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PETITIONER: RAO NIHALKARAN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAMGOPAL

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27/01/1966

BENCH: SHAH, J.C. BENCH: SHAH, J.C. GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) WANCHOO, K.N. SIKRI, S.M. RAMASWAMI, V.

CITATION:  1966 AIR 1485            1966 SCR  (3) 427  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1966 SC1624  (3)  F          1980 SC 449  (6)

ACT: Madhya  Pradesh Land Revenue Code (20 of 1959), ss. 185  (1) (ii)  (a) 261 and 262(2)-Tenant if includes a  person  whose tenancy  has  been terminated at the commencement  of  Code- Tenant  against whom ejectment Proceedings had commenced  at the  commencement  of  the  Code-If could  claim  to  be  an occupancy tenant.

HEADNOTE: The appellant (holder of an inam in Madhya Pradesh) served a notice an his tenant, the respondent, terminating to tenancy on  the  ground  that  he  wanted  the  land  for   personal cultivation and filed a suit for ejectment.  The trial court decreed the suit.  During the pendency of the appeal in  the District-Court, Art. 32 of 1954 was enacted, and pursuant to its provisions the hearing of the appeal was stayed.   After the  Madhya  Pradesh Land Revenue Code came  into  force  in 1959,  the District Court held that by virtue of s.  185  of that  Code  the  respondent  acquired  the  rights,  of   an occupancy  tenant  and dismissed the suit.  The  High  Court confirmed the judgment of the District Court. In  appeal  to this Court, it was contended that :  (i)  the rights  of an occupancy tenant arise in favour of a  personl under  s. 185(1) (i) (a) only if there was between  him  and the landlord a subsisting tenancy at the date when the  Code came  into force and since under the- law in force  before the  commencement of the Code, the respondent had ceased  to be  a tenant because of the notice terminating the  contract of  tenancy the respondent was not invested with the  rights of  an  occupany tenant; and (ii) bi virtue of ss.  261  and 262(2), the operation of S. 185 is expressly excluded when a person,   against  whom  ejectment  proceedings  have   been instituted  prior  to  the  commencement  of  the  Code   in enforcement  of a right then acquired, claims the status  of an occupancy tenant. HELD : (i) The respondent acquired the right of an occupancy

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tenant under the Code, because the expression "tenant" in s. 185  (1)  (ii)  (a)  includes a  person  whose  tenancy  was terminated before the commencement of the Code. The  definition  of  the expression  "tenant"  in  the  Code postulates  a  subsisting  tenancy, but the  position  of  a tenant prior to the date on which the Code was brought  into force  is not dealt with in the definition.  In the  context in  which the expression "tenant" occurs in s. 185(1),  that definition could not be intended to apply in deter ining the conditions which invest a holder of land with the status  of an  occupancy  tenant  at the  commencement  of,  the  Code. Therefore  having regard to the object of the enactment  the expression should be ascribed the meaning it ’has in Act  32 of  1954.   Under  ss. 3 & 4 of that Act a  person  who  was inducted  into  the land as a tenant and who  continued  ’to hold the land at the commencement of the Act was entitled to protection   against  eviction  and  continue   as   tenant, notwithstanding  that  under the law in force prior  to  the commencement  of  the Act. the contractual  relationship  of landlord and tenant was determined. [432 D; 432 14-433 C] 428 There  is no reason to think that the Legislature sought  to make a A distinction between tenants of Inam land in s.  185 (1)  (ii) (a) and ryotwari sub-lessees of other lands in  s. 185(1)(ii)(b).  Therefore, if the expression "ryotwari  sub- lessee’  in  s. 185(1)(ii)(b) includes  a  sub-lessee  whose tenaure was terminated before the commencement of the  Code, a  tenant  of inam land, whose tenancy has  been  terminated would  also be included in the protection, provided at  some time  prior to the date on which the Code was  brought  into force, he was in possession of the land as a tenant, and  he continued to hold the land till the date of the commencement of the Code. [434 E-H] (ii) The  provisions  of  the  Code  appeal  to  tenants  in proceedings for ejectment pending at the commencement of the Code. The  proviso  to  s. 261 protects a  right  which  had  been acquired  under  a law repeated by the Code  and  the  right could  be enforced as if the code had not been passed.   But the right to evict a tenant was governed by the general law of  landlord  and  tenant and was  not  acquired  under  any repealed  law.   The proviso had no operation  and  a  legal proceeding  pending at the date of the commencement  of  the Code will be disposed of according to the law enacted in the Code.  Therefore, the tenant could not’ be evicted otherwise than  in the manner and for reasons mentioned in a.  193  of the  Code but, personal requirement for cultivation of  land is  not  a ground on which a claim for  ejectment  could  be maintained. [435 G436 A] Section  262(2) is only procedural it provides that a  civil court  will  continue to have jurisdiction to dispose  of  a civil  suit  pending before it at the  commencement  of  the Code,  Which, if it had been instituted after the  Code  was passed would have been tried by a revenue court; and in  the disposal of such a suit, the civil court will be governed by the  procedural  law  applicable  there  to  prior  to   the commencement of the Code.  It does not nullify the statutory conferment  of occupancy right upon persons in the  position of  tenants against whom proceedings were taken at the  date when the Code was brought into force. [436 B-D]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 365 of 1965.

