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PETITIONER: RAO NARAIN SINGH (DEAD) BY L.RS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA

DATE OF JUDGMENT06/04/1993

BENCH: VENKATACHALA N. (J) BENCH: VENKATACHALA N. (J) JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J)

CITATION:  1993 AIR 1557            1993 SCR  (2) 969  1993 SCC  (3)  60        JT 1993 (2)   610  1993 SCALE  (2)400

ACT: Land Acquisition: Requisitioning  and Acquisition of Immovable  Property  Act, 1952.     Ss.    7,    8--Acquisition    of    requisitioned property--compensation--Determination    of--Valuation    of land--Comparable  Sales Method’--Held, when parties  produce evidence of sales of lands in the vicinity of acquired land; ’comparable  sales  method’  is  a  ’healthy  criterion  for determining the market value. Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act 1953--S.23(2) Solatium--To be paid for land acquired under Requisitioning and  Acquisition Act, 1952 cannot be a benefit of solatium not available  for a land acquired under State Act.

HEADNOTE: The   respondent-Union   of  India   requisitioned   certain properties of the land owner-appellant comprising a building and  1,38,117.20 sq. yards of land appurtenant  thereto  and acquired  the same in May, 1967 under the provisions of  the Defence  of India Act 1962.  After the Defence of India  Act ceased  to  have  its force, the  Collector  exercising  the powers under the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property  Act  1952 (the Act), offered to the  appellant  on 10.9.1968 a sum of Rs.5,32,594 as total compensation for the acquired  building  and land.  The  appellant  rejected  the offer  as  inadequate.   Consequently,  an  arbitrator   was appointed  under  S.8(1)  (b) of  the  Act.   The  appellant claimed Rs.2,50,000 for the building and Rs.10 per sq.  yard for the acquired land as compensation. The  Arbitrator,  by his award, fixed the  market  value  at Rs.2,50,000 of the building and Rs.7.50 per sq. yard of  the land  and  Rs.2,000  as  damages  for  loss  of  access   to appellant’s unacquired land.  Solatium at the rate of 15 per cent  on the market value of the land, and interest  at  the rate of 6% per annum was also awarded.  Two appeals  one  by the  land-owner  seeking enhancement and the  other  by  the Union   of  India  seeking  reduction  in  the   amount   of compensation-were filed before the High Court. 970 The  High Court dismissed the appeal of the land  owner  and partly  allowed that of the Union of India.  It reduced  the

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compensation  to Rs.1,41,100 for the building and  Rs.4  per sq. yard for the land.  Solatium at a uniform rate of 10 per cent  on the market value of the building and the  land  and interest at 4% per annum was provided.  Aggrieved, the land owner riled the appeal by special leave. The  appellant  contended that the High Court erred  in  not awarding the compensation liable to be paid under s.8(3)  of the Requisitioning and Acquisition Act inasmuch as the price of the property determined by the High Court fell far  short of what the property would have fetched if it had been  sold in the open market on the date of its acquisition; that  the High  Court  did  not take  into  consideration  the  prices fetched under sale deeds of similar lands in the vicinity of the  acquired land, and trend in price rise of  lands;  that solatium  should  have  been  awarded  at  15  per  cent  as permissible  under the Central Land Acquisition Act and  not at  the  rate  of  10  per  cent  under  the  Rajathan  Land Acquisition Act. Allowing the appeal in part, this Court, HELD: 1.1. Method of valuation to be resorted to by a  court in determining acquired land’s just equivalent price has  to necessarily  depend  on the nature of  evidence  adduced  by parties in that regard.  When, in a given case, the  parties produce  evidence of sales relating to the land or lands  in the vicinity of the acquired land and require the  concerned court  to  determine  the  compensation  payable  for   such acquired land, the court can resort to ’the Comparable Sales Method’  of Valuation of land which is a  healthy  criterion for  determining the market value of an acquired  land.  [p. 975 C-E] Atmaram  v. Collector of Nagpur, AIR 1929 P.C. 92,  referred and  Union of India v. Kamlabhai Harjiwandas Parekh &  Ors., [1968] 1 SCR 463, relied on.  1.2.  The High Court was right in examining the sale  deeds produced as evidence of comparable sales and in relying upon the sale deeds marked as Ext.P-18 relating to sale of 26,733 sq.  yards for Rs-3 per sq. yard which was a portion of  the acquired  land,  and Ext.P-10 relating to sale of  5124  sq. yards  at the rate of Rs.3.50 per sq. yard situated  to  the close vicinity  of the acquired land, and taking the  prices fetched for them as criteria for 971 determining the market value of the acquired land.  [pp. 976 B-C; 977 E-H; 978 A-E] Bangaru Narasingha Rao Naidu v. R.D.O. Vizianagaram,  [1980] 1 SCC 75, relied on. The High Court rightly held the sale deeds, marked as Ext.P- 4  and  Ex.  P-19 or land situated in populous area  of  the city and sale deeds Exts.P-6 and P-7 of small bits of  lands as  not comparable to the large extent of the acquired  land situated at a place farther away from the city. [pp. 976  D- G; 977 A-D] Collector of Lakhimpur v. Bhuban Chandra Dutta, [1972] 4 SCC 236  and Prithvi Raj Taneja v. State of M.P., [1977]  1  SCC 684, relied on. 1.3. The evidence in the case indicated trend in  price-rise of lands in the area of acquried land between the year  1961 when  the appellant sold the land adjacent to  the  acquired land  and  the  year  1967 when the  land  in  question  was acquired.  Since the High Court determined the market  value of  the acquired land without taking into account the  trend of price-rise of lands in the vicinity of the acquired land, it would be very just and proper to add to the price of Rs.4 per sq. yard, as determined by the High Court, another  Re.1 per sq. yard on account of the factor of price-rise of lands

