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PETITIONER: RATAN LAL ADUKIA & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA

DATE OF JUDGMENT19/07/1989

BENCH: VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J) BENCH: VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J) MISRA RANGNATH

CITATION:  1990 AIR  104            1989 SCR  (3) 440  1989 SCC  (3) 537        JT 1989 (3)   148  1989 SCALE  (2)28  CITATOR INFO :  R          1990 SC2072  (31)

ACT:     Indian Railways Act, 1890: Section 80--Suits for compen- sation  against Railways--Choice of forum for cognizance  of suits--Whether  limited by the section itself or  provisions of  Section 20 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Section  18 of  the  Presidency Small Cause Courts Act,  1882  are  also applicable. Statutory  Interpretation--Doctrine of  implied  repeal--Ap- plicability of.

HEADNOTE:     Under Section 80 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890, prior to  its substitution by the Amendment Act, 1961, the  choice of  forum  for filing suits for compensation for  loss,  de- struction,  damage, deterioration or non-delivery  of  goods etc. carried by the Railways was regulated by Section 20  of the Code of Civil Procedure or Section 18 of the  Presidency Small  Cause Courts Act, 1882, as the case may be.  However, the  new  section, besides making specific  reference  to  a certain  class of suits, to be dealt with under the  section and  identifying  the Railways  Administrations  which  were liable  to the claim, also specifically provided the  places where such suits may be instituted.     The appellants filed two separate suits in the courts at Alipore  and Calcutta for recovery of certain  amounts  from the Railways for short deliveries of consignments booked  by them. The respondent contended that in view of Section 80 of the  Indian Railways Act, 1890, the trial  courts  concerned had no jurisdiction. The trial courts rejected the objection and decreed the suits.     In the revisions filed by the respondent, the Full Bench of the High Court, by its common order, held that the  trial courts had no jurisdiction. It was of the view that the  new Section  80, was a complete and self-contained special  law, as to the place of suing, respecting suits envisaged by  the section  derogating from the generally of the provisions  of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1890 and  Section 18  of the Presidency Town Small Cause Courts Act, 1882  and that it brought about an implied repeal of those  provisions

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as to the jurisdiction of 441 courts by itself providing a jurisdiction to those suits.     In  the  appeals before this Court it was  contended  on behalf  of  the appellants that the legislative  intent  was clear: that it did not render Section 80 over-riding, by not expressly  excluding Section 20 of the Code of Civil  Proce- dure,  1890, and that even if the provisions of  Section  80 were  held to be a later special law, the principle  of  im- plied  repeal could not be invoked, as there was  no  incon- sistency  between the two provisions and, on  the  contrary, both sets of provisions could exist and prevail. Dismissing the appeals,     HELD:  The  doctrine of implied repeal is based  on  the postulate that the legislature which is presumed to know the existing  state  of  the law did not intend  to  create  any confusion  by  retaining conflicting  provisions..Courts  in applying  this doctrine, are supposed merely to give  effect to the legislative intent by examining the object and  scope of  the two enactments. But in a conceivable case, the  very existence of two provisions may by itself, lead to an infer- ence of mutual irreconcilability if the later set of  provi- sions is by itself a complete code with respect to the  same matter.  In such a case, the actual detailed  comparison  of the two sets of provisions may not be necessary. [452F-G]     It  is a matter of legislative intent that the two  sets of provisions were not expected to be applied  simultaneous- ly. [452H]     Section  80 is a special provision dealing with  certain class of suits distinguishable on the basis of their partic- ular  subject-matter. It made a conscious departure  on  the law  as to the place of suing in respect of suits  envisaged by that Section, and is a self-contained provision in regard to the choice of fora for such suits. There was no need  for the  legislature to specify the places of suing which  would otherwise be covered by Section 20 C.P.C. unless the special prescription  as  to places of suing was  considered  to  be necessary  in  derogation to the general law as  the  matter contained  in  Section 20 C.P.C. or the  provisions  in  the Small Cause Courts Act. [453B-C]     Assam Cold Storage v. Union of India, AIR 1971 Assam 69; Hindustan  Machine Tools v. Union of India, AIR 1985  Madras 130; Oghamal Chaudhury v. Union of India, [1974] CLJ 420 and Union of India v. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd., AIR 1981 Bombay 414, approved. 442     New  India  Assurance Co. v. Union of  India,  AIR  1981 Delhi  135  and Union of India v. C.R. Prabhanna,  AIR  1977 132, over-ruled.     Shah  Babulal Khimji v. Jaya Ben D. Kania  and  another, [1982]  1 SCR 187; Municipal Council, Palai v.  T.J.  Joseph and others, [1964] 2 SCR 87; Zaver Bhai Amaidas v. State  of Bombay,  AIR 1954 SC 752; Union of India v. Ladu  Lal  Jain, [1964]  3  SCR  624 and Union of India v.  The  Steel  Stock Holders Syndicate, Poona, AIR 1976 SC 879, referred to.