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Appeal  by special leave from the Judgment and  order  dated February 18, 1963 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court (Indore F Bench) in Second Appeals Nos. 68 and 70 of 1961. C.   B.  Agarwala, B. Dutta, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C.  Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant. K.   B. Chaudhry, for the respondent. B.   R.  L. lyengar, G. L. Sanghi and A. G. Ratnaparkhi  for Intervener No. 1. J.   B.  Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder  Narain,  for interveiier No.. 2. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah,  J. Ramgopal-respondent in this appeal-was a tenant  F of  certain  Inam  land situate in village  Nanda  Panth  in Indore  Tahsil. the appellant Rao Nihalkaran-holder  of  the Inam-                             429 served  a notice terminating the tenancy on the ground  that he  needed the land for personal cultivation, and  commenced an action in the Court of the civil Judge, Class 11, Indore, on  July  21,  1950,  against  Ramgopal  for  a  decree   in ejectment.   The Trial Court decreed the suit.   During  the pendency  of  the appeal to the District Court,  Indore,  by Ramgopal  against  the decree, Madhya Bharat  Muafi  &  Inam Tenants  and  Sub-tenants  Protection Act  32  of  1954  was enacted,  and pursuant to the provisions thereof hearing  of the  appeal remained stayed till 1960. in the mean time  the Madhya  Pradesh  Land  Revenue Code (Act  20  of  1959)  was brought  into  force.  Ramgopal urged  before  the  District Court  that he had by virtue of s. 185 of the Code  acquired rights  of an occupancy tenant and the appellant’s right  to obtain  an order in ejectment on the ground set up  must  be refused.  The District Judge accepted the contention of  the respondent  and  allowed  the appeal.   Against  the  decree passed by the District Court, Indore, the appellant appealed to   the  High  Court  of  Madhya  Pradesh,  Indore   Bench. Following their judgment in Rao Nihalkaran v. Ramchandra and Others  (1),  the High Court confirmed the  decree  of.  the District  Judge,  and dismissed the  appeal.   With  special leave granted by this Court, this appeal has been preferred. The  dispute in the appeal centres round the meaning of  the expression  "tenant" used in s. 185(i) cl. (ii) (a)  of  the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code.  The material part of  the clause reads:               "Every person who at the coming into force  of               this Code holds-               (i)               (ii)  in the Madhya Bharat region-               (a)   any Inam land as a tenant, or as a  sub-               tenant or as an ordinary tenant,               shall be called an occupancy tenant, and shall               have all the rights and be subject to all  the               liabilities  conferred  or  imposed  upon   an               occupancy tenant by or under this Code." It is common ground that the tenancy of ran occupancy tenant may  be determined under s. 193 of the Madhya  Pradesh  Land Revenue  Code by an order of the Sub-Divisional  Officer  on the   grounds  specified  in  that  section,  and   personal requirement  of  the land-lord is not one of  such  grounds. But  counsel, for the appellant urged that the rights of  an occupancy  tenant arise in favour of a person under  s.  185 (1)  cl.  (ii)  (a) only if there is  between  him  and  the claimant  to the land a subsisting relation under  which  he holds land (1)  L. P. A. No. 14 of 1961 decided on Sept. 24, 1962. 430

