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PETITIONER: RATAN GOND

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF BIHAR

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 19/09/1958

BENCH: DAS, S.K. BENCH: DAS, S.K. IMAM, SYED JAFFER KAPUR, J.L.

CITATION:  1959 AIR   18            1959 SCR 1336  CITATOR INFO :  R          1984 SC1622  (18)

ACT: Evidence-Statement of dead person not made in judicial  pro- ceeding or to Person authorised nor relating to the cause of his  death-Admissibility-Confession-Person  in  authority  - Circumstantial Evidence-Use in corroboration of  confession- Indian Evidence Act, (1 of 1872), SS. 24, 32 and 33.

HEADNOTE: The  appellant  was  charged  with  the  murder  of  a  girl Baisakhi.  On information given by Aghani, younger sister of the  deceased,  the headless body of the  deceased  was  re- covered.   The appellant absconded but was found in  another village and was brought back by the village volunteer force. On interrogation by the Mukhia, Sarpanch and a panch of  the Gram   Panchayat   the  appellant  made   an   extrajudicial confession.   A blood-stained cutting weapon  was  recovered from a room of the appellant.  At his instance some  strands of hair were recovered from a place at a short distance 1337 from the place where the dead body had been recovered, which were stained with human blood and appeared to be scalp  hair of  a  human  female.   The  appellant  was  convicted   and sentenced to death and the High Court upheld the  conviction and  sentence.   The  Courts  took  into  consideration  the statements made by Aghani to her mother and to other persons that  the  deceased  was last seen in  the  company  of  the appellant.  Aghani, however, died before her statement could be  recorded in a judicial proceeding.  It was contended  by the   appellant   that  the  statements   of   Aghani   were inadmissible,  that  the extra-judicial confession  was  not relevant  and  that  the  circumstantial  evidence  was  not sufficient to establish the guilt of the appellant. Held,  that  the statements of Aghani  were  not  admissible either under S. 32 or S. 33 Of the Evidence Act.  Section 33 had  no  application as her statement was not  made  in  any judicial  proceeding or before any person authorised by  law to  record the same.  The statements did not relate  to  the cause  of her death or to any circumstances relating to  her death  but  related to the death of her sister and  did  not

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fall  under cl. 1 of s. 32 which was the only  clause  which could have any bearing on the question. Held,  further,  that  though having  regard  to  the  Bihar Panchayat  Raj  Act, the Mukhia, Sarpanch and panch  of  the Gram  Panchayat  to whom the extra-judicial  confession  was made  were persons in authority within the meaning Of S.  24 Evidence  Act, no threat, promise or inducement  for  making the confession was proved.  The facts that the appellant was brought  back to the Village by the village volunteer  force and  that  it  took two or three hours before  he  made  the confession  do  not  indicate that the  confession  was  not voluntary.   There was nothing to show that  the  confession contained   any   untrue  or  inaccurate   statement.    The circumstantial  evidence may not be sufficient by itself  to prove the guilt of the appellant, but it afforded sufficient corroboration to the confession and the corroboration was of such a nature as to connect the appellant with the murder.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 76  of 1958. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated March  4, 1958, of the Patna High Court in  Criminal  Appeal No. 50 of 1958 and Death Reference No. 3 of 1958 arising out of  the  judgment and order dated January 18, 1958,  of  the Court  of  the  1st  Additional  Judicial  Commissioner   of Chotanagpur at Ranchi in Sessions Trial No. XC of 1957. B.   R. L. Iyengar, for the appellant. 1338 R. H. Dhebar for the respondent. 1958.   September  19.   The  Judgment  of  the  Court   was delivered by S.   K.  DAS  J.-This is an appeal by  special  leave.   The appellant  is Ratan Gond, aged about 28 years.  Tried  on  a charge under s. 302, Indian Penal Code, he was convicted and sentenced  to  death  by  the  learned  Additional  Judicial Commissioner  of Ranchi in the State of Bihar.  The  learned Additional Judicial Commissioner submitted the record to the High Court of Patna for confirmation of the sentence, as  he was  required  to do under the provisions of s. 374  of  the Code  of Criminal Procedure.  Ratan Gond also  preferred  an appeal  to  the High Court.  The appeal  and  the  reference under  s. 374, Criminal Procedure Code, were heard  together by  a Division Bench of the said High Court and it  accepted the  reference and dismissed the appeal  thereby  confirming the sentence of death passed upon the appellant.  On May 19, 1958,  the appellant prayed for and obtained  special  leave and then filed the present appeal in pursuance of the  leave granted to him. The facts lie within a, narrow compass.  The appellant was a resident  of  village Urte, Tola  Banmunda,  police  station Kolebera in the district of Ranchi.  One Mst.  Jatri (P.  W. 2), who was a widow, also lived in the same village and same Tola.   She had two young daughters, one named Baisakhi  and the  other named Aghani.  Baisakhi was about nine years  old and Aghain about five years old.  The subject of the present appeal  is the murder of the girl Baisakhi.  On  a  Tuesday, May 7, 1957, the two sisters, Baisakhi and Aghani, had  gone out  to Pluck wild berries in a hilly jungle situated  at  a short  distance  from  their  village,  the  distance  being estimated variously by various witnesses from 300 yards to a little more than a mile.  We may give here some idea of  the location  of  the  village  and  the  hilly  area  near  it.