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos.  224  & 734 of 1988.     From the Judgment and Order dated 17.6.87 of the Calcut- ta High Court in Ref. No. 1/83 from C.R. Case No. 2938-40/81 & Civil Order No. 2537/81, C.R. Case No. 75/81, Civil  Order No. 362/82, & C.R. No. 3803 of 1980.

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   Dr.  Shankar Ghosh, Badar Durrez Ahmed,  Parijat  Sinha, A.K. Sarkar, A.K. Sahay for the Appellants.     Kuldip  Singh, Additional Solicitor General, A ,K.  Gan- guli, C.V. Subba Rao, A. Subba Rao and Hemant Sharma for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     VENKATACHALIAH,  J. These appeals, by certificate,  pre- ferred against the common order dated 17.6.1987 of the  High Court of Calcutta in Full Bench Reference 1 of 1983 raise  a short and interesting question, of some general  importance, whether the choice of the forum for the cognizance of  suits envisaged in Section 80 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 (As substituted by Section 14 of the Indian Railways (Amendment) Act,  1961 (Act 39 of 1961) is limited by Section 80  itself or  whether  provisions of Section 20 of the Code  of  Civil Procedure, 1908 and Section 19 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts  Act, 1882, as the cases may be, in regard to  places of  suing, are also applicable to the suits referred  to  in the said Section 80.     The  question, in other words, is whether the said  Sec- tion  80 is a complete, self-contained, exhaustive  Code  in regard to the place of suing respecting suits constituting a special law for such suits excluding, by necessary  implica- tion, the operation of provisions of Section 20 of the  Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Section 18 of the Presidency 443 Small Cause Courts Act, 1882. The Full Bench, resolving  the earlier  conflicts of Judicial opinion in the High Court  on the  points  has held Section 80 as containing within  it  a self-contained  scheme  for suits envisaged by it  and  that Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 18  of the  Presidency Small Cause Courts, Act 1882 stand  excluded from  operation. The Full Bench, however, has left open  the question whether Section 80 also over-rides clause 12 of the letters patent.     2.  In the original proceedings from which C.A.  224  of 1988 arises, appellant instituted Money Suit No. 35 of  1978 against the Respondent in the Court of the 6th Sub-Judge  at Alipore, Distt.--24 Parganas, West Bengal, seeking  recovery of  Rs.  13,200 respecting an alleged short  delivery  of  a consignment  booked  with the Respondent  on  94.4.1975  Ex- Ernakulam  to  Ranchi,  a station under  the  South  Eastern Railway  Administration.  Respondent contested the  suit  on grounds, inter-alia, that having regard to the said  Section 80,  the  Court at Alipore had no jurisdiction.  The  trial- Court by its order 22.5. 1981 having rejected this objection as  to jurisdiction, Respondent preferred C.R. 2938 of  1981 under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, before the High  Court to have that order revised. The matter  was  re- ferred  to a Full-Bench, culminating in the order now  under appeal.     3. In C.A. 734 of 1988, appellant instituted a Suit  No. 3831 of 1985 in the Court of the Small Causes, Calcutta, for the  recovery of a sum of Rs.6,573.50p. on account of  snort deliveries of two consignments booked with the Respondent on 27.4.1984  and 24.7.1984 respectively, Ex-Saugar in  Central Railway to Ramkrishtopur in Eastern Railway. Similar  objec- tion  as to jurisdiction having been urged, the trial  Court rejected  that  objection  and decreed the  suit.  This  was assailed before the High Court by the Respondent. The  Full- Bench,  by its common-order, has held that the  trial  Court had  no jurisdiction and directed the return of  the  plaint for presentation to the proper Court.     4.  In order that the contentions of Dr.  Shankar  Ghosh urged  in support of these appeals are apprehended in  their