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in  the area of the acquired land.  Hence, the market  value of  the  acquired land is determined at Rs.5  per  sq.  yard which  would  satisfy the principle or awarding  to  it,  an equivalent price. [pp. 979 B-H; 980-A] 1.4. The High Court was justified in fixing the market value of the acquired building at Rs.1,41,100 on the basis of  the estimate  prepared  and approved by Rajasthan  Public  Works Department  and  produced  on  behalf  of  the   land-owner. However,  the High Court should have added to that amount  a sum  of Rs.5,720, the price of items in the  building  which was  left out in the estimate.  Hence, the  just  equivalent price  of  the acquired building would be  Rs.1,41,100  plus Rs.5,720. [pp. 981 D-G] 2. The High Court rightly fixed the solatium at the rate  of 10  per cent on the amount of compensation payable  for  the land  and the building under s.23(2) of the  Rajasthan  Land Acquisition  Act,  as the solatium to be paid for  the  land acquired  under  the  Requisitioning and  Acquisition   Act, 1952  cannot  be a benefit of solatium not available  for  a land acquired under the State Act. [pp. 981 G-H; 982 A-B] 972

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.1799 of 1980. From the Judgment and Order dated 9.5.1980 of the  Rajasthan High Court in D.B. Civil First Appeal Nos. 54 & 56 of 1971. U.R. Lalit, A.K. Sen and Ms. V.D. Khanna for the Appellant. M.L. Verma (NP), Niranjana Singh, Ms. A. Subhashini (NP) and C.V.S. Rao for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATACHALA,  J.  This  civil appeal by  special  leave  is preferred against the common judgment and. separate  decrees dated 9.5.1980 of the Rajasthan High Court, dismissing Civil First  Appeal  No.  54 of 1971 in which  the  appellant  had sought  enhanced compensation for his acquired property  and partly  allowing  Civil First Appeal No.56 of  1971  of  the Union  of  India  in which it had sought  reduction  in  the market value of the same acquired property. The  appellant,  since deceased (represented  by  his  Legal Representatives), was the owner in possession of a  property known as ’Kasuda House’ at Ajmer, comprised of a thirty year old building with a large extent of land of about 70 Bighas, 14  Biswas, appurtenant thereto.  On’24th April,  1963,  the Union  of India, in exercise of its powers under Section  29 of the Defence of India Act, 1962 (D.I. Act),  requisitioned the  said  building  and land  for  stationing  the  Central Reserve  Police  Force (C.R.P.F.) and took  its  possession. Then, on 5th May, 1967 the Collector of Ajmer, having served a notice on the appellant under Section 36 of the D.I.  Act, acquired the said building and land.  As the D.I. Act ceased to  have  its force with effect from 10th  July,  1968,  the Collector  of  Ajmer took recourse to Section  8(1)  of  the Requisitioning  and Acquisition of Immovable  Property  Act, 1952  the Requisitioning and Acquisition Act and offered  to the appellant on 10th September, 1968 a sum of Rs.  5,32,594 as  total compensation for the acquired building  and  land. The  appellant,  ejected  that  offer  of  compensation   as inadequate.   This situation led to the appointment of  Shri Updesh  Narain Mathur, the Joint Legal Remembrancer for  the State  of Rajasthan, as Arbitrator under Section 8(1)(b)  of the Requisitioning and Acquisition Act, for determining  the just amount of compensation payable 973