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as a tenant at the date when the Code came into force.   The Code  has, it is said, no retrospective operation,  and  the person who under the law in force before the commencement of the  Code had ceased to be a tenant because, of  termination of  the  contract  between,  him and  the  landlord  is  not invested with the rights of an occupancy tenant under s. 185 (1)  (ii) (a).  In the alternative it is contended  that  by virtue  of  s.  261 and s. 262(2), operation of  s.  185  is expressly  excluded, when a person against whom  proceedings have  been instituted prior to the commencement of the  Code for’  a  decree  in  ejectment in  enforcement  of  a  right acquired  under the law then in force, claims the states  of an occupancy tenant. The District Court held that the expression "tenant"  within the  meaning  of s. 185 (1)(ii)(a) of the  Code  includes  a person   whose   tenancy   stood   determined   before   the commencement of the Code, and with that view the High  Court agreed.   Counsel  for  the  appellant  complained  that  in reaching  this  conclusion,  the Courts  below  ignored  the definition  in  s.  2(y) of the  Code  that  the  expression "tenant" means a person holding land from a Bhumiswami as an occupancy tenant under Ch.  XIV, and said that a person  qua whom the contractual relation under which he was inducted as a tenant was determied prior to the commencement of the Code is not a tenant within the meaning of s. 185(i)(ii)(a).   To appreciate  this  argument it is necessary  to  examine  the relevant legislative history culminating in the enactment of the Code in 1959. In  1948  twenty  Indian  States  including  the  States  of Gwalior,  Indore and Malwa formed themselves into  a  Union. Five  more States were later incorporated into  this  Union. Under the Constitution, Madhya Bharat was formed as a Part B State  out  of  the  territories of  the  United  States  of Gwalior, Indore & Malwa and certain enclaves merged  therein and  the  Chief Commissioner’s Province  of  Panth  Piploda. Under  the  States Reorganisation Act, 1956 a new  State  of Madhya   Pradesh  was  formed  as  from  November  1,   1956 consisting  of the Part B State of Madhya Bharat,  parts  of the former State of ’Madhya Pradesh, the territories of  the States of Bhopal and Vindhya Pradesh and Sironj sub-division of  Kotah in the former State of Rajasthan.  Apparently  the diverse land tenures prevalent in the covenanting States and the  laws  governing  them remained in  operation  in  their respective territories, even after the formation if the Part B  State of Madhya Bharat.  Attempts were made to  evolve  a uniform pattern of revenue administration in conformity with the directive principles of State Policy in the Constitution to  bring the tiller of the soil into direct relation  with the  State.  The Legislature of the Part B State of  Madhya Bharat  enacted Act 66  of 1950 to consolidate and  declare the  law  relating to revenue administration in  the  United States of Gwalior, Indore and Malwa  and land revenue,  land tenure 431 and  other matters connected with the land in  the  Ryotwari tracts or villages of the United States.  Section 54 of  Act 66 of 1950 defined "Pakka tenant", "ordinary tenant",  "sub- tenant" and prescribed the duties of a tenant by s. 55.   By s.  73 a "Pakka tenant" was prohibited from sub-letting  for any  period  any land comprised in his  holding,  unless  he belonged to any of the classes mentioned in s. 74.  By s. 74 certain  classes of disabled persons were permitted to  sub- let the whole or any part of their holding.  But such a sub- lease made in pursuance of the provisions of the Act was  to cease to be in force after one year of the determination  of