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According  to the evidence of Rup Ram (P.  W. 1),  uncle  of the  two girls, Tola Banmunda consists of about  40  houses. At  a  short distance to the north, there is a  hilly  tract known 1339 as Amtis Chua hill.  Close to the hill, there are jungles on two sides and there is also a spring or well in between  the two  strips of jungles.  On Tuesday, Mst.  Jatri (P.  W.  2) had herself gone to pluck berries known as Keond berries  at another place.  When she left the house in the morning,  her two  daughters were in the house.  Mst.  Jatri came back  at about  noon  and  found  Aghani alone  in  the  house.   She enquired  from  Aghani about the elder sister  Baisakhi  and Aghani  made certain statements to her mother as well as  to other  persons  later that day and the  next  day.   Aghani, however, died within a few months of the occurrence,  before her  statements could be recorded in a judicial  proceeding. The  courts below have referred to, and the High  Court  has relied  on,  the statements of Aghani.  One  of  the  points urged  on behalf of the appellant is that the statements  of Aghani were not admissible in evidence either under s. 32 or s.  33  of the Evidence Act (I of 1872).  As we are  of  the view  that this contention is correct, we are  omitting  all reference  to the statements of Aghani in stating the  facts of the case.  When Baisakhi did not return to the house even in  the evening Mst.  Jatri went in the direction  of  Amtis Chua  hill,  but  could not find  Baisakhi.   Next  morning, information  was sent to Rup Ram (P.  W. 1) about  the  fact that  Baisakhi was missing, Rup Ram having gone  to  village Targa  for  making tiles on the preceding Monday.   Rup  Ram came  back  to Banmunda on Wednesday, May 8, 1957.   In  the meantime  certain other villagers including Dalpat  Sai  (P. W. 4), mukhia of the village, and Sohar (P. W. 5), chaukidar of the village, had been informed that Baisakhi was missing. Aghani took Rup Ram and these villagers to the foot of Amtis Chua hill and showed them the spring or well.  This  village party  found  the  headless  body of  Baisakhi  at  a  short distance from the aforesaid spring.  The body was identified by  Mst.  Jatri and others as the dead body of  Baisakhi  by reason  of the white saree of yellow border  which  Baisakhi was  wearing, five red " churis " round the right hand,  two red " churis " round the 170 1340 left hand, one " bera " round the left hand, one brass  ring on  the  left finger and certain beads of a " mala  "  which Baisakhi  had  put  on.  When the  headless  dead  body  was discovered  and  identified,  Dalpat Sai left  some  of  his companions  to guard the dead body and went to the house  of the appellant, but did not find him there.  He then sent Rup Ram  and the chaukidar to the police station which was at  a distance  of 43 miles.  He also sent some volunteers of  the Gram Panchayat to look for the appellant.  On Thursday,  May 9, 1957, at about 10 a.m., Rup Ram and the chaukidar appear- ed  at  the police station of Kolebera and Rup Ram  gave  an information,  which  was  recorded  by  the  Assistant  Sub- Inspector  of  Police.   This information  referred  to  the statements  of Aghani and to the other facts which had  been discovered  by  that  time.   On  the  same  Thursday,   the appellant was found in the house of his sister’s husband  in another village called Karmapani.  The appellant was  caught hold  of  by  the village volunteers  and  brought  back  to village Banmunda on Thursday.  At about 1 or 2 p. m. on that day,  he was questioned by Dalpat Sai (P.W.4) mukhia of  the Gram  Panchayat, Krishna Chandra Singh (P.  W. 7),  Sarpanch