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proper  perspective,  it becomes necessary to refer  to  and notice the legislative history of the provision. Section  14 of  the Indian Railways (Amendment) Act,  1961,  substituted the  old  Section  80 by a new provision.  The  old  Section reads:               "Section 80: suit for compensation for  injury               to through booked traffic:               444               Notwithstanding  anything  in  any   agreement               purporting  to limit the liability of  Railway               Administration  with respect to traffic  while               on the Railway of the another  Administration,               a  suit for compensation for loss of the  life               of, or personal injury to, a passenger, or for               loss, destruction or deterioration of  animals               or  goods where the passenger was or the  ani-               mals  or  goods were booked through  over  the               Railways  of two or more  Railway  Administra-               tions,  may  be  brought  either  against  the               Railway Administration from which the  passen-               gers obtained his pass or purchased his  tick-               et,  or  to which the animals  or  goods  were               delivered  by  the consignor thereof,  as  the               case  may be, or against the Railway  Adminis-               tration  on  whose Railway the  loss,  injury,               destruction or deterioration occurred."               The new Section 80 substituted in 1961 by  the               amending Act provides:               "80.  Suits for Compensation: A suit for  com-               pensation for loss of the life of, or personal               injury  to, a passenger or for loss,  destruc-               tion, damage, deterioration or non-delivery of               animals or goods may be instituted.                        (a)  if  the passenger  was,  or  the               animals or goods were, booked from one station               to another on the railway of the same  railway               administration against that railways  adminis-               tration;                        (b)  if  the passenger  was,  or  the               animals or goods were, booked through over the               railway of two or more railway  administration               against the railway administration from  which               the  passenger obtained his pass or  purchased               his  ticket or to which the animals  or  goods               were  delivered for carriage, as the case  may               be,  or against the railway administration  on               whose railway the destination station lies, or               the  loss,  injury,  destruction,  damage   or               deterioration occurred;                              and,  in either case  the  suit               may be instituted in a Court having  jurisdic-               tion  over  the place at which  the  passenger               obtained  his pass or purchased his ticket  or               the  animals or goods were delivered for  car-               riage, as the case may be, or               445               over  the place in which the destination  sta-               tion  lies, or the loss  injury,  destruction,               damage or deterioration occurred." The  changes brought about in the scheme of  the  provisions are quite marked. The old Section did not deal with--liabil- ity  for  claims  in respect of goods carried  by  a  single Railway.  It  concerned itself with goods etc.,  carried  by more than one Railways or what, in the concerned jargon,  is called  "through  booked traffic" and provided that  a  suit

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inter-alia  for loss, destruction, damage, deterioration  or nondelivery could be brought against the Railway Administra- tion  with which the booking had taken place or against  the Railway  Administration  of the delivery  station.  The  old section  spoke nothing of the places where such suits  could be laid. The choice of the forum was regulated by Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure or the relevant provisions of the  Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, as the case may  be. This Court in Union of India v. Ladu Lal Jain, [1964] 3  SCR 624 observed that the principal place of Railway Administra- tion  can be said to be the place where the Railways can  be said  to  carry on business for purposes of  clause  (a)  of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was held:               "The  principle behind the provisions of  Cls.               (a)  and  (b)  of S. 20 is that  the  suit  be               instituted  at a place where the defendant  be               able   to  defend  the  suit   without   undue               trouble."               "  .....  Union of India carries on the  busi-               ness  of running railways and, can be sued  in               the Court of the subordinate Judge of  Gauhati               within  whose  territorial  jurisdiction   the               head-quarters  of one of the railways  run  by               the Union is situated." This  was said in a case governed by the old  Section.  Does the  position continue to hold good even after the new  Sec- tion 80 was substituted in place of the old?     the  new  Section 80 (substituted by Act  39  of  1961), however,  brought about far reaching changes in its  scheme, the  notable amongst them being three. The new Section  made specific reference to a certain class of suits having regard to  their subject-matter, to be dealt with under  that  Sec- tion. Secondly, the new Section also dealt with identity  of the  Railway Administrations which were made liable  to  the claim 446 and,  thirdly, the section specifically provided the  places where such suits "may be instituted". Referring generally to the scope of the changes brought about by the 1961 amendment to  Chapter  VII of the Railways Act, 1890, this  Court,  in Union of India v. The Steel Stock Holders Syndicate,  Poona, AIR 1976 SC 879 observed:               "The  history  and the object with  which  the               radical provisions of the new Act were  intro-               duced  bear testimony to change of the  nature               of  the liability of the  railway  administra-               tion."               "We, therefore, agree with the learned counsel               for the respondent that under the new Act  the               liability of the Railway has been increased so               as to take upon itself the responsibility of a               common carrier."     The  new comprehensiveness of the scheme of  the  amend- ments was one of the circumstances that commended itself  to the  High Court to persuade it to hold that the new  Section 80 in Chapter VII, constituted a complete and self-contained special law as to the place of suing respecting suits envis- aged  by that Section derogating from the generality of  the provisions  of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure  or the provisions touching the jurisdiction of the Small  Cause Courts  and  that with the enactment of the new  Section  80 there  was an implied repeal of those other  provisions  re- specting such suits.     5.  The High Court took due notice of the fact that  the new  Section  did not expressly provide that in  respect  of