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the  disability  by  death or otherwise.  By s.  75  it  was provided  that a sub-lease of the whole or any part  of  the holding of a "Pakka tenant" effected "properly and  legally" prior to the commencement of the Act was to terminate  after the  expiry  of the period of sub-lease or  expiry  of  four years  after the commencement of the Act,  whichever  period was  less.  By s. 76 a sub-lessee failing to hand over  pos- session  after  expiry  of  his right was  to  be  deemed  a tresspasser  and liable to ejectment in accordance with  the provisions  of the Act.  The Legislature with the object  of improving  the conditions of agriculturists and with a  view to remove the middleman between the State and the tiller  of the  soil also enacted the Zamindari Abolition Act  and  the Abolition of Jagirs Act. Another  statute which has a bearing on the dispute in  this appeal-the  Madhya  Bharat Muafi and Inam Tenants  and  Sub- tenants  Protection Act 32 of 1954-was enacted  to  provide, for  the duration of the Act, for the protection of  tenants or  ordinary tenants and sub-tenants of Muafidars,  Inamdars and Istumurardars in Madhya Bharat against eviction by  such Muafidars or Inamdars of their tenants, as the case may  be, and for stay of suits and other proceedings relating to such eviction.   By  s. 2(ii) the terms  "tenant",  "sub-tenant", "ordinary tenant" and "rent" were given the same meaning  as was assigned to them in sub-ss. (1) (7), (8) & (9) of s.  54 of  Act 66 of 1950.  By s. 1 a restriction was placed,  upon eviction  of any tenant, sub-tenant. or ordinary  tenant  of Inam  land during the continuance  Act and it  was  declared that the tenant, sub-tenant or ordinary tenant shall not pay rent  higher  than what he was ’paying in  the  agricultural year  ending June 30, 1948.  By s. 4 all suits,  proceedings in execution of decrees or orders and other proceedings  for the  eviction of Inam land tenants, sub-tenants or  ordinary tenants  from  Inam  lands, or in which  a  claim  for  such eviction   was  involved,  pending  in  the  Court  at   the commencement  of  the Act or which may be  instituted  after such  commencement,  were  to  be  stayed  subject  to   the provisions contained in the Act.  By sub-s. (II) of s. 4  it was  provided that if the Inamdar, Muafidar or  Istumurardar had  taken possession of the land-illegally from  a  tenant, sub-tenant or an ordinary tenant after August 15,- 1947 such a tenant, sub-tenant or an ordinary 432 tenant  may  apply  to  the  Tahsildar  to  be  restored  to possession  of  such  land  and  on  such  application   the Tahsildar  shall  cause  the land to  be  returned  to  such tenant,  sub-tenant  or ordinary tenant  from  the  Inamdar, Muafidar,  or Istumurardar, as the ease may be.  By s. 6  it was provided that all suits and proceedings shall, after the expiration  of  the Act, be proceeded with  subject  to  the provisions  of any law which may then be in force  from  the stage which had been reached when the suit or proceeding was stayed. Act 32 of 1954 was intended initially to remain in force for a  period of two years, but its life was extended  by  later enactments.    Protection   against  eviction   during   the continuance  of  Act 32 of 1954 by enforcement of  a  decree passed in a suit or a proceeding either before or after  the date  on which the Act was brought into force was  conferred upon tenants, sub-tenants and ordinary tenants.  It is clear from the terms of ss. 3 & 4 of the Act that the  Legislature did  not  seek to grant protection only to  persons  between whom and the claimants for protection there was a subsisting contractual  relation.  A person who was inducted  into  the land  as  a tenant, sub-tenant or ordinary  tenant  and  who

