RASIKLAL DALPATRAM THAKKAR Vs STATE OF GUJARAT .
Case number: Crl.A. No.-002041-002041 / 2009
Diary number: 13206 / 2007
Advocates: VARINDER KUMAR SHARMA Vs
E. C. AGRAWALA
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2041 OF 2009 (Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.)NO.2915 of 2007)
Rasiklal Dalpatram Thakkar … Appellants Vs.
State of Gujarat & Ors. … Respondents
J U D G M E N T
ALTAMAS KABIR, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The Madhavpura Mercantile Cooperative Bank
Ltd., which is governed by the provisions of the
Multi State Cooperative Societies Act, 2002, has
its Registered as well as Head Office at Madhavpura
Market, Shastribaug, Ahmedabad, and carries on
banking operations in the State of Gujarat,
Maharashtra among other States in India. According
to the Bank, all its activities relating to
disbursement of loans are conducted from the Head
Office at Ahmedabad.
3. In 1992, the appellant’s company took loan from
the aforesaid Bank which for the reasons prevailing
closed down its business operations in 2001.
Thereafter, a Scheme of Reconstruction approved by
the Reserve Bank of India was formulated and a new
Board of Management (Administration) came to be
appointed to implement the same. Several
irregularities were discovered regarding the grant
of loans to borrowers with the connivance of the
then Chief Executive Officer, Managing Director and
Chairman of the Bank. Several complaints came to be
registered against the said officers and several
borrowers. Five such complaints were filed against
the appellant on 9th July, 2003, before the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad, who directed
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the Economic Offences Wing, State C.I.D. (Crime),
Ahmedabad, under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. to carry
out an investigation. The Investigating Agency
submitted a report stating that the allegations
complained of had been committed within the
territorial limits of the city of Mumbai,
Maharashtra, and that the investigation should,
therefore, be transferred to the Investigation
Agency in Mumbai, Maharashtra.
4. The said report was rejected by the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad, on the ground
that it was not for the Investigating Agency to
decide not to investigate a complaint forwarded to
it under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. on the ground that
the offence complained of was allegedly committed
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
Investigating Agency. The learned Magistrate by his
order dated 31.5.2006, directed the Investigating
Agency to carry out a further investigation and
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report whether the alleged offence had been
committed or not.
5. The said order of the learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Ahmedabad, was challenged by the
appellant herein before the City Civil and Sessions
Court at Ahmedabad in revision which was dismissed
on 22.9.2006 by the City Sessions Judge Court
No.11, Ahmedabad. A writ petition was filed in
the High Court by the appellant on 21.11.2006 being
Writ Petition No.2366 of 2006, challenging the
decision of the Sessions Court.
6. Before the High Court it was reiterated that
the loan had been availed of by the appellant’s
company from the Mandvi Branch of the Bank in
Mumbai which had an independent identity as a
registered co-operative Society under the
Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act. It was also
reiterated that the loan amount had been disbursed
from the said Branch in Mumbai. It was contended
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that since the cause of action for the alleged
offence had arisen outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Ahmedabad, he could not direct the Investigating
Agency under his jurisdiction to conduct an
investigation into the complaint made against the
appellant in respect of such cause of action.
7. Accepting the views expressed by the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate that the Investigating
Agency was only required to state the outcome of
the investigation pursuant to an order under
Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and that it had no authority
to state which Court had jurisdiction to inquire
into the alleged offence, the High Court by its
impugned judgment dated 15.3.2007 dismissed the
writ petition filed by the appellant, inter alia,
on the following grounds :-
(i) That the Investigating Agency had travelled beyond its jurisdiction in
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expressing its views regarding the territorial jurisdiction in regard to a criminal offence which was for the Courts to decide.
(ii) That the Station House Officer is vested with the authority to investigate any cognizable offence in respect of which an F.I.R. is lodged.
(iii) The powers reserved to the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. could not be interfered with or curtailed on the ground that the Investigating Officer had no territorial jurisdiction over the investigation.
8. It appears that when the writ petitions were
taken up for hearing a prayer was made for
amendment of the prayers by incorporating paragraph
14(BBB)in each of the writ petitions. By virtue of
the amended prayer, the appellant wanted the High
Court to quash and set aside Enquiry Case No.21 of
2003 filed before the Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, Ahmedabad, and to also quash the order
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directing investigation under Section 156(3)
Cr.P.C. and the proceedings arising therefrom. The
said prayer was rejected by the High Court on the
ground of delay and also on the ground that the
order of the Magistrate dated 9.7.2003 had not been
challenged for a period of four years.