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of  the Gram Panchayat, and Praduman Singh (P.  W. 13),  one of  the panches of the Panchayat, and it is stated that  the appellant made an extra-judicial confession to these persons to  the  effect that he had killed the  child  Baisakhi  for greed  of money, as a contractor who was building a,  bridge on the Lurki river had offered Rs. 80 for a human head.  The appellant was detained by the aforesaid village  authorities till  the Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police arrived  at  the village  on  Friday,  May  10,  1957.   The  Assistant  Sub- Inspector arrived at about 3 a.m. He was taken to the  place where the headless dead body of Baisakhi lay.  The Assistant Sub-Inspector  made an inquest on the dead body  and  seized the articles found there including 29 beads of the " mala "’ which Baisakhi was wearing and which lay scattered near  the place.   The Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police arrested  the appellant,  who was already in custody of the  mukhia.   The house of the 1341 Weapon  called " balua " was found in the north facing  room of  the house, between a wall and the roof.  This " balua  " had  certain  blood-stains  on it,  but  the  stains  having disintegrated,  the  origin  of  the  blood  could  not   be determined.  It is stated that on being questioned where the head  of  the  girl Baisakhi was,  the  appellant  took  the Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police and some of the  villagers to a place at a short distance of 100 yards or so from where the  dead  body  was.  At that place  were  discovered  some strands  of  bloodstained  hair which  were  seized  by  the Assistant  SubInspector  of  Police.  The  strands  of  hair looked like the hair on the bead of a female person and  the Chemical  Examiner later reported that the strands  of  hair were stained with human blood and "appeared to be scalp hair of  human (female) origin morphologically ".  After  further investigation by two different Sub-Inspectors of Police, the appellant was sent up for trial.  There was an enquiry by  a Magistrate of the first class, who, at the conclusion of the enquiry,  committed the appellant for trial by the Court  of Session. The  defence of the appellant was that he had  been  falsely implicated.   He  denied that he killed  Baisakhi  near  the jungle  at Amtis Chua hill.  He further denied that  he  had made  any extra-judicial confession to Dalpat  Sai,  Krishna Chandra Singh and Praduman Singh.  He denied that any blood- stained weapon was found in his house by the Assistant  Sub- Inspector  of Police and he also denied that he  was  absent from  his village or was found in the house of his  sister’s husband in village Karmapani. The  learned Additional Judicial Commissioner, as  also  the High  Court,  rightly  stated  that  the  case  against  the appellant rested on (a) circumstantial evidence and (b)  the extra-judicial  confession stated to have been made  by  the appellant.   The  courts below concurrently  held  that  the extra-judicial  confession  was  voluntary and  it  did  not appear to them to have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise having reference to the charge made against 1342 he appellant so as to attract the provisions of s. 24 of the Evidence Act.  They further held that the confession, though later denied by the appellant, was sufficiently corroborated by  the circumstantial evidence and the confession  and  the circumstantial  evidence  read  together  led  to  only  one reasonable inference’, namely, that the appellant had killed the child Baisakhi in the hope of getting some money. It is not disputed that in an appeal filed by special  leave under  Art. 136 of the Constitution it is not normally  open