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continued  to hold the land at the commencement of  the  Act was  entitled to protection, notwithstanding that under  the law  in  force  prior to the Commencement  of  the  Act  the contractual relation was determined. The  Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code was enacted  in  1959. By  s. 157 of the Code it was declared that there  shall  be only  one  class of tenure holders of lands  held  from  the State  to  be  known as Bhumiswami, and by  s.  158  it  was provided  that every person, who at the time of coming  into force  of  the  Code, belongs to any  of  the  four  classes specified  shall be called a Bhumiswami, and shall have  all the  rights and be subject to all the liabilities  conferred or imposed upon a Bhumiswami by or under the Code, and among the  persons specified is "every person in respect  of  land held by him in the Madhya Bharat region as a Pakka tenant or as a Muafidar, Inamdar or Concessional holder as defined  in the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act Samvat 2007". The  argument  of  counsel for the  appellant  is  that  the respondent  not  being a tenant at the commencement  of  the Code  could not acquire the rights of an  occupancy  tenant, and  that any proceeding instituted against the tenant  must be heard and disposed of according to the law in force prior to  the  commencement of the Code.  The  definition  of  the expression  "tenant"  in  s. 2(y)  postulates  a  subsisting tenancy,  but  that  definition  may  be  resorted  to   for interpreting s. 185 (1) only if the context or the  subject- matter of the section does not suggest a different  meaning. A tenant is by the definition a person who holds land as  an occupancy  tenant  from a Bhurmiswami: but the status  of  a Bhumiswami is recognized 433 for the first time by the Code, and an occupancy tenant from a  Bhumiswami  would mean only a person  belonging  to  that class who acquires rights of occupancy tenant after the Code comes  into  force.  The position of a tenant prior  to  the date  on  which  the Code was brought into  force  does  not appear  to  have been dealt with in  this  definition.   The definition which is specially devised for the purpose of the Act  throws  no  light  on the nature  of  the  right  which invests. the holder of land with the status of an  occupancy tenant  at the commencement of the Code.  In the context  in which  the  expression "tenant" occurs in s. 185  the  defi- nition  could  not be intended to apply in  determining  the conditions which invest upon a holder of land the status  of an  occupancy tenant.  If the expression "tenant" in s.  185 (1)  be released from the artificial definition as given  in s.  2(y),  in view of the context in which  it  occurs,  the expression  "tenant" in s. 185(1)(ii)(a), having  regard  to the  object of the enactment would be ascribed  the  meaning that expression had in Act 32 of 1954. This  view is strengthened by certain indications  found  in cl. (ii)(b) if s. 185 (1) which provides that in the  Madhya Bharat  region every person who at the commencement  of  the Code holds any land as ryotwari sub-lessee as defined in the Madhya Bharat Ryotwari Sub-Lessee Protection Act 29 of  1955 shall be called an occupancy tenant.  Unless a ryotwari sub- lessee  as defined in Act 29 of 1955 included  a  sub-lessee whose  tenure was terminated before the commencement of  the Code, that clause would not apply to any concrete case.  The Court  would  not unless compelled by  unambiguous  language impute to the Legislature an intention to enact a  provision which  was ineffective.  By s. 73 of Act 66 of 1950 a  Pakka tenant  could not sub-let for any period any land  comprised in  his holding except in the cases provided for in s.  74,, and by s. 75 it was provided that all sub-leases in force at