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suits  envisaged by it, the provisions of Section 20 of  the Code  of  Civil Procedure or Section 18  of  the  Presidency Small  Cause Courts Act, 1882, as the case may be, shall  no longer  be applicable. The High Court took due note  of  the situation emerging from this omission. It noticed:               "the  new  Section 80, no doubt, did  not  ex-               pressly  provide  that the said  provision  of               Section 80 of the Act would override all other               laws.  But Section 80 of the  Indian  Railways               Act is in the nature of the special  provision               applicable  only  to  suits  for  compensation               against the Railways."               "The point is whether by enacting"  ....   the               suit  may be instituted" in the Courts  having               jurisdiction over the places mentioned in  the               last part of Section 80 of the Indian Railways               Act,  1890, the said Section of  the  Railways               Act by               447               implication overrides section 20 of the  Civil               Procedure  Code,  1908 and Section 18  of  the               Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882."     The  High Court took into consideration what,  according to it, was the real intention in enacting the new Section 80 and was persuaded to the view that the Section brought about an  implied repeal of the other provisions as to the  juris- diction  of  Courts by itself providing  a  jurisdiction  to these suits. It was observed:               "By  mentioning the Courts in which the  suits               for  compensation may be filed, Section 80  of               the Railways Act purports to deal with matters               which  have been dealt with in Section  20  of               the  Code  and Section 18  of  the  Presidency               Small  Causes  Courts Act. These two  sets  of               laws deal with the same subject of territorial               jurisdiction  of  Courts. We  are,  therefore,               required  to ascertain whether in  respect  of               suits  for compensation against the  Railways,               the  intention  was to  override  the  general               law."               "We have already indicated that Section 80  of               the  Railways Act was a particular or  special               legislation.  Section 80 of the  Railways  Act               purports  to deal with the subject  of  places               for  instituting  particular  class  of  suits               which was previously covered by Section 20  of               the  Code which was a general  enactment.  Two               statutes cover the same field, i.e.,  territo-               rial  jurisdiction. Mentioning for  the  first               time in Section 80 of the Railways Act of  the               places  where  suits for compensation  may  be               instituted  was itself introductive of  a  new               law implying a negative. When the same subject               of  territorial  jurisdiction has  been  dealt               with  in  the  subsequent  legislation  (i.e.,               Section 80 of the Railways Act) the prior laws               (Section 20 of the Code and Section 13 of  the               Presidency Small Cause Courts Act) on the same               subject were not intended to subsist."               "In  other  words, Section 80  of  the  Indian               Railways Act by requiring something special to               be done repealed by necessary implication  the               former general statute relating to territorial               jurisdiction of Courts in so far as the  suits               for  compensation  against the  Railways  were