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to  the appellant for his acquired buidling and land.  On  a notice  issued by the Arbitrator to the  appellant  inviting his  claim  for compensation, the appellant filed  a  claim- statement  claiming  Rs.2,50,000  as  compensation  for  the acquired building and Rs.10 per sq. yard as compensation for the  acquired  land.  The Arbitrator, purporting to  act  on evidence  produced by parties in an enquiry held by him  for determining the compensation payable to the appellant,  made an  award  on 15th April, 1971.  By that award,  the  market value  of  the acquired building was  fixed  at  Rs.2,50,000 while the market value of land was fixed at Rs.7.50 per  sq. yard.   Then,  the  damages  for  loss  of  access  to   the appellant’s unacquried land was fixed at Rs.2,000.  Further, the  solatium  payable  on the total  market  value  of  the acquired land was fixed at 15 per cent while the interest on the  total compensation payable was fixed at 6 per cent  per annum  from  the date of the award to the date  of  payment. The  appellant,  who felt that the  amount  of  compensation awarded  by  the  Arbitrator was  inadequate,  preferred  an appeal   in  the  High  Court  seeking  grant  of   enhanced compensation.   The, Union of India which, on the  contrary, felt  that  the  amount  of  compensation  awarded  by   the Arbitrator  was excessive, preferred an appeal in  the  High Court seeking reduction in the amount of compensation.   The High Court which clubbed both the appeals and heard them, by its  common judgment partly allowed the appeal of the  Union of India and dismissed the appeal of the appellant.  By that judgment  the market value of the building was reduced  from Rs.2,50,000  to  Rs.1,41,100 while the market value  of  the land  was  reduced from 7.50 per sq. yard to  Rs.4  per  sq. yard.   Solatium was given at a uniform rate of 10 per  cent on  the  market value of both the building and the  land  as against the rate of solatium of 15 per cent, which had  been given  on  the  market  value of  the  land  by  the  award. Interest  at  4  per  cent  per  annum  on  the  amount   of compensation  was granted directing payment of that rate  of interest  on the total amount of compensation from the  date of  acquisition till 2nd November, 1968, the date  on  which Rs.4,59,150.84  paise was paid to the appellant and  on  the balance amount of compensation from 3rd November, 1968  upto the  date  of  its payment to the  appellant.   That  common judgment of the High Court and the decrees made thereon, are appealed against by the appellant in these appeals, where by grant of enhanced compensation is sought.  Due to the  death of  the  appellant during the pendency of this  appeal,  his Legal  Representatives  are  permitted  to  prosecute   this appeal. Shri A.K. Sen, the learned senior counsel for the appellant, con- 974 ended  before  us  that the market  value  of  the  acquired building  as well as the market value of the acquired  land, determined  by  the High Court fell ar short  of  the  price which each of them would have fetched in the open market  if had  been sold on the date of their acquisition in the  same condition in which they were at the time of requisition  and hence  were not the respective prices liable to be paid  for them   under   Section  8(3)  of  the   Requisitioning   and Acquisition Act.  Elaborating the contention, he argued that the  High  Court  in determining the  market  value  of  the acquired  land  at  Rs.4 per sq. yard  had  not  taken  into consideration  the  relevant  factors,  such  as,  (i)   the building potentiality of the acquired land, (ii) the  prices fetched under sale deeds of similar lands in the vicinity of the  acquired land and (iii) trend in price-rise  of  lands,