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the commencement of the Act were to terminate either on  the expiry  of the period of sub-lease or expiry of  four  years whichever  was earlier.  All sub-leases except  those  which were  covered by s. 74 i.e. sub-leases granted  by  disabled persons  before  the commencement of Act 66  of  1950  stood terminated  some  time  before the end of 1954  and  by  the express  terms  of s. 76 the sublessees were  to  be  deemed trespassers  and liable to ejectment in accordance with  the provisions of the Act.  Notwithstanding these provisions, by another  Act 29 of 1955, scheme of which  was  substantially the  same  as  the scheme of Act 32 of  1954,  ejectment  of ryotwari sub-lessees other than a sub-lessee under s. 74  of Act  66 of 1950 was suspended for the duration of  the  Act, and  all  suits and proceedings in execution  for  ejectment were  to be stayed.  By s. 2(b) of Act 29 of 1955  "Ryotwari sub-lessee" was defined as meaning "a person to whom a Pakka tenant  of  any ryotwari land has sub-let on  sub-lease  any part of his ryotwari land".  By 434 S.   3  a ban was imposed against ejectment of all  ryotwari sub-lessees other than sub-lessees under S. 74 of Act 66  of 1950.  By s. 4 provision was made for ejectment of  ryotwari sub-lessees and provisions similar to ss. 5 & 6 of Act 32 of 1954  were  made  in this Act also.   A  ban  was  therefore imposed   against  eviction  of  ryotwari  sub-lessees   and proceedings for eviction against them were stayed by Act  29 of  1955.  Therefore ryotwari sub-lessees who had ceased  by determination  of the sub-leases to have right in the  lands were  still protected from eviction during the  pendency  of Act 29 of 1955, and by S. 185(1)(ii)(b) of the Code upon the ryotwari  sub-lessees the rights of occupancy  tenants  were conferred.  If the expression "ryotwari sub-lessee" were  to be construed to mean a ryotwari sub-lessee between whom  and his  lessor there was a subsisting contract of  sub-letting, the  protection for all purposes would be ineffective,  for, by express statutory provision read with s. 74 of Act 66  of 1950 all ryotwari sub-leases stood determined before Act  29 of 1955 was brought into force, and by virtue of s. 185  (3) of  the  code a holder of land from  a  disabled  Bhumiswami belonging to a class mentioned in s. 168(2) of the Code does not  qualify for the status of an occupancy tenant.  It  may be  noticed that in the class of disabled persons  in  sub-s (2)  of s. 168 of the Code are included all persons who  are declared disabled by sub-s. (2) of s. 74 of Act 66 of 1950. If  ryotwari  sub-lessees of disabled persons  mentioned  in subs. (2) of s. 74 of Act 66 of 1950 cannot claim rights  of occupancy  tenants by virtue of s. 185 (3) of the  Code  and other  ryotwari sublessees cannot qualify for  those  rights because  of  the  determination of their  interest  as  sub- lessees  by virtue of ss. 75 & 76 of Act 66 of 1950 s.  185, (1)(ii)(b)  of  the  Code will not apply  to  any  class  of ryotwari sub-lessees.  This is a strong ground in support of the  view  taken  by  the High  Court  that  the  expression "ryotwari  sublessee"  in  s. 185  (1)(ii)(b)  of  the  Code include  persons  whose contractual relation has  been  det- ermined  either under the terms of contract of sub-lease  or statutorily  under  Act  66 of 1950.  If that  be  the  true meaning of the expression "ryotwari sub-lessee’ there  would be no reason to think that the Legislature sought to make  a distinction   between  tenants,  sub-tenants  and   ordinary tenants  of  Inam land in s. 185(1)(ii)(a) of the  Code  and ryotwari sub-lessees of other lands in s. 185(1)(ii)(b).   A member  belonging,  to  those  classes  would  therefore  be included  in the protection provided at some time  prior  to the date on which the Code was brought into force, if he was