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             concerned."               Any other construction, according to the  High               Court, would lead               448               to anomalies and render Section 80 a  surplus-               age. High Court said:               "If  it  was  to be held that  clause  (c)  of               Section 20 of the Code still applied to  suits               for  compensation against the  Railways,  then               the cause of action for the purpose of  juris-               diction of Courts would arise not only at  the               three  places mentioned in Section 80  of  the               Act  but  at several other  places.  In  other               words, the provisions of Section 80 of the Act               relating to places where the suits for compen-               sation  may be instituted, would be,  in  that               event, surplusage and unnecessary."     6.  In the view of the High Court, the  distinction  be- tween  provisions in the New Section 80 on the one hand  and Section  20 of the Code of Civil Procedure or Section 18  of the Small Cause Courts Act on the other, assumed  particular significance  as  qualifying  the  Court’s  jurisdiction  in respect  of  a particular subject-matter  as  distinct  from those  that relate to a Court’s territorial jurisdiction  or pecuniary jurisdiction. The High Court observed:               "Section  80 of the Railways Act,  in  effect,               limits  the application of Section 20  of  the               Code by specifying the Courts which shall have               jurisdiction  over  the  suits  whose  subject               matter  is the claim for compensation  against               the  Railways  for loss of  life  or  personal               injury  to a passenger or  loss,  destruction,               damage,   deterioration  or  non-delivery   of               animals  or goods. We have already  held  that               Section  80 of the Act, in other words  is  in               the  nature of a special provision in  respect               of classes of suits mentioned in Section 80 of               the Indian Railways Act."     7. Dr. Shankar Ghosh assailing the soundness of the High Court’s  view, urged that the proposition on which its  con- clusions  rest, if accepted, would render what was  intended as  a mere an enabling entitlement to lose its character  as such  and  become, on the contrary, a  limiting  factor  and convert  a right into a liability. Dr. Ghosh said  that  the legislative  intent was clear; it did not render Section  80 over-riding  by  not expressly excluding Section 20  of  the Code  of  Civil Procedure. It expressly supplied,  says  Dr. Ghosh,   an   enabling   provision   when   it   chose   the expression"   .....  may be instituted". It is further  con- tended  that  the doctrine of implied  repeal  was,  clearly inapplicable to the situation. 449 Dr.  Ghosh  commended for acceptance the  reasoning  of  the Assam and Madras High Courts, in Assam Cold Storage v. Union of  India, AIR 1971 Assam 69 and Hindustan Machine fools  v. Union of India, AIR 1985 Madras 130, respectively, in  pref- erence  to  the  views of the Calcutta,  Bombay,  Delhi  and Karnataka  High  Courts  in Oghamal Chaudhury  v.  Union  of India,  [1974] CLJ 420; Union of India v. Indian  Hume  Pipe Co.  Ltd., AIR 1981 Bombay 414; New India Assurance  Co.  v. Union  of  India, AIR 1981 Delhi 135 and Union of  India  v. C.R. Prabhanna, AIR 1977 132 respectively.     8. The thrust of the arguments of Dr. Ghosh is that  the construction  placed by the High Court ignores  the  crucial aspect  that  while the old Section 80 did  not  render  the