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which would have warranted granting of a higher market value for it.  He further contended that the High Court ought  not have reduced the market value of the acquired building to an amount  failing  short  of the amount fixed for  it  by  the Arbitrator  on  the  basis  of the  estimate  of  its  value prepared by Shri G.L. Sharma, a private Engineer and his own spot inspection report.  As regards the solatium awarded  by the  High  Court at 10 per cent on the market value  of  the acquired  land  and building, his contention was  that  such solatium should have been awarded at the rate of 15 per cent as  was permissible under the Central Land  Acquisition  Act and not at the rate of 10 per cent as was permissible  under the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act.  The learned counsel for the  Union  of  India,  who  refuted  the  said  contentions advanced  on behalf of the appellant, sought to sustain  the judgment of the High Court. The  principal controversy which needs our decision  in  the light  of the above rival contentions since relates  to  the correctness of the amount of compensation determined by  the High  Court  as  that  payable  for  the  acquired  land  of 1.38,117.20  sq. yards, we shall proceed to deal with it  at the first instance. Sub-section  (3)  of  Section 8 of  the  Requisitioning  and Acquisition Act, being the provision according to which  the compensation  payable  for  the  acquired  land  has  to  be determined, it is excerpted               "8(3).   The  compensation  payable  for   the               acquisition  of any property under  section  7               shall  be  the price which  the  requisitioned               property would have fetched in the open 975               market,  if  it  had  remained  in  the   same               condition   as   it  was  at   the   time   of               requisitioning  and been sold on the  date  of               acquisition." As it is ruled by this Court in Union of India v.  Kamlabhai Harjiwandas  Parekh  & others, [1968] 1 SCR  463,  that  the provision   of  Section  8(3)  of  the  Requisitioning   and Acquisition Act lays down a principle aimed at giving to the owner  of the acquired land an amount of compensation  which approximates  to  such land’s just equivalent value  on  the date  of its acquisition, our endeavor here would be to  see whether that principle is rightly applied by the High  Court in  determining the amount of compensation payable  for  the acquired land. Method  of  valuation  to  be resorted  to  by  a  court  in determining  acquired land’s just equivalent price, has  to, necessarily  depend  on the nature of  evidence  adduced  by parties in that regard.  When, in a given case, the  parties produce  evidence of sales relating to the acquired land  or lands  in the vicinity of the acquired land and require  the concerned  court to determine the compensation  payable  for such acquired land, such court naturally resorts to what  is known as ’the Comparable Sales Method’ of valuation of land. Indeed,  ’Comparable  Sales  Method’  of  valuation  of   an acquired land is invariably resorted to by every court  ever since  the Privy Council in Atmaram v. Collector of  Nagpur, AIR 1929 P.C.92, regarded that method as one which furnishes ’a healthy criterion’ for determining the market value of an acquired  land.   As  regards the acquired  land,  with  the market  value of which we are concerned, parties  themselves had   produced  evidence  of  sales  of  lands  before   the Arbitrator  in order to enable him to determine  its  market value  based on prices fetched for lands under those  sales. The same sale deeds are considered by the High Court to find