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to  the appellant to raise questions of fact or to  ask  for interference by us with concurrent findings of fact,  unless the   findings  are  vitiated  by  errors  of  law  or   the conclusions  reached  by the courts below  are  so  patently opposed  to  well-established principles as to amount  to  a miscarriage  of justice.  Mr. Iyengar for the appellant  has urged  before  us  three  main  points.   Firstly,  he   has submitted  that the extra-judicial confession said  to  have been  made by the appellant is not admissible  in  evidence. Secondly, he has contended that even if admissible, there is no  guarantee of its truth.  Thirdly, he has submitted  that even  with  regard to circumstantial  evidence,  the  courts below have relied on inadmissible evidence, with  particular reference  to the statements of Aghani, to establish one  of the circumstances, namely, that the appellant was last  seen with  Baisakhi before her murder.  His argument is that  the other  circumstances  established  against  the   appellant, namely, the recovery of the blood-stained " balua ", of  the blood-stained hair and the absence of the appellant from the village  on  Wednesday, do not carry the  case  against  the appellant  far enough so as to complete the chain  and  make them  inconsistent with any hypothesis other than the  guilt of the appellant.  He has submitted that in considering  the circumstantial  evidence in this case the courts below  have departed  from  the  well  established  principle  that  the circumstances affirmatively proved against an accused person must  be of such a character as to be consistent  only  with his guilt and inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of his innocence. 1343 Before we examine the aforesaid submissions, it is necessary to state that the finding of the courts below that  Baisakhi was  murdered some time between May 7 and May 8,  1957,  and that  the headless dead body which was discovered on May  8, 1957, was correctly identified as the dead body of the  girl Baisakhi has not been challenged before us.  The  postmortem examination  on the dead body was held on May 11, 1957,  and the  ante-mortem  injuries which the doctor found  were  (1) complete severance of the head from the neck,(2)one  incised wound  on the left shoulder and (3) anincised wound  on  the left upper arm.  The doctor’s evidence makes it quite  clear that  the unfortunate girl was brutally done to death.   The identification  of  the headless dead body also rests  on  a very  sure  foundation.   We have already  referred  to  the clothing, ring, beads, etc., from which the identity of  the dead body was established.  The murder of the girl  Baisakhi having  been clearly established, the courts  below  rightly applied  their  mind  to a consideration  of  the  principal question   in  the  case,  namely,  if  the  appellant   was responsible for that murder. This brings us to a consideration of the submissions made on behalf of the appellant.  We may say at the very outset that we  agree  with learned counsel for the appellant  that  the statements  of Aghani, who unfortunately died within  a  few months  of  the occurrence before her  statements  could  be recorded  in a judicial proceeding, were not  admissible  in evidence  either under s. 32 or s. 33 of the  Evidence  Act. Section 33 is clearly out of the way because Aghani made  no statements  in  a judicial proceeding or before  any  person authorised  by law to take her evidence.  The only  relevant clause of s. 32 which may be said to have any bearing is cl. (1)  which relates to statements made by a person as to  the cause of his death or as to any of the circumstances of  the transaction which resulted in his death.  In the case before us, the statements made by Aghani do not relate to the cause

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of her death or to any of the circumstances relating to  her death ; on the contrary, the statements relate to the  death of her sister.  We are, therefore, of the opinion 1344 that  the  statements  do not come within s.  32(1)  of  the Evidence Act and, indeed, Mr. Dhebar appearing on behalf  of the State, has conceded that s. 32(1) does not apply to  the statements of Aghani. Excluding  the  statements  of  Aghani,  what  then  is  the evidence against the appellant ? Firstly, we have the extra- judicial   confession.    Then,  we   have   the   following circumstances which the courts below have held to have  been clearly  established  against  the  appellant,  namely,  (a) recovery  of the blood-stained " balua " from a room of  the appellant, (b) recovery of the blood-stained strands of hair from   a  place  pointed  out  by  the  appellant  and   (c) disappearance of the appellant from the village  immediately after  the  murder and his arrest in  village  Karmapani  in circumstances  mentioned  by  Maheshwar  Sai  (P.   W.   6). Lastly,  there is another adverse circumstance which  arises out of the total denial by the appellant of the recovery  of the  blood-stained  " balua " and of his arrest  in  village Karmapani.    As  to  the  extra-judicial  confession,   two questions  arise: is it voluntary, and, if so, is it true  ? The  appellant  denied at a later stage that he had  made  a confession, but it is not necessary to consider in this case the abstract question as to whether, as against its maker, a conviction can be based on a confession which is found to be voluntary and true.  It is enough to state that usually  and as  a  matter  of  caution,  courts  require  some  material corroboration    to   such   a    confessional    statement, corroboration  which  connects the accused person  with  the crime  in  question, and the real question which  falls  for decision in the present case is if the circumstances  proved against the appellant afford sufficient corroboration to the confessional  statement  of the appellant, in case  we  hold that the confessional statement is voluntary and true. Let  us first see if the confession was voluntary.   Section 24 of the Evidence Act states: "A  confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in  a criminal proceeding, if the making of the confession appears to  the Court to have been caused by any inducement,  threat or  promise  having  reference to  the  charge  against  the accused person, 1345 proceeding from a person in authority and sufficient, in the opinion  of  the Court, to give the accused  person  grounds which  would appear to him reasonable for supposing that  by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against  him ". Mr.  Iyengar  has referred us to the evidence of  the  three witnesses,  Dalpat Sai (P.W. 4), Krishna Chandra  Singh  (P. W. 7), and Praduman Singh (P.  W. 13), Mukhia, Sarpanch  and Panch respectively of the Gram Panchayat.  We agree with Mr. Iyengar  that having regard to the provisions of  the  Bihar Panchayat  Raj Act (Bihar VIII of 1948) the aforesaid  three persons  can be said to be persons in authority  within  the meaning  of s. 24.  The question, however, is-are there  any circumstances  which  tend to show that the  making  of  the confession  appears to have been caused by  any  inducement, threat  or promise, having reference to the  charge  against the  appellant and proceeding from any one of the  aforesaid three persons and sufficient in the opinion of the court  to give  the appellant grounds which would appear to him to  be