9. Learned counsel Mr. I.H. Syed, appearing for
the appellant submits that the High Court had
dismissed the appellant’s Writ Petition on an
erroneous interpretation of the provisions of
Section 156(3) and 181(4) Cr.P.C. Learned counsel
submitted that the High Court had failed to notice
that Sub-section (2) of Section 156 Cr.P.C.
conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the
Investigation Officer to investigate into a case
and no proceeding of a police officer in any case
in which he is entitled to investigate shall at any
stage be called in question. Alleging that the
power of the Magistrate under Sub-section (3) was
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circumscribed by the powers vested in the
Investigating Agency under Sub-Section (2) of
Section 156 Cr.P.C, and that it was only the
Investigating Agency which could decide the
question relating to the territorial jurisdiction
in respect of the crime committed, learned counsel
submitted that the High Court had erred in
upholding the views expressed by the learned Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate that the Investigating
Agency was only required to state the outcome of
the investigation conducted pursuant to an order
under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and that it had no
authority or right to state as to which Court had
jurisdiction to inquire into the alleged offence in
question. Learned counsel submitted that the High
Court had erred in law in observing that it was a
settled proposition of law that when a Magistrate
directs an investigation to be conducted in
exercise of his powers under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
the main duty of the Investigating Agency is to
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submit a report as to the commission of an offence
and, thereafter, it was for the Court concerned to
accept such Report and to decide the question of
jurisdiction and that the learned Magistrate had
rightly rejected the Final Report on the ground
that the Investigating Agency had no authority
under the law to express its opinion on the merits
of a case.
10. Learned counsel re-emphasized the submissions
made before the High Court that although the
Registered Office and Head Office of the Bank were
in Ahmedabad in Gujarat, each of its Branches in
the other States was an independently registered
Co-operative Society and was a unit of its own
under the provisions of the Maharashtra Co-
operative Societies Act. Furthermore, the loan was
availed of and disbursed in Mumbai. Consequently,
since the entire cause of action relating to the
application and disbursement of the loan had arisen
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in Mumbai, the Gujarat High Court had committed an
error of law in passing the impugned order and the
same was liable to be quashed. In support of his
aforesaid contention, learned counsel referred to
the decision of this Court in Agencia Commercial
International Ltd. vs. Custodian of the Branches of
Banco National Ultramarino [(1982) 2 SCC 482],
wherein while considering a similar question, this
Court held that in the case of a body corporate its
branches are not distinct entities and the Branches
are mere components through which the corporate
entity expresses itself and all transactions
entered into with the Branches are transactions
with the corporate body itself. However, a
distinction was made in cases of Banks which also
operate through its Branches which are regarded for
many purposes as separate and distinct entities
from the Head Office and each other.
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11. Learned counsel then relied on the decision of
this Court in Satvinder Kaur vs. State (NCT of
Delhi) [(1999) 8 SCC 728} in support of his
submission that in view of the provisions of
Section 156(1) Cr.P.C. a police officer was
competent to investigate any cognizable offence and
was also competent to forward the same to the
police station having territorial jurisdiction if
he came to the conclusion that the crime had been
committed beyond his territorial jurisdiction.
12. Reference was also made to the decision of this
Court in the case of Naresh Kavarchand Khatri vs.
State of Gujarat [(2008) 8 SCC 300], where the
question involved was the High Court’s jurisdiction
to transfer an investigation from one police
station to another. In the facts of the said case
it was held that under Section 156 Cr.P.C. the
police authorities exercise statutory powers to
direct transfer of an investigation from one police
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station to another in the event it was found that
they did not have jurisdiction in the matter and
the Court should not interfere in the matter at an
initial stage in regard thereto.
13. Similar observations were made in Asit
Bhattacharjee vs. Hanuman Prasad Ojha [(2007) 5 SCC
786], though in a different context involving the
transfer of an investigation ordered under Section
156(3) Cr.P.C. to another State where the major
part of the offences had taken place. This Court
reiterated that only in the event an Investigating
Officer arrived at a finding that the alleged crime
had not been committed within his territorial
jurisdiction could the F.I.R. be transferred to the
police having jurisdiction in the matter.
14. Learned counsel urged that once the
Investigating Agency in respect of an order under
Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. came to a finding that it
did not have territorial jurisdiction in the
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matter, the High Court could not have directed a
fresh investigation into the matter on the ground
that it was not for the Investigating Agency to
decide the question of jurisdiction which is the
prerogative of the Courts.