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in  possession of land as a tenant, sub-tenant  or  ordinary tenant  and he continued to hold the land till the  date  of commencement of the Code. The  alternative  argument that s. 185 of the  Code  has  Po application in respect of pending proceedings for  ejectment is without substance.  By s. 261 of the Code a large  number of 435 statutes  specified  in Sch.  II were repealed.  By  s.  261 certain enactments specified in Sch. 11 including the Madhya Bharat  Land  Revenue  and Tenancy Act 66 of  1950  and  the Madhya  Bharat  Muafi  and  Inam  Tenants  and   Sub-tenants Protection  Act 32 of 1954 were wholly repealed.  But it  is expressly  provided  in  s. 261 that the  repeat  shall  not affect(a)  the previous operation of any law so repealed  or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (b) any right, privilege,  obligation  or liability  acquired,  accrued  or incurred  under  any law so repealed or (c  )  any  penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any  offence committed  against any law so repealed; or (d)  any  invest- igation,  legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any  such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or  punishment  as aforesaid; and  any  such  investigation, legal  proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued  or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be  imposed as if the Act had not been passed.  Section  262 which  deals  with  transitory  provisions  by  sub-s.   (2) provides:               "Any case pending in Civil Court at the coming               into  force  of this Code, which  would  under               this Code be exclusively triable by a  Revenue               Court,  shall  be disposed of  by  such  Civil               Court  according to the law in force prior  to               the commencement of this Code." Relying upon these two provisions it was urged that  persons who  were tenants, sub-tenants or ordinary tenants  of  Inam land  prior to the date on which the Code was  brought  into for  , whose rights have consistently with the law in  force before  that date been terminated, cannot set up  rights  of occupancy  tenants  acquired under s. 185, for,  within  the meaning of s. 261 the right to eject a tenant has accrued to the  landlord  before  the commencement of the  Code  and  a proceeding  for enforcement of that right may  be  continued and  the right enforced as if the Code had not been  passed, and  the Court in which the proceeding is pending  would  be bound  to dispose of the proceeding according to the law  in force prior to the commencement of the Code. The argument is misconceived.  Act 66 of 1950 did not deal With the right of a landlord to evict a tenant from land.  Act 66 of 1950  was expressly repealed by the Code, but since the right to evict a  tenant was governed G by the general law of landlord  and ’tenant  the proviso to s. 261 had no operation.   In  terms the   proviso  to  s.  261  protects  a  right,   privilege, obligation, or liability which had been acquired, accrued or incurred  under the law repealed by the Code.  The right  to obtain  possession  not having been acquired under  the  law repealed,  a  legal proceeding pending at the  date  of  the commencement  of the Code will be disposed of  according  to the law "then in force’.  That was expressly provided by  s. 6  of Act 32 of 1954 and by s. 6 of Act 29 of 1955.   If  at the  date of the trial the tenant had acquired the right  of an occupancy tenant, he could not be evicted 436 otherwise than in the manner and for reasons mentioned in s. 19  3 of the Code.  Personal requirement for cultivation  of

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land  is  not, however, a ground on which claim,  since  the commencement of the Code, for ejectment may be maintained. Section  262(2)  is a transitory provision which  enables  a Civil  Court to hear and dispose of a  suit  notwithstanding that under the Code such a proceeding would be triable by a Revenue  Court.   It  is  expressly  declared  that  such  a proceeding  shall  be disposed of according to  the  law  in force  prior to the commencement of the Code.  That  however does  not imply that the contract between the parties  which was  sought  to  be enforced  unaffected  by  the  statutory declaration  of occupancy tenants under s. 185 in favour  of the tenant may be enforced.  In our view sub-s. (2) is  only procedural: it provides that a Civil Court will continue  to have jurisdiction to dispose of a civil suit pending  before it  at  the commencement of the Code, which if it  had  been instituted after the Code was passed, would have been  tried by  a Revenue Court, and in the disposal of such a suit  the Civil   Court  will  be  governed  by  the  procedural   law applicable  thereto prior to the commencement of  the  Code. There  is  nothing in s. 262(2) which seeks to  nullify  the statutory conferment of occupancy rights upon persons in the position of tenants, sub-tenants or ordinary tenants against whom  proceedings were taken at the date when the  Code  was brought into force. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. 437