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reasonable for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage  or  avoid  any  evil  of  a  temporal  nature  in reference to the proceedings against him.  The courts  below have  categorically answered this question in the  negative. We  have  examined  the  evidence  of  the  three  witnesses mentioned above.  That evidence shows that the appellant was brought  to the house of Dalpat Sai (P.  W. 4) at  about  10 a.m.  on Thursday (May 9, 1957).  He was questioned for some time;  Dalpat Sai (P.W. 4) said that he was  questioned  for about two hours.  The evidence of Dalpat Sai makes it clear, however, that it was not a process of continuous questioning for two hours.  Ratan was given some food and then, when  he was  questioned, he kept quiet for some time and  then  said that  he had killed the girl because the contractor who  was building the bridge on river Lurki had offered to pay a  sum of Rs. 80 for a human head.  Having examined the evidence of the three witnesses who prove the extra-judicial confession, we do not come to 1346 a conclusion different from the one arrived at by the courts below.  Mr. Iyengar referred us to the observations made  by Cave J. (as he then was) in The Queen v. Thompson(1).   That was a case in which a prisoner was tried for embezzling  the money of a company.  It was proved at the trial that,  being taxed  with  the crime by the Chairman of the  company,  the prisoner  said  that he had taken the money.   The  Chairman stated  that  at the time of the confession,  no  threat  or promise  was made, but he said to the prisoner’s brother,  " It  will  be  the right thing for your  brother  to  make  a statement  "  and  the court drew  the  inference  that  the prisoner,  when  he  made  the  confession,  knew  that  the Chairman  had spoken these words to his brother.   In  these circumstances, the learned Judge said: " I prefer to put  my judgment  on  the  ground  that  it  is  the  duty  of   the prosecution to prove, in case of doubt, that the  prisoner’s statement  was  free and voluntary, and that  they  did  not discharge themselves of this obligation ". He further  added that there were always reasons to suspect those  confessions which  were  supposed to be the offspring of  penitence  and remorse,  and  which  nevertheless were  repudiated  by  the prisoner  at the trial.  It is true that in the  case  under our  consideration  the appellant denied to  have  made  the confession  which he had made earlier; but we find  no  such circumstances  as were present in Thompson’s case (1),  such as  the  statement  of the Chairman of the  company  to  the brother of the prisoner.  It is true that the appellant  was brought  back  from  village Karmapani  by  members  of  the village  volunteer  force.  He  was  taken  to  the  village authorities to whom he made a confession.  The evidence does not  even  remotely  suggest that  any  threat,  promise  or inducement was made.  The only circumstance relied on by Mr. Iyengar  is that it took about two to three hours  from  the time  when  the appellant was brought to the  house  of  the mukhia  up  to  the  time  when  he  made  his  confessional statement.   Mr. Iyengar has relied on In re  Kataru  Chinna Papiah (2), where a Superintendent of Police questioned  the accused person for four hours at night (1) (1893) 2 Q. B. 12, 18. (2) A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 136. 1347 and again for two hours in the morning.  It was pointed  out that  this was a flagrant violation of the relevant rule  in the  instructions  issued to police officers.  All  that  we need  say  is  that there was no  such  questioning  in  the present  case.   Another decision to which Mr.  Iyengar  has