15. Appearing for the private respondents, Mr. L.N.
Rao, Senior Advocate, submitted that except for
disbursement of the loan amount to the appellant
through the Mandvi Branch of the Bank at Mumbai,
the entire transaction had been proceeded and dealt
with at the Head Office in Ahmedabad. Even the
application for the loan had been made directly to
the Head Office at Ahmedabad instead of filing it
in the Mandvi Branch at Mumbai.
16. On the legal question raised on behalf of the
appellant, Mr. Rao submitted that Section 156
Cr.P.C. only spelt out the powers of a police
officer to investigate a cognizable case and the
power of a Magistrate to order such an
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investigation to be made. In addition, it was also
stipulated that no investigation by a police
officer at any stage of such investigation could be
questioned on the ground that such officer was not
empowered to conduct such investigation. Mr. Rao
submitted that the decisions cited by Mr. Syed did
not really make any difference to the appellant’s
case as the power of the Investigating Officer to
transfer an investigation, which he did not have
the jurisdiction to investigate, to a police
officer having such jurisdiction, was never at
issue in the instant case. What was at issue was
the Investigating Officer’s decision not to conduct
an investigation despite an order passed by the
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ahmedabad, under Section
156(3) Cr.P.C. on the ground that he did not have
territorial jurisdiction to undertake such
investigation. Mr. Rao submitted that an
investigation ordered under the provisions of Sub-
Section (4) of Section 181 Cr.P.C. would have to be
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read in that context.
17. Appearing for the State, Mr. Hemantika Wahi,
learned Advocate, submitted that the State was
ready to carry out whatever directions that may be
given by the Court in regard to the investigation
directed to be conducted by the Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Ahmedabad.
18. The principal question which emerges from the
submissions made on behalf of the parties is
whether in regard to an order passed under Section
156(3) Cr.P.C. the police authorities empowered
under Sub-Section (1) of Section 156 can
unilaterally decide not to conduct an investigation
on the ground that they had no territorial
jurisdiction to do so.
19. Section 156 Cr.P.C. which is the focus of
consideration in this case, reads as under :-
“156. Police officer's power to investigate cognizable cases.
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(1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII.
(2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one, which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate.
(3) Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may order such an investigation as above mentioned.”
20. From the aforesaid provisions it is quite clear
that a police officer in charge of a police station
can, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate
any cognizable offence which a Court having
jurisdiction over such police station can inquire
into or try under Chapter III of the Code. Sub-
section (2) of Section 156 ensures that once an
investigation is commenced under Sub-section (1),
the same is not interrupted on the ground that the
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police officer was not empowered under the Section
to investigate. It is in the nature of a “savings
clause” in respect of investigations undertaken in
respect of cognizable offences. In addition to the
powers vested in a Magistrate empowered under
Section 190 Cr.P.C. to order an investigation under
Sub-section (1) of section 202 Cr.P.C., Sub-section
(3) of Section 156 also empowers such Magistrate to
order an investigation on a complaint filed before
him.
21. As far as the reference made to Sub-section (4)
of Section 181 is concerned, the same appears to be
misconceived having regard to the contents thereof
which read as follows :-
“181. Place of trial in case of certain offences. (1) xxx xxx xxx (2) xxx xxx xxx
(3) xxx xxx xxx (4) Any offence of criminal misappropriation or of criminal breach of
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trust may he inquired into or tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or any part of the property which is the subject of the offence was received or retained, or was required to be returned or accounted for, by the accused person.”
Sub-section (4) only indicates that an inquiry
or trial of an offence of criminal misappropriation
or criminal breach of trust can be conducted by a
Court within whose jurisdiction the offence had
been committed or any part of the property forming
the subject matter of the offence is received or
retained or was required to be returned or
accounted for by the accused person. The said
provisions do not account for a stage contemplated
on account of an order made under Section 156(3)
Cr.P.C.