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as to which of them could form the basis for determining the market value of the acquired land.  It is why we have now to see, whether the sale deeds relied upon by the High Court to determine  the market value of the acquired land did  really furnish  a  proper  basis  to  make  such  determination  by resorting  to ’the Comparable Sales Method’ of valuation  of land. Building  potentiality of the acquired land, claimed  to  be possessed  by the acquired land, can assume no  significance in  the  instant case as ’the Comparable  Sales  Method’  of valuation  of land is resorted to by the High  Court.   Such method is resorted to, as the acquired land was found to be 976 comparable in its essential features with land(s) respecting which  evidence  of  certain  sale  deed(s),  was  produced. Hence,  the  contention  of  the  learned  counsel  for  the appellant  raised to establish, that the acquired  land  had building  potentiality at the time of its acquisition,  need not engage our consideration. The  High Court, as is seen from it% judgment, has  examined the sale deeds produced as evidence of comparable sales with a  view  to find out as to which of them could be  taken  to relate  to a land or lands comparable to the acquired  land. Such  examination  was necessary to find  whether  the  land covered  under a genuine sale deed was basically similar  to the  acquired land.  If so found, it would not be  difficult for  the Court to hold that the price fetched for such  land could  be  regarded  as  the price  of  the  acquired  land, although  some  amount may have to be either added  to  sale price or deducted out of the sale price in balancing certain factors  not  common  to  the  land(s)  sold  and  the  land acquired. A site plan of an area in Ajmer, available in the record, by consent  of  parties,  is utilised by  the  High  Court  for locating  the actual situation of the lands covered  by  the sale  deeds vis-a-vis the actual situation of  the  acquired land.  A sale deed dated 11.10.1960 produced in evidence  as Ex.P-4  is  found to relate to sale of 48.400 sq.  yards  of land  at the rate of Rs.650 per sq. yard by Mayo College  to Life Insurance Corporation of India while another sale  deed dated 17.11.960 produced in evidence as Ex.P-19 is found  to relate  to sale of 13,572 sq. yards of land at the  rate  of Rs.7 per sq. yard by the very Mayo College to Model  Housing    Cooperating Society Ltd.  These sale deeds, according  to the  High  Court,  since  related to  lands  situated  in  a populous area of Ajmer City, the lands sold under them  were not comparable to the acquired land which was situated at  a place farther away from the city.  Although it was contended on  behalf  of the appellant that the lands sold  under  the said  two  sale deeds ought to have been held by  the  High. Court  as  those  comparable  to  the  acquired  land,  that contention cannot merit our acceptance since the location of the lands covered by the sale deeds is altogether  different from the location of the acquired land, as becomes  apparent from  the site plan with reference to which the  High  Court has  concluded  that the lands covered by  the  sale  deeds’ lands and the acquired land were not comparable. Sale deed dated 14.1.1964 produced as Ex.P-5 whereunder Mayo 977 College  had  sold 1,000 sq. yards of land at  the  rate  of Rs.10  per  sq. yard in favour of Mrs. V.M.  Kaula;  another sale  deed  dated 25.9.1964 produced as Ex.P-6  relating  to sale of a small strip of land at Rs.10 per sq. yard  between the  same  parties; and a third sale deed  dated  13.11.1964 produced as Ex.P-7 whereunder the very Mayo College had also

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sold  to Navin Chandra Sharma 782 sq. yards of land at  Rs.7 per  sq.  yard,  are  regarded by  the  High  Court  as  not comparable  sales for determining the value of the  acquired land,  in that each of them were small bits as  compared  to the  acquired land.  The High Court, as suggested on  behalf of the appellant, cannot be found fault with for its refusal to act upon the said three sale deeds as comparable sales to determine  the  market  value of the  large  extent  of  the acquired  land,  when  it is well settled  that  the  prices fetched’  under sale deeds of small bits of lands ought  not to, ordinarily, be made the basis for determination of large extents  of acquired land, (See: Collector’ of Lakhimpur  v. Bhuban Chandra Dutta, [1974] SCC 236 and Prithvi Raj  Taneja v. State of M.P., [1977] 1 SCC 684.  Besides, in the instant case  when’  sale deeds of lands of even larger  extents  of lands  situated  in the very area where the  bits  of  lands covered by the three rejected sale deeds were’ situated were not considered by the High Court as comparable sales for the reason  of their situation in a populous area of  the  city, that reason should equally hold good for the High Court  not acting  upon the three sale deeds relating to bits of  lands as  comparable  sales  for fixing the market  value  of  the acquired land. However, there are other two important sale deeds which  the High, Court has regarded as sales of lands comparable to the acquired land and, has taken the prices fetched for them  as the  criteria  for  determining the,  market  value  of  the acquired  land.   A sale deed of the year 1961  produced  as Ex.P-  18 related to sale of 26,733 sq. yards of land  which was a portion of the acquired land.  That land had been sold by  the  very  appellant to  Nayjiwan  Co-operative  Housing Society Ltd. at the rate of Rs.3 per sq. yard.  Another sale deed dated 14.3.1958 produced as Ex.P-10 related to, sale of 5,  124 sq. yards of land situated in the close vicinity  of the  acquired land.  That land had been sold at the rate  of Rs.3.50  per  sq.  yard by  Joharilal  to  Saraswati  Balika Vidhyalaya.   As regards sale deed Ex.P-18 under  which  the appellant  had sold a large extent of land to  Navjiwan  Co- operative  Society  at the rate of Rs.3 per  sq.  yard,  the contention  of learned counsel for the appellant  before  us was,  as was before the High Court, that the real  value  of the  land  as on the date of sale was Rs.6 per sq.  yard  as stated by 978 P.W.6,  Sadu Singh, and hence that rate should  have  formed the  basis for determining the market value of the  acquired land.   The High Court rejected this contention on its  view that  the statement of P.W.6, the President of the  Society, that the price of the land was Rs.6 per sq. yard at the time of its purchase in the year 1958 was difficult of acceptance when the Society had accepted its price at the rate of  Rs.4 per sq. yard in relation to the year 1965, when it had  been acquired.   Besides,  what  cannot  be  overlooked  is  that neither  the vendor of the land nor P.W.1,  Narayana  Singh, who  has given evidence on behalf of the vendor,-had  stated at  any time that the real price of the land in Ex.P-18  was Rs.6  per  sq. yard as on the date of its  sale.   The  High Court,  therefore,  cannot be found fault with  for  relying upon the sale deed relating to a land Which formed part  and parcel of the acquired land earlier, as furnishing the  real criterion  for determining the price of acquired land  (See: Bangaru  Narasingha Rao Naidu v. R.D.Vizianagram,  [1980]  1 SCC  75.  Hence, the contention urged that the  price  under sale  deed Ex.P-18 should be regarded as Rs.6 per  sq.  yard and  that  price should form the-basis for  determining  the