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invited our attention is Hashmat Khan v. The Crown (1).   We do not think that that decision is of any assistance to  Mr. Iyengar.   It  was held therein that a mere  possibility  of there  having  been  some inducement is  not  sufficient  to attract s. 24 of the Evidence Act; but only when it  appears to  the court that the confession has been made as a  result of some inducement held out by a person in authority that it becomes  irrelevant.  That was a case in which  the  accused person,  when questioned, was told that it would  be  better for him if he told the truth; it was held that this amounted to  an inducement within the meaning of s. 24 of the  Indian Evidence Act. As to the truth of the confession, nothing has been  brought to  our  notice  which  would  show  that  the  confessional statement contained any untrue or inaccurate statement.   It is  true that the prosecution has given no evidence to  show that  the contractor who was building the bridge over  river Lurki, or for that matter, any contractor, had offered a sum of  Rs. 80 for a human head.  In the very nature of  things, it is not expected that any contractor, even if he had  made such  an  offer, will admit having done so, and  we  do  not think that the prosecution can be asked to give evidence  in support  of any such offer.  We recognise that  in  ordinary and  normal circumstances nobody asks for a human  head  for building  abridge; nor is it usual normally for a person  to accept  such  an  offer, even if it is made.   We  must  not forget,  however,  that  we are dealing in  this  case  with aboriginal  people who are ,still steeped  in  superstition. It is worthy of note that Maheshwar Sai (P.  W. 6) said that when   the  appellant  was  taken  in  custody  in   village Karmapani,  he did not even enquire why he was arrested;  on the contrary, he offered Rs. 20 and a he-goat to the witness and (1) (1934) I.L.R. 15 Lah. 856. 171 1348 implored the latter to save him.  Such a statement was again of an incriminatory nature, and if the evidence of Maheshwar Sai  is correct, the statement was absolutely voluntary  and was  not  the result of any questioning at all.   For  these reasons,  we do not think that the reference to an offer  of Rs. 80 for a human head in the confessional statement of the appellant necessarily destroys its veracity. There can be no doubt that the recovery of the blood-stained " balua " (even though the origin of the blood could not  be determined owing to disintegration) and of the blood-stained strands  of  female  hair at the place pointed  out  by  the appellant,  are  circumstances clearly  proved  against  the appellant.   These  circumstances may not be  sufficient  by themselves to prove that the appellant was the murderer, but there  is no doubt that they lend assurance to  the  confes- sional statement of the appellant, assurance of a kind which connects the appellant with the crime in question.  This  is a case in which the confession and the circumstances have to be read together.  There is the additional circumstance that soon  after  the murder the appellant disappeared  from  his village  and when arrested in another village,  his  conduct was  such  as to show that he was suffering  from  a  guilty mind.  On the top of all this, there is the total denial  by the appellant that any blood-stained " balua " was recovered from his house or that he disappeared from the village after the  murder.  It is unfortunate that the learned  Additional Judicial  Commissioner did not ask the appellant to  explain the  recovery of the blood-stained strands of  female  hair. That was an important circumstance against the appellant and

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when  the learned Additional Judicial Commissioner  examined the appellant under the provisions of s. 342 of the Code  of Criminal  Procedure  he should have asked the  appellant  to explain  this  circumstance.  We take  this  opportunity  of inviting  the attention of the learned  Additional  Judicial Commissioner   to  this  very  serious  omission.    Another omission  on  the part of the  learned  Additional  Judicial Commissioner is his failure to comply with the provisions of s. 287 of the Code of 1349 Criminal Procedure.  The examination of the accused recorded by  or before the Committing Magistrate does not  appear  to have been tendered by the prosecutor in the present case; at least  we  do  not find any such statement  in  the  printed paper-book.   We are satisfied, however, that  no  prejudice has been caused.  The Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police  who gave  evidence of the recovery of blood-stained hair from  a place  pointed out by the appellant was not even  cross-exa- mined  on  the point.  The defence of the  appellant  was  a total  denial and even if the recovery of the  blood-stained strands  of female hair was put to the appellant,  he  would undoubtedly have denied such recovery as having been made at his pointing out the place. To  sum up: we see no reasons to differ from the  conclusion arrived  at  by  the  courts  below  that  the  confessional statement   made   by  the  appellant  was   voluntary   and admissible;  there are no reasons for thinking that  it  was not  true.   The circumstances clearly  proved  against  the appellant,  even excluding the circumstance which rested  on the statements of Aghani, afford sufficient corroboration to the  confession of the appellant, though denied at  a  later stage,  and  the  corroboration is of such a  nature  as  to connect the appellant with the murder of the child Baisakhi. The  only reasonable inference which can be drawn  from  the confession read with the circumstantial evidence is that the appellant  killed  the child Baisakhi between May 7  and  8, 1957, in the hope of getting some money.  Whether that  hope was realised or not is more than we can tell.  The head  was never  recovered,  but there can be no doubt that  the  dead body was correctly identified to be the dead body of the child Baisakhi. As  to the sentence, in view of the circumstances  in  which the  child  Baisakhi was killed, we do not  think  ,that  we shall  be  justified in interfering with it in  the  present case.  For these reasons, we hold that the appeal is without merit and must be dismissed. Appeal dismissed. 1350