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destination  railway as such, liable to be sued if loss  was not proved to have occurred there, the new Section, however, renders  the destination Railway also liable even though  no loss  occurred  there. The provision in the new  Section  80 enabling  the  suit  to be instituted at the  place  of  the destination  Railway, where no part of the cause  of  action might otherwise be shown to have arisen, was, it is urged, a mere consequential provision--to give effect to the substan- tive  provision, that the destination Railway was  also  li- able. Dr. Ghosh emphasised the expression "may be  institut- ed"  in Section 80 to reinforce his contention that  Section 80 did really expand the rights of and not seek to  restrict therein  suitors. Learned counsel also emphasised that  sec- tion  80  did  not contain  any  words  expressly  excluding clauses (a) and (b) of Section 20, Code of Civil  Procedure, in  so  far as suits contemplated by Section  80  were  con- cerned. The new Section 80, it is contended, did not  intend to impair the choice of the forum afforded by Section 20  of the  Code  of Civil Procedure and that  any  contrary  view, offends settled principles of statutory construction guiding the matter. Learned counsel invited attention to the follow- ing  observations  in Ajay Kumar Banerjee & Others  etc.  v. Union of India & Others etc., [1984] 3 SCR 252 at page 282:               "The  general rule to be followed in  case  of               conflict  between  two statutes  is  that  the               later  abrogates  the earlier  one.  In  other               words,  a prior special law, would yield to  a               later  general law, if either of the two  fol-               lowing conditions is satisfied:               (i) The two are inconsistent with each other;               (ii)  There is some express reference  in  the               later to the earlier enactment.               450               If  either  of these two  conditions  is  ful-               filled,  the later law, even  though  general,               would prevail." and  submitted that even if, conversely, the  provisions  of Section 80 are held to be a later special law, the principle of  implied  repeal  could not be invoked as  there  was  no inconsistency  between the two provisions and that,  on  the contrary, both set of provisions could co-exist and prevail. Learned counsel invited our attention to and relied upon the following  passage  in Shah Babulal Khimji v.  Jaya  Ben  D. Kania and Another, [1982] 1 SCR 187:               "We find ourselves in complete agreement  with               the  arguments  of Mr. Sorabjee  that  in  the               instant case S. 104 read with Order 43, Rule 1               does not in any way abridge, interfere with or               curb  the powers conferred on the Trial  Judge               by  Clause  15  of the  Letters  Patent.  What               Section 104 read with Order 43, Rule 1 does is               merely to give an additional remedy by way  of               an  appeal from the orders of the Trial  Judge               to a larger Bench." The  learned counsel also placed reliance on  the  following observations  of  this  Court in  Municipal  Council,  Palai v.T.J. Joseph and Others, [1964] 2 SCR 87 at page 98:               "In order to ascertain whether there is repug-               nancy  or  not this Court has  laid  down  the               following  principles  in Deep  Chand  v.  The               State of Uttar Pradesh,:                    1.  Whether  there  is  direct   conflict               between the two provisions;                    2.  Whether the legislature  intended  to               lay down an exhaustive code in respect of  the

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             subject matter replacing the earlier law;               3.  Whether  the  two  laws  occupy  the  same               field."     9. Reliance was also placed on Section 21-A inserted  by Section 4 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts (West  Bengal Amendment) Act, 1980 which provides:               "21A.  Act  to override other  laws  including               Letters  Patent:  The provisions of  this  Act               shall have effect notwithstanding               451               anything  to  the contrary in any  other  law,               including in particular the Letters Patent  of               the High Court." to contend that the construction opted for by the High Court would run in the teeth of this express provision.     10. Lastly, learned counsel invited our attention to the following passage in Crawford on Statutory construction:               "All  laws  are  presumed to  be  passed  with               deliberation,  and with full knowledge of  all               existing cases on the same subject, it is  but               reasonable  to conclude that the  Legislature,               in passing a statute, did not intend to inter-               fere with or abrogate any former law  relating               to  the  same  matter,unless  the   repugnancy               between  the two is irreconcilable.  Bowen  v.               Lease,  5 Will 225. It is a rule, says Sedwick               that a general statute without negative  words               will not repeal the particular provisions of a               former  one, unless the two acts are  irrecon-               cilably inconsistent."                                                              (p.               633)               "And,  as  we have already  suggested,  it  is               essential  that  the  new  statute  cover  the               entire  subject matter of the  old;  otherwise               there  is no indication. of the intent of  the               Legislature  to abrogate the old  law.  Conse-               quently,  the  latter enactment will  be  con-               structed  as  continuation of  the  old  one."               (624) It  was urged that repeal by implication is not to  be  pre- sumed and that, on the contrary, there is always presumption against  a repeal by implication. In order that there  be  a repeal by implication, there should be a clear, irreconcila- ble  conflict  between the two sets of  provisions  and  the later  enactment should be an exhaustive code in  itself  in respect  of  the subject matter. On these  submissions,  Dr. Ghosh says that the view taken by the High Court is  clearly unsustainable in law.     11.  The contention emphasised is that where  a  statute merely  recognises  a right pre-existing in  common-law  and provides  a  remedy, such a remedy, unless the  statute  ex- pressly  bans or excludes other remedies, could only  be  an additional or concurrent one open to an election. It  is true that where a statute does not itself bring  into being a 452 new  right  not  a pre-existing right and  also  provides  a remedy  therefore so however that the right and  the  remedy cannot  be said to have been brought into existence for  the first  time uno-flatu, such a remedy would not generally  be held  to be exclusive but only an additional and  concurrent one, along with the pre-existing remedies, unless there  are express indications to the contrary in the statute itself.     In Municipal Council, Palai v. T.J. Joseph, [1964] 2 SCR