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market value-of the acquired land, ought to fail. The  contention  that the rate of Rs.3.50 per  sq.  yard  at which  Joharilal sold the land under Ex.P-10  to  Saraswathi Balika  Vidayalaya had to be regarded as a concession  price since  he was the Vice-President of the  vendee  Vidayalaya, was not accepted by the High Court because of its view  that oral testimony given by Joharilal as P.W.2, several  decades after the actual sale had taken place, was difficult to  act upon, particularly, when there was nothing in the sale  deed which could give such indication.  This contention has  been rightly  not accepted by the High Court.  We are  unable  to find any good reason to take a contrary view in the matter. The  learned counsel for the appellant then  contended  that the  High Court should not have brushed aside the  claim  of the appellant that the market value of the acquired land  as on  the date of its acquisition could be fixed at  least  at the  rate  of  Rs.6 per sq. yard as had  been  done  by  the Arbitrator taking into consideration the trend of price-rise of lands.  The High Court has taken the view that there  was no  reliable evidence available on record to show  that  the land  price  in  the area between the  year  1961  when  the deceased-appellant had sold the land adjoining the  acquired land at Rs.3 per sq. yard and the year 1967, when the  land, the compensation or which had to be determined, was actually acquired, had gone up 979 appreciably.  The view so taken by the High Court, according to  the  learned  counsel for  the  appellant,  ignored  the reliable  evidence on record relating to the sale prices  of building plots formed on a land far beyond the acquired land by  the Urban Improvement Trust of Ajmer fixed in  the  year 1963,  that is, Rs.15 per sq. yard for commercial plots  and Rs.7 per sq. yard for residential plots and the said  prices were  approved by the State Government.  This  evidence,  it was  asserted  by  the learned counsel  for  the  appellant, clearly  demonstrated the price-rise of land in the area  of the  very acquired land after the year 1961.  In  our  view, the  contentions  of  learned counsel as  regards  trend  of price-rise of land in the area of the acquired land are well founded.   No  doubt, the plots of Urban  Improvement  Trust made ready for sale at high prices pertained to a  developed lay-out.   Yet,  they clearly indicated the prices  of  land situated beyond the acquired land, as prevailed in the  year 1963.  Besides, in the instant case it is admitted that  for the  land  which  was purchased under  Ex.P-18  by  Navjiwan Housing  Society in the year 1961 at Rs.3 per sq.  yard  the Arbitrator  had  awarded a rate of Rs. 4 per sq.  yard  with reference  to  its acquisition in the year  1965,  and  that award  was  not challenged by the State, as  fixing  a  high price.   From this, it becomes obvious that even  the  State was  well aware of the trend of price-rise of lands  in  the area  of the acquired land between the year 1961  and  1965. Thus,  trend  in  price-rise of lands in  the  area  of  the acquired  land between the year 1961, the year in which  the appellant  sold the land adjacent to the acquired  land  and the  year 1967, the year in which the land in  question  was acquired, was therefore, very much seen.  Indeed, the rising trend  in  prices  of  immovable  properties  is  a   common phenomenon  all  over  the  country  after  the  year  1950, although  such rising trend has varied in degree from  place of place and year to year The lands around Ajmere City, were no  exception to such trend in price-rise.  However, as  the market value of the acquired land is determined by the  High Court at Rs.4 per sq. yard in the year 1967, without  taking into  account  the  trend  of prise-rise  of  lands  in  the