22. In the instant case, the stage contemplated
under Section 181(4) Cr.P.C. has not yet been
reached. Prior to taking cognizance on the
complaint filed by the Bank, the learned Chief
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Judicial Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad, had
directed an inquiry under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
and as it appears, a final report was submitted by
the Investigating Agency entrusted with the
investigation stating that since the alleged
transactions had taken place within the territorial
limits of the city of Mumbai, no cause of action
had arisen in the State of Gujarat and, therefore,
the investigation should be transferred to the
police agency in Mumbai. There seems to be little
doubt that the Economic Offences Wing, State CID
(Crime), which had been entrusted with the
investigation, had upon initial inquiries
recommended that the investigation be transferred
to the police agency of Mumbai. In our view, both
the trial Court as well as the Bombay High Court
had correctly interpreted the provisions of Section
156 Cr.P.C. to hold that it was not within the
jurisdiction of the Investigating Agency to refrain
itself from holding a proper and complete
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investigation merely upon arriving at a conclusion
that the offences had been committed beyond its
territorial jurisdiction. A glance at the material
before the Magistrate would indicate that the major
part of the loan transaction had, in fact, taken
place in the State of Gujarat and that having
regard to the provisions of Sub-section (2) of
Section 156 Cr.P.C., the proceedings of the
investigation could not be questioned on the ground
of jurisdiction of the officer to conduct such
investigation. It was open to the learned
Magistrate to direct an investigation under Section
156(3) Cr.P.C. without taking cognizance on the
complaint and where an investigation is undertaken
at the instance of the Magistrate a Police Officer
empowered under Sub-section (1) of Section 156 is
bound, except in specific and specially exceptional
cases, to conduct such an investigation even if he
was of the view that he did not have jurisdiction
to investigate the matter.
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23. Having regard to the law in existence today, we
are unable to accept Mr. Syed’s submissions that
the High Court had erred in upholding the order of
the learned Trial Judge when the entire cause of
action in respect of the offence had allegedly
arisen outside the State of Gujarat. We are also
unable to accept the submission that it was for the
Investigating Officer in the course of
investigation to decide whether a particular Court
had jurisdiction to entertain a complaint or not.
It is the settled law that the complaint made in a
criminal case follows the place where the cause
arises, but the distinguishing feature in the
instant case is that the stage of taking cognizance
was yet to arrive. The Investigating Agency was
required to place the facts elicited during the
investigation before the Court in order to enable
the Court to come to a conclusion as to whether it
had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint or not.
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Without conducting such an investigation, it was
improper on the part of the Investigating Agency to
forward its report with the observation that since
the entire cause of action for the alleged offence
had purportedly arisen in the city of Mumbai within
the State of Maharashtra, the investigation should
be transferred to the concerned Police Station in
Mumbai. Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. contemplates a
stage where the learned Magistrate is not convinced
as to whether process should issue on the facts
disclosed in the complaint. Once the facts are
received, it is for the Magistrate to decide his
next course of action. In this case, there are
materials to show that the appellant had filed his
application for loan with the Head Office of the
Bank at Ahmedabad and that the processing and the
sanction of the loan was also done in Ahmedabad
which clearly indicates that the major part of the
cause of action for the complaints arose within the
jurisdiction of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,
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Ahmedabad. It was not, therefore, desirable on the
part of the Investigating Agency to make an
observation that it did not have territorial
jurisdiction to proceed with the investigation,
which was required to be transferred to the Police
Station having jurisdiction to do so.
24. On the materials before him the learned
Magistrate was fully justified in rejecting the
Final Report submitted by the Economic Offences
Wing, State CID (Crime) and to order a fresh
investigation into the allegations made on behalf
of the Bank. The High Court, therefore, did not
commit any error in upholding the views expressed
by the Trial Court. As mentioned hereinbefore,
Section 181(4) Cr.P.C. deals with the Court’s
powers to inquire or try an offence of criminal
misappropriation or of a criminal breach of trust
if the same has been committed or any part of the
property, which is the subject of the offence, is
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received or retained within the local jurisdiction
of the said Court.
25. The various decisions cited by Mr. Syed, and in
particular the decision in Satvinder Kaur’s case
(supra) provide an insight into the views held by
the Supreme Court on the accepted position that the
Investigating Officer was entitled to transfer an
investigation to a Police Station having
jurisdiction to conduct the same. The said
question is not in issue before us and as indicated
hereinbefore, we are only required to consider
whether the Investigating Officer in respect of an
investigation undertaken under Section 156(3)
Cr.P.C. can file a report stating that he had no
jurisdiction to investigate into the complaint as
the entire cause of action had arisen outside his
jurisdiction despite there being material available
to the contrary. The answer, in our view, is in
the negative and we are of the firm view that the
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powers vested in the Investigating Authorities,
under Sections 156(1) Cr.P.C., did not restrict the
jurisdiction of the Investigating Agency to
investigate into a complaint even if it did not
have territorial jurisdiction to do so. Unlike as
in other cases, it was for the Court to decide
whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the
complaint as and when the entire facts were placed
before it.
26. We, therefore, are not inclined to entertain
the appeal and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.
…………………………………………J. (ALTAMAS KABIR)
…………………………………………J. (CYRIAC JOSEPH)
New Delhi Dated: November 6, 2009.
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