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87,  this Court considered the tests of  repugnancy  applied under  Article 254(2) of the Constitution, relevant  in  the examination  of  circumstances  bringing  about  an  implied repeal.  Strictly speaking the examination of  the  question whether an act of Parliament prevails against the law enact- ed by a State under Article 254, does not really involve any question  of repeal. In Zaver Bhai Amaidas v. State of  Bom- bay, AIR 1954 SC 752 this Court applied the test conversely, of  the principle of implied repeal to cases  of  repugnancy under Article 254(2). It was observed:               "It is true, as already pointed out, that on a               question  under Art. 25(1) whether an  Act  of               Parliament  prevails  against  a  law  of  the               State,  no question of repeal arises, but  the               principle on which the rule of implied  repeal               rests,  namely, that if the subject-matter  of               the  later legislation is identical with  that               of the earlier, so that they cannot both stand               together, then the earlier is repealed by  the               later enactment, will be equally applicable to               a  question trader Art. 254(2) where the  fur-               ther  legislation by Parliament is in  respect               of the same matter as that of the State law." The  doctrine  of implied repeal is based on  the  postulate that the legislature which is presumed to know the  existing state  of the law did not intend to create any confusion  by retaining  conflicting provisions. Courts, in applying  this doctrine, are supposed merely to give effect to the legisla- tive  intent  by examining the object and scope of  the  two enactments. But in a conceivable case, the very existence of two  provisions may by itself, and without more, lead to  an inference  of mutual irreconcilability if the later  set  of provisions is by itself a complete code with respect to  the same  matter. In such a case the actual detailed  comparison of the two sets of provisions may not be necessary. It is  a matter of legislative intent that the two sets of provisions were  not expected to be applied simultaneously. Section  80 is a special provi- 453 sion.  It deals with certain class of suits  distinguishable on the basis of their particular subject-matters.     The  High  Court  has come to the  conclusion  that  new Section  80 made a conscious departure on the law as to  the place of suing in respect of suits of a particular  subject- matter  envisaged by that Section. The High Court  has  held that  the  new Section 80 is a  selfcontained  provision  in regard  to the choice of fora for such suits.  According  to the  High  Court, there was no need for the  legislature  to specify the places of suing which would otherwise be covered by  Section 20 C.P.C. unless the special prescription as  to places  of suing was considered to be necessary--in  deroga- tion  to the general law as contained in Sec. 20 CPC or  the provisions in the Small cause Courts Act.     As  to the words "may be instituted" occurring  in  that Section, the High Court observed:               "The use of the expression ’may be instituted’               in Section 80 of the Railways Act was  equiva-               lent  to  ’shall be  instituted’.  Section  80               conferred right to institute suits for compen-               sation  against  the Railways  for  breach  of               their  obligations  for  carrying  passengers,               animals  or goods specified in Chapter VII  of               the  Indian Railways Act. Both the  obligation               on  the part of the Railways and the right  of               the  consignor and the consignee to  institute

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             suits  are now statutory in their nature.  The               clear  intendment of the Legislature was  that               it  would be obligatory for the plaintiffs  to               institute  suits only in the Courts  mentioned               in Section 80 of the Railways Act for enforce-               ment  of the claims for  compensation  against               the Railways."     12. After a consideration of the matter, we are inclined to the view that the reasoning of and the conclusion reached by  the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court that  the  new Section  80 is a selfcontained provision are sound  and  re- quire to be preferred to the view expressed by the Assam and the Madras High Courts. The view of the Full-Bench is to  be preferred  having regard to the weight and preponderance  of the  relevant  interpretatory criteria. No  appeal,  in  our opinion, could be made to Section 21A of the State Amendment to  the Small Cause Courts Act either, in as much  as,  that provision  cannot  be understood to have  been  intended  to cover a situation of the present 454 type.  It does not exclude a special law applicable  to  and governing a distinct class of subject matter intended to  be covered by that special law.     In the result, for the fore-going reasons, these appeals fail  and are dismissed; but in the  circumstances,  without any directions as to costs. N.P.V.                                    Appeals dismissed. 455