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vicinity of the acquired land, we consider that it would  be very  just and proper to add to that price of Rs. 4 per  sq. yard, another Re.1 per, sq. yard on account of the factor of price-rise of lands in the area of the acquired land between the year 1961 and the year 1967.  If Re.1 per sq. yard is so added  to  Rs.  4  per sq. yard, the  market  value  of  the acquired  land in 1967, the year of its  acquisition,  would work out to Rs.5 per sq: yard, Hence, as against the  market value  of the acquired land determined by the High Court  at Rs.4 per sq yard, 980 we  determine the same at Rs.5 per sq. yard,,  inasmuch  as, such  determination  of market value of  the  acquired  land would satisfy the principle of awarding to it an  equivalent price, The next question which requires our examination keeping  in view  the  arguments of learned counsel for  the  contesting parties,  is as to whether the High Court had gone wrong  in not  accepting the price of the acquired  building   ’Masuda House’ determined by the Arbitrator in a sum of Rs. 2,50,000 as  on  the date of its acquisition as  the  correct  market price. The Arbitrator for fixing the price of the acquired building had  acted  on  an estimate of one G.L.  Sharma,  a  retired Executive  Engineer  of  Government of  Rajasthan,  who  had claimed  that he had prepared the estimate of  the  acquired building on an inspection of the building in the presence of Shri  B.D. Gupta, Assistant Surveyor, C.P.W.D.  representing the C.R.P.F. Ajmer for which the building had been acquired. So  also the Arbitrator had acted on the  inspection  report which he had claimed as prepared on local inspection of  the building.   The High Court found that the retired  Executive Engineer, who, it was said, had prepared the estimate of the building  for fixing its price on the date  of  acquisition, had  not given evidence about it as a witness and  that  had led  to  denial to the contesting party, an  opportunity  of cross-examining  him  as  to acceptability  of  the  Report. Therefore, according to the High Court, such estimate  could not  have  had any evidentiary value and the  price  of  the building  fixed  by  the Arbitrator on  the  basis  of  such estimate  had to be discarded.  Further, the High Court  has found  fault  with the Arbitrator to have  relied  upon  his Inspection  Report  to  test the estimate  of  the  building prepared by the retired Executive Engineer, although it  had not been admittedly signed by the Arbitrator at the time  of making  his  award.   In the view of the  High  Court,  such report could not have been made use of by the Arbitrator for the  purpose of accepting the estimate of the building  made by  the retired Executive Engineer, inasmuch as the  parties against  whom such inspection report had been used,  had  no opportunity  of  knowing about the very  existence  of  such report.   As  is seen from the evidence on  record  and  the proceedings before the High Court the reasons as to why  the High Court did not attach any value to the estimate made  by the  retired Executive Engineer and the  Inspection  Report, cannot  be  said  to be ill-founded.  Besides,  it  was  not disputed  before us that the retired Executive  Engineer  Li had  been  employed by the appellant-Rao Narain  Singh,  the owner of the 981 acquired building, as his private Engineer, inasmuch as that Executive  Engineer had admittedly visited the building  and prepared   the  estimate  of  costs  and  specification   of structures  in the building on behalf of Rao  Narain  Singh. Again, it was not disputed that the Arbitrator came to  sign

