be made for execution.  It must  be noted that the present Limitation Act has amended Section 48 of  the old CPC.  The position under Article 182 of the  old Limitation  Act  was quite different from its  corresponding Article  136  of the present Limitation Act.  Now period  of execution  of a decree starts running from the date when  it becomes  enforceable.   In the Objects and  Reasons  for introducing  the bill for altering the parameters of Article 182 following has been stated, inter alia, thus:

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     Existing  Article  182 has been a fruitful source  of litigation  and therefore the proposed Art.135 (now Art.136) in  lieu  thereof,  provides  that  the  maximum  period  of limitation  for  the execution of a decree or order  of  any civil  court shall be 12 years from the date when the decree or  order  became enforceable (which is usually the date  of the  decree  or  order) or, where the decree  or  subsequent order  directs  any  payment  of money or  delivery  of  any property  to  be  made  at a certain date  or  at  recurring periods,  from the date of the default in making the payment or  delivery  in  respect of which the  applicant  seeks  to execute  the  decree  or order.  There is no  reason  why  a decree should be kept alive for more than 12 years;  Section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, provides that a decree ceases to be enforceable after 12 years.

     When  is  a decree becoming enforceable?   Normally  a decree  or  order  becomes enforceable from its  date.   But cases are not unknown when the decree becomes enforceable on some  future  date or on the happening of certain  specified events.  The expression enforceable has been used to cover such  decrees  or  orders   also  which  become  enforceable subsequently.

     Filing   of   an   appeal   would   not   affect   the enforceability  of  the decree, unless the  appellate  court stays  its operation.  But if the appeal results in a decree that  would  supersede the decree passed by the lower  court and  it  is  the  appellate   court  decree  which   becomes enforceable.   When the appellate order does not amount to a decree  there  would be no supersession and hence the  lower court decree continues to be enforceable.

     A  decree  is  defined in Section 2(2) of the  CPC  as under:    Decree   means  the   formal  expression  of   an adjudication  which, so far as regards the Court  expressing it,  conclusively determines the rights of the parties  with regard  to  all or any of the matters in controversy in  the suit  and  may be either preliminary or final.  It shall  be deemed  to  include  the  rejection  of  a  plaint  and  the determination  of  any question within Sec.  144, but  shall not  include- (a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as  an  appeal from an order, or (b) any order of  dismissal for default.

     Explanation.-  A  decree is preliminary  when  further proceedings  have  to  be  taken  before  the  suit  can  be completely  disposed of.  It is final when such adjudication completely  disposes  of  the  suit.    It  may  be   partly preliminary and partly final."

     In  order  that  decision of a court should  become  a decree  there  must  be an adjudication in a suit  and  such adjudication  must have determined the rights of the parties with  regard to all or any of the matters in controversy  in the  suit  and  such determination must be of  a  conclusive nature.   If  those  parameters  are   to  be  applied  then rejection  of application for condonation of delay will  not amount to a decree.  Consequently, dismissal of an appeal as time  barred  is also not a decree.  We are aware that  some decisions  of the High Courts have taken the view that  even rejecting  an appeal on the ground that it was presented out of  time  is  a  decree  within  the  meaning  of  the  said definition.   We  are also aware of the  contrary  decisions rendered  by  High Courts on the same point.   Dealing  with

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some  of  those decisions a Full Bench of the Calcutta  High Court  [S.P.  Mitra, CJ, Sabyasachi Mukherjee, J (as he then was) and S.K.  Datta, J] has held in Mamuda Khateen and ors. vs.  Beniyan Bibi and ors.  (AIR 1976 Calcutta 415) that if the  application  under Section 5 of the Limitation Act  was rejected  the resultant order cannot be decree and the order rejecting  the memorandum of appeal is merely an  incidental order.  The  reasoning of the Full Bench was that  when  an appeal is barred by limitation the appeal cannot be admitted at  all  until  the  application  under  section  5  of  the Limitation  Act  is  allowed  and   until  then  the  appeal petition,  even  if  filed, will remain in  limbo.   If  the application is dismissed the appeal petition becomes otiose. The  order  rejecting  the  memorandum  of  appeal  in  such circumstances  is  merely an incidental order.  We  have  no doubt that the decisions rendered by the High Courts holding the  contrary view do not lay down the correct principle  of law.

     In  such  a  situation the mere fact that  the  second appeal  was  dismissed  as a corollary to the  dismissal  of application  for  condonation of delay has no effect on  the decree passed by the first appellate court.

     Learned  counsel  cited  the decision of a  two  Judge Bench  of  Calcutta High Court in Shyama Pada Choudhury  vs. Saha Choudhury & Co.  & ors.  (AIR 1976 Calcutta 122) as the Bench  repelled  the  contention that the time  would  start running  from the date of the decree of the lower court when the  appellate court did not interfere with the lower  court decree.   That position was adopted in the background  where the  appellate court affirmed the decree of the lower  court though  with  a  slight  modification  regarding  the  costs portion.   In such a situation it was rightly held that  the appellate court decree became enforceable and hence the time would start running from the date of that decree.

     Learned counsel reminded us of the observation made by this  Court  in Anandilal & anr.  vs.  Ram Narain  and  ors. (AIR  1984  SC  1383)  that there is  no  justification  for placing  a  rigid  construction  on the  provisions  of  the Limitation  Act.  But we must remind ourselves of the  other profile   that  in  construing   statutes   of   limitation, considerations  of  hardships  are out of  place.   What  is needed  is a liberal and broad based construction and not  a rigid  or  narrow  interpretation of the provisions  of  the Limitation Act.

     The  observations  of the Privy Council  contained  in Nagendra Nath Dey and anr.  vs.  Suresh Chandra Dey and ors. (AIR  1932 PC 165) cited by the learned counsel do not  help in  the  present  context  as it related to  the  scope  and interpretation  of  Article 182 of the old  Limitation  Act. The  serious departure made by the Parliament from the  said article  to  the present one cannot be lost sight  of  while considering the decisions rendered under the former article.

     So  the  end  result  is   this:   The  decree  became enforceable  on 1.8.1973 when the appellate court passed the decree  which superseded the decree of the trial court.   As no  decree was passed by the High Court in the second appeal the  decree of the first appellate court remained unaffected and  the enforceability once commenced remained  undisturbed for  a period of 12 years therefrom.  The execution  process

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initiated by the appellant long after the expiry of 12 years from  1.8.1973  is  thus  irretrievably  barred.   Hence  no interference  is  called  for.  The  appeal  is  accordingly dismissed.