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the  Inspection  Report said to have been  prepared  by  him after the award had been made and when he had become functus officio’ as an Arbitrator.  In the said view of the matters, it  is difficult for us to think that the High Court was  in any  way unjustified in refusing to accept the valuation  of the  building as Rs.2,50,000 based on the estimate  made  by Shri  G.L.  Sharma retired Executive Engineer and  the  spot Inspection  Report claimed to have been made use of  by  the Arbitrator.   However, as is seen from the judgment  of  the High  Court, it has fixed the market price of  the  acquired building  at  Rs.1,41,100  having  regard  to  the  estimate prepared  by  the  Executive Engineer,  scrutinised  by  the Superintending  Engineer  of  the  Rajasthan  Public   Works Department  and  approved  by  the  Chief  Engineer  of  the Rajasthan   Public   Works  Department.    Such   estimates, admittedly  had been produced on behalf of the owner of  the building   Rao  Narain Singh of ’Masuda House’, by  his  own witness  P.W.5,  Ramdayal Gupta and spoken to  by  him.   We cannot,  therefore,  say  that the High Court  in  the  said circumstances,  was  not  justified  in  relying  upon   the estimates  made by the Public Works Department of the  State of  Rajasthan  in  fixing  the  price  of  the  building  at Rs.1,41,100.  Yet,  we consider that the High  Court  should have  added to that price of the building a sum of  Rs.5,720 when it had found that  amount of Rs.5,720 was the price  of items in the building which were left out in the estimate of the Engineers of the Public Works Department of the State of Rajasthan.   As stated by the High Court itself,  the  items for  which cost had not been fixed by the Engineers  of  the Public  Works Department in their estimate, were ’road  side retaining walls’, ’wire fencing’ and ’main gate wall’.   The cost  of those left out items was found to be Rs.5,720.  We, therefore,  consider  it  just and reasonable  to  add  that amount  of Rs.5,720 to the price of the  acquired  building. Hence,  in’  our  view, the just  equivalent  price  of  the acquired  building would be Rs.1,41,100 plus  Rs.5,720  i.e. Rs.1,46,820 and not merely Rs.1,41,100, its price determined by the High Court. The  last  question  that arises for  our  consideration  is whether  the  High  Court had acted rightly  in  fixing  the solatium payable on the amount of compensation for land  and building at 10 per cent instead of at 15 per cent.  The High Court in fixing the solatium at the rate of 10 per cent on 982 the amount of compensation payable for the land and building has  held that the land and building acquired being  in  the State  of  Rajasthan  the  solatium  payable  was  the  rate admissible  therefore under Section 23(2) of  the  Rajasthan Land  Acquisition  Act   the  State Act  and  not  the  rate admissible under the corresponding provision in the  Central Land  Acquisition Act.  We find no good reason  to  disagree with the High Court in the said matter as the solatium to be paid  for  the land acquired under  the  Requisitioning  and Acquisition  Act  cannot  be  a  benefit  of  solatium   not available  for  a land acquired under the  State  Act,  i.e. under  the  Rajasthan  Land  Acquisition  Act.   Thus,   the appellant cannot succeed on this question. In  the result, we allow this appeal partly and  modify  the judgment  and decrees of the High Court under  appeal.   The market  price of acquired land of 70 Bighas, 14  Biswas  and 1412 sq. yard is enhanced to Rs.5 per sq. yard from Rs.4 per sq. yard awarded by the High Court.  The market price of the Masuda  House  is enhanced to Rs.1,46,820  from  Rs.1,41,100 awarded  by  the High Court.  The solatium at  10  per  cent shall  be payable on the said total amount of the  price  of

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the  land  and price of the building, as determined  by  us. The damages of Rs.2,000 awarded by the High Court as loss of access  to  and  utility  of  the  unacquired  land  of  the appellant  stands undisturbed.  The interest of 4  per  cent per  annum  shall be payable on the total of  all  the  said amounts  in  the manner indicated by the High Court  in  its judgment and decrees under appeal.  Since the appellant died during  the  pendency of this civil appeal,  the  amount  of compensation  which has become payable under this  judgment, less the amount of compensation ,already paid or  deposited, shall be paid to the legal representatives of the  deceased- appellant,  who are prosecuting this appeal.  Costs  payable in this appeal shall be paid by the respondent to the  legal representatives of the deceased7appellant, in proportion  to their success. R.P.                        Appeal partly allowed. 983